2025:HHC:22352 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 646 of 2024 Reserved on: 17.6.2025 Date of Decision: 11.07.2025. Het Ram Chauhan ...Appellant Versus Rajender Prasad Sonkar ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Appellant : Mr. Kishore Pundeer, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Ajay Sipahiya, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 29.3.2003, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Solan, District Solan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 30.7.2022 and order of sentence dated 6.8.2022, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kasauli, District Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were set-aside and the appeal filed by the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was allowed. (Parties shall 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:22352 hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that Het Ram Chauhan and Sons is a sole proprietorship of Het Ram Chauhan. It is engaged in the business of purchasing fruits and vegetables. The accused purchased apples worth ₹38,12,846/- from the complainant on a credit basis. He paid ₹22,65,457/- leaving the balance of ₹15,53,389/-. He issued a cheque of ₹5.00 lacs, drawn on HDFC Bank. The complainant presented the cheque to his Bank, but it was returned with an endorsement ‘Instrument out of date/stale’. The complainant issued a notice to the accused asking him to pay the money within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The notice was duly served upon the accused, but the accused failed to pay the amount, hence, the complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court to take action as per the law. 3 2025:HHC:22352 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined himself (CW1) to prove his case. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the complainant’s case in its entirety. He stated that he and the complainant never had any business transactions with each other. Initially, he stated that he wanted to lead defence evidence; however, no evidence was produced despite many opportunities; hence, the evidence was closed by the order of the Court. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the issuance of the cheque was not disputed in the cross-examination; therefore, a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act would arise that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability, and the burden would shift upon the accused to rebut the presumption. The accused failed to rebut the presumption; yherefore, the 4 2025:HHC:22352 accused was convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 10 months and pay compensation of ₹5,60,000/-. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Solan (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the cheque was dishonoured on the ground of ‘Instrument out dated/stale’, which does not attract the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act. Learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused; therefore, the appeal filed by the accused was allowed, and the accused was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the complainant filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in appreciating the material on record. It was wrongly assumed that the date of the cheque returning memo was the date of presentation. The cheque was presented through the payee's 5 2025:HHC:22352 bank. The finding recorded by the learned Appellate Court that the cheque was presented after the expiry of the validity period is wrong and illegal. The cheque was issued on 21.10.2017, and its validity expired on 21.1.2018. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Kishore Pundeer, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and Mr. Ajay Sipahiya, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr. Kishore Pundeer, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, submitted that the cheque was issued on 21.10.2017 and could have been presented till 21.1.2018, which was a holiday; therefore, its presentation on 22.1.2018 was valid. Learned Appellate Court erred in holding that the dishonour was on the ground that the cheque was ‘Instrument out dated/stale’. The notice was served upon the accused, and he failed to pay the amount despite the receipt of the valid notice of demand. All the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were satisfied. The notice was sent through courier and is deemed to be served in the ordinary 6 2025:HHC:22352 course of business. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submission: - (i) M/s Gimpex Private Ltd. Vs. Manoj Goel (2022) 11 SCC 705; (ii) N. Paraesewaran Unni Vs. G. Kannan (2017) 5 SCC 737; (iii) C.C. Alavi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammad and another (2007) 6 SCC 555; (iv) M/s Ajeet Seeds Ltd. Vs. K. Gopala Krishnaih: (2014) 12 SCC 685; (v) Rohit Bhai Jivanlal Patel Vs. State of Gujarat and another (2019) 18 SCC 106; (vi) Rajesh Jain Vs. Ajay Singh (2023) 10 SCC 148; (vii) Budh Dev Vs. Parveen Sharma, 2024:HHC:1480-DB; (viii) T. Vasant Kumar Vs. Vijay Kumari AIR 2015 SC 2240; (ix) Sri Dattaraya Vs. Sharanappa, 2024 0 INSC 586; (x) Chuni Lal Vs. Indira Seth (2017) 1 DCR 195; (xi) Muddasani Venkata Narasaiah Vs. Muddasani Saojana (2016) 12 SCC 288; (xii) V. Velu v. Chennakrishnan, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 39152; (xiii) Gunnet Bhasin Vs. State of NCT Delhi (2023) 1 BC 263; 7 2025:HHC:22352 (xiv) Sunderpal Singh Chawla Vs. State of Gujarat (2010) 1 RCR (Criminal) 10; (xv) J. Veeraraghavan Vs. Lalith Kumar 1995 3 Crimes (HC) 205; (xvi) Satyaveer Singh Vs. Suraj Cr. A. No. 556/2016, decided on 12.01.2024. (xvii) Harendra Rai Vs. State of Bihar and Anr. AIR 2023 SC 4331; (xviii) Bhupender Kumar Sharma Vs. Rattan Singh (2013) 2 SimLC 780; and (xix) P. Narasimha Vs. State of A.P. & Anr. (2019) ACD 587; (xx) Thomas Varghese Vs. P. Jerome (1992) 2 Bank CLR 126; (xxi) Syed Rasool and Sons and others Vs. Alidas and Company and another (1993) 2 AICLR 159; (xxii) NEPC Micon Limited and others Vs. Magma Leasing Limited (1999) 38 ACrC 876; and (xxiii) Goa Plast (P) Ltd. Vs. Chico Ursula D’Souza (2004) 48 ACrC 212. 11. Mr. Ajay Sipahiya, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the dishonour of the cheque on the ground of ‘Instrument out dated/stale’ does not attract the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act. The presentation has to be made before the bank of the accused, and 8 2025:HHC:22352 the presentation before the bank of the complainant is not sufficient. The memo of dishonour is a computer-generated document which cannot be proved in the absence of the certificate required under Section 65(B)(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, and such a certificate is lacking in the present case; hence, no reliance can be placed on the memo of dishonour. The notice was sent through courier, and there is no proof of its delivery. Learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while deciding the appeal, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court while deciding an appeal against the acquittal. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submission: - (i) Ishar Alloy Steels Vs. Jayaswals Neco Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 609; (ii) Nitin Mahajan Vs. Vinod Kumar Cr. M-M 14696 of 2021, decided on 11.5.2023; (iii) Boddu Jhansi Rani Vs. State of Telangana (2023) 3 ALT (Crl.) 288; (iv) M. Meeran Mohideen Vs. B. Vijayakumar (2019) 4 CivCC 642; 9 2025:HHC:22352 (v) Arjun Panditrao Khotkar Vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and others (2020) AIR (SC) 4908; (vi) Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473; (vii) Vandana Vs. Abhilasha (2018) 4 BomCR (Cri) 774; (viii) Krishnapal Vs. Hari Singh, Cr. Appeal No. 13704 of 2023, decided on 25.4.2024; (ix) Satyendra Tiwari Vs. State of M.P. (2014) 3 MPLJ 574; (x) Rajinder Singh Verma Vs. Haji B.K. Hanchnamani, Cr. Appeal No. 582 of 2017, decided on 30.4.2019; and (xi) Rameshchandra Ambalal Joshi Vs. State of Gujarat and another (2014) ACD 554. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It is admitted case of the complainant that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘Instrument out dated/stale’. 14. Delhi High Court held in H.D. Gumber v. Ashok Sachdeva, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 2037, that a cheque presented after its validity will not make the accused liable for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was observed: - 10 2025:HHC:22352 “8. Admittedly, the cheque was drawn on 23rd November, 2002, and the period of six months within which it could be presented to the bank on which it was drawn, expired on 22.5.2003. However, the cheque was presented by the complainant on 23.5.2003, i.e. one day after the expiry of the statutory period of six months. Consequently, the cheque became invalid and thus the petitioner could not be made criminally liable for its dishonour under the provisions of Section 138 of the Act.” 15. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘Instrument outdated/stale’. It was laid down by the Madras High Court in M. Meeran Mohideen vs. B. Vijayakumar 2019 (4) Civil Court Cases 642 that when the cheque was returned with the reason Instrument outdated/stale, the cheque became invalid and no proceedings could have been initiated for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was observed: “7. In view of the same, the instrument, viz., the Cheque, is valid only for a period of 6 months from the date of issuance of the same. In the case at hand, admittedly, the cheque was presented only after the period of 6 months, viz., 26.09.2017. Therefore, the cheque dated 10.03.2017 became invalid and hence, the entire proceedings have been vitiated, and the learned Judicial Magistrate, without even considering the said fact, mechanically took cognisance and issued a summons to the petitioner. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are liable to be quashed.” 11 2025:HHC:22352 16. Gujarat High Court held in Anil Vasudev Rajgor v. State of Gujarat, 2017 SCC OnLine Guj 2799 that when the cheque was presented beyond the period of validity and was dishonoured with the endorsement ‘Instrument outdated’, the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act do not lie. It was observed: “11. From the above proviso, it is clear that the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are enacted taking into consideration the currency of cheques for a period of six months from the date of issue or the reduced period of validity, whichever is earlier. Therefore, this provision of the Negotiable Instruments Act contemplates a cheque with a lesser period of validity than six months, which is the general Banking practice and’ stipulates that the cheque should be presented for encashment1 either within the period of six months or within the period of validity of the cheque, whichever is earlier. Hence, a cheque, which is issued with a reduced validity period, has to be presented for encashment within the expiry of that period so as to attract the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Indisputably, in the case on hand, the cheque was presented by the complainant for encashment after the expiry of currency of three months and in such circumstances, the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are not attracted in this case in view of Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 of the. Negotiable Instruments Act. The Supreme Court, in the case of Shri Ishar Alloys Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals NECO Ltd. [(2001) 3 SCC 609: AIR 2001 SC 1161, observed in para 9 as under: — 12 2025:HHC:22352 “It, however, does not mean that the cheque is always to be presented to the drawer's Bank on which the cheque is issued. The payee of the cheque has the option to present the cheque in any Bank including the collecting Bank ‘where he has his account but to attract the criminal liability of the drawer of the cheque such collecting Bank is obliged to present the cheque in the drawee or payee Bank on which the cheque is drawn within the period of six months from the date on which it is shown to have been issued. In other words, a cheque issued by (A) in favour of (B) drawn in a Bank named (C) where the drawer has an account can be presented by the payee to the Bank upon which it is drawn, i.e. (C) Bank, within a period of six months or present. It is to any other Bank for the collection of the cheque amount, provided such other Bank, including the collecting Bank, presents the cheque for collection to the (C) Bank. The non- presentation of the cheque to the drawee-bank within the period specified in the Section would absolve the person issuing the cheque of his criminal liability under Section 138 of the Act, who shall, otherwise, may be liable to pay the cheque amount to the payee in a civil action initiated _under the law. A combined reading of Sections 2, 72 and 138 of the Act “would” leave no doubt in our mind that the law mandates the cheque to be presented at the Bank on which it is drawn if the drawer is to be held criminally liable. Such presentation is necessarily to be made within six months at the Bank on which the cheque is drawn, whether presented personally or through another Bank, namely, the collecting Bank of the payee.” 12. