2025:HHC:18956 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 2291 of 2024 Reserved on: 16.05.2025 Date of Decision: 20.06.2025. Narcotics Control Bureau ...Petitioner Versus Vivek Sharma ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Petitioner : Mr. Ashwani Pathak, Senior Advocate with Mr. Dev Raj, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking cancellation of the bail granted to the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) by the learned Special Judge, Kangra (learned Trial Court). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:18956 2. It has been asserted that the complainant, Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), registered a Crime No. 52 of 2022, dated 21.7.2022, at Sub Zone Office, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., pursuant to secret information received by it that a car bearing registration No. PB-07Y-3385 was involved in the trafficking of contraband. The vehicle was intercepted near Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P. and 1.950 kilograms of charas was recovered from the vehicle. Vivek Sharma, Rakesh Kumar and Praveen Kumari were travelling in the vehicle. The quantity of charas recovered from the car was commercial, and the rigours of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act apply to the present case. Accused Vivek Sharma made a statement under Section 67 of the ND&PS Act that contraband was purchased from Taaz Mohammad, who was known to Praveen Kumari. Taaz Mohammad has also procured some charas from Latif Mohammad. Hence, the NCB filed a complaint against five persons. Learned Special Judge, Kangra granted bail to the accused, Vivek Sharma. Learned Special Judge exceeded his jurisdiction by granting bail to the petitioner by overlooking the mandate of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act. Another FIR was registered against the respondent, and his bail application was liable to be rejected. Even if the respondent was 3 2025:HHC:18956 suffering from a paralytic attack, an interim bail could have been granted. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted by the learned Trial Court be cancelled. 3. No reply was filed. 4. I have heard Mr. Ashwani Pathak, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Dev Raj, Advocate, for the NCB and Mr. Sanjeev Kumari Suri, Advocate, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 5. Mr. Ashwani Pathak, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in granting bail to the respondent. As per the complaint, a commercial quantity of charas was recovered from the vehicle in which the petitioner was travelling. Rigours of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act apply to the present case, and the bail could not have been granted. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted to the respondent be cancelled. 6. Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the accused was suffering from a paralytic attack. He was wheelchair-bound. The bail 4 2025:HHC:18956 should have been granted in the peculiar facts and circumstances. He relied upon the judgment in Jagdish Lal v. State of H.P. 2020:HHC:1979 and Salim Valimamad Majothi Vs. State of Gujarat 2023 SCC OnLine SC 659 in support of his submission. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974 that the bail, once granted, should not be cancelled mechanically; however, an unreasoned and perverse order is open to interference by the Superior Court. The bail can be cancelled if there are serious allegations against the accused. It was observed at page 783: “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing 5 2025:HHC:18956 the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .] 27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse bail order is always open to interference by the superior court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on society, resulting in such an order. In P v. State of M.P. [P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1)CrPC in the following words : (SCC p. 224, para 24) “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive 6 2025:HHC:18956 to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” Considerations for Setting Aside Bail Orders 28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined, and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided. Suffice it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused. 29. In Jagjeet Singh [Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560], a three-judge Bench of this Court has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439CrPC is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding a bail application. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial mind following well-established principles of law. In the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with 7 2025:HHC:18956 the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Rambilas [Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124]; Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat [Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 13 SCC 584: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 813].) 9. Similar is the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik Madhukar versus Vitthal Damuji Meher and Ors. 2024: INSC:636 wherein it was observed as under: - “19. Courts, while granting bail, are required to consider relevant factors such as the nature of the accusation, the role ascribed to the accused concerned, possibilities/chances of tampering with the evidence and/or witnesses, antecedents, flight risk, et al. Speaking through Hima Kohli, J., the present coram in Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, apropos relevant parameters for granting bail, observed: “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. (Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7 SCC 525; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav (supra) (2004) 7 SCC 528; Masroor v. State of Uttar 8 2025:HHC:18956 Pradesh (2009) 14 SCC 286; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496; Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 16 SCC 508; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 12 SCC 129; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar @ Polia (supra) (2020) 2 SCC 118. 27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the Superior Court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a Superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on society, resulting in such an order. In P v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) (2022), 15 SCR 211 decided by a three-judge bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J)] has spelt out the considerations that must be weighed with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) of the CrPC in the following words: “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” (emphasis supplied) 9 2025:HHC:18956 20. In State of Haryana v. Dharamraj, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1085, speaking through one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), the Court, while setting aside an order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court granting (anticipatory) bail, discussed and reasoned: “7. A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is warranted. This Court considered the factors to guide the grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496, the relevant principles were restated thus: ‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and 10 2025:HHC:18956 (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by the grant of bail.’ 8. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia (2020) 2 SCC 118, this Court opined as under: ‘16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. …’ 9. In Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak, 2023 INSC 761, this Court, in view of Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh, (1996) 4 SCC 693 and X v. State of Telangana, (2018) 16 SCC 511, held as follows: ‘13. It is also required to be borne in mind that when a prayer is made for the cancellation of the grant of bail, cogent and overwhelming circumstances must be present, and bail, once granted, cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it in conducing to allow fair trial. This proposition draws support from the Judgment of this Court in Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349, Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh (1996) 4 SCC 693 and XXX v. State of Telangana (2018) 16 SCC 511.’ 10. In XXX v. Union Territory of Andaman & Nicobar Islands, 2023 INSC 767, this Court noted that the principles in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (supra) stood 11 2025:HHC:18956 reiterated in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra (2022) 9 SCC 321. 11. The contours of anticipatory bail have been elaborately dealt with by 5-Judge Benches in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 is worthy of mention in this context, despite its partial overruling in Sushila Aggarwal (supra). We are cognizant that liberty is not to be interfered with easily. More so when an order of pre- arrest bail already stands granted by the High Court. 12. Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail is to be exercised with judicial discretion. The factors illustrated by this Court through its pronouncements are illustrative and not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case turns on its own facts and merits.” (emphasis supplied) 21. In Ajwar (supra), this Court also examined the considerations for setting aside bail orders in terms below: “28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate Court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined, and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided. Suffice it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused. 12 2025:HHC:18956 29. In Jagjeet Singh (supra) (2022) 9 SCC 321, a three-judge bench of this Court has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439 Cr. P.C. is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding an application for bail. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial mind following well-established principles of law. In the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate Court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Ram Bilas (2001) 6 SCC 338; Narendra K. Amin (Dr.) v. State of Gujarat (2008) 13 SCC 584)” (emphasis supplied) 10. As per the complaint, the petitioner was found travelling in the vehicle from which 1.950 kilograms of charas was recovered. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874, the contraband was recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It was observed: “19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehi- cle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to 13 2025:HHC:18956 each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle. 20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit, there must be conscious possession. 21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was cou- pled with the requisite mental element, i.e. conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted. 22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term which assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes. 23. The word “conscious” means awareness about a par- ticular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or in- tended. 24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194: 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the article in the case in question, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or con- trol. 25. The word “possession” means the legal right to pos- session (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC 498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sulli- 14 2025:HHC:18956 van v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966 : (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)] .) 26. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where also presumption is also available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles. 27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only possession but conscious possession has been established. It has not been shown by the accused- appellants that the possession was not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.” 11. Therefore, in view of the binding precedent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the respondent/accused has to be treated in possession of 1.950 kilograms of charas, which is a commercial quantity. Therefore, the rigours of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act apply to the present case. 12. Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence involving commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as under: “37. Offences are to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— 15 2025:HHC:18956 (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19, section 24, or section 27A, and also for offences involving commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or his own bond unless– (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.” 13. This Section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC 738 and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit an offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was observed: “7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain offences enumerated under the said Section. They are : 16 2025:HHC:18956 (1) In the case of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 19, (2) Under Section 24, (3) Under Section 27A and (4) Of offences involving commercial quantity. 8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case, the court proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment. (1) The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty of such an offence; (2) that person is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 14. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held: “19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the application for bail moved by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In Union of India vs. Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429, it has been elaborated as under:- "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the accused commits the murder of one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent young victims, who are 17 2025:HHC:18956 vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs. Chief Secy., Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as under: 24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly impact on society as a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine. 8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37, namely, 18 2025:HHC:18956 (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence; and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful socio- economic consequences and health hazards which would accompany trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the court should implement the law in the spirit with which Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended." 20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of the commission of an offence under the Act unless twin conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application, and the second is that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail operates. 21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the 19 2025:HHC:18956 accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” 15. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237 wherein it was observed at page 110: “21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial quantity are: (i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail; and (ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to believe” that : (a) the person is not guilty of such an offence; and (b) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is “reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505], held that : (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11) “7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable grounds”. The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn points to the existence of such facts and circumstances as are 20 2025:HHC:18956 sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. 8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. ‘7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy.’ [See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532] ] *** 10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a question of fact whether a particular act is reasonable or not, depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315] 11. The court, while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose, essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail, that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable 21 2025:HHC:18956 grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.” (emphasis supplied) 23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High Court and this Court are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed. 16. Learned Trial Court held in para-5 of judgment that rigours of Section 37 of ND&PS Act apply to the present case. It was noticed in the para-6, that it could not be said that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner/accused is not guilty of the offence as alleged. However, in view of the special circumstances, the prayer for bail was accepted. The special circumstances highlighted by the learned Trial Court were that the petitioner had suffered a sudden attack of paraplegia, due to which lower part of his body was not working. He was stated to be admitted to Baba Hospital, Ludhiana. 17. These were irrelevant considerations. The sympathy of the Court cannot override the law, and the learned Trial Court 22 2025:HHC:18956 could not have ignored the mandate of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act. Further, it was rightly submitted that interim bail could have been granted instead of regular bail till the continuation of the treatment. 18. In Jagdish Lal (supra), the State had submitted that it was unable to provide the treatment to the accused due to the COVID-19 Pandemic; therefore, the Court granted the bail. This order was passed in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and due to the COVID-19 Pandemic. In Salim Valiamad Majothi (supra), the accused was incarcerated for more than one year and seven months, and this was a circumstance for granting bail. 19. In the present case, the prescription slip dated 24.2.2025 was issued by Doctor Rajendra Prasad Government Medical College Kangra at Tanda, which is near Dharamshala, where the respondent could have easily received any treatment, if so required. 20. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction while granting bail, ignoring the mandatory provisions of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act. It was held in Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2018) 13 SCC 813: (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 424: 23 2025:HHC:18956 2018 SCC OnLine SC 415 that the bail granted in violation of Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot be sustained. It was observed at page 820: “14. Be that as it may, the order dated 21-9-2017 [Beant Singh v. State of Punjab, 2017 SCC OnLine P&H 3801] passed by the High Court does not show that there is any reference to Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The quantity is reportedly commercial. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court could not have and should not have passed the order under Section 438 or 439 CrPC without reference to Section 37 of the NDPS Act and without entering a finding on the required level of satisfaction in case the Court was otherwise inclined to grant the bail. Such a satisfaction having not been entered, the order dated 21-9-2017 [Beant Singh v. State of Punjab, 2017 SCC OnLine P&H 3801] is only to be set aside and we do so.” 21. This position was reiterated in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237 wherein it was observed at page 115: “36. The High Court has clearly overlooked crucial requirements and glossed over the circumstances which were material to the issue as to whether a case for the grant of bail was established. In failing to do so, the order of the High Court becomes unsustainable. Moreover, it has emerged during the course of the hearing that after the respondent was enlarged on bail, he has consistently remained away from the criminal trial, resulting in the issuance of a non-bailable warrant against him. The High Court ought to have given due weight to the seriousness and gravity of the crime, which it has failed to do.” 24 2025:HHC:18956 22. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the order passed by the learned Trial Court granting bail to the respondent is ordered to be cancelled. The respondent is directed to surrender before the learned Trial Court within 15 days. However, it is expressly made clear that it will be open to the learned Trial Court to make an arrangement for the treatment, including interim bail, if deemed necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case. 23. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 20th June, 2025 (Chander)