Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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2025:CGHC:12509
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR No. 66 of 2025 • Smriti Tripathi D/o Hridaynarayan Tripathi Aged About 17 Years being a Minor Is Represented Through- Her Natural Guardian I.E. Her Father Namely Hridaynarayan Tripathi, S/o Janaradan Tripathi, Aged About 57 Years, R/o Village Katkona, Police Station Patna, District- Koriya ( C.G. )
... Applicant. versus 1 - Secretary, Chhattisgarh Board Of Secondary Education, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - District Education OfÏcer Baikunthpur, District- Koriya ( C.G. ). 3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Collector, Baikunthpur, District- Koriya, (C.G.). 4 - Any Public.
... Respondent(s) For Applicant : Ms. Swesksha Sharma, Advocate. For State : Shri Dilman Rati Minj, Govt. Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari
Order On Board 17/03/2025
1. This Civil Revision has been preferred against the order dated 29.01.2025 passed by the District Judge, Baikunthpur District Koriya (Chhattisgarh)
2 in Civil Appeal No.6-A/2025, whereby application preferred by the Non- Applicant No.1/appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was allowed and delay of 165 days in filing the first appeal was condoned. 2. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that applicant had filed a civil suit seeking correction of her name in the educational certificates and other ofÏcial documents where her name was erroneously recorded as Satyawati Tripathi and the same was sought to be corrected as Smriti Tripathi. The learned First Civil Judge Class-2, Baikunthpur District Koriya in Civil Suit No.23A/2022, after due consideration of the facts and evidence, passed a judgment and decree in favour of the applicant on 28.02.2024 directing the concerned authorities to correct the applicant’s name in all relevant records. The concerned authorities complied with the said directions. Thereafter, on 17.09.2024 with an inordinate delay, an appeal has been preferred with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the learned First Appellate Court, without any sufÏcient cause, accepted the explanation and condoned the delay. Learned counsel for the applicant would further submit that delay in taking timely legal action should not be excused as it prejudices the applicant and prays to allow the instant revision. 3. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and perused the documents annexed with the revision carefully. 4. In the matter of Sheo Raj Singh (DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES And Others v. Union of India And Another {(2023) 10 SCC 531}, it has been observed that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufÏciency of the cause shown and the degree
3 of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial. Further, it has also been observed that it would be improper to put the State on the same footing as an individual since it was an impersonal machinery operating through its ofÏcers. Factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice- oriented process. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts.
The ofÏcer responsible for the negligence would be liable to suffer and not public interest through the State and the principles have been summarized with regard to law of limitation for consideration to condone the delay in Para 35, 35.1, 35.2, 35.3, 35.4 , 35.5, which reads thus:-
“35. We find that the High Court in the present case assigned the following reasons in support of its order:
35.1. The law of limitation was founded on public policy, and that some lapse on the part of a litigant, by itself, would not be sufÏcient to deny condonation of delay as the same could cause miscarriage of justice. 35.2 The expression “sufÏcient cause” is elastic enough for courts to do substantial justice. Further, when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against one another, the former would prevail. 35.3 It is upon the courts to consider the sufÏciency of cause shown for the delay, and the length of delay is not always decisive while exercising discretion in such matters if the delay is properly explained. Further, the merits of a claim were also to be considered when deciding such applications for condonation of delay. 35.4 Further, a distinction should be drawn between inordinate unexplained delay and explained delay, where in the present case, the first respondent had sufÏciently explained the delay on account of negligence on part of the government functionaries and the government counsel on record before the Reference Court. 35.5 The ofÏcer responsible for the negligence would be liable to suffer and not public interest through the State. The High Court felt inclined to take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein did not border on callousness.”
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5. Following was further materially observed at Para 40 and 41 of the
judgment passed in the matter of Sheo Raj Singh (supra), which read thus:-
“40. We can also profitably refer to Koting Lamkang (2019 10 SCC 408), cited by Mr. Sen, where the same Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court which decided University of Delhi ((2020) 13 SCC 745) was of the view that the impersonal nature of the State’s functioning should be given due regard, while ensuring that individual defaults are not nit-picked at the cost of collective interest. The relevant paragraphs read as follows: ( Koting Lamkang case, SCC p.410, paras 7-8)
“7. But while concluding as above, it was necessary for the Court to also be conscious of the bureaucratic delay and the slow pace in reaching a government decision and the routine way of deciding whether the State should prefer an appeal against a judgment adverse to it. Even while observing that the law of limitation would harshly affect the party, the Court felt that the delay in the appeal filed by the State, should not be condoned. 8. Regard should be had in similar such circumstances to the impersonal nature of the Government's functioning where individual ofÏcers may fail to act responsibly. This in turn, would result in injustice to the institutional interest of the State. If the appeal filed by the State are lost for individual default, those who are at fault, will not usually be individually affected.” (emphasis supplied)
41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel that the High Court’s decision to condone the delay on account of the first respondent’s inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice- oriented approach by the Courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the working of the
5 grand scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests.”
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In the case at hand, after obtaining certified copy of the judgment and decree and after getting due approval and appointment of the OfÏcer-in- Charge, an appeal was preferred with a delay of 165 days and the learned First Appellate Court considering all such aspects condoned the delay caused in presenting the appeal. 7. This Court after having considered the submission of learned counsel for the applicant as also the principles laid down in catena of judgments by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the facts and circumstances of the case, does not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned order warranting any interference invoking revisional jurisdiction. 8. In the result, this Revision fails and is hereby dismissed. However, the concerned Court is directed to decide the main appeal in an expeditious manner. Sd/-
(Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Avinash