-1- Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:4017-DB Reserved on 19.11.2024 Delivered on 22.01.2025 Court No. 9 Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 732 of 2022 Appellant :- Jainendra Kumar Alias Deepu Respondent :- State Of U.P Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Counsel for Appellant :- Desh Deepak Verma,Ankit Kumar Pandey,Ashish Kumar Rastogi,Ashutosh Verma,Aviral Raj Singh,Palash Banerjee,Ritwick Rai,Vaibhav Tiwari Hon'ble Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra, J. Hon'ble Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan, J. 1. Heard Shri Ritwick Rai along with Shri Ashutosh Verma, Shri Vaibhav Tiwari and Shri Aviral Raj Singh, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri P.K. Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State-respondent and perused the record. 2. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant, namely, Jainendra Kumar @ Deepu under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. against the judgment and order dated 10.02.2022 passed by learned Special Judge (E.C. Act)/Additional Sessions Judge, Barabanki in Sessions Trial No.434 of 2018 (State vs. Shiv Singh and another), arising out of Case Crime No.182 of 2018, under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 316, 302 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Jaidpur, District Barabanki, whereby the appellant - Jainendra Kumar @ Deepu has been convicted for committing offence under Sections 302, 316 I.P.C. and has been acquitted for committing offence under Section 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. as well as under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and he has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment for committing offence under Section 302 I.P.C. and fine of Rs.20,000/-, in default, to undergo six months additional imprisonment and to undergo ten years rigorous imprisonment for committing offence under Section 316 I.P.C. and fine of -2- Rs.10,000/-, in default, to undergo three months additional imprisonment. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 3. The necessary facts required for disposal of the instant appeal appears to be that an F.I.R. was lodged by informant – Rajeev Kumar at Police Station Jaidpur at 07:45pm. on 01.08.2018 alleging therein that marriage of his sister Priti Verma was solemnized on 28.04.2016 with the appellant - Jainendra Kumar Alias Deepu and till six months after the marriage, everything was sailing smooth, however, thereafter his sister started complaining about the cruelty which was being committed with her by her mother-in-law – Anoopa Devi, Jethanis Sushila and Arti and Jeth Om Chandra, Shiv Singh and Reetu (nanad) and her husband/appellant/Jainendra Kumar Alias Deepu in lieu of demand of a four wheeler vehicle. It is further stated that his sister was pregnant, but she was not provided adequate medical aid and when he went to bring his sister, the accused persons did not allow her to accompany him and on 30.07.2018 at about 10:00am, one Om Chandra informed him through mobile phone that his sister has been bitten by the snake and died. It is on the basis of this information, they are stated to have arrived at the matrimonial house of his sister and on became suspicious, they demanded postmortem of the body of the deceased. It is apprehended in the application that the accused persons have jointly killed his sister. 4. On the basis of this written information, an F.I.R. in Case Crime No.182 of 2018, under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 316 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was registered at Police Station Jaidpur, District Barabanki and the investigation of the same was conducted by Shri Rajesh Kumar Yadav, Circle Officer of the police and he prepared inquest report of the deceased and after preparation of the necessary papers sent the dead body of the deceased for the purpose of postmortem. -3- 5. The postmortem of the body of the deceased was performed by Dr. Shekh Rizwan in presence of Dr. Umesh Chandra on 31.07.2018 at District Lady Hospital, Barabanki at about 02:00pm. and video recording of the same was also made. The deceased was found to be aged about 22 years and her height was found about 153cm. Rigor mortis was passing through upper limb and was present in lower limb. P.M. staining was found on the back. Following ante-mortem injury was noted by the doctor at the time of postmortem:- (i) Abraded contusion 14cm. x 3cm. in front of the neck. 5cm. Below chin and 4cm below left ear beneath which ecchymosis was also found and trachea rings was found fractured and congested. Internal Examination On internal examination, scalp of the deceased was found normal, brain was found congested and tongue was found contused. Ribs and chest of the deceased were normal. The pleura was found congested. There was about 350ml. semi digested food in the stomach. A fetus having length of about 11cm and weighing about 35gram was also found in the uterus, which would be of 3-4 months old and the cause of death of deceased was ascertained as ‘asphyxia’ as a result of ante mortem throttling and in order to ascertain poisoning, viscera of the deceased was also preserved. 6. The investigating officer prepared site plan and recorded the statement of many prosecution witnesses and finding sufficient material against the accused persons submitted charge sheet against Shiv Singh @ Bhure, Jainendra Kumar @ Deepu and Anoopa Devi under Sections 498- A, 304-B, 316, 302 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. -4- 7. The trial court framed the charges against the appellant and other accused persons under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 316, 302 I.P.C. and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, to which the appellant and other accused persons denied and claimed trial. 