2025:HHC:28895 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.M.M.O. Nos. 689 of 2023 Reserved on: 19.08.2025 Decided on: 27.08.2025 Tilak Raj ...…. Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and another …...Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner: Mr. Ganesh Barowalia, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. Lokender Kutlheria, Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1-State. Mr. Arush Matlotia, Advocate, for respondent No.2. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present petition has been filed for quashing of F.I.R. No. 132 of 2019, dated 15.07.2019, registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property (PDPP) Act and the consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant, Roshan Lal, made a complaint 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes 2 2025:HHC:28895 to the police stating that the Gram Panchayat Sihund had constructed a road from the Health Centre, Sihund to Patwar Circle in the year 2003-2004 by spending a ₹14,880/-. This road was damaged by Tilak Raj (present petitioner). He had also damaged the water pipe laid adjacent to the road. The people of the villages Ramhaid, Sihund and Baldhar were facing inconvenience in visiting the offices. The water supply was also disrupted. The Police registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation. The police seized the record of the construction of the road. It was found out after investigation that the road was constructed on the land of Tilak Raj, who had damaged the road on 10.06.2019 by employing an excavator. Hence, the chargesheet was filed before the Court. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the FIR was lodged due to a political rivalry between the informant and the petitioner. The Secretary Gram Panchayat, Sihund told the police that the road was constructed on the petitioner’s land by spending ₹14,880/- of the government money in the year 2003-2004; however, no objection certificate was not available on record. No public path was entered in the revenue record. The petitioner allowed the 3 2025:HHC:28895 residents of the village to use his land as a path. He had not gifted the land to the Gram Panchayat. He is the owner of the land and has every right to use the land. The property was not proved to be public property, and the offence punishable under Section 3 of the PDPP Act was not made out. The unauthorised construction was done by the then Pardhan Gram Panchayat over the petitioner’s land without his consent; such unauthorised construction cannot be considered to be public property. The petitioner has constructed an Ambulance Road on his private land, and no inconvenience is being caused to the General Public. The continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R., as well as consequential proceedings of the said F.I.R., be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply reproducing the contents of the F.I.R. and various steps taken by the police during the investigation. It was asserted that the waived right over a particular property cannot be claimed later on, especially when public funds were spent on it. The petitioner had permitted the legal residents to use his land as a path. The petitioner had damaged the Pucca path by employing an 4 2025:HHC:28895 excavator. The investigation was properly conducted. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and affirming those of the petition was filed. 6. I have heard Mr. Ganesh Barowalia, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State and Mr.Arush Matlotia, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant. 7. Mr. Ganesh Barowalia, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner and the informant have a political rivalry and the F.I.R. was lodged by the informant to harass the petitioner. As per the material collected by the police, the road was constructed on the petitioner’s land without taking a No Objection Certificate from the petitioner. The PDPP Act was enacted to prevent damage to the property during the riots and similar activities; therefore, the present case is not covered under the statement of objects and reasons. The petitioner had constructed an Ambulance Road on his own land and caused no inconvenience to the public. The path is not recorded in the revenue record, and the existence of the path is doubtful. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed 5 2025:HHC:28895 and the F.I.R.,and the consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., be quashed. 8. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State, submitted that the police conducted the investigation and filed a charge-sheet. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. Mr. Arush Matoltia, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant, submitted that the petitioner had damaged the road constructed by the Gram Panchayat with the public funds. It falls within the definition of public property. The consent would have been material at the time of construction of the road and not after the road was constructed. The petitioner had no right to damage the road. The FIR was rightly registered against the petitioner. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 6 2025:HHC:28895 11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if 7 2025:HHC:28895 any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the 8 2025:HHC:28895 accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the endsofjustice. Theseinherentpowersare neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded withinSection482oftheCrPCitself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear 9 2025:HHC:28895 abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 13. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the statement of objects and reasons to submit that the PDPP Act was enacted to prevent damage to public property during the riots and similar activities. Therefore, the same cannot be applied to the present case. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Devadoss v. Veera Makali Amman Koil Athalur, (1998) 9 SCC 286, that the statements of objects and reasons cannot be used to determine the meaning of the statute. It was observed at page 295: “Whether the Statement of Objects and Reasons of Act 27 of 1966 could be looked into 10 2025:HHC:28895 21. The question arises naturally whether the court can refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons mentioned in a bill when it is placed before the legislature, and even if it is permissible, to what extent the court can make use of the same. On this aspect, the law is well settled. In Narain Khamman v. Parduman Kumar Jain [(1985) 1 SCC 1] it was stated that though the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a legislative bill could not be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of a statute, it was permissible to refer to the same for the purpose of understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute and the evil which the statute sought to remedy. (See also Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha v. Eileen K. Patricia D'Rozarie [(1995) 1 SCC 164] .) 15. Therefore, it is impermissible to look into the statement of objects and reasons to determine the meaning of the statute when its words are clear and there is no ambiguity in them. 16. Section 3 of the PDPP Act reads that whoever commits mischief by damaging any public property other than the public property referred to in sub-section 2 shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with a fine. 17. The statute provides for damage to public property by committing the mischief. It does not restrict itself to damage caused in a particular situation. When the words of the statute 11 2025:HHC:28895 are unambiguous, they are to be interpreted in their plain manner, and it is impermissible to curtail/extend their scope by taking recourse to external aid of interpretation. Therefore, the submissions that the PDPP Act applies only to the damage caused during the riots or similar activities cannot be accepted. 18. The petitioner has not disputed the existence of a public path constructed by the Gram Panchayat in the present petition. He specifically asserted in Para-13 of the petition that the petitioner had allowed the resident to use his land as a path, but he had not gifted the land or transferred it to the Government or the Gram Panchayat. He asserted in para 18-A that the unauthorised construction was done by the then Pardhan of Gram Pancahyat Sihund over the private land of the petitioner and that too without his consent. Hence, the fact that the Panachayat had constructed the path over the petitioner’s land is admitted. 19. The term ‘Public Property’ has been defined in Section 2(b) (iv) of the PDPP Act as any property, whether moveable or immovable, owned by or in the possession of or under the control of any local authority. Thus, the possession or control and not the ownership of the property is required to 12 2025:HHC:28895 make it public property, and the submission that the petitioner is an owner and the property cannot be public property is unacceptable. The road was constructed by the Gram Panchayat by spending public money; therefore, the road was under the control of the Gram Panchayat, a local authority, and would be public property as per the definition. 20. It was submitted that the petitioner’s consent was not obtained before the construction of the road. The absence of the consent would enable the petitioner to approach the Court for damages, possession or injunction, but would not authorise the petitioner to damage public property. 21. It was submitted that no path is recorded in the revenue record, and the existence of public property is doubtful. This submission is only stated to be rejected. When the petitioner himself admits the construction of ther oad by the Gram Panchayat, maybe without consent, the ingredient of the road being under the control of the Gram Panchayat is satisfied. The petitioner also admitted that he had allowed the residents to use his land as a path, which also establishes the existence and use of the road by the public. Hence, the fact that no public 13 2025:HHC:28895 path was recorded in the revenue record does not show that no public path exists. 22. It was submitted that the F.I.R. was lodged due to the political rivalry to harass the petitioner; this will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” Xxxx 39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As 14 2025:HHC:28895 observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 23. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground that it is mala fide. 24. It was undisputed that a charge sheet had been filed before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because, even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be 15 2025:HHC:28895 filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 25. No other point was urged. 26. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petitions and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 27th August 2025. (ravinder)