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Arunbhai Nilkantharai v. Jayaben Prahladbhai [2000 Cri LJ 1152] had an occasion to consider almost an identical issue. In the said case, it was contended on behalf of the 13 2025:HHC:22352 complainant that what should the payee of the cheque should do if the cheque is returned, holding that the validity period had expired. In the said case, an argument was canvassed that there may be a delay on the part of the collecting’ Bank in sending the cheque to the paying Bank though it had been within the period of validity, or because of the delay on the part of the postal Authority, the cheque might reach the paying Bank after the expiry of the period of validity or six months, as the case may be, the holder of the cheque, in such circumstances, would be helpless. The learned Single Judge rejected the contention, observing as under: — “10…The contention must fail. In that case, initiation of criminal action is viewed as non- fulfilment of the requirements of Sec. 138 of the Act would certainly be barred, but it will be open to the payee to initiate the civil action by filing the suit for the recovery of the cheque amount, subject to the law of limitation. The civil Court will certainly pass the decree if the case alleged in the plaint is proved. The payee qua the recovery of the sum will not be helpless. It may however be stated that when the cheque is required to be presented at the paying Bank before it becomes a stale cheque, the holder of the cheque or the payee has to present the cheque well in advance, considering the exigencies or contingencies or delay that is likely to occur on the part of the collecting Bank or the postal Authorities. He cannot wait till the last day of the period of validity for presentment of the cheque, because proviso (a) to Sec. 138 makes it abundantly clear that if presentment of a cheque is not made within 6 months from the date on which the cheque is drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier, the cause to lodge the complaint does not subsist or live on, for in that case the offence cannot be said to have been constituted and payee 14 2025:HHC:22352 or holder of a cheque loses his right if there be any to initiate criminal action. 11. In this case, presentment of the cheque to the paying Bank is, in view of the above-stated dates, not made within 6 months of the date of the cheque. The presentment is late by four days. The cheque, therefore, became a stale cheque and the same was bounced without honouring the same. As the presentment is not in consonance with Sec. 138 of the Act, and is late by 4 days, one of the essential requirements of Sec. 138 of the Act for initiating penal action is not satisfied. When that is so, the complaint lodged cannot be entertained, the same has to be quashed, and the petitioner, who is the accused, in that case, is required to be discharged.” 13. In taking the aforesaid view, I am supported by a decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Kesavan Thankappan v. State of Kerala [1999 Cri LJ 714], I may quote the relevant observations as under: — “5. The counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the dishonour of the cheque on the ground that the cheque was out of time since the cheque drawn on Treasury Saving Bank Is Current only for three months from the date of issue as against the Banking practice of the currency of cheques for six months from the date of issue, and the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, are illegal and unsustainable. The Treasury Code is framed by the Government of Kerala as empowered under Article. 283(2) of the Constitution and promulgated by the Governor of Kerala by notification No. 54282 dated 6-4-1983. 6. As per List 1, which is styled as Union List in 7th Schedule of the Constitution, all the items mentioned therein fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union of India, and item 45 in the list I of Schedule 7 is Banking and entry 46 15 2025:HHC:22352 therein is Bill of Exchange, Cheques etc. Therefore, the counsel for the appellant argued that Banking comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Government of India and the same can be regulated only by the Government of India and the Reserve Bank of India. 7. The counsel for the appellant further argued that the Treasury Code is intended for transactions in Government money only and not for Banking business for the public and if the Treasuries conduct Banking business the entire rules and regulations regarding Bank including those rules applicable to cheques etc. contained in the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Banking Practice should be followed by the Treasuries. According to him, though the Treasury can regulate the period of validity of cheques, it will bind only the Treasuries and persons who are transacting with the Treasury by opening accounts with them, and it cannot bind a person who has no dealings with the Treasury and in whose favour a Treasury cheque is issued. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant also argued that Appendix 3 to Treasury Code Vol. II relates to rules regulating transactions in the Treasury Savings Bank. Rule 1 in Appendix 1 states that the object of the Government in establishing the Treasury Savings Bank Scheme is to provide a ready means for the deposit of savings and so to encourage thrift. Treasury Code Vol. I, Part I, Rule 2(c) defines ‘cheque’ and Rule 61(1) deals with non- Banking Treasuries and Rule 61(2) deals with Banking Treasuries. Chapter III of the Kerala Treasury Code Vol. II deals with the rules relating to the Treasury Savings Bank. The counsel for the appellant argued that transaction in the Banking Treasury is similar to the transaction in ordinary Banks and the Treasury cheque drawn has to be 16 2025:HHC:22352 treated as a cheque drawn on a Bank for all purposes under S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and there cannot be any distinction between ordinary Bank and the Treasury dealing with Banking transactions. 9. The counsel for the appellant further argued that Banking being a Union subject in the first list of Schedule 7 of the Constitution, the Treasury Code, which is a subordinate legislation promulgated by the Governor of Kerala applicable to the territory in Kerala under Art. Section 283(2) of the Constitution cannot have an overriding effect on the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act enacted by the Parliament and the Banking Rules and Regulations, and the Banking Practice approved and enforced by the Central Government. Therefore, according to him, the provisions regarding the currency of cheques drawn on a Banking Treasury reducing, the period of currency to three months as provided under Rule 245(b) of Vol. I of the Treasury Code cannot be pressed into service in this case as against the prevailing Banking practice of currency of cheques for six months as provided under the Negotiable Instruments Act. 10. Though the above arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellant are very attractive, they cannot be accepted on the face of clause (a) of the proviso to S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which reads as follows: — “Provided that nothing contained in this Section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the Bank within the period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier.” From the above proviso, it is clear that the provisions of S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments 17 2025:HHC:22352 Act are enacted taking into consideration of the currency of cheques for a period of six months from the date of issue or the reduced period of validity, whichever is earlier. Therefore, this provision of the Negotiable Instruments Act contemplates a cheque with a lesser period of validity than six months, which is the general Banking practice and stipulates that the cheque should be presented for encashment either within the period of six months or within the period of validity of the cheque, whichever is earlier. Hence, a cheque which is issued with a reduced validity period has to be presented for encashment within the expiry of that period so as to attract the provisions of S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, the argument advanced by the counsel for the appellant that the Treasury Code promulgated by the Governor of Kerala should be subject to the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Banking Rules and Regulations issued by the Government of India, the Banking Practice and the Rules promulgated by the Reserve Bank of India and the provisions of the Treasury Code cannot have overriding effect against the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Banking Practice, need not be considered in this case. 11. 11. In view of the fact that the cheque was presented by the appellant for encashment after the expiry of currency of three months, the provisions of S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are not attracted in this case in view of clause (a) of the proviso to S. 138 of the Act.” 17. A Similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Ansh Chugh vs. Pradeep Gupta, 2020 STPL 8425 Delhi, wherein it was held that: 18 2025:HHC:22352 “7. Admittedly, the cheque was presented to the drawee bank after the period of expiry of its validity of three months, which is to be calculated from the date mentioned on the cheque. Clause (a) of the Proviso to Section 138 of N.I. Act stipulates that Section 138 shall not be applicable unless the cheque is presented to the bank within a period of six months (the period has been reduced from 6 months to 3 months vide the aforementioned RBI notification dated 04.11.2011) from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. 8. In Shri Ishar Alloys Steel Ltd. v. Jayaswals NECO Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 609, the Supreme Court held that non- presentation of the cheque to the drawee bank within the period specified in the section would absolve the person issuing the cheque of his criminal liability under Section 138 N.I. Act. 9. The Supreme Court in MSR Leathers v. S.Palaniappan & Anr.,2012 SCCOnLineSC 791, it was held as under:- "14. Presentation of the cheque and dishonour thereof within the period of its validity or a period of six months is just one of the three requirements that constitutes cause of action' within the meaning of Sections 138 and 142(b) of the Act, an expression that is more commonly used in civil law than in penal statutes...." xxx 19. ....A careful reading of Sections 138 and 142, as noticed above, makes it abundantly clear that the cause of action to institute a complaint comprises the three different factual prerequisites for the institution of a complaint to which we have already referred in the earlier part of this order. None of these prerequisites is in itself sufficient to constitute a complete cause of action for an offence under Section 138. For instance if a cheque is not presented within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier, no cause of action 19 2025:HHC:22352 would accrue to the holder of the cheque even when the remaining two requirements, namely service of a notice and failure of the drawer to make the payment of the cheque amount are established on facts...." 10. Learned counsel for the respondent has fairly not disputed the aforesaid legal position, though he urged that all such issues could be considered at the stage of framing of notice. 11. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondent in Rajeev Ranjan Sinha(supra), Jitender Singh(supra), Thomas Varghese(supra) and A.V. Murthy(supra) is misplaced as the issue involved in the present case was not raised in the aforesaid judgments. The validity of a cheque goes to the root of the initiation of proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act. There is no cause of action if the cheque presented was not valid.” 18. This Court also took a similar view in Dolma Devi v. Roshan Lal, 2023 STPL 4524 HP, wherein it was held that “8. The reasons, on account of which the complaint of the present appellant has been dismissed, already stand spelt out by me in the above part of the judgment. It is not in dispute that the cheque in issue is dated 14.09.2004. The same was drawn upon H.P. State Cooperative Bank, branch Beri, District Bilaspur, H.P. This cheque though was presented by the appellant with her bank on 07.03.2005, yet the same was received by the payee bank, i.e. H.P. State Cooperative Bank, branch Beri, District Bilaspur, H.P. on 15.03.2005, i.e. after six months from the date of issuance of the cheque which lapsed on 13.03.2004. 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shri Ishwar Alloy Steels Ltd. Versus Jayaswals Neco LTD., (2003) 3 Supreme Court Cases 609, has been pleased to hold that the law mandates a cheque to be presented at the bank on which it is drawn if the drawer is to be held criminally liable necessarily 20 2025:HHC:22352 within six months as from the date of its issuance (this judgment relates to the period when the validity of cheque used to be for a period of six months). In Para 10 of said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold as under: “It, however, does not mean that the cheque is always to be presented to the drawer's bank on which the cheque is issued. The payee of the cheque has the option to present the cheque in any bank including the collecting bank where he has his account but to attract the criminal liability of the drawer of the cheque such collecting bank is obliged to present the cheque in the drawee or payee bank on which the cheque is drawn within the period of six months from the date on which it is shown to have been issued. In other words a cheque issued by (A) in favour of (B) drawn in a bank named (C) where the drawer has an account can be presented by the payee to the bank upon which it is drawn i.e. (C) bank within a period of six months or present it to any other bank for collection of the cheque amount provided such other bank including the collecting bank presents the cheque for collection to the (C) bank. The non-presentation of the cheque to the drawee bank within the period specified in the Section would absolve the person issuing the cheque of his criminal liability under Section 138 of the Act, who shall otherwise be liable to pay the cheque amount to the payee in a civil action initiated under the law. A combined reading of Sections 2, 72 and 138 of the Act would leave no doubt in our mind that the law mandates the cheque to be presented at the bank on which it is drawn if the drawer is to be held criminally liable. Such presentation is necessarily to be made within six months at the bank on which the cheque is drawn, whether presented personally or through another bank, namely, the collecting bank of the payee.” 