1 2025:CGHC:2326 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 512 of 2019 1 - Shivshankar Singh Gond S/o Bandhan Singh Aged About 20 Years R/o Puran Godripara, Chirmiri, Police Station- Chirmiri, District- Korea, Chhattisgarh., District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh ... appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House OfÏcer, Police Station- Sonhat, District- Korea, Chhattisgarh., District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For appellant : Mr. Anil Gulati, Advocate For Res./State : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Deputy Government Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Judgment on Board 14.01.2025 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.01.2019 passed by Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) / Special Judge (Under POCSO Act, 2012), Baikunthpur, District Koria (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case (under POCSO Act, 2012) No. 23/2017 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction U/S Sentence Fine In default of payment of 2 Fine Under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code No separate sentence awarded ……. ……. Under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 Rigorous imprisonmen t for 10 years Rs. 500/- R.I. for 06 months Under Section 363 of Indian Penal Code Rigorous imprisonmen t for 03 years Rs. 500/- Rigorous imprisonment for 06 months Under Section 366 of Indian Penal Code Rigorous imprisonmen t for 5 years Rs. 500/- R. I. For 06 months All the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 27.10.2017, a missing report has been lodged by maternal grand mother (Nani) of the victim (PW02) to the effect that the victim is missing since 25.10.2017 when she had gone to market. On search of her whereabouts in the market as well as her relative’s house, she could not be tressed out. Another boy of the village has informed her that the appellant had used to meet with the victim and he raised suspension that she was being kidnapped by the appellant. On the basis of written report lodged by maternal grand mother of the victim (PW02), the Police has registered the FIR Ex. P/4 for the offence under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code (in short IPC) against the appellant. During the course of investigation, the victim was recovered on 28.10.2017 from the house of the appellant and recovery Panchanama Ex. P/5 was prepared in presence of the witnesses. The victim was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital, Baikunthpur where Dr. Swati Bansariya (PW-10) has medically examined her and gave her report Ex. P/10. While medically examine the victim, the 3 doctor has not found any external injuries on her body and has opined that she is habitual to sexual intercourse. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed it over to police for its chemical examination. The victim was also referred for VDRL, HIV, UPT tests. With respect to age and date of birth of the victim, her mark-sheet of class 5th has been seized vide seizure memo Ex. P/08. The Police has seized the School Register from Government Primary School, Tanjara vide seizure memo Ex. P/14 and after retaining the attested true copy of School register Ex. P/16C, the original Register Ex.P/16 was returned to the School. The spot map (Ex.P/1) was prepared by the Patwari and spot map (Ex. P/11) was prepared by the Police. The appellant was arrested on 29.10.2017 and he too was sent for medical examination to Community Health Centre, Sonhat where Dr. R. P Singh (PW05) has medically examined him and gave his report Ex. P/18. After examination of the appellant, the doctor has opined that the appellant is able to perform sexual intercourse. Vaginal slides and pubic hair of the victim and semen slides and underwear of the appellant were sent for chemical examination to Regional FSL, Ambikapur from where FSL report Ex.P/29 was received and according to the FSL report, semen and sperm were found on the vaginal slides of the victim. 3. The statement of witnesses were recorded under section 161 of Cr.P.C. Statement of the victim under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. have also been recorded. After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant for the offence under Section 363, 366, 368 read with Section 34 and 376(2)(d) of Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short “POCSO Act, 2012”) and against the co-accused – Amar Singh charge sheet was filed under Section 363,66,368 read with Section 34, 376 (2)(d) read with 4 Section 109 of the IPC and Section 6 read with Section 17 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 4. 4. The Trial Court has framed charges against the appellant namely- Shivshankar Singh Gond for the offences under Sections 363/34, 366/34, 368/34 and 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 5 (l)/6 POCSO Act, 2012 whereas the charge against the co-accused namely-Amar Singh for the offences under Section 363/34, 366/34, 368/34 376 (2) (n)/109 of IPC and Section 6 read with Section 17 of the POCSO Act, 2012. The accused persons denied the charges and claimed trial. 