1 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 4216 of 2013 Reserved on: 29.07.2025 Decided on: 12.08.2025 State of Himachal Pradesh ...…..Appellant Versus Surinder Kumar …..Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellant: Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent: Mr. Udit Shaurya Kaushik, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 01.07.2013, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamshala, vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of offences punishable under Sections 324 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code (in short “IPC”). (Parties 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes. 2 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 324 and 504 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant, Shyam Rani (PW2), made a complaint (Ex.PW2/A) to the police, stating that her father-in-law had thrown tea at her. He used to abuse and harass her. Her brother-in-law had also beaten her. Her mother-in-law and sister-in-law also taunted her. All of them threatened to throw her out of the matrimonial home. They asked the informant's husband to divorce her. The police registered the F.I.R. (Ex.PW4/A) and conducted the investigation. An application was filed for medical examination of the informant. Dr. Anupama (PW1) conducted her medical examination and found simple burn injuries on her body. She issued MLC (Ex.PW2/B). HC Raman Kumar (PW5) conducted the investigation. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW5/A) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. 3 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) After completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 324 and 504 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined six witnesses to prove its case. Dr. Anupama (PW1) conducted the medical examination of the informant. Shyam Rani (PW2) is the informant/victim. HC Rajesh Kumar (PW3) proved the entry in the daily diary. Mukesh Kumar (PW4) signed the F.I.R. Raman Kumar (PW5) conducted the investigation. Chet Ram (PW6) did not support the prosecution case. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr. P.C. denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He claimed that he was falsely implicated. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that Chet Ram, an independent witness, did not support the prosecution case. He stated that the informant fell and sustained injuries. This made the prosecution’s case suspect. The 4 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) Medical Officer stated in her cross-examination that the injuries noticed by her could have been caused by a fall. Therefore, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The evidence was not appreciated in its proper perspective. Unrealistic standards were laid down to evaluate the direct and cogent prosecution evidence. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses were discarded without any cogent reason. The learned Trial Court misinterpreted the statement of Dr Anupama. She categorically denied the suggestion that injuries could be caused by way of fall. Chet Ram (PW6) corroborated the version of the victim that she had brought the tea for the labourers. The medical evidence also proved that the informant had sustained burn injuries. The learned Trial Court wrongly discarded the statements of the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 5 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) 8. I have heard Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant-State and Mr. Udit Shaurya Kaushik, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant had specifically stated that the accused threw hot tea at her and she sustained burn injuries. This was duly corroborated by the statement of Dr. Anupama (PW1), who found burn injuries on the face, neck and breast of the informant. Chet Ram (PW6) also deposed that the informant had brought tea on the spot, which substantially corroborates the informant’s testimony. The learned Trial Court wrongly discarded the statements of the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. Udit Shaurya Kaushik, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the 6 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) accused. This Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against the acquittal. Chet Ram (PW6) did not support the prosecution case, and he was declared hostile. The other labourers working on the spot were not examined by the prosecution, and an adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution. The complaint made to the police was highly vague, and no action could have been taken on the same. The learned Trial Court was justified in recording the acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person 7 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) would have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position about the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: 8 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, 9 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) reaffirmed, and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 10 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/ omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. A similar view was taken in Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 523, wherein it was observed: - “6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court has to reappreciate the evidence. After re-appreciating the evidence, the first question that needs to be answered by the Appellate Court is whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a plausible view that could have been taken based on the evidence on record. 11 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) Perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that this question has not been adverted to. The Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it is satisfied after reappreciating the evidence that the only possible conclusion was that the guilt of the accused had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal only on the ground that another view is possible. In other words, the judgment of acquittal must be found to be perverse. Unless the Appellate Court records such a finding, no interference can be made with the order of acquittal. The High Court has ignored the well-settled principle that an order of acquittal further strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused. After having perused the judgment, we find that the High Court has not addressed itself to the main question.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The complaint (Ex.PW2/A) made to the police was highly vague. It stated in one line that the informant's father-in-law had thrown the tea at her, and he used to harass her. It does not mention the date, time and place of the incident. The prosecution evidence has to be evaluated while keeping this fact in mind. 16. The informant (PW2) stated that she had gone to serve tea to the masons and labourers on 23.4.2011. When the labourers/masons started picking up the tea, 12 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) the accused pushed the tray having glasses, and the tea fell on her. She sustained injuries on her face, neck and breast. She admitted in her cross-examination that the house in which she was residing belonged to the accused. She admitted that the accused had started the construction work, and he paid the wages to the mason and labourers. She denied that she fell on the construction material. 17. The informant admitted in her cross- examination that she was residing separately from her parents-in-law, and she had separated her kitchen after one and a half years of her marriage. She asserted that the accused was harassing her, which shows that the relationship between the parties was strained, and therefore, it was necessary that there should have been some independent corroboration of the testimony of the informant. 18. Chet Ram (PW6) did not support the prosecution case. He stated that the informant brought the tea. The accused told her that he had not asked for the tea. The informant slipped on the construction material. 13 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) He was permitted to be cross-examined. He stated in his cross-examination by the ld. A.P.P. that the informant fell at a distance of about one foot. He denied that the accused pushed the tray and the tea spilt over the informant’s body. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. 19. This witness has not supported the version of the informant. He categorically denied that the accused pushed the tray and the tea fell on the informant. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that there was no corroboration of the testimony of the informant by the statement of this witness. 20. Dr. Anupama (PW1) found redness over the left cheek, neck, and both breasts with blisters. The nature of the injury was 9% superficial burn injury, and the injury could have been caused by throwing hot tea. 21. This is the entire evidence which was led before the learned Trial Court. 22. It is undisputed that labourers and masons were working on the spot. The prosecution only examined one mason, Chet Ram (PW6). However, he did not support 14 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) the prosecution's case. No other mason/labourer was examined, and there is no corroboration of the testimony of the informant. 23. As already stated, the complaint made by the informant was vague. It did not contain any details of the incident except that hot tea was thrown at the informant by the accused. The circumstances in which the tea was thrown were not mentioned, and it was stated for the first time in the Court that the accused pushed the tray containing the glasses. All these circumstances cast a doubt upon the prosecution case, and the learned Trial Court was justified in holding that the evidence was not sufficient to convict the accused; hence, the judgment of the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be perverse. 24. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. Accordingly, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. 25. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- 15 ( 2025:HHC:27071 ) with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in an event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 26. 26. A copy of the judgment and the record of the learned Trial Court below be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 12th August, 2025. (yogesh)