21 2025:HHC:22352 19. Punjab and Haryana High Court also took a similar view in Nitin Mahajan vs. Vinod Kumar (11.05.2023 - PHHC): MANU/PH/3563/202326.) and held: “5. From a perusal of proviso (a) to Section 138, it is apparent that one of the essential conditions to bring into effect the substantive provision i.e. Section 138 of NI Act is that cheque be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. In the present case, the cheque in question was issued on 18.05.2018; therefore, as per the RBI circular/notification dated 04.11.2011, which is in vogue, the same was valid till 17.08.2019 only and it was ultimately dishonoured on 8.11.2018, clearly showing that it was presented in the bank much beyond its validity. Reliance has rightly been placed on Ansh Chugh's case (supra), wherein it was held that the validity of a cheque goes to the root of initiation of proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act, and there is no cause of action if the cheque presented was not valid. Even learned Counsel for the respondent has not been able to produce any judgment to counter the same.” 20. Telangana High Court has also held similarly in Boddu Jhansi Rani vs. The State of Telangana (12.04.2023 - TLHC): MANU/TL/0599/2023 27 as under: - 7. It is not in dispute that the subject cheque was presented beyond the three-month period from the date of the cheque. The Reserve Bank of India had issued a notification on 04.11.2011, signed by the Chief General Manager in charge. The said notification was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and accordingly directed the Banks not to make payment of the cheques/drafts/pay 22 2025:HHC:22352 order/bankers cheque if the cheques are presented beyond the period of three months from the date of such instruments. Section 35A in the BANKING REGULATION ACT,1949 reads as follows: 35A Power of the Reserve Bank to give directions. - Where the Reserve Bank is satisfied that- in the 178 [public interest]; or 179 [ in the interest of banking policy; or] to prevent the affairs of any banking company being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or a manner prejudicial to the interests of the banking company; or to secure the proper management of any banking company generally, it is necessary to issue directions to banking companies generally or to any banking company in particular, it may, from time to time, issue such directions as it deems fit, and the banking companies or the banking company, as the case may be, shall be bound to comply with such directions. The Reserve Bank may, on representation made to it or on its own motion, modify or cancel any direction issued under sub- section (1), and in so modifying or cancelling any direction may impose such conditions as it thinks fit, subject to which the modification or cancellation shall have effect.] 8. Under Section 138-A of N I Act, it is mentioned that the cheque should have been presented to the Bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of validity. Section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, confers powers to the Reserve Bank for giving directions in the interest of public or banking policy. Accordingly, directions were issued that the Banks should not make payment of the cheques which are presented beyond the period of three months from the date of such instrument. 23 2025:HHC:22352 9. Section 138-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act deals with two contingencies, firstly, the cheque being presented within a period of six months and secondly, within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. By virtue of the notification of the Reserve Bank of India, the period of validity would be three months, and the cheque should have been presented within a period of three months. The Bank has committed an error in entertaining the cheque and giving a memo stating that the cheque was returned for the reason of 'insufficient funds'. It is the specific direction of the Reserve Bank of India that the Banks should not entertain the cheque beyond the period of three months, which had to be scrupulously followed by the Bank and should have returned the cheque on the ground of being stale or invalid. 10. The basis for prosecution is the return of the cheque, which was presented beyond the period of its validity. Applying the judgment reported in Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd., v. Jayaswals Neco Limited's case (supra), the Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the petitioner.” 21. Therefore, the dishonour of the cheque on the ground of ‘Instrument out dated/stale’ does not attract the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act. 22. It was submitted that the memo issued by the bank is not important, and it is open to the complainant to show that the reason for dishonour was something else. There is no dispute with the proposition of law. It was laid down by Thomas Varghese (supra) that the offence punishable under Section 138 24 2025:HHC:22352 of the NI Act does not depend upon the endorsement made by the Bank while returning the cheque. It was observed: - “8. Section 138 was enacted by the legislature to enhance the acceptability of cheques. The drawer of the cheque was sought to be made liable in case of bouncing of cheques due to insufficiency of funds in the accounts or for the reason that it exceeds the arrangements made by the drawer with the bank. If the cheque is bounced on account of insufficiency of funds in the accounts of the drawer or for the reason that it exceeds the arrangements made by the drawer, then the drawer must be liable. It cannot solely depend on the endorsement made by the banker. An endorsement by the banker that a cheque is returned due to insufficiency of funds standing in the name of the drawer will tell upon the financial soundness of the drawer. Such an endorsement may adversely affect the reputation of the drawer. Sometimes a banker may be slow to use the words such as "no sufficient fund in the account" etc. because it may have adverse implication on the financial soundness of the drawer of the cheque and consequently affect his reputation also, so if the banker refrains from making such a derogatory endorsement, should be object of the legislation be defeated? 9. The rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes in favour of an accused is not of rigid or universal application. It must be considered along with other well- established rules of interpretation. When it is seen that the scheme and object of the statute are likely to be defeated by the strict interpretation, courts must endeavour to resort to that interpretation which furthers the object of the legislation. It is well recognised that a statutory provision must be construed, if possible, to avoid absurdity and mischief. In K.P. Vaghese v. Income Tax Officer, Emakulam, (1981)4 SCC 173. Their Lordships observed: - "It is not a well-settled rule of construction that where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory 25 2025:HHC:22352 provision produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result which could never have been intended by the legislature, the court may modify the language used by the legislature or even do some violence' to it, so as to achieve the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a rational construction (vide Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioner). The court may also, in such a case, read into the statutory provision a condition which, though not expressed, is implicit as constituting the basic assumption underlying the statutory provision." In this circumstance, we are not in a position to hold that a complaint under Section 138 of the Act should not be thrown out at the threshold if the banker's endorsement while returning the cheque is anything other than that the amount of money 'standing to the credit of the account of the drawer is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank. If the circumstances contemplated by Section 138 of the Act are made out, the court has to examine whether the return of the cheque was on account of insufficiency of funds belonging to the drawer. This can be done even without reference to the endorsement made by the banker. Endorsements like "refer to drawer", "account closed", "payment has been stopped", etc., made by the banker at the time of the return of the cheque are having the effect of proving that the cheque has been bounced. If the bouncing of the cheque was on account of insufficiency of funds belonging to the drawer, then the drawer will be subjecting himself to proceedings under Section 138 of the Act. 23. In the present case, the complainant never examined any official from the bank to prove on record that the reason for dishonour was not the instrument being outdated/stale but 26 2025:HHC:22352 something else; therefore, not much advantage can be derived from the cited judgment. 24. It was submitted that if the payment is not made to the complainant for any reason and the accused fails to pay the amount despite the receipt of a valid notice of demand, the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act is made out. It is true that the Bombay High Court has taken such a view in Rakesh Nemkumar Porwal v. Narayan Dhondu Joglekar, (1993) 78 Comp Cas 822 and held that the use of the term etc. in Section 138 of the NI Act will mean that whenever the cheque is dishonoured the provisions of Section 138 of NI Act would be attracted. It was observed: - “25. This, to our mind, is too narrow a construction of the section and fails to take into account the objects and reasons behind the amendment. The wording and the endorsement from the bank or the circumstances under which a cheque is returned are not the guiding criterion, but the fact that, on presentation of the cheque, the payment was not made. There could be a host of reasons for this but the bottom line of the situation is that the payment could not be made by the Banker and the mechanics of the reasons apart, the irresistible conclusion that had the funds been available, the payment would have been made leads back to the position that dishonour, therefore, implies insufficiency of funds. We are reinforced in this view by the definition of a cheque as appears in Section 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which defines it as a bill of 27 2025:HHC:22352 exchange drawn on a specified banker. A bill of exchange is defined in Section 5, which reads as follows: "A bill of exchange is an instrument in writing containing an unconditional order signed by the maker directing a certain person to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person or to the bearer of the instrument." Reading these provisions with the statement of objects and reasons of the Banking, Public Financial institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 (66 of 1988), whereby Chapter 17 comprising of Sections 138 to 142 were inserted with effect from 1.4.1989, there can be little doubt that Section 138 was intended to be a provision to curb instances of dishonour. It will have to be presumed that the multifarious grounds on which a cheque would be dishonoured are common place and in not having made any exception for such situations, the legislative intent behind Section 138 was that cases of dishonour of a cheque would constitute a criminal offence unless the payment was forthcoming within the prescribed period. The reference to the term 'insufficiency of funds' was obviously a qualifying clause which only reiterates the basic principle that an order to the bank conveyed through a cheque to make a prescribed payment would only fail in a situation where the bank could not implement that directive for want of the requisite funds. The circumstances that may contribute to the situation would, therefore, be irrelevant. The presumption in section 139 heavily supports this view. 26. It would be useful in this regard to refer to another decision of this court, reported in Pawankamar v. Ashish Enterprises, 1992 Cr. LJ 1619, where the cheque was returned with the endorsement "suit filed by bank against account holder". The court held that the reason apart, that the dishonour had been occasioned because of insufficiency of funds, and further that the criminal proceedings under Section 138 were justified regardless of the plea that civil action for recovery had been initiated. In our considered view, if the object of introducing 28 2025:HHC:22352 Section 138 into the statute book is to be achieved, it will have to be meaningfully enforced, brushing aside technical and frivolous pleas.” (Emphasis supplied) 25. Andhra Pradesh High Court held in Syed Rasool and Sons v. Aildas and Co., (1993) 78 Comp Cas 738 that the cause of action is given by failure to pay the amount despite the receipt of a valid notice of demand. Therefore, the failure to pay the amount despite the receipt of a valid notice of demand will complete the offence. It was observed: “23. From the Scheme of the Act, it is clear that following the dishonour of the cheque a notice has to be issued in writing to the person who has issued the cheque inviting his attention that the cheque has been dishonoured and he is liable for penal consequences under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Act. When the reason for return of the cheque has been mentioned as "refer to drawer" or "insufficiency of funds" or "account closed", it is the primary duty of the drawer of the cheque to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. So, an opportunity has been given by the Legislature