8. The prosecution in order to prove its case has presented P.W.-1/Informant/Rajeev Kumar, P.W.-2/Krishnawati, P.W.-3/Santosh Kumari, P.W.-4/ Sushil Pratap Singh, Naib Tehsildar, P.W.-5/Uma Shankar, P.W.-6/Rajesh Kumar Yadav, Investigating Officer, P.W.-7/Constable Munsi Mahendra Bahadur Singh, P.W.8/Dr. Umesh Chandra. 9. Apart from the above-mentioned oral evidence, the prosecution has also relied on documentary evidence e.g. written application - Exhibit Ka- 1, panchnama – Exhibit Ka-2, letter to the C.M.O. Exhibit-Ka-3, letter to the R.I. and to the C.M.O. Exhibits Ka-4 and 5, Letter to the R.I. Exhibit Ka-6, Police Form No.379 Exhibit Ka-7, sample of seal Exhibit Ka-8, site plan Exhibit Ka-9, charge sheets filed against the appellant and other accused persons separately Exhibit Ka-10 and 11, chik F.I.R. Exhibit Ka- 12, postmortem report Exhibit Ka-13. 10. After conclusion of the evidence of the prosecution, the statement of the appellants/accused including of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied all the evidence produced by the prosecution and also stated that the deceased was suffering from acute depression and at the time of incident, appellant was working in Lucknow and was not present in his house while other accused persons namely Shiv Singh @ Bhure and Anoopa Devi have stated that the deceased was suffering from depression and they were living separately from his son and his wife and claimed that they have been falsely implicated in this case, however, the accused persons including the appellant did not produce any evidence in their defence. -5- 11. The trial court after hearing learned counsel for the parties did not find the case of the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt against the accused persons namely Shiv Singh and Smt. Anoopa Devi and they were acquitted of all the charges framed against them and the appellant was also acquitted of the charges framed under Sections 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, but was finding sufficient evidence, he was convicted under Section 316, 302 I.P.C. and was sentenced in the manner described in the 2nd paragraph of this judgment. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant while challenging the impugned judgment and order of the trial court, submits that the trial court has committed manifest illegality in appreciating the evidence available on record and has passed the judgment of conviction only on the basis of 'surmises and conjectures'. 13. It is further submitted that a specific plea was taken by the appellant before the trial court that at the relevant point of time he was residing and serving at Lucknow and was not present in his house, where the incident happened, but the trial court has brushed aside his defence without discussing it in its right perspective. 14. It is vehemently submitted that the trial court has taken the aid of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act for the purpose of recording of judgement of conviction without paying due regard to the fact that even for invocation of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the prosecution could not be absolved of its duty to prove the initial facts on the basis of which Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act may be used against an accused and the burden to prove the specific facts, which, according to learned trial court, were in his knowledge, was wrongly put on him and therefore, the judgement of the trial court is perverse and may not withstand the test of law. -6- 15. It is further submitted that it was specifically pleaded before the trial court that the deceased has been done to death by some unknown assailants, which was also evident from the fact that boundary wall of the house of the appellant was also found demolished, however, this aspect of the matter was not dealt with in its right perspective. It is also submitted that at the time of inquest, everybody was convinced that the deceased had died due to snake bite and the informant Rajeev Kumar was of the same view as is evident from the inquest report, however, he under the influence of some persons of the village has lodged the F.I.R. It is also submitted that viscera of the deceased was not sent for forensic examination and there are major contradictions, embellishments, inherent weaknesses in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and all the prosecution witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and were declared hostile, and it was a case wherein reasonable doubt was emerging out of the evidence of the prosecution tendered before the trial court. Thus the trial court has committed mistake in convicting the appellant and the impugned judgment and order of the trial court be set- aside and appellant be acquitted of all the charges framed against him. