2025:HHC:17996 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 4120 of 2013 Reserved on: 06.05.2025 Date of Decision: 06.06.2025 Aruneet Sood ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr. Dushyant Dadwal, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 29.12.2012 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P, (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 29.10.2007 and order of sentence dated 30.10.2007 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. P a g e | 2 2025:HHC:17996 manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that HC. Parkash Chand (PW-2) and Constable Soni Kumar (PW-4) were on traffic duty at Paprola Bazar on 22.08.2006 at about 10:30 p.m. A vehicle bearing registration No. PB12F-8666 was parked in the middle of the road. Water tanks were being unloaded from the vehicle. This vehicle was obstructing the traffic. HC Parkash Chand (PW-2) requested the Driver, Baljit Singh, to remove the vehicle; however, he did not pay any heed. HC Parkash Chand (PW-2) demanded the documents of the vehicle. The accused, Aruneet Sood, owner of Mahalaxmi Traders, came to the spot and asked the driver not to show the documents to the police; otherwise, the police would issue a challan. HC Parkash Chand objected to the intervention of the accused. The accused got infuriated. He abused the informant and obstructed him in the discharge of his official duty. He threatened to get the informant transferred. He also tried to snatch the challan book from the P a g e | 3 2025:HHC:17996 informant. The matter was reported to the police. An entry (Ext.PW-1/A) was recorded in the Police Station. An application was filed for permission to conduct an investigation. Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baijnath District Kangra, H.P., accorded the permission vide order dated 30.08.2006, (Ext.PW5/A). ASI Pratap Chand (PW-5) conducted the investigation. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW5/B) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. After completion of the investigation, a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined five witnesses to prove its case. Gulzar Chand (PW-1) proved the entry in the daily diary. Parkash Chand (PW-2) is the informant. Sureshta Thakur (PW-3) prepared the complaint against the accused. Constable Soni Kumar P a g e | 4 2025:HHC:17996 (PW-4) is an eyewitness. Partap Chand (PW-5) conducted the investigation. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., stated that the truck left the spot after unloading the water tanks. He was innocent. HC Parkash Chand visited his shop and demanded the articles on credit basis, but he refused to provide the articles on credit; therefore, HC Parkash Chand had ill will. He examined Yash Pal Sharma (DW-1) in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. The failure to examine the shopkeeper or other persons present in the bazaar was not sufficient to discard the prosecution's version. The defence taken by the accused that HC Parkash Chand demanded articles on a credit basis was not probable. Testimonies of police officials cannot be ignored on the ground that they happened to be police officials. The accused had not only abused HC Parkash Chand (PW-2) but also tried to snatch the challan book from him. He also asked the driver, Baljit Singh, not to produce the documents, and in this manner, he obstructed the informant in the discharge of his official duty. Hence, the learned Trial Court P a g e | 5 2025:HHC:17996 convicted the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC and sentenced him as under:- 186 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for seven (7) days and was directed to pay a fine of ₹200/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for four (4) days. 189 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for seven (7) days and was directed to pay a fine of ₹200/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for four (4) days. Both sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused had obstructed the informant in the discharge of his official duty. The failure to examine the independent witnesses did not make the prosecution's case suspect. The defence version that the informant demanded the articles on credit basis, which the accused refused to provide, was not believable because no P a g e | 6 2025:HHC:17996 complaint was made to the higher officials; therefore, the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed. 8 Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused filed the present revision petition, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. They ignored the evidence on record. The prosecution's evidence did not prove the ingredients of Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC. No independent witness was examined to corroborate the testimonies of police officials. The petitioner had no concern with the vehicle, and he had no reason to interfere in the process of the challan of the vehicle. There were material contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, and discrepancies in the entries of daily dairy which made the prosecution's case highly suspect. The report from the Probation Officer was not called, and the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was not given to the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision petition be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. P a g e | 7 2025:HHC:17996 9. I have heard Mr. Dushyant Dadwal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State. 