5. In order to establish the charges against the accused persons, the prosecution has examined as many as 13 witnesses. The statements of appellants were also recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which they denied the material appearing against them, plead innocence and submitted that they are innocent and have falsely been implicated in the case. 6. After appreciation of oral & documentary evidence available on record, learned trial court has acquitted the co-accused- Amar Singh from all the offences but convicted the appellant -Shivshankar Singh Gond and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubts. There are material omission and contradiction in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, which cannot be made basis for his conviction. There is no sufÏcient documentary evidence with respect to the age and date of birth of the victim to prove that she was minor on the date of incident. The School record produced by the prosecution has not been proved in accordance with law by examining its author and also the 5 basis on which the entries have been made in the school record, has not been produced. There is no other evidence led by the prosecution to prove the age of the victim. It is further contended that the victim is a major girl having love affair with the appellant and she herself eloped with him on her own free will without raising any objection and engaged in making consensual physical relation with the appellant without any protest. She being the consenting party to the act of the appellant and accompanied with the appellant, they visited place to place without any complaint, no offence either kidnapping or rape are made out against the appellant and he is entitled for acquittal. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State while opposing the arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellant contended that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are sufÏcient material available on the record that the victim was minor on the date of incident and she was kidnapped and subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant which does amount to offence of rape and the learned trial court after considering the entire evidence available on record, by the impugned judgment has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant which is absolutely justified and needs no interference. 9. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. The first and foremost question arises for consideration would be the age of the victim as to whether on the date of incident she was minor or not. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school Register Ex. P/16C and Ex. P/ 17C, which is sought to be proved by Ramnarayan Singh (PW-4), who was the Teacher in the school. He stated in his deposition that he is posted as Teacher Panchayat Grade-III at Primary School Tanjara. The Police has seized the School Register from him with 6 respect to the date of birth of the victim and after retaining the attested true copy of the School register Ex. P/16C, original School Register (Ex.P-16) was returned to the school. The Police has also seized another Register Ex. P/17 and its attested true copy is Ex. P/17C. As per entries made in the School Register, the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 03rd May, 2001 and she left the school on 16.06.2012. In his cross examination, he admitted that earlier one another Headmaster was posted in the school. He also admitted that at the time of admission of the victim in the school, he was not posted there. He also admitted that with respect to the date of birth certificate of the victim, there is no document available in the school Register. 11. Ramnarayan Singh (PW04) is not the author of the school Register and the basis on which the entries has been made in it has also not been produced by the prosecution. 12. The admissibility and evidencery value of the School Register has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, in which the Supreme Court has observed as under: "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P-16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- 7 "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the 8 purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 13. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be 9 the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 10 14. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. 11 It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference." 15. Reverting to the facts of the present case except the school Register, there is no other documentary evidence produced by the prosecution to prove the age of the victim. 16. The victim (PW01) has stated in her evidence that her date of birth is 03.05.2001 and she has passed class 10th examination. In cross- examination, she stated that she was not in knowledge at the time of death of her father. After death of her father, her mother has performed second marriage and she is residing alongwith her grand parents. She 12 further stated in her cross-examination that she had her birth certificate, which was given to the police but she did not know as to whether her birth certificate is annexed with the case or not. 17. PW02, who is the maternal grand-mother of the victim has stated that she did not know the date of birth of the victim, but she is aged about 16 years. She stated in her evidence that the victim has got admitted in the school by her grand-father. She admitted that they have not got prepared the birth certificate of the victim. She did not know as to whether at the time of admission of the victim in the school, they have submitted any document or not. She denied the suggestion that her date of birth is not recorded in the Kotwari Register. 18. PW03, who is the aunt (Chachi) of the victim, has stated that she did not know the date of birth of the victim but she is aged about 17-18 years. She admitted in her cross-examination that the police has not seized any birth certificate of the victim in her presence. 