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the following case laws: i. Satye Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Uttarakhand; MANU/SC/0192/2022 ii Dev Kanya Tiwari Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh; MANU/SC/0262/2018 iii. Nagendra Sah Vs. The State of Bihar; MANU/SC/0641/2021 iv. Shivaji Chintappa Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra; MANU/SC/0136/2021 v. Jose Vs. The Sub-Inspector of Police, Koyilandy & Ors.; MANU/SC/1162/2016 vi. Manharan Rajwade Vs. State of Chhattisgarh; Criminal Appeal No(s).818 of 2019 -7- vii. Subramaniam Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.; MANU/SC/0795/2009 viii. Sukhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab; MANU/SC/0888/2014 ix. Narendra Singh VS. State of M.P.; MANU/SC/0341/2004 x. Idris & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.; MANU/SC/2047/2017 xi. Badam Singh Vs. State of U.P.; MANU/SC/4325/2022 xii. Ram Milan Bunkar Vs. State of U.P.; MANU/UP/2437/2024 xiii. Mohibur Rahman and Ors. Vs. State of Assam; MANU/SC/0690/2002 xiv. Balvir Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand; MANU/SC/1092/2023 17. Shri P.K. Mishra, learned A.G.A. for the State on the other hand submits that the trial court has not committed any illegality or to say any irregularity in convicting the appellant as the case of the prosecution was proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that the case of the prosecution is very clear as is reflected from the F.I.R. that at the relevant point of time the deceased was in her matrimonial house and she was found dead and it was projected by the appellant and his other family members that the deceased had died due to snake bite and the informant on becoming suspicious moved two applications before the appropriate authorities for conducting postmortem and it is in the postmortem report, the theory developed by the appellant that the deceased had died due to snake bite, was proved wrong and it was found that the deceased had died due to ‘asphyxia’ as a result of ante mortem throttling. 18. 18. It is further submitted that though nobody had seen the appellant and other accused persons committing the crime, but since the crime has been committed within the four-walls of the house owned by appellant and the true facts, in all probability, must be in the knowledge of the appellant and other accused persons as to how the deceased had died, but they have failed to put forth any reasonable explanation with regard to the same and the theory put forth by them that she had died due to snake bite was proved wrong in the postmortem report, which also suggests that the -8- deceased had been done to death by none other than the appellant and his other family members by throttling. It is also submitted that the principle contained under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act has been rightly invoked by the trial court in this case as to how the deceased died could only be in the knowledge of the accused persons including the appellant, therefore, it was their duty to explain as to how she died and the explanation given by them that she had died due to snake bite is patently wrong and false, which clearly reveals that the crime has been committed by none other than the appellant and his family members. It is further submitted that the case of the prosecution was proved beyond reasonable doubt and the oral evidence was supported by the medical evidence and thus no illegality has been committed by the trial court in convicting the appellant. 19. Before proceeding further in order to assess as to whether any illegality has been committed by the trial court in convicting the appellant for committing offence under Sections 302, 316 I.P.C., it is desirable to look at the evidence produced by the prosecution before the trial court. 20. P.W.-1/Rajeev Kumar is the informant of this case and he has proved the contents of the F.I.R. in his examination in chief and stated categorically that the marriage of the deceased was solemnized with the appellant in April, 2016 and she remained happy with him till six months after the marriage and thereafter, the appellant and his family members started committing cruelty on her in lieu of demand of a four wheeler vehicle. He further stated that whenever the deceased was coming to her maternal house, she was complaining of atrocities being committed by the appellant and his family members in lieu of demand of four wheeler vehicle. It is also stated that a few days before the incident, he had gone to the house of the appellant and the deceased had informed him that she is being treated with cruelty by the appellant and his family members on account of demand of four wheeler and on 30.07.2018 at about 10:00am -9- one Om Chandra had called him on telephone and informed that his sister Priti Verma has died due to snake bite, however, when he arrived at the matrimonial house of his sister, he suspected that the deceased has been done to death by throttling and thereafter he got the F.I.R. written by a person sitting out side of the police station and lodged the same. During the course of cross examination, he admitted that the appellant was working in Lucknow and at the time of incident, he was not present in his house and his sister Priti Verma was living with her mother-in-law and brother-in-law (jeth) in a separate room. It is also admitted by him that the boundary wall of the house was in a deteriorated condition and any miscreant may easily come in the house through the same. He also got information afterwards that the deceased has been done to death by some unknown miscreants. It has been stated by him, while under cross examination that the deceased has not been done to death by the appellant and his family members and he does not want to falsely implicate innocent persons and he has given earlier statement under the compulsion of the police. The trial court has also put some questions to this witness and he replied that he was suspicious about the commission of offence by the appellant and his family members and also that the investigating officer has never recorded his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Though there is no express order of the trial court with regard to the declaration of this witness as hostile, however, it is evident from the record that the prosecution was given opportunity for the cross-examination of this witness and on said opportunity provided, the prosecution has cross examined this witness, wherein he has stated that it is wrong to say that his sister was being dealt with cruelty by the appellant and his family members and they have committed her murder. 