2025:HHC:19455 ____________________ Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No.364 of 2025 Reserved on: 28.05.2025 Date of Decision: 24.06.2025 Pardeep Sharma & others ….Petitioners Versus Deepika Gautam ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the Petitioners : Mr. Tara Singh Chauhan, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Surya Chauhan, Advocate. For Respondent : Nemo Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition against the order dated 21.02.2025 passed by learned l Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No.2, Ghumarwin, District Bilapsur, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which an application moved by the petitioners for 2 2025:HHC:19455 registration of the F.I.R. against the respondent for filing false affidavit was kept in abeyance. 2. It has been asserted that the respondent filed an affidavit of assets and liabilities in which the entire assets were not disclosed. The petitioners filed an application for registration of the F.I.R. for filing a false affidavit. The respondent filed a reply in which she admitted that she had not disclosed her complete source of income. The petitioners filed a rejoinder and disclosed her salary account, which was not disclosed by the respondent. Learned Trial Court ordered to keep the application filed by the petitioners in abeyance. There was a deliberate and conscious attempt by the respondent to misguide the Court and to interfere in the administration of justice. The respondent had made a specific declaration that filing of the false affidavit would make her liable for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 191 read with Sections 191 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). There was a prima facie case against the respondent for deliberate falsehood. Hence, the present petition. 3 2025:HHC:19455 3. I have heard Mr. Tara Singh Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Surya Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioners. 4. Mr. Tara Singh Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in keeping the application in abeyance. The respondent had filed a false affidavit, and this fact was admitted in the reply filed by her. Learned Trial Court should have taken action against the respondent for committing perjury, and the learned Trial Court erred in keeping the application in abeyance; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submission:  Sejalben Tejasbhai Chovatiya vs State of Gujrat R/SC.RA/7666/2016  Smt. Ritu @ Ridhima and another vs. Sandeep Singh Sangwan passed in CRR No. 457 of 2022, decided on 15th March, 2022. 5. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made by him at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 4 2025:HHC:19455 6. The petitioners filed an application for registration of F.I.R. against the respondent for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 191, 193, 199 and 204 of the IPC. Section 195(1) (b) (i) of Code of Criminal Procedure (in short ‘Cr.P.C’) provides that the Court shall not take congnisance of any offence punishable under Sections 193 to 199 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) when such offence alleged to have been committed about the proceedings in any Court. 7. In the present case, it was categorically asserted that the respondent had filed a false affidavit before the Court, and the offence was alleged to have been committed during the proceedings pending before the Court. Hence, provisions of Section 195(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. would be attracted to the present case, and the F.I.R. cannot be registered. 8. Learned Trial Court had not dismissed the application but had kept it in abeyance. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AmarsangNathaji v. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel, (2017) 1 SCC 113: (2017) 1 SCC (Cri) 237: 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1316 that the Court cannot proceed under Section 340 of Cr.P.C. unless it forms an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice to 5 2025:HHC:19455 initiate an inquiry into the offence of false evidence having regard to the overall actual matrix. It was observed at page 117: 5. There are two preconditions for initiating proceedings under Section 340 CrPC: (i) materials produced before the court must make out a prima facie case for a complaint for the purpose of in- quiry into an offence referred to in clause (b)(i) of sub- section (1) of Section 195 CrPC, and (ii) it is expedient in the interests of justice that an in- quiry should be made into the alleged offence. 6. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always suf- ficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”); but it must be shown that the defendant has inten- tionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of jus- tice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically re- ferred to in Section 340(1) CrPC, having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution. (See K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India [K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 178: 1992 SCC (Cri) 572] ). The court must be satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the interests of justice and appropriate in the facts of the case. 7. In the process of formation of opinion by the court that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into, the requirement should only be to have a prima facie satisfaction of the offence which appears to have been committed. It is open to the court to hold a preliminary inquiry, though it is not mandatory. In case the court is oth- 6 2025:HHC:19455 erwise in a position to form such an opinion, that it appears to the court that an offence as referred to under Section 340 CrPC has been committed, the court may dispense with the preliminary inquiry. Even after forming an opinion as to the offence which appears to have been committed, it is not mandatory that a complaint should be filed as a matter of course. (See Pritish v. State of Maharashtra [Pritish v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 1 SCC 253: 2002 SCC (Cri) 140] .) 8. In Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101], a Constitution Bench of this Court has gone into the scope of Section 340 CrPC. Para 23 deals with the rele- vant consideration : (SCC pp. 386-87) “23. In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding com- mission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words “court is of opin- ion that it is expedient in the interests of justice”. This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the inter- est of justice requires it and not in every case. Before fil- ing the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary en- quiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon the administration of justice. It is pos- sible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the ef- fect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of ad- ministration of justice may be minimal. In such circum- 7 2025:HHC:19455 stances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint.” 9. Therefore, taking of action by the Court is not automatic but is dependent upon the satisfaction recorded by the Court that it is necessary to do so. The satisfaction is to be arrived at after examining the evidence. 10. If the Court has decided not to proceed further at this stage and decided to wait for waiting for the evidence, the action of the Court cannot be said to be arbitrary. 11. In Sejalbend Tejasbhai Chovatiya (supra), it was held that a proceeding can be initiated only if the Court is satisfied that it is expedient in the interest of justice to do so. Therefore, this judgment does not hold that the action has to be taken immediately after the filing of the complaint. 12. In Smt. Ritu @ Ridima (supra), the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that when the Court had taken any action for making a false statement on oath, there was no reason to interfere with it. 8 2025:HHC:19455 13. It is evident that in the cited case, the learned Court had proceeded to file the complaint, which is not the case here. Therefore, the cited judgments do not help the petitioners. 14. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 15. In the aforesaid terms, the present petition stands disposed of, and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any. 16. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th June, 2025 (ravinder)