1 2025:CGHC:16281 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 986 of 2025 • Surjeet Singh Saluja S/o Lt. Haveli Singh Aged About 48 Years At- Kashiram Nagar, Raipur, P/S Telibandha, Raipur, C.G. ... Petitioner versus • Madhu Poddar W/o Lt. Narayan Poddar Aged About 58 Years At- Golchcha Residency, Shankar Nagar, District Raipur C.G. ... Respondent For Petitioner : Mr. Lukesh Kumar Mishra, Advocate appears through VC Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Order On Board 07/04/2025 1. Heard. 2. This Petition has been filed under Section 419(4) of the BNSS, 2023 for grant of special leave to Appeal against the judgment dated 09.01.2025 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur in Complaint Case No.863/2015, whereby, the respondent/accused has been acquitted of the PRIYANKA VERMA Digitally signed by PRIYANKA VERMA Date: 2025.04.08 17:18:19 +0530 2 charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, “the NI Act”). 3. Brief facts of the case are that the present petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent/accused by making an averment inter alia that due to personal relations, the complainant advanced a loan of Rs.4 lakh in the month of December, 2014 to the respondent and the respondent/accused promised to return the same within a period of 2-3 months and also gave a post-dated cheque of Rs.2 lakhs dated 15.02.2015 (Ex.P/1). However, when the complainant presented the same for collection before the United Bank of India, Raipur, it got dishonoured due to insufficient funds vide Ex-P/2. Thereafter, a legal notice was sent vide Ex-P/3. However, even after the said notice, the payment was not made by the respondent. Hence, the complaint was filed. 4. In order to prove his case, the complainant examined himself. The respondent/accused denied the offence in particular. She stated in her statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that she has been falsely implicated and further took a defence that she took some amount from the complainant and for which, the complainant snatched an unsigned blank cheque from her. 5. Learned trial Court, after evaluating the evidence available on record, reached to the conclusion that the complainant had neither proved the Bank Return Memo nor examined any Bank employee to the effect that the cheque got dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds and thereby, 3 acquitted the accused. Hence, this Petition has been filed for grant of leave. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as the signature on the cheque has not been disproved by the respondent/accused, therefore, in view of Section 146 of the NI Act, the information provided is sufficient to prove that the cheque got dishonoured on account of insufficiency of funds. He also draws attention towards para 16 and para 46 of the cross- examination of complainant- Surjeet Singh Saluja (PW-1), wherein, the respondent has admitted that before presentation of the cheque, no consent was obtained from her. 7. Heard and perused the impugned judgment and other documents, particularly the statement of the complainant annexed with the Petition carefully. 8. In the matter of Budh Singh vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 9 SCC 731], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in a matter of Appeal against acquittal, the High Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, although the view of the Appellate Court is a more probable one. However, while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, it is free to consider the entire evidences on record so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. It is also entitled to consider as to whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court has failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and has taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law. 4 9. Further, in the matter of V.N. Ratheesh vs. State of Kerala, (2006) 10 SCC 617, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is no embargo on the Appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court said that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. It is further held that the paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. It was also observed that the principle to be followed by appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 10.If we examine the facts and circumstances of this case in light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above 5 mentioned cases, it is quite vivid that the complainant has categorically admitted in his cross-examination that he does not know the husband of the respondent. He is also not aware as to where the respondent resides as also the whereabouts of her family members. The complainant also could not state, on which date, he had given loan to the respondent. In para 30 of his cross- examination, when a specific question was put to the complainant about his annual income for the years 2015-2018, he simply stated that it can be answered only by his Charted Accountant and he is not aware about his annual income. 11.In this backdrop, when no documents have been maintained by the complainant and it has been simply stated by him that he has given a loan of Rs.4 lakh to the respondent/accused, the transaction itself becomes doubtful. 12.Further, in the matter of Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54, referred the provision of Section 271-D of the Income Tax Act which provide penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of of Section 269-SS which reads as under:- “Section 271-D. Penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 269-SS.-(1) If a person takes or accepts any loan or deposit in contravention of the provisions of Section 269-SS, he shall be liable to pay, by way of penalty, a sum equal to the amount of the loan or deposit so taken or accepted. 6 (2) Any penalty imposable under sub-section (1) shall be imposed by the Joint Commissioner.” 13.In the aforesaid judgment of Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) it has been further observed that an accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. Standard of proof on the part of an accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different. 14.Considering the fact that a Circular has been issued by the Reserve Bank of India stating that the dishonored/returned cheque memo need to be signed/initialed, which has been referred to by the trial Court also, and on the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the respondent/accused has been acquitted, this Court is of the view that the finding arrived at by the trial Court was a possible view. 15.In light of the aforesaid principles and considering the facts of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned judgment and the trial Court has not committed any error in acquitting the respondent/accused. 16.In the result, the Leave Petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Priyanka