21. P.W.-2/Krishnawati, who is the mother of the deceased, in her in chief examination has stated that after solemnization of marriage of her daughter with the appellant, whenever she came to her maternal house, -10- she found her happy and also that she had died in her matrimonial home and at that point of time, she was also pregnant by seven months. She stated that she could not say as to how her daughter died and she did not get any information with regard to the commission of any crime by the appellant and his family members with the deceased. At this point of time this witness was declared hostile and the prosecution was permitted to cross examine. It is in the cross examination, this witness has stated that she did not give any statement to the investigating officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and thus disowned her statement given under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The trial court has also asked some questions from this witness and in her answers to these queries, she replied that as the appellant and his family members did not allow the deceased to come her maternal house for about seven months and when she arrived at the house of the matrimonial house of the deceased, she found her bleeding from mouth, nose and ears. She had been informed that she has been bitten by snake while there was no symptom of any snake bite. The responsibility of explaining her death lies on the accused persons. 22. P.W.-3/Santosh Kumari, who is the wife of P.W.-1/Rajeev Kumar (bhabhi of the deceased), stated in her examination in chief that at the time of incident she was in her 'sasural' at Jalalpur and on the fateful day, the in-laws of the deceased had informed through phone that the deceased has been bitten by a snake and had died and she did not go to the house of the deceased. She also stated that the deceased informed her that she is living with peace in her 'sasural'. She has also denied her statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and stated categorically that the appellant and his family members have never demanded any dowry nor subjected the deceased to cruelty. This witness was also declared hostile and opportunity was given to the prosecution to cross examine her, wherein she refused to have given any statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and also that the deceased Priti Verma was living -11- separately from her parents-in-law and also that at the time of incident, husband of the deceased (appellant) was serving at Lucknow and at that point of time he was at Lucknow and was not present in his house. She further stated that the appellant or his family members have never committed cruelty with the deceased in lieu of demand of dowry and she was living happily in her matrimonial house. 23. P.W.-4/Sushil Pratap Singh is the Naib Tehsildar, who had prepared the inquest report and also prepared various documents for the purpose of postmortem and had proved the same. 24. P.W.-6/Rajesh Kumar Singh, who at the relevant time was the Circle Officer of the Police, Barabanki, is the investigating officer of the case and has stated to have received information of entrustment of the investigation and to have proceeded immediately to prepare inquest report and to have recorded statement of Magistrate, who has conducted inquest and thereafter recorded statement of the scribe of the F.I.R. and of the informant Rajeev Kumar and prepared site plan. He also stated to have arrested the accused persons and recorded the statement of the Doctors, who had conducted postmortem, and other witnesses and finding sufficient material against the appellant and other accused persons, to have submitted Charge Sheet against them. 25. P.W.-7/Constable Munsi Mahendra Bahadur Singh has proved to have recorded substance of written information in the relevant diary and to have lodged the F.I.R. and that the substance of which was entered into the general diary of the police station at Rapat No.39 time 19:45 hours. 26. P.W.-8/Dr. Umesh Chandra is the Doctor, in front of whom postmortem of the deceased was conducted and he has proved the postmortem report, contents of which has been mentioned in detail this judgement at appreciate place. -12- 27. Before proceeding further, a glance is also required to be made on the principle of the appreciation of evidence as well as how the evidence is to be appreciated in the cases, which are based on circumstantial evidence and also with regard to the conditions under which Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act may be invoked. 28. The case of the prosecution as is evident from the record is that on 30.07.2018 at about 10:00am accused persons including the appellant had caused the murder of the deceased Priti Verma on account of non fulfillment of demand of dowry i.e. a four wheeler and the deceased at that point of time was also pregnant and by illegal act of the appellant and his family members, the fetus also died. It is to be recalled that the trial court has not found the case of the prosecution proved against the appellant for the offence under Section 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act but convicted him for committing offence under Section 302, 316 I.P.C. 29. Perusal of the record would also reveal that the trial court despite hostility of three witnesses of fact namely P.W.-1/Informant/Rajeev Kumar, P.W.-2/Krishnawati, P.W.