( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No. 4886 of 2022 Date of decision: 20.05.2025 Arun Kang ...Petitioner. Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ...Respondents. Coram: Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the Petitioner : Mr. Onkar Jairath, Advocate with Mr. Anshul Jairath, Advocate. For the respondent(s) : Mr. Rajat Chaudhary, Assistant Advocate General, for respondents No.1 to 5-State. Mr. Piyush Dhanotia, Advocate, for respondent No.6. Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge Petitioner was a contractual employee of the respondents. For financial loss allegedly caused to respondents because of his overvaluing a work, show cause notice and recovery notice were issued to him inter-alia with stipulation that his services were liable to be terminated in case the overvalued amount was not deposited by him. Petitioner whose juniors & counter-parts had been Whether reports of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?Yes. 2 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) regularized in service, was not being regularized for the said reason. Petitioner deposited the amount as assessed by the respondents & continued to serve. Two years later, respondents terminated his services citing that his reply to the notices was found unsatisfactory and he had caused financial loss to the respondents. No regular inquiry was conducted in the matter. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner has preferred this writ petition. 2. Brief Facts 2(i) On the basis of recommendations of the Selection Committee headed by respondent No.3- Additional Deputy Commissioner-cum-Projector Director of District Rural Agency Una, petitioner was offered appointment as Junior Engineer (Contract) (IWMP) on 16.02.2010. He joined the service in the Development Block Haroli on 03.03.2010 and served thereafter at various places. A complaint was made by a Gram Panchayat Member on 03.11.2018 to the Deputy Commissioner, Una alleging financial irregularities against the Pradhan, Gram Panchayat Nandpur, in relation to the construction works got executed by the said Panchayat. All 3 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) the works pointed out in the complaint, were checked and found satisfactory by the concerned authority during re-assessment except the work namely “Construction of Check Dam Ward No.5 in Gram Panchayat Nandpur” which had been executed under the technical supervision of the petitioner. The respondents conducted a preliminary inquiry into the allegations levelled in the complaint. Petitioner was not associated in the preliminary inquiry. The inquiry pointed out that the petitioner had assessed the work for 3,57,271/- but during re-evaluation/re-assessment, the ₹ work was found to be worth 1,78,194/-. ₹ 2(ii). Based upon the aforesaid preliminary inquiry, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 04.11.2019 pointing out that an amount of 1,79,077.5/- ₹ had been shown as excess spent on the work, for which petitioner was held responsible and his act & conduct had been found incompatible with the proper discharge of his duty rendering him liable to disciplinary action. The petitioner was directed to furnish his reply to the said notice 4 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) as to why disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated against him for violation of Rules and dereliction of duties. 2(iii). Petitioner replied on 13.11.2019 that the work involved earthwork in cutting; At the time of inquiry the check dam was full of water and as such the correct measurement of earthwork could not have been taken accurately thereby reducing the amount of revised assessment. Petitioner did not accept the re-assessment got done by the respondents. The respondents got assessed the construction work again through another technical officer. This time the same work was assessed as worth Rs.1,32,000/-. Petitioner though accepted the measurement of work on 10.12.2019, but did not specifically accept the reassessment of the value of the work. 2(iv). A notice was issued to the petitioner on 23.07.2020 for depositing an amount of Rs.2,25,271/-, as expenditure incurred in excess in the execution of the work. The notice was followed by another show cause notice calling upon the petitioner that despite direction to deposit Rs.2,25,271/-, the petitioner had not deposited the 5 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) aforesaid amount, therefore, why his services should not be terminated for non-compliance of the directions and dereliction of the duties. Faced with the aforesaid situation, the damocles sword hanging over his head, petitioner deposited an amount of Rs.2,25,271/- allegedly spent in excess and in lieu of this deposit, the respondent issued a No Objection Certificate (NOC) to him on 15.09.2020. 2(v). Petitioner continued to serve as Junior Engineer. Two years later, the respondent No.2 – Deputy Commissioner–cum-Chief Executive Officer, DRDA Una, District Una (H.P) issued an order on 14.07.2022 terminating petitioner’s services with immediate effect in the following manner:- “Therefore, the undersigned after carefully considering the facts of the case, and material placed on record, is of the considered opinion that, financial probity is an essential requirement for the job of J.E. In the present matter, the wrongful conduct of Sh. Arun Kang, J.E., has led to financial loss to the public exchequer which has been admitted by him. There is an established violation of the terms of his employment agreement. As per para-3 of the contract i.e. “The appointment is liable to be terminated on/in case the performance/conduct of the contract appointee is not found good or if a regular incumbent is appointed/posted against the vacancy for which the first party was engaged or Contract”. Thus, as per para-3 of the agreement, the appointment of Sh. Arun Kang, Junior Engineer (IWMP), Development Block – Haroli is hereby ordered to be terminated with immediate effect.” 