HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU WP(C) No. 491/2025 Reserved on : 22.04.2025 Pronounced on : 30.08.2025 Nagar Mal …. Petitioner/Appellant(s) Through:- Mr. B. S. Sarmal, Advocate V/s Union of India and others …..Respondent(s) Through:- Mr. Sumant Sudan, Advocate vice Mr. Vishal Sharma, DSGI CORAM: HON9BLE MRS. JUSTICE SINDHU SHARMA, JUDGE (Through Virtual Mode) HON9BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD CHATTERJI KOUL, JUDGE Judgment Per : Sindhu Sharma-J 01. The petitioner, by way of the present writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, has challenged the order dated 15.01.2024, passed by the Hon’ble Armed Forces Tribunal, Srinagar Bench at Jammu, in O.A. No. 399/2018, whereby his claim for grant of Service/Special Pension was rejected. 02. Before we advert to the grounds of challenge, we deem it appropriate to take notice of material facts. 03. The petitioner was enrolled in the erstwhile J&K Militia on 26.10.1948 and discharged from the same on 25.09.1964. The J&K Militia prior to the reorganisation on 01.04.1964 was purely temporary and non-pensionable State Force of J&K without any pensionary benefits. The pensionary benefits became applicable to the personnel of this Force only after its re- organisation into permanent Force as per terms and conditions of the 2 WP(C) No. 491/2025 Government of India, Ministry of Home affairs letters dated 16.05.1964. the existing personnel of J&K Militia were required to give option for absorption in the reorganised Force. The optees who were considered fit by duly constituted board of officers were absorbed in the re-organised Force. The petitioner was found unsuitable for absorption in the re- organised J&K Militia by the duly constituted board. Thus, he was discharged from service and given financial relief w.e.f. 01.10.1985. 04. The petitioner thereafter filed Original Application No. 399/2018 before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Srinagar Bench at Jammu, seeking a direction to the respondents to release service pension from date of his discharge i.e. 25.09.1964, along with arrears and interest till its realisation. The Tribunal rejected the claim of the petitioner vide order dated 15.01.2024, by holding that the applicant being a member of temporary Force was not a part of regular Indian Army, as such, he is not entitled to any relief. 05. The principal contention of the petitioner is based on the provisions of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961, Part I. Regulation 132 provides that the minimum period of qualifying service required for earning service pension (without weightage) is 15 years. In addition, the petitioner has relied on Regulation 164 and 165 which reads as under: - <Special Pension & Gratuities to Junior Commissioned Officers, Other Ranks & Non-Combatants (Enrolled)-When admissible 164. Special pension or gratuity may be granted at the discretion of the President to individuals who are not transferred to the reserve and are discharged in large numbers in pursuance of Govt’s. Policy: - (i) of reducing the strength of establishment of the Armed Forces; Or (ii) of re-organisation, which results in disbandment of any unit/formation. Rank for Assessment of Special Pension 165. Special pension is assessed on substantive or paid acting rank and the group actually held by an individual on the date of discharge.” 3 WP(C) No. 491/2025 06. It is submitted that since the J&K Militia was reorganized into JAK LI with effect from 01.04.1964 and the petitioner was discharged shortly thereafter on 25.09.1964, therefore, he was squarely covered under the reorganization clause and entitled to Special Pension as per the above provisions. It is further submitted that the Tribunal failed to appreciate this aspect of the matter and passed the impugned order without due consideration of the governing pension regulations. 07. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Parshotam Das, Civil Appeal No. 477 of 2023, wherein the Hon’ble Court held that petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal are maintainable. The petitioner submits that the present petition is filed within the limitation period prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963, and that there is neither delay nor laches in filing the same. 08. The petitioner was discharged from erstwhile J&K Militia on 25.09.1964. The contention of the respondent that J&K Militia was a temporary and non-pensionary State Force of J&K and, therefore, its members were not entitled to any pensionary benefits is not denied. The petitioner admittedly was not absorbed in re-organised Force as he was not found suitable and was discharged on 25.09.1964. This discharge was not questioned by him for more than 54 years. It is only in the year 2018 he has filed this petition for grant of pension. The provisions of Pension Regulation for Army, as such, are not applicable to the petitioner. 4 WP(C) No. 491/2025 09. The pension regulations are admittedly applicable to the members of Indian Army. Since the petitioner was never absorbed into the reorganised force and did not become part of the Indian Army, he cannot claim entitlement under the said regulations. This apart, this petition is also barred by delay and laches. The petitioner has questioned the discharge after more than 50 years. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in 8Virender Chaudhary vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation and others, reported as (2009) 1 SCC 2979, held as under: <In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh &Ors. [(2007) 9 SCC 278], this Court held: 16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Karnataka Power Corp. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan.) 17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India and M. R. Gupta v. Union of India= 11. Similarly, in 8State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri and others, reported as (2015) 15 SCC 6029, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: <21. In this regard reference to a passage from Karnataka Power Corp. Ltd Through its Chairman & Managing Director &Anr Vs. K. Thangappan and Anr. MANU/SC/8094/2006: (2006) 4 SCC 322 would be apposite: - <Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.= 5 WP(C) No. 491/2025 After so stating the Court after referring to the authority in State of M.P. v. Nandalal Jaiswal MANU/SC/0034/1989: (1986) 4 SCC 566 restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements, which is to the following effect: - <The High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.= 12. The Tribunal, after due consideration of the facts and applicable law, has rightly decided the OA. We find no reason for the interference in the impugned order. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed. (Vinod Chatterji Koul) (Sindhu Sharma) Judge Judge Jammu 30.08.2025 Vishal Khajuria