19. Except from these evidence no other evidences have been produced by the prosecution to prove the age of the victim. Despite having the birth certificate as stated by the victim, her birth certificate has not been seized. As per the evidence of her maternal grand-mother, no birth certificate has been prepared and her date of birth has also not been recorded in the Kotwari Register. There is no ossification test conducted by the prosecution to prove the age of the victim. In absence of any cogent and clinching evidence, merely on the basis of school Register, which has not been proved by the prosecution in accordance with law, age of the victim cannot be determined that she was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court has held her minor. 13 20. So far as the offence of kidnapping and rape is concerned, I again examined the evidence of the victim and other witnesses. 21. The victim (PW01) has stated in her evidence that on the date of incident, the appellant met her at Surajpur, they visited place to place and stayed at Bus stand at Vishrampur. She stayed alontwith appellant and his brother and Sister-in-law and their children were also there with them. On the next day, the police had taken them back. When she declared hostile and cross-exmined by the prosecution, she admitted that when the appellant was residing in a rented house, the appellant used to come to her house and proposed her that he likes her. She also admitted that he wanted to marry with her. She also admitted that after staying sometime at Baikunthpur, they came to Vishrampur by Bus and the appellant took her to his brother’s house. On the next date the police came there and in between that period the appellant made physical relation with her thrice. In cross-examination, she further stated that she has not disclosed the proposal of the appellant to her grand-parents. She admitted that she had come to Baikunthpur from Sonhat by Bus directly. The appellant may met her at Surajpur and he called her. She admitted that they have already exchanged their mobile Numbers and she on her own will had gone to Bishrampur and no one has pressurized her. She also admitted that she has not disclosed to co-accused Amar singh about the present appellant Shivshankar Singh. She further admitted that she stayed with the family of Amar Singh and she used to go to market alongwith the family of Amar Singh. She has not made any complaint to Amar Singh that the appellant has forcefully taken her with him. She used to talk to the appellant on telephone regularly. She further admitted that in house of Amar Singh, when the appellant has made physical relation with her, neither she raised any alarm nor informed the incident 14 to anyone in his family. Even, while going to Baikunthpur from Sonhat and to Bishrampur from Baikunthpur by Bus, neither she has made any complaint to any passenger of the bus that she was being forcefully taken by the appellant nor she disclosed about the incident to any of the neighbour of the Amar Singh. 22. From the evidence of the victim, it is quite vivid that while she had gone to Sonhat Market alongwith her maternal grand-mother, she eloped with the appellant on her own will she travelled up to Bishrampur by bus but has not made any objection and has not made any complaint to any of the passenger of the bus by which she was travelled. Even in the market, when she was being taken by the appellant, has not raised any alarm and had gone with the appellant. While staying at the house of Amar Singh she has not made any complaint that she was being kidnapped by the appellant or subjected to forceful sexual intercourse by him and engaged in making consensual physical relation. The evidence of the victim is not sufÏcient to hold the appellant guilty for the alleged offence, as she is not that sterling quality of the witnesses, which is required for holding conviction of the accused. 23. In the matter of Santosh Prasad @ Santosh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar reported in 2020 (3) SCC 443, in paragraph 5.4.2 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “5.4.2 In the case of Rai Sandeep alias Deepu (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider who can be said to be a “sterling witness”. In paragraph 22, it is observed and held as under: “22 In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a 15 position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co- relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all 16 other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 24. When the victim has not been proved to be minor on the date of incident and when she herself accompanied with the appellant and has made physical relation with him on her own will, it cannot be said that she was being kidnapped/abducted and subjected to forceful intercourse by the appellant which constitute the offence against the appellant. 25. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim’s evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable then the accused cannot be convicted. 17 The prosecution has to bring home charges levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 26. In view of the aforesaid reasons this Court find force in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that no offence are made out against the appellant and this Court is also in agreement with the same. 27. In the result, The appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The appellant is acquitted from all the offences. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentences are set aside. The appellant is reported to be on bail. His bail bond shall continue for further period of six months as provided under Section 481 of B.N.S.S. 2023. 28. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge amita Digitally signed by AMITA DUBEY Date: 2025.01.28 10:29:14 +0530