itself by providing a notice to the drawer and for payment of the amount within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice and if he fails to comply with clause (c) of Section 138, filing of a complaint within one month from the date of cause of action is also provided under sub-section (b) of Section 142 of the Act. Thus, a notice has to be given to the drawer, and that notice is a condition precedent. That means the drawer of the cheque has an opportunity to know in advance, before filing the complaint, that the cheque was dishonoured for a particular reason. When that information was already available to him and when he had not made any attempt to pay the same, it cannot 29 2025:HHC:22352 be said that the cheque was returned not for insufficiency of funds or not arranged for. In the normal banking parlance "refer to drawer" means that no funds are available and when an opportunity has been given to the drawer of the cheque by inviting his attention and when he has not paid the amount, it has to be construed that "refer to drawer" or "insufficiency of funds" or "account closed" etc., ultimately resulted in dishonouring the cheque and preventing the drawee from getting the amount which is only on account of the act committed by the drawer, who has given the cheque. The two situations contemplated in Section 138 are insufficiency of the amount standing to the credit of the account, or it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid by an agreement made with the bank, such as obtaining the facility of overdraft, etc. If either of these two contingencies has not been complied with, the only alternative left to the bank is to dishonour the cheque or to return the cheque with the endorsement as is being followed by them from time to time as per the trade custom, usage and practice. It is not the phrase or the words used by the Bank in dishonouring the cheque that has to be taken into account, but the intention of the bank has to be taken into consideration. The intention of the Legislature is clearly to see that in the event of the amount not being paid on presenting the cheque due to insufficiency of funds or if it exceeds the arrangement, the person is liable for prosecution. However, the further safeguard that has been made to prevent hasty action is that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque shall make a demand for the payment of the amount covered by the said cheque giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the banker is well settled that the penal provisions have to be construed strictly and not liberally. The court will not extend the law beyond its meaning to take care of a broader legislative purpose. Here, "strict" means merely that the court will refrain from exercising its creative function to apply the rule announced in the statute to 30 2025:HHC:22352 situations not covered by it, even though such an extension would help to advance the manifest purport of the statute. Here, strictness relates not to the meaning of the statute but to using the statute as a basis for judicial aw making by analogy with it. Even in the Calcutta High Court case, viz.., Voltas Ltd. Vs. Hiralal Agarwalla’s (supra) averments have been made in the complaint petition, which show that the complainant had observed the formality as required by the provisos (a),(b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Act before initiating the criminal proceeding against the drawer of the cheque. It was contended therein on behalf of the petitioners that the clause "refer to drawer" does not necessarily mean that the cheque was dishonoured. But, on a clarification from the Bank, to the effect that the remark "refer to drawer" necessarily means as per banking custom that the cheque has been returned for want of funds, the court came to the conclusion that it is prima facie seen that the cheque in question was bounced because of inadequacy of funds in the drawer's account. The endorsements "refer to drawer" or "insufficiency of funds" or "not arranged" or "account closed" or some other technical words used by the bank, ultimately resulted in dishonouring the cheque, on account of the fault of the person who has issued the cheque in not providing sufficient funds or not arranging funds. Having issued the cheque without having sufficient funds or not arranging the funds or after closing the account, it is definitely an act on the part of the drawer of the cheque which ultimately resulted in dishonouring the cheque. This again is a matter of evidence which has to be adduced in support of the endorsement. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said at this stage that taking cognisance of a private complaint by the court itself is bad. The words 'refer to drawer in their ordinary meaning amounted to a statement by the bank, "we are not paying; go back to the drawer and ask him why "or else" go back to the drawer and ask him to pay". In view of the above discussion, we are of the firm view that "refer to drawer" necessarily means, as per banking parlance, that the 31 2025:HHC:22352 cheque has been returned for want of funds in the account of the drawer of the cheque. So we are not in agreement with the view expressed by the learned single Judge of this court (Eswara Prasad, J.) in M/s. Union Road Ways (P) Ltd., & Another vs. M/s. Shah Ramanlal Satesh Kumar & another (supra). 26. A similar view was taken by the Madras High Court in J. Veeraraghavan v. Lalith Kumar, (1995) 83 Comp Cas 853: 1994 SCC OnLine Mad 567: 1995 Cri LJ 1882: (1995) 1 BC 318: (1994) 2 LW (Cri) 663 wherein it was observed: 23. Apart from any one of the 21 reasons catalogued above, that is usually given by a bank in the case of return of a cheque unpaid, there may be a myriad of reasons, depending upon the contingency and exigency of the situation. Insufficiency of funds in the accounts may be a situation, which may be created either innocently or unknowingly by the drawer or may be a product of mischievous gimmicks, like “closure of account”, countermanding the payment, etc., or even a situation wherein the bank dishonours the cheque since it has already instituted a suit against the drawer to recover the debt against his account. Further, insufficiency of funds may be indicated by various direct and indirect endorsements by the dishonouring bank, such as “insufficiency of funds”, “refer to drawer”, “funds expected, present again”, “effects not cleared”, etc. There may even be a Situation rather created in a mischievous or malicious fashion to see that the cheque issued by the drawer stands returned by the banker unpaid by subscription of the signature in such a way as not to tally with the specimen signature, just to purchase time to meet the demands made knowing fully well that on the date when the cheque had been 32 2025:HHC:22352 drawn, there was insufficiency of funds in his account. For the outside world, it may appear that the reason for the return of the cheque unpaid was the existence of suspicion as regards the genuineness of the cheque issued by the drawer. But the real reason is altogether different in such a situation. The drawer, in a fraudulent way, does the mischief of subscribing his signature totally in a different fashion to create a doubt as to the genuineness of the cheque so issued by him. He does it with a purpose, which is rather obvious. Such a trickery device could be adopted to stall the situation of not being in a position to meet the demand, in the sense of not having adequacy of funds in the account of the drawer, and by adoption of such a device, the payee had really been hoodwinked. Manifold situations may be created by a fraudulent drawer using all sorts of ingenuity to make it appear that the reason for the return of the cheque unpaid, was neither of the two contingencies contemplated by section 138 of the Act although in the real state of affairs, the reason for the return of the cheque unpaid was either of the two contingencies contemplated therein alone. We are, therefore, of the firm view that the reasons, as given by the bank for the return of the cheque may not at all reflect the reality of the situation relatable to the sufficiency or otherwise of the funds in the accounts of the drawer or whether it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid by the drawer by agreement with, the bank. 24. Once a cheque is dishonoured, whatever be the reason therefor, it behoves upon the payee or the holder in due course to issue a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days from the date of such return, intimating, as has been provided under the sanguine provisions adumbrated under clauses (b) and (c) to the proviso to section 138 of the Act, the factum of such return and requiring him to comply with the 33 2025:HHC:22352 demand within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notice and the demand so made, if not complied with, gives rise to a cause of action for the launching of the prosecution against such drawer and the cause of action so enured; lasts for a period of one month, enabling the aggrieved payee or holder in due course to file a complaint before the competent criminal court. The existence of such factors thus prima facie constitutes an offence under section 138 of the Act, requiring the case to be taken cognisance of by the competent court, before which the complaint had been filed. Cognisance of a complaint is capable of being taken by a competent court, provided the necessary and requisite averments constituting the offence complained of are made available in the complaint and nothing further, excepting the taking of a sworn statement from the complainant. 25. In the case of prosecution for an offence under section 138 of the Act, a moot question very often raised before courts is, as to whether averments regarding sufficiency or otherwise of funds in the account of the drawer were to be made in the complaint. Divergent views emerge on such a question from various High Courts, to which we have already adverted. The rationale or reasoning for the view that there should be a specific averment in the complaint as to the insufficiency of funds before ever the case is taken cognisance of, we rather feel, is not reflecting the real import, purport or the intendment of section 138 of the Act. We have already adverted to as to what is necessary and requisite for a complaint to be taken cognizance of, in respect of an alleged offence under section 138 of the Act, i.e., the factum of dishonour of the cheque, whatever be the reason, which was issued in discharge of a debt or other liability in whole or in part, after its presentation within its period of validity of six months from 34 2025:HHC:22352 the date of issue, whichever is earlier, coupled with the non- compliance with the drawer of the demand made upon him and the institution of prosecution within one month from such non-compliance. Such being the case, the non-mentioning in the complaint by way of a specific averment made therein as to the insufficiency of funds in the account of the drawer, is of no consequence and the question whether there was sufficiency of funds or not in the account of the drawer on the date when the cheque had been drawn, will be relevant only during the stage of trial and such a question is capable of being decided, with ease and grace, by the court on the adduction of evidence by utilising the salient provisions adumbrated under the provisions of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891. Once it is proved in the trial that bouncing of a cheque was due to lack of balance in the account of the drawer on the date when the cheque was drawn, then it goes without saying that the act of giving a cheque resulting in the bouncing of the cheque due to lack of balance in the account was an “absolute offence” even if it was done without any “criminal intent”, inasmuch as no mens rea has been prescribed for the commission of such an offence. The non-prescription of any mens rea therein is rather obvious. The monetary blood flow in the arteries of trade and business heart cannot be permitted to be calcified by the dishonouring of the cheque by debtors. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that there is no necessity at all to make any specific averment in the complaint as to the insufficiency of funds in the account of the drawer on the date when the cheque was drawn, before ever such a complaint is taken cognizance of by a competent court. 35 2025:HHC:22352 27. However, it is difficult to agree to the submission that the dishonour of the cheque for any reason would give rise to criminal liability. The Legislature has consciously used the words “returned unpaid because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque, or it exceeds the amount” in Section 138 of the NI Act. These words have been extended to cover the situation where the payment was not made by the Bank due to the default committed by the drawer, like payment stopped by the drawer [Modi Cements Vs. Kuchil Kumar Nandi (1998) 3 SCC 241 and NEPC Micon Limited and others vs. Magma Leasing Limited (1999) 4 SCC 253], account closed (Goa Plast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D'Souza, (2004) 2 SCC 235 and Subhodh S Salaskar Vs Japrakash M Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 689), signatures mismatch (Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 13 SCC 375) account non-existent (Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi,(2009) 14 SCC 683) etc. The proceedings are not maintainable when the cheque is dishonoured due to a circumstance beyond the control of a person, like account frozen (Best Buildwell (P) Ltd. v. R.D. Sales, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4267) contact the drawer and present again (Sathiya Murthi vs Kesava Narayanan Crl.O. P No.10406 of 2019 36 2025:HHC:22352 decided on 24 July, 2019 and D.S. Shridhar vs. P. John and Ors. (13.12.2022 - TLHC): MANU/TL/2690/2022), Hence, the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act will not be attracted to every case of dishonour but to a dishonour which is attributable to the drawer and not to any other person. 