6 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition seeking the following substantive reliefs:- “A. That a writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction may kindly be issued quashing the impugned order dated 14.07.2022 (Annexure P-11) being patently illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and unconstitutional. B. That a writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction may kindly be issued directing the Respondents to re-instate the petitioner in his service with all consequential benefits and consequently regularize the services of the petitioner as per the prevailing regularization policy.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had not accepted the re-assessment of the value of the work as determined by the respondents. Petitioner had only accepted the measurement of the work. Petitioner had deposited the amount shown as excess spent for the work in question under threat of termination of his services in case of non-deposit. The petitioner was eligible for regularization of his services. His juniors & counter- parts had been regularized in service. The respondents were not considering his case for regularization. Respondents made the petitioner to understand that his case for regularization could be considered only upon his depositing 7 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) the amount in question. Faced with this situation, petitioner had no option but to deposit the amount as directed by the respondents. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that deposition of the amount under compelling and forced circumstances created by the respondents could not be held against him as a ground for not regularizing his services or in terminating his services and condemning him unheard in violation of principles of natural justice. Reliance in support of this submission was placed upon several decisions. Countering the above submission, learned Assistant Advocate General, submitted that petitioner had himself deposited the amount which was sought to be recovered from him in terms of the preliminary inquiry report as excess spent on the execution of the work in question. In the circumstances, there was no requirement for conducting disciplinary inquiry into the matter. Respondents had justly terminated petitioner’s services. Petitioner was a contractual employee not a regular Government employee. His service was governed by an 8 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) agreement executed between him and the respondents. Clause 3 thereof stated “The service of FIRST PARTY will be purely on temporary basis. The appointment is liable to be terminated on/in case the performance/conduct of the contract appointee is not found good or if a regular incumbent is appointed/posted against Vacancy for which the First Party was engaged or contract.” 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the case file. 4(i) Legal Position 4(i)(a) It will be relevant to take note of State of H.P. & Ors. Vs. Dr. Parvesh Thakur1. Respondent therein was appointed on contract basis. He was terminated from service invoking terms of the contract executed with him. The Hon’ble Division Bench noticing several authoritative pronouncements as also the fact that the State had not chosen to hold any independent inquiry with regard to the case registered against the respondent did not interfere with the decision of the learned Tribunal whereby termination 1CWP No. 1666/2017, decided on 24.08.2020. 9 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) order was set aside. Relevant portion from the decision reads as under:- “2. The facts are not in dispute. The respondent was appointed as Veterinary Doctor in the Department of Animal Husbandry, in the year 2014 on contract basis. Initially, the appointment was for one year and the same was renewed year after year. 4 Based   upon   arrest   of   the   respondent,   the   State terminated services of the respondent by passing the following order: In exercise of powers conferred by the proviso 15-A[VII (B)] of Recruitment & Promotions Rules for the post of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services, Class-I (Gazetted), made under Article 309 of the Constitution, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleaded to terminate the contract appointment of Dr. Parvesh Thakur, Veterinary Officer (Contract) presently posted as Veterinary Hospital, Katgaon, District Kinnaur, w.e.f. 13.12.2016, for remaining arrested under under IPC Section 376, for more than 48 hours. 5……………………... 6 The learned Tribunal, after going through the pleadings and material on record; and after relying upon the judgments of the Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   in  Gujarat   Steel   Tubes   Ltd.   vs. Mazdoor Sabha,2    Nar Singh Pal vs. Union of   India  and   ors.3, All   India   Council   for Technical    Education    vs.  Rominder Randhawa,  decided  on 23.2.2010, came to the conclusion that the impugned order of termination of services of the respondent was punitive in nature and accordingly, directed his reinstatement with all consequential benefits by quashing the termination order, as aforesaid. 7. It is vehemently argued by Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned Advocate General assisted by Ms. Seema Sharma, Deputy Advocate General that the learned Tribunal has gravely erred in holding the respondent entitled for re-instatement in service with all consequential benefits ignoring the provisions of the contract agreement/appointment order, more particularly, condition No.3, which clearly provides that the service of respondent was purely on contract basis and could be 2 1980 (2) SCC 593 3(2000)  3   SCC  588 10 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) terminated in case performance/conduct of the contract appointee i.e. respondent, was not found good. 8 to 11 …………………….. 