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2025 DAILYLAW 13284 (CHH)

M/S SHRI NAKODA ISPAT LTD. v. SOHANLAL VERMA

WPL/78/2019 · 2025-02-19

Shri Rakesh Mohan Pandey

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Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:8618 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 78 of 2019 1 - M/s Shri Nakoda Ispat Ltd. Through The Director, Shri Anant Dave, S/o Shri Late A.B. Dave, Aged About 50 Years, Plot No. 74, 75, 109 Industrial Growth Central Phase Ii Shitara Raipur, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Sohanlal Verma R/o Village Mohbhatta, Thana Bhatapara, District - Baloda Bazar - Bhatapara Chhattisgarh., District : Balodabazar- Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh 2 - Controlling Authority Under Payment Of Gratuity Act And Asst. Labour Commissioner Kutchhary Chowk Raipur, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Appellate Authority Under Payment Of Gratuity Act And Deputy Labour Commissioner, C/o Labour Commissioner Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Raipur District - Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. J.K. Gupta, Advocate For respondents : None appears Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 19.02.2025 1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to Digitally signed by REKHA SINGH -2- issue an appropriate writ/ writs, direction/directions, order/orders in the circumstances of the case and to quash the impugned orders Annexure P-1 and P-2. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to pass any writ, order or direction as deem fit in the circumstances of the case.” 2. Mr. Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that respondent No.1 was an employee of the petitioner/M/s. Shri Nakoda Ispat Ltd. After retirement, respondent No.1 moved an application before respondent No.2 i.e. the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act for the period of 12 years and six days from 13.05.2004 to 20.05.2016. The petitioner filed a reply and denied the averments. A specific stand was taken by the petitioner that there was a break in service. Respondent No.1 failed to adduce evidence but the Controlling Authority vide order dated 31.07.2017 directed the petitioner to make payment of Rs.61,269/-. He would further submit that an appeal was preferred before the Appellate Authority on 11.01.2018 and there was a delay of 162 days. He would also submit that the learned Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was preferred after the expiry of 120 days. He would contend that an application for condonation of delay was moved which was rejected by the appellate authority whereas the authority concerned ought to have taken a lenient view. 3. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and 3 perused the documents placed on record. 4. In the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short ‘the Act of 1972’) particularly while filing an appeal, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not attract. It is a complete code and in the absence of any provision with regard to condonation of delay, the appellate authority cannot condone it. Admittedly, the appeal was preferred after 120 days. 5. Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 provides for filing of appeal against the order passed under sub-section (4) of Section 7 of the Act of 1972 which reads as under:- “(7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub- section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days: [Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount.]” 6. The Hon’ble Division Bench in the matter of Kirtan Ram Thakur Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and other connected matters passed in Writ Appeal No.349 of 2016 decided on 22.08.2016, held that the Appellate Authority has no jurisdiction to condone the delay. -4- Relevant para 9 is reproduced herein below:- "9. We must remember that the appeal is creation of statute. Law makers lay down the period of limitation. In case there was no outer limitation provided in the proviso, we could have taken recourse to the Limitation Act and held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applicable. However, in the PG Act, which is a special piece of legislation, the legislature in its wisdom has clearly laid down that delay can be condoned only up to sixty days and no further delay can be condoned, therefore, the Appellate Authority is powerless to condone the delay when the delay is beyond sixty days." 7. In view of the aforementioned facts and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Division Bench in the matter of Kirtan Ram Thakur (supra), in my opinion, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply in the Act of 1972. The period for filing an appeal as provided under Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 is 60 days + the extended period of 60 days i.e. a total of 120 days. In the present case, there was delay of 162 days, thus the Appellate Authority rejected the application for condonation of delay. 8. Taking into consideration the above-stated facts, no case is made out for interference. Consequently, the present petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Rekha