28. In the present case, the memo of dishonour (Ex.CW1/C) mentions the cheque date 20.1.2018 and return date 22.1.2018. The cheque was issued on 21.10.2017. This memo shows that the cheque was presented on 20.1.2018 and was returned on 22.1.2018. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rameshchandra Ambalal Joshi v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 11 SCC 759 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 274 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 542: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 134 that the use of the word from in Section 138(a) requires the exclusion of the first day on which the cheque was drawn and inclusion of the last day within which such act needs to be done. It was observed at page 768: - 22. Drawing a conclusion from the abovementioned authorities, we are of the opinion that the use of the word “from” in Section 138(a) requires the exclusion of the first day on which the cheque was drawn and inclusion of the last day within which such act needs to be done. In other words, six months would expire one day prior to the date in the corresponding month, and in case no such day falls, the last day of the immediate previous month. 37 2025:HHC:22352 Hence, for all purposes, the date on which the cheque was drawn i.e. 31-12-2005 will be excluded and the period of six months will be reckoned from the next day i.e. from 1- 1-2006; meaning thereby that according to the British calendar, the period of six months will expire at the end of the 30th day of June, 2006. Since the cheque was presented on 30-6-2006, we are of the view that it was presented within the period prescribed. 29. In the present case, the cheque was issued on 21.10.2017, which is to be excluded, and the period of three months expired on 21.1.2018. The cheque was presented on 20.1.2018 as per the memo of dishonour produced by the complainant. It was Sunday on 21.1.2018, and the cheque could have been presented on the next working day as per Section 25 of the NI Act. It was laid down by this Court in Bhupender Kumar Sharma vs Rattan Singh 2013 (2) ShimLC 780 that when the date of maturity is a public holiday, it can be presented on the next working day. It was observed: 5. Thus, Section 25 of the N.I. Act also applies to a cheque and in case the day on which the cheque is at maturity, is a public holiday, the instrument shall be deemed to be due on the next preceding business day as in the present case (please see K.S. Subbaraman v. lyyammal, 1998 CRI.L.J. 4758, Madras High Court). 30. A similar view was taken in P Narasmiha Reddy vs State of Andhra Pradesh 2019 ACD 587 = 2019(1) Andh LD (Criminal) 989 wherein it was observed: 38 2025:HHC:22352 10. A reading of section 25 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would clearly show that if the day on which the cheque period expires is a public holiday, the cheque shall be deemed to be due on the next preceding business day. In the said section, the Explanation would indicate that the expression "public holiday" includes Sunday. 11. Similar is the wording of section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads: "10. Computation of time-(1) Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877) applies. (2) This section also applies to all Central Acts and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887." 31. Hence, even if the cheque was presented on 22.1.2018, it was presented within the period of limitation and the Bank erred in dishonouring it on the ground ‘instrument outdated/stale. 32. Thus, it is apparent that the reason for dishonour of the cheque given by the Bank is not correct. The complainant did not lead any evidence to establish that the accused had 39 2025:HHC:22352 insufficient funds on the date of dishonour, and the real reason for the dishonour was the insufficiency of funds and not the instrument being outdated/stale as mentioned in the memo. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly concluded that the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act are not attracted to the present case. 33. It was laid down by this Court in Rajinder Singh Verma vs. B.K. Hanchnmani (30.04.2019 - HPHC): MANU/HP/0437/2019 that a computer-generated memo of dishonour not having the official seal is inadmissible. It was observed: - “9. Even if, assumingly, the complainant may, upon recoursing to an appropriate remedy, be cast under the provisions of Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, rather could therethrough strive to prove the afore- mentioned cheque, borne in Ex. CW1/A, carrying the authentic signatures of the accused, (a) and, thereafter it, was permissible for the complainant, to rely upon the statutory provisions, cast under the provisions of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, qua his holding it in discharge, of, a contractual or other legal liabilities, arising inter se him, and, the accused. Nonetheless, dehors, the aforecurative recoursings, for, hence, dispelling the effect of Ex. CW1/A, rather than being feigned, in the testification rendered hence by the complainant, to, hence assuredly contain the signatures of the accused, also, the mandate, of Section 146 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter, was, also vis-a-vis, Ex. CW1/B, the 40 2025:HHC:22352 purported return memo given, Ex. CW1/A, hence enjoined, to be cogently satiated. "146. Bank's slip prima facie evidence of certain facts. The Court shall, in respect of every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of a bank's slip or memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved. Even though, the court is statutorily empowered, to, qua the apposite return memo hence enunciating, the, declining to honour the negotiable instrument concerned, rather avail the apposite therewith presumption, as, engrafted therein, (a) yet the afore presumption would be aptly galvanized, upon, the memo evidently carrying thereon, the official mark, and, seal, of the bank concerned. However, the afore presumption, as occurring therein, and, with a statutory coinage, "unless and until such fact is disproved", is, rebuttable, only upon, adduction into evidence, the return memo, (b) whereupon hence, it would also stand proven qua it not carrying the official mark or seal of the bank concerned. The evidence in consonance with the afore-mentioned statutory coinage, occurring in the last part of Section 146 of the N.I. Act is, prima facie, rather upsurging, given, Ex. CW1/B evidently not carrying the seal or official mark of the bank concerned, (I) AND, with one Naresh Kumar, Accounts Officer from ICICI Bank, The Mall Shimla, upon his stepping into the witness box, rather showing his inability to bring the original of Ex. CW1/B, given, it not being traceable in the apposite records, (ii) and, when only on production, of the original in the Court of EX. CW1/B, and, evident existence thereon, of the afore statutorily mandated requirements, of it, hence carrying the official mark or seal of the bank concerned, would, hence enable, the, marshalling, of, the statutory presumption qua the apposite cheque being declined, to be honoured, to, rather hold the fullest conclusivity or 41 2025:HHC:22352 sway, (iii) besides it would benumb any endeavour of the defence, to rely, upon the afore statutory coinage, occurring in the last part of Section 146 of the N.I. Act, (iv) reiteratedly for want of production of the original of Ex. CW1/B, this court is constrained to conclude qua the statutory requirement of Ex. CW1/B on its presentation, for its being honoured, hence, being declined to be honoured, rather remaining, within the ambit of Section 146 of the N;l. Act, to be hence, disproven. 34. Madhya Pradesh High Court has also held in Satyendra Tiwari v. State of M.P., 2014 SCC OnLine MP 6786: ILR 2014 MP 1679: (2014) 3 MP LJ 574 that when the memo of dishonour does not bear the banker’s seal, the same is not valid. It was observed at page 1685: - “Endorsement Memo 29. Another reason given by the learned court to acquit the accused was that the complainant failed to prove the submission of the cheque (Ex. P-1) in the bank. 30. When a cheque is drawn by a person on an account maintained by him for payment of any amount or discharge of liability or debt and is returned by the bank with endorsement like (i) refer to drawer, (ii) exceeds arrangement, (iii) instruction for stoppage of payment; (iv) fund insufficient and like other usual endorsements, it amounts to dishonour within the meaning of section 138 of the N.I. Act. 31. Cheque to be presented within six months from the date of the cheque to the bank on which it was drawn, and if it is presented beyond that time complaint is not maintainable. In this case in hand the cheque (Ex.P-1) was presented within time. 32. In fact, the learned trial Court initially committed a grave mistake while issuing summons for the appearance 42 2025:HHC:22352 of the accused on the assumption that the case had been disclosed, while the bankers’ seal was totally missing of the bankers written memo in such circumstances the summons was not required to issue against the accused. 33. Learned trial Court after scrutinising the statement of the complainant in this regard and after examining the cheque (Ex. P-1) with returning endorsement (Ex. P-2), found that there is a lack of a banker's seal on the endorsement memo (Ex. P-2). 34. It is pertinent to mention here that even after committing initial error learned trial Court given appropriate opportunity to the complainant to examine Manager or any authorized Officer of the Punjab and Sindh Bank, the Banker's who returned the Cheque (Ex.P.-1) vide their endorsement memo (Ex.P.-2) under the caption “Fund Insufficient”, but the complainant fail to comply. In such a situation, endorsement memo (Ex.P.-2) has no evidentiary value as a public document, but a mere piece of paper.” 35. It was held in Krishnapal v. Hari Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine MP 2516 that the Bank is required to prove the seal and the signatures on the cheque returning memo as per the guidelines issued by the RBI and in the absence of the seal and the signatures, the memo does not carry a presumption under Section 146 of the NI Act. It was observed: - “5. Having gone through the record, it is found that the said document Ex-P/2 has no seal of the said bank and signature of the authority; therefore, it is in violation of guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India vide its letter No. RBI/2011-12/121 DPSS.CO. CHD NO. 120/03.06.01/2011-12 dated 25.07.2011. The said guidelines are required to be and are hereby reproduced hereunder:— 43 2025:HHC:22352 “RBI/2011-12/121 DPSS.CO. CHD.No. 120/03.06.01/2011-12 July 25, 2011 The Chairman and Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer All Scheduled Commercial Banks, including RRBs /Urban Co-operative Banks/State Co-operative Banks/ District Central Co-operative Banks Madam/Dear Sir, Dishonour/Return of Cheques - Need to Sign/Initial the Cheque Return Memo Please refer to our circular DPSS. CO. CHD. No. 485/03.06.01/2010-11 dated September 1, 2010 on Dishonour/Return of Cheques - Need to Mention the ‘Date of Return’ in the Cheque Return Memo, wherein citing the criticality of the document in case of recourse to legal action, it has been indicated that instruments returned unpaid should have a signed/initialed objection slip on which a definite and valid reason for refusing payment must be stated, as prescribed in Rule 6 of the Uniform Regulations and Rules for Bankers' Clearing Houses (URRBCH). Certain instances of banks not signing the Cheque Return Memos stating that the Memos are computer- generated and therefore no signature is necessary have been brought to our notice. Such practices are a violation of instructions contained in Uniform Regulations and Rules for Bankers' Clearing Houses (URRBCH), which is issued under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, read with Payment and Settlement Systems Regulations 2008. 44 2025:HHC:22352 Banks are, therefore, advised to strictly adhere to the instructions and sign/initial the Cheque Return Memos as laid down in Rule 6 of URRBCH. Yours faithfully, (Pankaj Ekka) Deputy General Manager” 6. In view of the guidelines, it can be predicated that not signing the cheque return memo by the Bankers and issuing them without any signature will be a violation of the instructions contained in the uniform regulations and rules of bankers. Hence, the petitioner cannot benefit from the law laid down in Guneet Bhasin (Supra). On this aspect, the learned trial Court, relying upon the judgment of this Court rendered in Satyendra Tiwari (Supra), opined that a dishonour memo of a bank without a seal has no evidentiary value as a public document and it would be treated as only a mere piece of paper. The aforesaid law laid down in Satyendra Tiwari (Supra) still holds the field, hence the contentions of the petitioner as to accepting the endorsement memo (Ex. P/2) are evidently found without merit.” 36. Bombay High Court held in Vandana v. Abhilasha, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2086: (2019) 2 Mah LJ 645: 2018 ACD 950: (2018) 4 Bom CR (Cri) 774 that a computer generated document requires a certificate under Section 65(b)(4) and in the absence of the certificate, the memo is not admissible. It was observed at page 649: - “9. In this context, section 146 of the aforesaid Act is relevant, which reads as follows: 45 2025:HHC:22352 “146. Bank's slip prima facie evidence of certain facts. — The Court shall, in respect of every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of a bank's slip or memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved.” 10. The said provision states the manner in which a complainant can prove dishonour of a cheque. The complainant is required to produce a slip or memo having an official mark on it, denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured. If such a document is placed on record by the complainant, it constitutes prima facie evidence of dishonour and a presumption operates about the fact of the dishonour of the cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved. Thus, once such a memo or slip issued by the bank bearing its official mark concerning dishonour of a cheque is placed on record by the complainant, the burden is clearly on the accused to disprove the fact of dishonour of a cheque. 