12 The entire law on the subject has been considered in detail by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Meenakshi vs. State of U.P. and ors.4, wherein the Court, after taking into consideration as many as 49 judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court including various Constitution Bench judgments, laid down the following principles to find out whether a simple order of termination/discharge of a temporary employee or probationer is punitive or not: “(a) The termination of services of a temporary servant or probationer under the rules of his employment or in exercise of contractual right is neither per se dismissal nor removal and does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. (b) An order of termination simplicitor prima facie is not a punishment and carries no evil consequences. (c) Where termination simplicitor is challenged on the ground of casting stigma or penal in nature, the Court initially would glance the order itself to find out whether it cast any stigma and can be said to be penal or not. If it does not, no further enquiry shall be held unless there is some material to show certain circumstances, preceding or attending, shadowing the simplicitorness of the said order. (d) The Court is not precluded from going beyond the order to find out as to whether circumstances, preceding or attending, makes it punitive or not. If the circumstances, preceding or attending, show only the motive of the employer to terminate, it being immaterial would not vitiate the order unless it is found that order is founded on such act or omission constituting misconduct. (e) If the order visits the public servant with evil consequences or casts aspersions against his character or integrity, it would be an order by way of punishment irrespective of whether the employee was a mere probationer or temporary. (f) "Motive" and "foundation" are distinct, though the distinction is either very thin or overlapping. "Motive" is the moving power, which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently. "Motive" is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. "Foundation", however, is the basis, i.e., the conduct of the employee, When his acts and 42018(9) ADJ 550 11 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) omissions treated to be misconduct, proved or founded, it becomes a case of foundation. (g) If an order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal, but if it falls short of it, it would not. (h) Where the employer is satisfied of the misconduct and the consequent desirability of termination, it is dismissal even though the order is worded innocuously. However, where there is mere suspicion of misconduct and the employer does not wish to bother about it, and, instead of going into the correctness of guilt, feel like not to keep the employee and thus terminate him, it is simpliciter termination and not punitive. (i) Where the termination simplicitor is preceded by an enquiry, purpose, object of such enquiry as also the stage at which, the order of termination has been passed. (j) Every enquiry preceding the order of termination/discharge, would not make it punitive. Where an enquiry contemplated in the rules before terminating an probationer or temporary employee is held, it would not make the order punitive. (k) If the enquiry is to find out whether the employee is fit to be confirmed or retained in service or to continue, such an enquiry would not render termination punitive. (l) Where the employer hold a formal enquiry to find out the correctness of the alleged misconduct of the employee and proceed on the finding thereof, such an order would be punitive, and, cannot be passed without giving an opportunity to the concerned employee. m) If some formal departmental enquiry commenced but not pursued to the end. Instead a simple order of termination is passed, the motive operating in the mind of the authority would be immaterial and such an order would be non punitive. (n) When an order of termination is assailed on the ground of mala fide or arbitrariness, while defending the plea of mala fide, if the authority has referred certain facts justifying the order of discharge relating to misconduct, negligence or inefficiency of the employee in the appeal or in the affidavit filed before the Court, that would not make the order founded on any misconduct. (o) Sometimes when some reason is mentioned in the order, that by itself would not make the order punitive or stigmatic. The following words mentioned in the order have not been 12 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) held to be punitive. i. "want of application", ii. "lack of potential", iii. "found not dependable", iv. "under suspension", v. "work is unsatisfactory", vi. "unlikely to prove an efficient officer". (p) Description of background facts also have not been held to be stigmatic. (q) However, the words "undesirable to be retained in Government service", have been held stigmatic. (r) If there is (i) a full scale formal enquiry, (ii) in the allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct, (iii) which culminated in a finding of guilt; where all these three factors are present, the order of termination would be punitive irrespective of the form. However, if any one of three factors is missing, then it would not be punitive.” 13 Judged in light of the aforesaid exposition of law, it would be noticed that the only basis for terminating the respondent was that he was arrested for an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and remained in custody for more than 48 hours. 14 The State did not even choose to hold any independent inquiry with regard to the case registered against the respondent. 15 It is not in dispute that the respondent was honourably acquitted in the case that was registered against him and the said findings have attained finality as neither the State nor the prosecutrix filed an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, dated 22.7.2019. 