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2025 DAILYLAW 13091 (RAJ)

SMT PREM KANWAR v. STATE HOME DEPARTMENT ORS

CW/2742/2012 · 2025-03-25

Anoop Kumar Dhand

Review Petitionbody2025

Judgment text

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[2025:RJ-JP:13586] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2742/2012 Smt. Prem Kanwar W/o Phool Singh, House of Amar Singh Ji Retired, Near Police Line, First Chauraha, Ajmer ----Petitioner Versus 1. State of Rajasthan through Chief Secretary, Government Secretariat, Jaipur 2. Deputy Secretary Home Group-2 Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur 3. Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan Police, Ajmer Range, Ajmer 4. Superintendent of Police, Rajasthan Police, Ajmer, District Ajmer ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr.Zeeshan Khan For Respondent(s) : Ms.Karishma Soni for Mr.Vinod Kumar Gupta, Addl.GC. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND Order 25/03/2025 1. By way of filing this writ petition, a challenge has been made to the order dated 17.04.2006 passed by His Excellency, The Governor in the review petition submitted by the petitioner under Rule 34 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, “the Rules of 1958”) by which the orders have passed to reinstate the petitioner in service, but no salary allowances will be payable to her for the intervening period, i.e., from the date of removal from service to the date of her reinstatement on the basis of the principles of ‘No Work No Pay’. [2025:RJ-JP:13586] (2 of 4) [CW-2742/2012] 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was working on the post of Class-IV Employee, Police Line, Ajmer where charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 was served upon her and after conducting Domestic Enquiry against her, an order was passed to terminate her from services vide impugned order dated 13.09.2004. Counsel submits that the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case by the competent Court of law on 19.10.2004 and thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal, but the same was rejected. Counsel submits that aggrieved by the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority, the petitioner filed a review petition under Rule 34 of the Rules of 1958 and the same was partly allowed and the order of her termination from service was quashed and set-aside, but no orders have been passed with regard to payment of salary for the period commencing from the date of termination of service till date of reinstatement of the petitioner. Counsel submits that the petitioner is entitled to get salary for the intervening period and all other consequential benefits, hence, under these interference of this Court is warranted. 3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-state opposes the prayer and submits that the theory/ principle of “No work No Pay” is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, as the petitioner did not perform any work during the intervening period, hence, under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to get any monetary benefits for this period. Counsel submits that there is no merit and substance in this petition, hence, the same is liable to be rejected. [2025:RJ-JP:13586] (3 of 4) [CW-2742/2012] 4. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and perused the material available on record. 5. This fact is not in dispute that on the basis of a F.I.R. lodged against the petitioner bearing No.12/03, her services were terminated by the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 13.09.2004. This fact is not in dispute that after facing trial in the aforesaid criminal case, she stood acquitted vide judgment dated 19.10.2004. This fact is also not in dispute that after passing of the aforesaid judgment, the petitioner submitted a review petition under Rule 34 of the Rules of 1958 against her termination order before His Excellency, The Governor and the review petition submitted by her was partly allowed and her termination order was quashed and set-aside, but it was observed by the Reviewing Authority that the petitioner would not be entitled to get any salary or allowances for the intervening period, i.e., from the date of termination of her service till the date of her reinstatement in service. 6. This Court finds no illegality in the aforesaid observation made by the Reviewing Authority as the petitioner has not worked in this intervening period, hence, under these circumstances, the theory/ principles of ‘No Work No Pay’ is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, as the petitioner has not performed or discharged any duties in this intervening period. 7. But, this Court cannot lose its sight upon the fact that the order of termination has been quashed and set-aside by the Reviewing Authority and an order was passed for her reinstatement, therefore, the petitioner is certainly entitled to get [2025:RJ-JP:13586] (4 of 4) [CW-2742/2012] all notional benefits arising out of her service from the date of her initial appointment. 8. Looking to the fact that the petitioner stood retired during the pendency of this petition, the respondents are directed to grant all the consequential benefits to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 9. Stay application and all pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J Aayush Sharma /118