10. Mr. Dushyat Dadwal, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner/accused is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The prosecution's case is inherently suspect because HC Parkash Chand was not deputed to Paprola Bazar as per the entry (Ext.PW1/B). Further, this entry was recorded on 22.08.2006 at 7:00 a.m. and it bears Sl. No.30. The prosecution also proved another entry (Ext.PW1/A) which was recorded on the same day at 11:50 a.m., but it bears Sl. No.11. The discrepancies in the serial number make the prosecution's case highly suspect. The learned Trial Court did not appreciate this aspect of the case. The statement of the informant and Soni Kumar (PW-4) do not prove any obstruction to the duty being discharged by public officials and the learned Courts below erred in convicting and sentencing the accused, therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in the State of H.P. Vs. Ashwani Kumar 2024 HHC 7086 in support of his submission. P a g e | 8 2025:HHC:17996 11. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that the accused obstructed the informant in the discharge of his official duty. He asked the driver of the truck not to show the documents to the informant and tried to snatch the challan book from the informant. These acts satisfied the ingredients of commission of offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC. Learned Courts below had rightly appreciated the evidence on record, and this Court should not interfere with the appreciation of the evidence of the learned Trial Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed on page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought P a g e | 9 2025:HHC:17996 on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed: “13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C., which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460, where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not P a g e | 10 2025:HHC:17996 be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much- advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed on page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the ground for exercising the P a g e | 11 2025:HHC:17996 revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another P a g e | 12 2025:HHC:17996 view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 14. In the above case, also conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its own view. This Court set aside the High Court's order holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, P a g e | 13 2025:HHC:17996 upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. The informant asserted that he was deputed vide entry No. 30 (Ext.PW-1/B). He was looking after the traffic duty at Paprola Main Bazar at 10:30 a.m. His version is not supported by entry No. 30 (Ext.PW-1/B), in which it was mentioned that HC Parkash Chand and Constable Madan Lal were sent on traffic duty to the bus stand in Baijnath, and Constable Soni Ram was sent to Paprola. 19. Constable Soni Kumar (PW-4) stated in his cross- examination that HC Parkash Chand was deputed at Bus Sand Baijnath. He volunteered to say that he was a Traffic Incharge and could go anywhere. Therefore, the statement of the witness Constable Soni Kumar (PW-4) and the entry in the daily diary clearly show that HC Parkash Chand was not deputed in Paprola P a g e | 14 2025:HHC:17996 Bazar. HC Prakash Chand did not say that he had visited Paprola Bazar on his own or even after receiving the complaint regarding obstruction of the traffic in Paprola Bazar. He was categorical in saying that he was deputed on duty at Paprola Bazar. Therefore, the prosecution’s case regarding the presence of HC Parkash Chand at Paprola Bazar is highly suspect. 20. HC Parkash Chand (PW-2) stated that a vehicle bearing registration No. PB-12F-8666 was parked in Paprola Bazar, which led to an obstruction in the traffic. He asked the driver, Baljit Singh, to remove the vehicle, but the driver refused to do so. The accused came to the spot and asked the driver not to remove the vehicle. HC Parkash Chand demanded the papers of the vehicle, but the accused asked driver Baljit Singh not to produce the documents. He started abusing the informant and threatened to get him transferred. The accused also tried to snatch the challan book. 21. It is apparent from his statement that the accused had threatened the informant to get him transferred. This threat does not fall within the definition of an injury within the meaning of Section 189 of the IPC. P a g e | 15 2025:HHC:17996 22. The word “injury” has been defined in Section 44 of IPC as any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property. The term “illegal” has been defined under Section 43 of the IPC to apply to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action. Getting a person transferred is not an offence. It is also not prohibited by law and does not furnish any ground for civil action. The transfer is an incident of service and any government servant can be transferred at the discretion of the appointing authority to any place at any time in