1 2025:CGHC:45737 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 2074 of 2022 • Smt. Shweta Kushwaha W/o Arvind Kumar Kushwaha, Aged About 38 Years Working As Assistant Teacher (Lb), Primary School, Katora, Block- Baikunthpur, District-Korea (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, School Education Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2. The Director, Directorate Of Public Instructions, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District- Raipur (C.G.) 3. The Divisional Joint Director, Public Instruction, Surguja Division, Ambikapur, District- Surguja (C.G.) 4. The District Education Officer, District- Korea (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Sudhandhu Upadhyay, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Sangeet Kumar Kushwaha, Advocate For State : Mr. T. L. Bareth, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 08. 09.2025 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, thereby directing the respondent authorities to consider the case of petitioner for counting the seniority of the petitioner from the date of initial appointment of the petitioner, in accordance with law in view of judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in W.A. No. 475/2015. 10.2 That, any other relief/order which may deem fit SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2025.09.12 10:50:04 +0530 2 and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award of the cost of the petition may be given.” 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that initially, the petitioner was appointed to the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade – III vide order dated 27.10.2007. He would further submit that a gradation list was published by the department on 01.04.2021, and the name of the petitioner was placed at serial No. 1869. He would also submit that the services of the petitioner were transferred from Janpad Panchayat, Sonhat to Janpad Panchayat, Baikunthpur vide order dated 26.07.2010. He would contend that the respondent authorities reckoned seniority of the petitioner from the date of joining at the transferred place and not from the date of her initial appointment. He would pray to allow the instant petition. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would oppose. He would submit that the petitioner was appointed to the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade – III on 27.10.2007, and the services of the petitioner were transferred from Janpad Panchayat, Sonhat to Janpad Panchayat, Baikunthpur vide order dated 26.07.2010. He would further submit that according to the Clause 7 of circular dated 02.03.2016 issued by Panchayat and Rural Development department, if any teacher voluntarily seeks transfer to another place, he would be considered junior at the new place of posting. He would contend that the petitioner preferred this petition claiming her seniority from date of initial appointment i.e. 27.10.2007 and the petition has been filed in the year 2022 after a lapse of 15 years, and the delay has not been explained properly, therefore, this petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the documents placed on record. 3 5. From a perusal of the documents, it is apparent that the petitioner was appointed to the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade – III on 27.10.2007, and the services of the petitioner were transferred from Janpad Panchayat, Sonhat to Janpad Panchayat, Baikunthpur within district vide order dated 26.07.2010. The petitioner is claiming her seniority from date of her initial appointment. The petitioner has approached this Court after a lapse of 15 years without explaining the delay part. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152, while dealing with a similar issue in para 2, held as under:- “2. ………………...One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional Engineers over the head of the appellant he did not come to the Court questioning it. There was a third opportunity for him to have come to the Court when respondents 2 to 4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers over the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years because of the tempting prospect of the Chief Engineership he has come to the Court. In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957 cannot be reproduced now. In any case as the Government had decided as a matter of policy, as they were entitled to do, not to relax the rules in favour of any except overseas scholars t will be wholly pointless to direct them to consider the appellants' case as if nothing had happened after 1957. Not only respondent 2 but also respondents 3 and 4 who were the appellant's juniors became Divisional Engineers in 1957 apparently on the ground that their merits deserved their promotion over the head of the appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he question the promotion of his juniors as Superintending Engineers over his head. He could have come to the Court on every one of 4 these three occasions. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his bead should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that 'here is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.” 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of delay and laches in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 held as under:- ‘17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remain unauthorizedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons -who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle” . In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold. 8. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be 5 ignored without any justification. Remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have an impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation, which, in an acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons; such delay does not deserve any indulgence, and on the said ground alone this Court deems it appropriate to dismiss this petition at the very threshold. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter, statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. 9. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in light of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of P.S. Sadasivaswamy (supra) and Chennai Metropolitan (supra), it is quite vivid that the petitioner has approached this Court after a delay of 15 years. The petitioner utterly failed to explain the delay caused in filing the instant petition. 10. Taking into consideration the above-stated facts, I do not find any good ground to entertain the instant petition. 11. Accordingly, the instant petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge $iddhant