16 In the given circumstances, no fault can be found with the findings rendered by the learned Tribunal, wherein it was observed as under: “From the sequence of the facts of the case, the inference is irresistible that the impugned order of termination of the services of the applicant is penal in nature. It is well settled that though the order is innocuous on the face of it, then the Court, if necessary for the ends of fair play and justice, can lift the veil and find out the real nature of the order. If it is found that the impugned order is penal in nature even though it is couched with the order of termination in accordance with the terms and conditions of the order of appointment, the order will be set aside.” 13 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) 4(i)(b) U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs Brijesh Kumar5, centered on whether respondent’s termination as a contract conductor by the appellant was lawful. Respondent had been appointed as a contract conductor on a preferential basis after applying for compassionate appointment following his father's death, who was an employee of the appellant. During his tenure, respondent was found guilty of misconduct, including carrying passengers without tickets and transporting extra luggage, resulting in his termination on January 30, 2016. He challenged this order, claiming he was a permanent employee appointed on compassionate grounds and, therefore, could not be dismissed without a proper disciplinary inquiry. Learned Single Judge set aside the termination, holding that since the appointment was on compassionate grounds, respondent was a permanent employee and entitled to the protection available to a regular employee. This decision was upheld by the Hon’ble Division Bench. The appellant contended before the Hon’ble 5Civil Appeal No.9903 of 2024 decided on 28.8.2024 14 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) Supreme Court, that respondent's appointment was strictly contractual, and that his services could be terminated as per the terms of his contract. Hon’ble Apex Court clarified that merely applying for compassionate appointment does not convert a contractual appointment into a permanent one under the Dying in Harness Rules. However, it was held that respondent’s services had been determined solely on the ground of misconduct but without holding any regular inquiry or affording any opportunity of hearing to him. The termination of his services even if on contractual basis could not be ordered without following the principles of natural justice. The services of the respondent had been determined solely on the ground of misconduct as alleged but without holding any regular inquiry or affording any opportunity of hearing to him. The termination order was apparently stigmatic in nature which could not have been passed without following the Principles of Natural Justice. Relevant para of the judgment is as under:- “19. The services of the respondent have been terminated solely on the ground of misconduct as alleged but without holding any regular inquiry or affording any opportunity of hearing to him. The 15 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) termination order has been passed on the basis of some report which probably was not even supplied to the respondent. No show cause notice appears to have been issued to the respondent. Therefore, the order of termination of his services, even if on contractual basis, has been passed on account of alleged misconduct without following the Principles of Natural Justice. The termination order is apparently stigmatic in nature which could not have been passed without following the Principles of Natural Justice. 4(i)(c) Swati Priyadarshini vs State of Madhya Pradesh6, Hon’ble Supreme Court addressed the termination of appellant, a contractual Assistant Project Coordinator under the Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan, whose services were not renewed. The appellant contended that her termination was stigmatic, based on allegations of misconduct, and was issued without a proper inquiry, violating applicable rules and the principles of natural justice. Learned Single Judge of the High Court quashed her termination, holding it to be stigmatic and invalid without a regular inquiry, but the Hon’ble Division Bench reversed this, treating the order as a simple non-renewal of contract. Hon’ble Supreme Court restored the Learned Single Judge's decision, holding that the termination was indeed stigmatic, as it followed show-cause notices and had adverse 6Civil Appeal No.9758 of 2024 decided on 22.8.2024. 16 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) consequences for her future employment. It was held that even if the termination order does not explicitly mention misconduct, courts can look into the background and context to determine its true character. Since the termination was for alleged misconduct, a formal inquiry was necessary, and its absence rendered the action invalid. Relevant paras from the judgment are as under:- “4. On 15.10.2012, the sole appellant was appointed by the Respondent No.4 to the post of Assistant Project Coor- dinator (hereinafter referred to as “APC”) under the Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan (hereinafter referred to as “SSA”) on contract basis, initially for one academic session (1 year), renewable in subsequent years for two years each “sub- ject to evaluation of work in the first year.” 5 to 10……………... 11. Order dated 30.03.2013 was passed by the Respon- dent No.4 deciding not to extend the contract of the ap- pellant as APC from 31.03.2013 on the ground of derelic- tion of duty, as the work/performance of the appellant was found to be unsatisfactory. English translation of this order as annexed by the appellant with the paper-book reads as under: “Under the above subject matter and under the Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan on 30.03.2013 in the meeting of the District Appointment Committee after the considera- tion and determination is done and subsequent to the same this decision has been taken that as you work is not satisfactory and due to this reason from the end dated 31.03.2013 of the Education Session your contract service may not be increased. In the context of the above decision from dated 31.03.2013 furthermore your contract service is not increased.” (sic) 17 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) 12 to 32…………………... 