accordance with the service conditions applicable to him. 23. Almost a similar case was considered by the Rajasthan High Court in Abdul Faqir Versus State of Rajasthan Crl. Misc. Petition No. 2755 of 2015, decided on 14th September 2017, where the complainant was told that in case he does not withdraw the complaint filed by him, he would suffer serious consequences, and the accused shall ensure that he does not get the pension. It was laid down by the Rajasthan High Court that the threat to stop the pension is not an injury which falls within the definition of Section 189 of the IPC. It was observed: P a g e | 16 2025:HHC:17996 “14. On bare reading of the statement of the complainant as well as witness, it is clear that the total allegation against the (5 of 6) present petitioner was that he had threatened the complainant that if the complaint against the Jetha Ram driver was not taken back then the complainant shall suffer all serious consequences which include stopping of pension. This Court has also taken note of the fact that the incident of 09.11.2012 has been complained on 14.02.2013 after a gross delay. 15. This Court finds that the necessary ingredients of the offence of Section 189 of IPC i.e. the threat of injury as defined under Section 44 of IPC clearly denote that there was no threat of any bodily, mind, reputation or property in the present complaint. It is also observed that the necessary ingredients of assault or criminal force also cannot be formed on the face of the FIR and on the face of it, it is reflected that the complainant was called in court premises at 7:00 am when he was neither discharging his duties which would constitute the performance of the duty” 24. If the Rajasthan High Court had not considered the threat to stop the pension as an injury to the property, mind or body, it is difficult to see how the threat to transfer can be considered an injury when, as already stated, transfer is an incident of service and does not involve any penal or civil consequences. Hence, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner has to be accepted as correct that the allegations, assuming them to be true, do not fall within the definition of Section 189 of IPC, and the learned Trial Court had erred in recording the conviction under these circumstances. P a g e | 17 2025:HHC:17996 25. HC Parkash Chand (PW-2) admitted in his cross- examination that the driver had not produced the documents, and the vehicle is to be impounded on failure to produce the documents. However, he had not impounded the vehicle. He had issued the challan; however, he had not produced any documents showing action taken by him against driver Baljit Singh. 26. The statement made by this witness in his cross- examination that he had not impounded the vehicle shows that his version that the accused had asked the driver not to produce the documents is not correct. Had the documents not been produced, he would have impounded the vehicle. The failure to impound the vehicle makes his version highly doubtful. Further, he failed to produce the challan issued by him to Baljit Singh. The challan would have corroborated the informant’s version that the vehicle was parked in the middle of the road, and it was causing obstruction to the traffic. The production of the challan was also necessary because HC Parkash Chand was not deputed in Paprola Bazar and would have established his presence in bazaar. 27. Constable Soni Kumar (PW-4) stated in his cross- examination that the incident continued for 15-20 minutes, and P a g e | 18 2025:HHC:17996 many people gathered on the spot. Learned Courts below held that non-examination of the witnesses is not fatal in the present case because the testimony of the informant was credible, however, they failed to notice that the informant was not deputed for duty at Paprola Bazar. He had not produced any document showing that the vehicle was causing obstruction to the traffic. He had not impounded the vehicle on failure to produce the documents. These circumstances required the corroboration from the independent witnesses, and the non-examination of the independent persons would assume significance in the present case. 28. Therefore, the learned Courts below erred in relying upon the statement of HC Parkash Chand (PW-2) and Constable Soni Kumar (PW-4). These could not have been relied upon in view of the infirmities noticed above. Therefore, judgments and order passed by the learned Court below are liable to be interfered with. 29. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and the judgment of conviction dated 29.10.2007 and order of sentence dated 30.10.2007 passed by learned Trial Court and affirmed by learned Appellate Court are set aside and the accused is acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 186 and P a g e | 19 2025:HHC:17996 189 of the IPC. The fine amount, if deposited by the petitioner, be refunded to him after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case of no further appeal, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 30. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in an event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 31. In view of the above, the present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 32. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 06h June,2025 (ravinder)