-3/Santosh Kumari observed that these witnesses have become hostile as they have colluded with the accused persons and the plea of the appellant that he, at the relevant point of time was working at Lucknow, was not established and as the deceased has died in the house of the appellant and other accused persons were living separately by applying principle as contained under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act and on account of not providing any reasonable explanation pertaining to the death of the deceased, was of the view that in all probability, the offence has been committed by the appellant and thus convicted him for committing murder of the deceased and also of her fetus. -13- 30. -13- 30. Perusal of the evidence of three prosecution witnesses available on record would reveal that P.W.-1/Rajeev Kumar, who had lodged F.I.R. in his examination in chief has supported the allegations as levelled by him in the F.I.R. and in his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., however, in the course of his cross examination, he has stated categorically that his sister was not dealt with cruelty by the accused persons and no demand of dowry was ever made from her and he on the basis of instigation given by the villagers had lodged the F.I.R. He has also admitted that the appellant at the relevant point of time was doing service in Lucknow and at the time of incident, he was not present at the spot. He also stated during the course of cross examination that the boundary wall of the house was broken and it was easy for any miscreant to enter into the house and subsequently he came to know that the deceased has been done to death by some miscreants. This witness has disowned his statement given to the investigating officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. This witness has been declared hostile and has been cross examined by the prosecution as well as certain questions were also put by the Presiding Judge. 31. P.W.-2/Krishnawati, who is the mother of the deceased, in her examination in chief has stated that after marriage of the deceased with the appellant, she was happy and has not ever complained about any atrocities committed on her by the appellant and his family members and she also denied to have given any statement to the investigating officer and on being declared hostile, she was cross examined by the prosecution, wherein also she disowned her statement given in chief examination and on being asked as to why she had a suspicion that the deceased has been done to death by the appellant and his family members, she replied that she is having a suspicion because the incident had occurred in the house of the appellant and in-laws of her daughter had not allowed the deceased to visit her maternal house for seven months and also from the fact that when she had arrived at the house of the deceased, she saw that the -14- deceased was bleeding from her nose, ear and mouth. Though it was told to her that it is a case of snake bite, but there was no sign of snake bite. 32. P.W.-3/Santosh Kumari, who is the Bhabhi of the deceased, has stated in her cross examination about the solemnization of marriage of the deceased with the appellant and also that everybody was happy and also that they were informed that the deceased had died of a snake bite. She denied to have given any statement to the investigating officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and further stated that the deceased has never told her about any atrocities or assault committed by the appellant and his family members. This witness was also declared hostile and was cross examined and apart from other she has stated that at the time of alleged incident, the appellant was at his service at Lucknow and was not present in his house (where the deceased had died). 33. Thus it is evident that none of the prosecution witnesses have stood with their statement given under Section 161 Cr.P.C. P.W.-1/Rajeev Kumar though was intact in his examination in chief, but was declared hostile under cross-examination. P.W.-2/Krishnawati and P.W.-3/Santosh Kumari were also declared hostile when they resiled from their statement given under Section 161 Cr.P.C., in their chief examination. The trial court appears to have taken some excerpts from the statement given by these witnesses in order to hold that these witnesses have colluded with the accused persons and therefore, have not supported the case of the prosecution. It is significant that though plea of ‘alibi’ has been taken by the appellant, but no evidence either oral or documentary was produced by him for proving such plea of alibi. However, at least two prosecution witnesses namely P.W.-1/Rajeev Kumar and P.W.-3/Santosh Kumari in categorical terms have stated in their evidence that at the relevant point of time (on the day of incident), the appellant was not present at his house. The trial court found the plea of alibi not proved by the accused persons, but question arises for our consideration as to whether when a fact was -15- admitted to the prosecution witnesses, the same would still be required to be proved by the accused person as he had taken a plea of alibi. It is evident from the evidence available on record that these two witnesses namely P.W.-1/Rajeev Kumar and P.W.-3/Santosh Kumari had specifically admitted in their evidence that at the time of incident, the appellant was not present at his house and was at Lucknow, where he was working. 34. Section 56 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that when a fact has been admitted to the parties, the same is not required to be proved. Thus what is reflected from the evidence available on record is that the fact of absence of the appellant at the date and time of the incident was admitted to two prime prosecution witnesses namely P.W.-1/Rajeev Kumar and P.W.