2025:UHC:1383 HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Criminal Misc Application No. 916 of 2024 27 February, 2025 Savita Pandey --Applicant Versus Himmat Singh --Respondent ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Presence:- Mr. Danish Khan and Mr. Yogesh Kumar Joshi, Advocate for the Applicant. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Alok Mahra, J. Heard learned counsel for the applicant. 2. This criminal misc. application has been filed by the applicant for quashing the orders dated 17.03.2023 & 10.05.2023 passed by the learned Second Judicial Magistrate, Haldwani in Criminal Case No. 3490 of 2018 and order dated 05.10.2023 passed by 1st Addl. District Judge Haldwani District Nainital in Criminal Revision No.81 of 2023, under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. By the impugned order an application filed by the applicant under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. was rejected and revision filed against the order was also dismissed. 1 2025:UHC:1383 3. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that complaint was lodged against the applicant by the respondent under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. 4. I have considered the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) states that the powers of revision cannot be used against interlocutory orders. 5. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Girish Kumar Suneja Vs. CBI reported in (2017) 14 SCC 809 has held as follows:- “ 24. The second reason why Amar Nath is important is that it invokes the principle, in the context of criminal law, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Therefore, when Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference with interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to set aside an interlocutory order. This is what this Court held: “3. While we fully agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that where a revision to the High Court against the order of the Subordinate Judge is expressly barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code the inherent powers contained in Section 482 would not be available to defeat the bar contained in Section 397(2). Section 482 of the 1973 Code contains the inherent powers of the Court and does not confer any new powers but preserves the powers which the High Court already possessed. A harmonious construction of Sections 397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under Section 397(2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to 2 2025:UHC:1383 such a case the provisions of Section 482 would not apply. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject-matter. Where there is an express provision, barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers. 25. This view was reaffirmed in Madhu Limaye when the following principles were approved in relation to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the context of Section 397(2) thereof. The principles are: (1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. Therefore, it is quite clear that the prohibition in Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. will govern Section 482 thereof. We endorse this view. 15. Sethuraman v. Raja Manickchand, (2009) 5 SCC 153. "5. Secondly, what was not realized was that the order passed by the Trial Court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. The Trial Court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent/accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant/complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The Trial Court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders, i.e., one on the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production of documents and other on the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable. 3 2025:UHC:1383 6. In view of the above discussions, this Court does not find any merit to entertain the present C528 application, therefore, the instant C528 application is dismissed in limine. (Alok Mahra, J.) 27.02.2025 BS 4