33. In either of the above-noted eventualities, the Impugned Judgment would have to necessarily be set aside. Nevertheless, let us examine the reasoning of the Division Bench, which opined that the order is non- stigmatic and simpliciter non-renewal of contract. The order dated 30.03.2013 was, quite obviously, the culmination of the process set into motion by the two SCNs, which has been overlooked by the Division Bench. The mere non-mention of the background situation or the SCNs in the order dated 30.03.2013 cannot, by itself, be determinative of the nature of the order. As held by this Court in Samsher Singh v State of Punjab7 and Anoop Jaiswal v Government of India8, the form of an order is not its final determinant and the Court can find out the real reason and true character behind terminating/removing an employee. Moreover, the Impugned Judgment also does not deal with Clause 4. Interestingly, this Clause also escaped the attention of or/and was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge either. 34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v Union of India9,: “28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India 10. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh 11 In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry 7(1974) 2 SCC 831 8(1984)2 SCC 369 91957 SCC OnLine SC 5 10 [(1953) 1 SCC 420: (1953) SCR 655] 11[(1955) 1 SCR 26]. 18 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India12 wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, 12[AIR (1956) Bom 455] 19 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression “terminate” or “discharge” is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant.” (emphasis supplied) 35. We would only be adding to verbosity by multiplying authorities. In view of the above dictum, it is 20 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) clear that the Respondents did not comply with Clause 4 – either the first part or the second part thereof. The order dated 30.03.2013 does visit the appellant with evil consequences and would create hurdles for her re further employment. 36. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, the Impugned Judgment is quashed and set aside. The judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 20.06.2017 stands revived, however with a modification to the extent that the appellant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits including notional continuation in service at par with other similarly- situated employees, but with the back wages restricted to 50%. Further, in view of the long passage of time, we deny liberty to the respondents to proceed afresh against the appellant as was granted by the learned Single Judge. However, this will not preclude the respondents from taking action against the appellant in accordance with law in futuro apropos her official duties on the post in question, if the situation so arises. The exercise be completed within three months from the date of receipt of this judgment.” 4(ii). In the instant case, according to the respondents, the petitioner had accepted the re-assessment carried out second time, deposited the excess amount spent & therefore, there was no need to hold disciplinary proceedings. It is an admitted position of the respondents that petitioner was not associated during preliminary inquiry conducted in the matter. The petitioner had assessed the work in question for 3,57,271/- but during ₹ second evaluation/re-assessment respondents found the work worth 1,78,192/-. The third assessment work valued ₹ 21 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) the same work at 1,32,000/-. It is logical to believe that a ₹ person who had himself assessed the work as worth 3,57,271/- and who did not accept the re-assessed value ₹ of work at 1,78,194/- would not accept the re-assessment ₹ on still lower side i.e. 1,32,000/-. There is no document on ₹ record to suggest that the petitioner had specifically and categorically accepted the re-assessment of value of work at 1,32,000/-. It is the admitted case of the respondents that ₹ the petitioner had even objected to valuation of work at 1,78,194/-. In this background, petitioner’s stand ₹ assumes significance that due to respondents not considering his case for regularization of the services and his counter-parts & juniors having been regularized in service, the petitioner under compulsion deposited the alleged overvalued expenditure of 2,25,271/-. Still further, ₹ on depositing the alleged excess expenditure, petitioner was allowed to continue to work for two years. It was on 14.07.2022 that the respondents issued the impugned order holding petitioner’s response to be unsatisfactorily and petitioner’s conduct resulting into financial loss to the 22 ( 2025:HHC:14631-DB ) public exchequer & terminated his services under clause 3 of the agreement executed by him. The order terminating petitioner’s services cannot be regarded as termination simplicitor. It was stigmatic termination. Petitioner’s services could not have been terminated without conducting regular inquiry. 5. In view of above, this writ petition is allowed. Impugned termination order dated 14.07.2022 (Annexure P- 11) is quashed and set aside. Petitioner shall be reinstated in service. Period during which he remained out of service as a consequence of impugned termination order shall be notionally counted towards his service and service benefits. The respondents shall be at liberty to hold inquiry against the petitioner in accordance with law. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off. Jyotsna Rewal Dua 20th May, 2025 Judge (Shamsh Tabrez)