-3/Santosh Kumari. In this background the endeavour of the trial court to invoke Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act against the appellant is also required to be examined. The law with regard to Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act is now no more res integra and the same has been settled by catena of judgements rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court. Some of these judgements are being reproduced for ready reference as under: Hon'ble Supreme Court in three Judges Bench Judgment in Anees Vs. The State Govt. of NCT, MANU/SC/0379/2024 described the principles enshrined under Section 106 of the Evidence Act in following words :- "i. Principles of law governing the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act 35. Section 106 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: 106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.- When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. -16- Illustration (a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him. (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him. 36. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The word "especially" means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the Accused. The ordinary Rule that applies to the criminal trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Accused is not in any way modified by the Rule of facts embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general Rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish the facts which are, "especially within the knowledge of the Accused and which, he can prove without difficulty or inconvenience". 37. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer MANU/SC/0023/1956 : 1956:INSC:15 : AIR 1956 SC 404, this Court while considering the word "especially" employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: 11. ... The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the Section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the Accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. -17- It is evident that that cannot be the intention & the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an Accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, MANU/PR/0151/1936 : 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. Rule 1936-3 All ER 36 AT P. 49 (B). 38. The aforesaid decision of Shambhu Nath (supra) has been referred to and relied upon in Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/0641/2021 : 2021:INSC:475 : (2021) 10 SCC 725, wherein this Court observed as under: 22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the Accused. When the Accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the Accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the Accused to discharge the burden Under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the Accused. (Emphasis supplied) 39. In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0748/2012 : 2012:INSC:401 : (2012) 10 SCC 373, this Court observed as under: 23. It is settled law that presumption of fact is a Rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact -18- from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilised. We make it clear that this Section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the Accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. It is useful to quote the following observation in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Ors. [ MANU/SC/0535/2000 : 2000:INSC:422 : (2000) 8 SCC 382: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1516]: (SCC p. 393, para 38) 38. Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the Accused. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer [ MANU/SC/0023/1956 : 1956:INSC:15 : AIR 1956 SC 404: 1956 Cri LJ 794] the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: 11. This lays down the general Rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the Accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. -19- The word "especially" stresses that. It means facts that are pre- eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. (Emphasis supplied) 41. The question of burden of proof, where some facts are within the personal knowledge of the Accused, was examined by this Court in the case of State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Ors., MANU/SC/0535/2000 : 2000:INSC:422 : (2000) 8 SCC 382 as under: "31. The pristine Rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Accused should not be taken as a recognized doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional Rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. 32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognized by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a Rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. -20- 34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that Mahesh was abducted by the Accused and they took him out of that area, the Accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the presumption that the Accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the Accused would tell the Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody. (Emphasis supplied) 35. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is evident that the court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution. It cannot be said that it has no application to criminal cases. The ordinary Rule which applies to criminal trials in this country is that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and is not in any way modified by the provisions contained in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 36. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anees (supra) further clarified the principle of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act in following paragraphs: "44. Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the Accused. This Section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence. It does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the Accused and it does not throw the burden on the Accused to show that no crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the Accused from absence of reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its legitimate burden. So, until a prima facie case is established by such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused. 45. Section 106 of the Evidence Act obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the Accused is established on the evidence -21- produced by the prosecution unless the Accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his knowledge, which would render the evidence of the prosecution nugatory. If in such a situation, the Accused offers an explanation which may be reasonably true in the proved circumstances, the Accused gets the benefit of reasonable doubt though he may not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the truth of the explanation. But, if the Accused in such a case does not give any explanation at all or gives a false or unacceptable explanation, this by itself is a circumstance which may well turn the scale against him. In the language of Prof. Glanville Williams: All that the shifting of the evidential burden does at the final stage of the case is to allow the jury (Court) to take into account the silence of the Accused or the absence of satisfactory explanation appearing from his evidence. (Emphasis supplied) 46. To recapitulate the foregoing: What lies at the bottom of the various Rules shifting the evidential burden or burden of introducing evidence in proof of one's case as opposed to the persuasive burden or burden of proof, i.e., of proving all the issues remaining with the prosecution and which never shift is the idea that it is impossible for the prosecution to give wholly convincing evidence on certain issues from its own hand and it is, therefore, for the Accused to give evidence on them if he wishes to escape. Positive facts must always be proved by the prosecution. But the same Rule cannot always apply to negative facts. It is not for the prosecution to anticipate and eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate an Accused. Again, when a person does not act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, it is not for the prosecution to eliminate all the other possible intentions. If the Accused had a different intention that is a fact especially within his knowledge and which he must prove (see Professor Glanville Williams-Proof of Guilt, Ch. 7, page 127 and following) and the interesting discussion-para 527 negative averments and para 528 - "require affirmative counter-evidence" at page 438 and foil, of Kenny's outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edn. 1958. -22- 47. But Section 106 of the Evidence Act has no application to cases where the fact in question, having regard to its nature, is such as to be capable of being known not only to the Accused but also to others, if they happened to be present when it took place. The intention underlying the act or conduct of any individual is seldom a matter which can be conclusively established; it is indeed only known to the person in whose mind the intention is conceived. Therefore, if the prosecution has established that the character and circumstance of an act suggest that it was done with a particular intention, then under illustration (a) to this section, it may be assumed that he had that intention, unless he proves the contrary. 48. A manifest distinction exists between the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one side to the other according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has offered evidence, which if believed by the court, would convince them of the Accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Accused, if in a position, should go forward with countervailing evidence, if he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the Accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of such facts, whether the proposition is an affirmative or negative one. He is not required to do so even though a prima facie case has been established, for the court must still find that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict. However, the Accused's failure to present evidence on his behalf may be regarded by the court as confirming the conclusion indicated by the evidence presented by the prosecution or as confirming presumptions which might arise therefrom. Although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the Accused may, therefore, as a practical matter find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution [See: Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, MANU/SC/1092/2023 : 2023:INSC:879] ii. What is "prima facie case" (foundational facts) in the context of Section 106 of the Evidence Act? -23- 49. The Latin expression prima facie means "at first sight", "at first view", or "based on first impression". According to Webster's Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), "prima facie case" means a case established by "prima facie evidence" which in turn means "evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted". In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the Plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the case or charges against the Defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties. 50. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding guilt of the Accused. 51. The presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. 