11. But, there cannot be any doubt about the fact that section 146 of the said Act provides for one of the modes of proving dishonour of cheques, and it certainly cannot be the only mode of proving the same. In the present case, the memo purportedly issued by the bank showing dishonour of cheque, admittedly, does not bear the official mark of the bank. It was for this reason that the said document was not exhibited during the evidence. Thus, the mode specified in section 146 of the said Act was not satisfied in the present case, and consequently, no presumption arose about the dishonour of the cheque in question. In such a situation, the appellant claims that the dishonour of the cheque was proved because a statutory notice was issued by her to the respondent. It was pointed out that specific pleadings were made in the complaint filed before the Court stating dishonour of the said cheque and that when the respondent had failed to adduce any evidence in support of her defence, the statements made by the appellant in this statutory notice and the complaint were enough to prove dishonour of the 46 2025:HHC:22352 cheque. It was submitted that when there was no denial on the part of the respondent about the deposit and dishonour of the cheque in question, the trial Court could not have held that the appellant had failed to prove the fact of dishonour of the cheque. It was further contended that when the findings were rendered on the question of discharge of legal debt and it was found by the trial Court that the appellant had indeed advanced hand loan for the amount stated in the cheque to the respondent, there was no reason why the trial Court could have held that the fact of dishonour of cheque was not proved by the appellant. 12. While examining the said contentions raised on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary to keep in mind that the present case concerns criminal liability alleged against the respondent. Although proceedings under the aforesaid Act are quasi criminal in nature, the fact is that when the offence under section 138 of the said Act is said to have been proved, criminal liability is fixed upon the accused (respondent in the present case) and therefore, the evidence on record and the burden of proof have to be analyzed on the touchstone of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proof clearly lies upon the appellant in the present case to prove basic facts that would constitute an offence under section 138 of the aforesaid Act. Under the said provision, the offence is deemed to have been committed the moment the cheque in question is returned by the bank unpaid. Therefore, it is necessary that there is proof of return or dishonour of the cheque in question before it can be said that an offence under section 138 of the Act has been committed. 13. When the complainant (appellant in the present case) asserted that the cheque was returned or dishonoured, it was for her to prove this basic fact, section 146 of the said Act provides that if the complainant places on record a slip or memo issued by the bank having official mark of the bank thereon, denoting that the cheque was dishonoured, it would be presumed that such cheque was dishonoured until such fact was disproved. Thus, if such a document were placed on record by the appellant in the 47 2025:HHC:22352 present case, it would constitute prima facie evidence of dishonour of the cheque, and the burden would have been entirely on the respondent to disprove such a fact. But, when the memo produced in the present case by the appellant did not bear the official mark of the bank, there was no document as contemplated under section 146 of the said Act to presume that the fact of dishonour of the cheque had been proved by the appellant. The burden continued to lie on the appellant to prove the basic fact of dishonour of the cheque, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 14. In such a situation, a mere statement made in the statutory notice and the complaint filed before the Court would not constitute proof of dishonour of cheque, unless further evidence to corroborate the same was placed on record on behalf of the appellant. The appellant is not justified in claiming that such statements would suffice as proof of dishonour of the cheque because the respondent failed to enter the witness box in support of her defence. As the complainant, it was for the appellant to prove the fact of dishonour of the cheque by cogent evidence. The appellant could have examined the bank official to prove that the cheque had indeed been dishonoured, but she failed to do so. 15. The appellant could have placed on record a certificate contemplated under section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in respect of the memo of the Bank, which was allegedly a computer-generated electronic record. But no such evidence was placed on record. The trial Court has also held that there was a lack of evidence to show even the deposit of the cheque because the deposit slip was not placed on record by the appellant. But, a perusal of the cheque in question (Exhibit-21) does show that the stamp of the bank in which the cheque was deposited is very much present on the cheque. To that extent, the trial Court was not right in holding that even the proof of deposit of the cheque was not on record. Yet, this fact alone does not take the case of the appellant any further because the stamp affixed on the cheque shows only the 48 2025:HHC:22352 name of the bank, and there is nothing to signify the date on which the cheque was deposited in the bank. Even as per the case of the appellant, the cheque in question was deposited twice, and it is clear that there is no cogent evidence placed on record by the appellant to show dishonour of the said cheque. 16. When the basic fact of dishonour of cheque was not proved by the appellant and the burden was not discharged offence under section 138 of the said Act could not be said to have been committed by the respondent. Another important aspect of the present case is that when there is lack of evidence to show dishonour of cheque and consequently the date when the cheque was dishonoured, there is no reference point to ascertain as to whether the notice for demand of payment was issued by the appellant to the respondent within the period of 30 days of receipt of information from the bank regarding return of cheque as unpaid, as provided under proviso (b) to section 138 of the said Act. This is the reason why the trial Court has held that the appellant failed to prove that she made a demand for payment of the amount within the statutory period, as the statutory period could not be computed in the facts of the present case. 17. Analysis of the provisions of the said Act, particularly sections 138, 142 and 146 thereof, shows that cognizance of the offence under section 142 of the said Act could not have been taken by the Court in the present case because the basic fact of dishonour of cheque could not be proved by the appellant. The appellant failed to prove dishonour of the cheque by any mode other than the one provided under section 146 of the said Act. The memo of return of cheque in the present case admittedly did not bear the official mark of the Bank, due to which presumption in favour of the appellant did not arise. Therefore, the complaint in the present case was correctly rejected by the trial Court, thereby acquitting the respondent. 49 2025:HHC:22352 37. It was laid down in Tejendrasingh v. Ravindrakumar, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 60: (2019) 3 Mah LJ 612: 2019 ACD 229: (2019) 2 RCR (Cri) 475: PLR (2019) 193 IJ 14: (2019) 1 Bom CR (Cri) 900 that when the document does not bear the official mark/ seal, the presumption under Section 146 of the NI Act cannot be drawn. It was observed: “ii. Admittedly, the UCO Bank representative is not examined. The Trial Court refused to accept the bank memo issued by that bank. It does not bear the seal of the bank. I agree with the trial Court. The presumption under section 146 of the N.I. Act will not come to his rescue. There has to be a seal on the bank slip before the presumption as to dishonour can be drawn. I could have given the benefit of this lacuna even if a proper person from SBI, that is the signatory of the letter, could have been examined. It seems that while conducting the prosecution, these minor procedural aspects are overlooked.” 38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1: (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 1: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 1: (2020) 2 SCC (L&S) 587: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 571 that the certificate under Section 65(b) (4) of the Indian Evidence Act is mandatory, in the absence of which the computer-generated document cannot be relied upon. It was observed at page 27: - 50 2025:HHC:22352 “23. Section 65-B(1) opens with a non obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, and shall be admissible in any proceedings without further proof of production of the original, as evidence of the contents of the original or of any facts stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deeming fiction is for the reason that “document” as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include electronic records. 24. Section 65-B(2) then refers to the conditions that must be satisfied in respect of a computer output, and states that the test for being included in conditions 65- B(2)(a) to 65-B(2)(d) is that the computer be regularly used to store or process information for purposes of activities regularly carried on in the period in question. The conditions mentioned in sub-sections (2)(a) to (2)(d) must be satisfied cumulatively. 25. Under sub-section (4), a certificate is to be produced that identifies the electronic record containing the statement and describes the manner in which it is produced, or gives particulars of the device involved in the production of the electronic record to show that the electronic record was produced by a computer, by either a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device; or a person who is in the management of “relevant activities” — whichever is appropriate. What is also of importance is that it shall be sufficient for such matter to be stated to the “best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it”. Here, “doing any of the following things …” must be read as doing all of the following things, it being well settled that the expression “any” can mean “all” given the context (see, for example, this Court's judgments in Banwarilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar [Banwarilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar, (1962) 1 SCR 33: AIR 1961 SC 849: (1961) 2 Cri LJ 12: “3. The first 51 2025:HHC:22352 contention is based on an assumption that the word “any one” in Section 76 means only “one of the directors, and only one of the shareholders”. This question as regards the interpretation of the word “any one” in Section 76 was raised in Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, AIR 1961 SC 838 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 1and it has been decided there that the word “any one” should be interpreted there as “every one”. Thus, under Section 76, every one of the shareholders of a private company owning the mine, and every one of the directors of a public company owning the mine, is liable to prosecution. No question of violation of Article 14 therefore arises.” (SCR p. 35: AIR p. 850, para 3) (emphasis supplied)] and Om Parkash v. Union of India [Om Parkash v. Union of India, (2010) 4 SCC 17 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 1, “70. Perusal of the opinion of the Full Bench in B.R. Gupta-1 [Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India, 1987 SCC OnLine Del 227: AIR 1987 Del 239] would clearly indicate with regard to interpretation of the word “any” in Explanation 1 to the first proviso to Section 6 of the Act which expands the scope of stay order granted in one case of landowners to be automatically extended to all those landowners, whose lands are covered under the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether there was any separate order of stay or not as regards their lands. The logic assigned by the Full Bench, the relevant portions whereof have been reproduced hereinabove, appears to be reasonable, apt, legal and proper.” (SCC p. 43, para 70)(emphasis supplied)] ). This being the case, the conditions mentioned in Section 65- B(4) must also be interpreted as being cumulative. 39. In the present case, the memo of dishonour specifically mentions that it is a computer-generated document and does not require signatures. It does not bear any certificate or the official seal of the bank; hence, it cannot be admitted in evidence to conclude that the cheque was dishonoured. 52 2025:HHC:22352 40. It was submitted on behalf of the complainant that the accused did not object to the exhibition of the memo of dishonour, and it is impermissible to raise an objection before this Court. This submission has some force. A perusal of the record shows that the affidavit (Ex.CW1/A), cheque (Ex.CW1/B), memo (Ex.CW1/C), notice (Ex.CW1/D) and receipt (Mark-A) were produced in the presence of the accused, and no objection was raised to their exhibition. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752 that an objection to the admissibility of the evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. When secondary evidence is being led and no objection is raised, the same is deemed to be waived and cannot be taken during the appeal. It was observed:- 20. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has relied on Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1457] in support of his submission that a document not admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the abovesaid case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not 53 2025:HHC:22352 subsequently. The objections as to the admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as “an exhibit”, an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because, by his failure, the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the 54 2025:HHC:22352 evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both parties. Out of the two types of objections referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to a waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior court. 21. The Privy Council in Padman v. Hanwanta [AIR 1915 PC 111: 19 CWN 929] did not permit the appellant to take objection to the admissibility of a registered copy of a Will in appeal for the first time. It was held that this objection should have been taken in the trial court. It was observed: (AIR p. 112) “The defendants have now appealed to His Majesty-in-Council, and the case has been argued on their behalf in great detail. It was urged in the course of the argument that a registered copy of the Will of 1898 was admitted in evidence without sufficient foundation being laid for its admission. No objection, however, appears to have been taken in the first court against the copy obtained from the Registrar's office being put in evidence. Had such an objection been made at the time, the District Judge, who tried the case in the first instance, would probably have seen that the deficiency was supplied. Their Lordships think that there is no substance in the present contention.” 22. Similar is the view expressed by this Court in P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumal [(1972) 1 SCC 9 : (1972) 2 SCR 646]. In this case, the police reports were admitted as evidence without any objection and the objection was sought to be taken in appeal regarding the admissibility of the reports. Rejecting the contention, it was observed: (SCC p. 15, para 19) 55 2025:HHC:22352 “19. Before leaving this case, it is necessary to refer to one of the contentions taken by Mr Ramamurthi, learned counsel for the respondent. He contended that the police reports referred to earlier are inadmissible in evidence as the Head Constables who covered those meetings have not been examined in the case. Those reports were marked without any objection. Hence, it is not open to the respondent now to object to their admissibility — see Bhagat Ram v. Khetu Ram [AIR 1929 PC 110] .” 41. This judgment was followed in Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, (2004) 7 SCC 107, wherein it was observed:- “13. We do not find merit in this civil appeal. In the present case, the objection was not that the certified copy of Ext. P-1 is in itself inadmissible, but the mode of proof was irregular and insufficient. The objection as to the mode of proof falls within procedural law. Therefore, such objections could be waived. They have to be taken before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record (see Order 13 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure). This aspect has been brought out succinctly in the judgment of this Court in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple [(2003) 8 SCC 752] to which one of us, Bhan, J., was a party vide para 20 : (SCC p. 764) “20. The learned counsel for the defendant- respondent has relied on Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1457] in support of his submission that a document not admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the above-said case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to 56 2025:HHC:22352 the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to the admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes : (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as ‘an exhibit’, an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because, by his failure, the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted 57 2025:HHC:22352 going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure are fair to both parties. Out of the two types of objections referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to a waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior court.” (emphasis in original) 14. To the same effect is the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Gopal Das v. Thakurji [AIR 1943 PC 83: 47 CWN 607] in which it has been held that when the objection to the mode of proof is not taken, the party cannot lie by until the case comes before a court of appeal and then complain for the first time of the mode of proof. When the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof was irregular, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. Similarly, in Sarkar on Evidence, 15th Edn., p. 1084, it has been stated that where copies of the documents are admitted without objection in the trial court, no objection to their admissibility can be taken afterwards in the court of appeal. When a party gives in evidence a certified copy, without proving the circumstances entitling him to give secondary evidence, the objection must be taken at the time of admission, and such objection will not be allowed at a later stage. 15. In the present case, when the plaintiff submitted a certified copy of the sale deed (Ext. P-1) in evidence and when the sale deed was taken on record and marked as an 58 2025:HHC:22352 exhibit, the appellant did not raise any objection. Even execution of Ext. P-2 was not challenged. In the circumstances, it was not open to the appellant to object to the mode of proof before the lower appellate court. If the objection had been taken at the trial stage, the plaintiff could have met it by calling for the original sale deed, which was on record in collateral proceedings. But as there was no objection from the appellant, the sale deed dated 14-11-1944 was marked as Ext. P-1 and it was admitted to the record without objection.” 42. A similar view was taken in Lachhmi Narain Singh v. Sarjug Singh, (2022) 13 SCC 746, wherein it was observed:- “21. In such a scenario, where no protest was registered by the probate applicant against the production of a certified copy of the cancellation deed, he cannot later be allowed to take up the plea of non-production of the original cancellation deed in the course of the appellate proceeding. As already noted, the main contention of probate applicants was that the mode of proof of the cancellation deed was inadequate. However, such was not the stand of the probate applicants before the trial court. The objection as to the admissibility of a registered document must be raised at the earliest stage before the trial court, and the objection could not have been taken in appeal, for the first time. On this, we may draw support from observations made by Ameer Ali, J. in Padman v. Hanwanta [Padman v. Hanwanta, 1915 SCC OnLine PC 21] wherein the following was set out by the Privy Council: (SCC OnLine PC) “The defendants have now appealed to His Majesty-in-Council, and the case has been argued on their behalf in great detail. It was urged in the course of the argument that a registered copy of the will of 1898 was admitted in evidence without sufficient foundation being laid for its admission. 59 2025:HHC:22352 No objection, however, appears to have been taken in the first court against the copy obtained from the Registrar's office being put in evidence. Had such an objection been made at the time, the District Judge, who tried the case in the first instance, would probably have seen that the deficiency was supplied. Their Lordships think that there is no substance in the present contention.” 22. A similar view was taken by George Rankin, J. in the decision of Privy Council in Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji [Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji, 1943 SCC OnLine PC 2] where it was held that objection as to the mode of proof must be taken when the document is tendered and before it is marked as an exhibit. It cannot be taken in appeal. The objection as to the mode of proof should be taken before a document is admitted and marked as an exhibit. In the present case, the probate applicant never raised any objection in regard to the mode of proof of the cancellation deed before the trial court, as is evident from a perusal of the records, and this must be held against him. 23. In support of our above conclusion, we may usefully refer to the ratio in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple [R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752] where Ashok Bhan, J. while dealing with the aspect of disallowing objection as to mode of proof at appellate stage as a rule of fair play to avoid prejudice to the other side, said as follows : (SCC p. 764, para 20) “20. … In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage 60 2025:HHC:22352 subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because, by his failure, the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure are fair to both parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to a waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence.” 24. This Court, in the opinion written by S.H. Kapadia, J. in Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi [Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, (2004) 7 SCC 107] has similarly held that the objection as to the mode of proof falls within procedural law. Therefore, such objections could be waived. Moreover, the objection is to be taken before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted in Court. 61 2025:HHC:22352 25. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that a plea regarding the mode of proof cannot be permitted to be taken at the appellate stage for the first time, if not raised before the trial court at the appropriate stage. This is to avoid prejudice to the party that produced the certified copy of an original document without protest by the other side. If such an objection was raised before the trial court, then the party concerned could have cured the mode of proof by summoning the original copy of the document. But such an opportunity may not be available or possible at a later stage. Therefore, allowing such an objection to be raised during the appellate stage would put the party (who placed a certified copy on record instead of an original copy) in jeopardy and would seriously prejudice the interests of that party. It will also be inconsistent with the rule of fair play as propounded by Ashok Bhan, J. in R.V.E. Venkatachala [R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752]. 43. It was held in Ronald Rao vs Dhanraj 2020 ACD 508= AIROnline 2020 Bom 639 that when no objection was raised to the memo of dishonour at the time of its exhibition, such an objection cannot be taken in appeal. It was observed: “6. It is true that Section 146 of the N.I. Act is included in N.I. Act for the purpose of facilitating early disposal of the case. It is also for the purpose of dispensing with the attendance of the bank witnesses. The presumption under Section 146 of the N.I. Act can be drawn if certain formalities are completed. One is that the bank slip should contain the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured. This presumption is a rebuttable presumption. The accused is at liberty to prove to the contrary. The trial Court, more specifically in paragraphs 19, 20 and 21, has dealt with this issue. The trial Court has 62 2025:HHC:22352 laid emphasis on the absence of a drawing presumption under Section 146 of the N.I. Act. The trial Court has also emphasised on failure of the complainant to examine the bank witnesses. 7. It is true that Section 146 of the N.I. The Act contains a special provision. But what I find is that the complainant wants to rely more on the conduct of the accused than on this presumption. I have perused the additional affidavit as well as the cross-examination. On 07-10-2016, an additional affidavit was recorded. The cheques, as well as relevant cheque return memos, were exhibited. It is very well true that at that time the accused had not objected. I have also perused the cross-examination. Learned Advocate Shri Anthony for the appellant brought to my notice certain answers given by the complainant. The complainant deposes that "he has intimated the accused about bouncing of cheque on the telephone". But I did not find anywhere in the evidence that the accused pointed out the lacunae in those memos. That is to say, it does not bear the seal or signature of the banker. I do not find any suggestion given that the complainant has not proved the reason for the dishonour of cheques. Here, I find there is some lapse on the part of the accused. 8. It is true that the trial under Section 138 of the N.I.Act is quasi-criminal only. So I do not find any objection in considering the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the two above-referred judgments. In both these judgments, the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorised the types of objections. One is about the inadmissibility of documents, and the second is about how to prove the documents. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also opined on what will be the consequences if the objection is not taken at the proper time and under which contingency it can be taken later on. If there is an objection about the inadmissibility of documents, the party is at liberty to take such objection at that particular stage. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that this cannot be the situation wherein the objection pertained to the mode of proof. 63 2025:HHC:22352 Hon'ble Apex Court insisted that the objection about the mode of proof has to be taken at that juncture only. It is true that there are two consequences for not taking objection at that juncture. One is to prohibit the person from taking objection at the subsequent stage. The other is the party relieved upon the documents is relieved from taking further steps to prove that document. I think the ratio laid down in these judgments applies to the facts of this case. 9. It is very well true that while not taking the objection at least on two occasions as referred above, the accused has relieved the complainant from proving those memos in other way.” 44. It was held in Chandrabhan Sudam Sanap v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 174 that when no objection regarding the exhibition of computer-generated document was taken before the Trial Court, such an objection cannot be taken at the appellate stage. It was observed: 40. In Sonu @ Amar v. State of Haryana, (2017) 8 SCC 570, (delivered on 18.07.2017), the following paragraphs, being crucial, are extracted hereinbelow: — “30. In R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder [R.V.E. Venkat- achala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752], this Court held as follows : (SCC p. 764, para 20) “20. … Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes : (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is [Ed. The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in the original.] it- self inadmissible [Ed. The matter between two as- 64 2025:HHC:22352 terisks has been emphasised in the original.] in evi- dence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the [Ed. The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in the original.] mode of proof [Ed. The matter between two aster- isks has been emphasised in the original.] alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as “an exhibit”, an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an ex- hibit, the objection that it should not have been ad- mitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be al- lowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tender- ing the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omis- sion to object becomes fatal because, by his failure, the party entitled to object allows the party tender- ing the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party ten- dering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking in- dulgence of the court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the ob- 65 2025:HHC:22352 jection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure are fair to both parties. Out of the two types of objections referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely ob- jection amounts to waiver of the necessity for in- sisting on formal proof of a document, the docu- ment itself which is sought to be proved being ad- missible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in the su- perior court. 31. It would be relevant to refer to another case decided by this Court in P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Peru- mal [P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumal, (1972) 1 SCC 9]. The earlier cases referred to are civil cases, while this case pertains to police reports being admit- ted as evidence without objection during the trial. This Court did not permit such an objection to be taken at the appellate stage by holding that : (SCC p. 15, para 19) “19. Before leaving this case, it is necessary to refer to one of the contentions taken by Mr. Ramamurthi, learned counsel for the respondent. He contended that the police reports referred to earlier are inad- missible in evidence as the Head Constables who covered those meetings have not been examined in the case. Those reports were marked without any objection. Hence, it is not open to the respondent now to object to their admissibility.” 32. It is nobody's case that CDRs, which are a form of electronic record, are not inherently admissible in evi- dence. The objection is that they were marked before the trial court without a certificate as required by Sec- tion 65-B(4). It is clear from the judgments referred to supra that an objection relating to the mode or method of proof has to be raised at the time of marking of the document as an exhibit and not later. The crucial test, 66 2025:HHC:22352 as affirmed by this Court, is whether the defect could have been cured at the stage of marking the document. Applying this test to the present case, if an objection was taken to the CDRs being marked without a certifi- cate, the Court could have given the prosecution an opportunity to rectify the deficiency. It is also clear from the above judgments that objections regarding the admissibility of documents which are per se inad- missible can be taken even at the appellate stage. Ad- missibility of a document which is inherently inad- missible is an issue which can be taken up at the ap- pellate stage because it is a fundamental issue. The mode or method of proof is procedural, and objec- tions, if not taken at the trial, cannot be permitted at the appellate stage. If the objections to the mode of proof are permitted to be taken at the appellate stage by a party, the other side does not have an opportunity of rectifying the deficiencies. The learned Senior Counsel for the State referred to statements under Section 161 CrPC, 1973 as an example of documents falling under the said category of inherently inadmis- sible evidence. CDRs do not fall into the said category of documents. We are satisfied that an objection that CDRs are unreliable due to violation of the procedure prescribed in Section 65-B(4) cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage, as the objection relates to the mode or method of proof.” As rightly pointed out by Mr. Raja Thakare, learned Addi- tional Solicitor General, it was held in Sonu (supra) that objection about Section 65-B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, not being complied, cannot be taken at the appellate stage since that will deny an opportunity for the prosecu- tion or the opposite party to rectify the defect. It was also held that the documents were not inherently inadmissible in evidence. 45. In the present case, the objection relates to the mode of proof and not to the admissibility. Once an objection was not 67 2025:HHC:22352 raised regarding the admissibility of the document, it is impermissible to raise such an objection during the present proceedings. Hence, the submission on behalf of the complainant has to be accepted as correct, that by not raising the objection before the learned Trial Court, the accused has waived the objection. 46. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment of V. Velu (supra); however, para 21 of the judgment shows that the complainant had filed an application for proving the memo of dishonour. In the present case, no such application was filed, and this judgment will not assist the complainant. In Guneet Bhasin v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3967, it was held that the cheque return memo is not a document covered under Section 4 of the Bankers’ Book Evidence Act and any infirmity in the cheque return memo will not render the trial illegal. It was observed:- 9. The cheque return memo is a memo informing the payee's banker and the payee about the dishonour of a cheque. When the cheque is dishonoured, the drawee bank immediately issues a cheque return memo to the payee's banker, mentioning the reason for non-payment. The purpose of the cheque return memo is to give the information of the holder of the cheque that his cheque on presentation could not be encashed due to the variety 68 2025:HHC:22352 of reasons as mentioned in the cheque return memo. As per section 146 of the NI Act, the cheque return memo on presentation presumed the fact of dishonour of the cheque unless and until such fact is disapproved. Neither section 138 nor section 146 of the NI Act has prescribed any particular form of cheque return memo. Section 138 of the NI Act does not mandate any particular form of cheque return memo, which is nothing but a mere information given by the Banker of the due holder of a cheque that the cheque has been returned as unpaid. If the cheque return memo does not bear any official stamp of the bank, it does not render the cheque return memo invalid or illegal. The cheque return memo is not a document which is not required to be covered under section 4 of the Bankers’ Book (Evidence) Act, 1891. If there is any infirmity in the cheque return memo, it does not render the entire trial under section 138 of the NI Act as nullity. 47. This judgment dealt with the quashing of the complaint, and it left open for the complainant to prove the document as per the law, as is apparent from the following observations: “10. The perusal of the alleged cheque return memo, which is under challenge, reflects that the cheque bearing no. 000192 dated 15.04.2019, amounting to Rs. 47,53,519/- could not be encashed due to the “account blocked”. If it is presumed that there is any irregularity or illegality in the format of the said cheque return memo, then it can be addressed during the course of the trial. The petitioner has not disputed the issuance of the cheque under his signature and the dishonour of the cheque by the concerned Banker.” (Emphasis supplied) 69 2025:HHC:22352 48. In the present case, the Trial is over, and the cited judgment will not apply to the present case. Further, this Court is bound by the judgment of Rajinder Singh Verma (supra), and cannot follow the judgment of the Delhi High Court. 49. It was submitted that the memo of dishonour was issued by Punjab National Bank and not by HDFC Bank, the banker of the accused. However, this will not make any difference. It was laid down in Surendrapal Singh Chawla vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. (14.07.2009 - GUJHC): MANU/GJ/0518/200940 that in core banking and online bank systems, any bank can verify the record. Hence, the issuance of the cheque return memo need not be by the banker of the accused. It was observed:- 9. It appears from the above deposition that there exists a system of 'core-banking and on-line banking system' by which it is very easy to verify on the day of presentation of cheque issued from any corner of the country as to whether there was any sufficient fund in the account of the drawer of a cheque or not. The said version is proved through the deposition of the Bank Officer, wherein he has specifically stated that as per the online banking system, the cheque in original is not required to be sent to the concerned Branch from where it was issued because of the core-banking and development of the computer network system. Without sending the cheque to the concerned Bank, the Branch in which the cheque is presented can also verify as to whether sufficient funds 70 2025:HHC:22352 are available in the account of the drawer of the cheque or not. In the present case, the cheque was issued by the ICICI Bank, Kanpur Branch, and presented in the ICICI Bank, Gandhinagar Branch, and because of the core banking system, Gandhinagar Branch, on verifying the record, wrote the endorsement of 'insufficient funds'. In view of the above, non-examination of the Officer who dealt with the cheque or non-production of the counterfoil of pay-in-slip showing deposit of cheque does not mean that the cheque was not presented to the Bank, nor does it create any doubt in the mind of the Court about the version given by the complainant. The applicant, therefore, would not be entitled to any benefit out of the afore-referred judgments relied on by the learned Advocate for the applicant. 50. I respectfully agree with the judgment and hold that the mere issuance of the memo of dishonour by the bank of the complainant will not invalidate the same. 51. The complainant stated that he issued the notice (Ex.CW1/D) to the accused. The receipt (Mark-A) was placed on record. This receipt is a carbon copy and does not contain the address of the accused. It only mentions the name and Varanasi without giving the complete address. This document was also not exhibited by examining a competent official from the courier services. Therefore, this document was not legally proven and could not have been relied upon. 71 2025:HHC:22352 52. The judgment in Gimpex Private Limited (supra) deals with the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. The judgments in N Paraeswaran Unni (supra), CC Alavi Haji (supra), and M/s Ajeet Seed (supra) deal with the presumption of service of notice. Judgments in Rohitbai Jivanlal Patel (supra), Rajesh Jain, Budh Dev (supra), T Vasant Kumar, Dattatraya (supra), Chunni Lal (supra), Muddasani Venkata (supra) dealt with the presumption under Sections 118 (a) and 139 of the NI Act and the manner of its rebuttal. These are not relevant for the adjudication of the controversy pending before this Court. 53. In the present case, no evidence was produced before the Court to show the true reason for the dishonour; therefore, the complaint was not maintainable under Section 138 of the NI Act, and was rightly dismissed by the learned Appellate Court. This was a reasonable view which could have been taken based on the material placed before the learned Appellate Court, and no interference is required with the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court. 72 2025:HHC:22352 54. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. 55. Records of the learned Courts below be sent back forthwith, along with a copy of this judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 11th July, 2025 (Chander)