52. To explain what constitutes a prima facie case to make Section 106 of the Evidence Act applicable, we should refer to the decision of this Court in Mir Mohammad (supra), wherein this Court has observed in paras 36 and 37 respectively as under: 36. In this context we may profitably utilize the legal principle embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act which reads as follows: "When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him." 37. The Section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the Section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the Accused by virtue of his special -24- knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. (Emphasis supplied)" In Neel Kumar vs. The State of Haryana reported in MANU/SC/0416/2012 it was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court that “17. In our opinion, the courts below have taken a correct view so far as the application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act is concerned. This Court in Prithipal Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. MANU/SC/1292/2011 : (2012) 1 SCC 10, considered the issue at length placing reliance upon its earlier judgments including State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Ors. etc. etc. MANU/SC/0535/2000 : AIR 2000 SC 2988; and Sahadevan @ Sagadevan v. State rep. by Inspector of Police, Chennai MANU/SC/1067/2002 : AIR 2003 SC 215 and held as under: "That if fact is especially in the knowledge of any person, then burden of proving that fact is upon him. It is impossible for the prosecution to prove certain facts particularly within the knowledge of the accused. Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases, in which, it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused." (See also: Santosh Kumar Singh v. State through CBI MANU/SC/0801/2010 : (2010) 9 SCC 747; and Manu Sao v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0512/2010 : (2010) 12 SCC 310)." In State of Rajasthan vs. Kashi Ram, MANU/SC/8632/2006, while considering many authorities on the subject it was held by Honble Supreme Court:- -25- “17. It is not necessary to multiply with authorities. The principle is well settled. The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categoric in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the Court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. It lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the Court can consider his failure to adduce any explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain. The principle has been succinctly stated in Re. Naina Mohd. AIR 1960 Mad 218.” 37. The aforesaid legal position would sufficiently demonstrate that the law is quite well settled that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused person is always on the prosecution, but there may be certain facts pertaining to a crime that can be known only to the Accused, or are virtually impossible for the prosecution to prove. These facts need to be explained by the Accused and if he does not do so, then it is a strong circumstance pointing to his guilt based on those facts. However,for the invocation of the principle of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the prosecution could not be exonerated from proving initial facts. In easy words, the prosecution would have to prove that at the relevant point of time specific fact were in the knowledge of the accused persons and it is thereafter the burden may be cast on the accused persons to explain the -26- circumstances, which may be stated to be in his specific knowledge. The trial court in the instant case presumed that the accused person/appellant was present in his house and has cast burden to prove or explain the facts under which the deceased had died. 38. In our considered opinion, the trial court appears to have taken an erroneous view in holding the presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence when two of the prosecution witnesses have admitted specifically that the appellant was not present at his house when the incident had taken place and all three prosecution witnesses of fact were declared hostile and having disowned their statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., therefore, in our considered opinion, there was no evidence available on the basis of which it may be inferred that the appellant was present inside his house at the relevant point of time. 39. At this stage, it needs to be clarified that the trial court has convicted the appellant for committing offence under Sections 302 and 316 I.P.C. and there is no presumption given anywhere with regard to the commission of offences under Sections 302 and 316 I.P.C. and the same is available only with regard to the commission of offence under Section 304-B I.P.C. i.e. under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, the prosecution, wherein the appellant has been acquitted by the trial court, should prove commission of death of the deceased by the appellant by leading evidence, which, in the opinion of the Court, is trustworthy and may be acted upon. At the cost of repetition, it is recalled that this is a case based on circumstantial evidence and the circumstances, which have been placed against the appellant, are in terms that the deceased was his wife and she had died in the house of the appellant and in the postmortem report, the death of the deceased is shown to have been caused due to ‘asphyxia’ as a result of ante mortem throttling, thus the deceased has been throttled by someone. Once it is not proved that the appellant was inside the house with the deceased, we are afraid that the -27- principle as enshrined under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act could not be invoked against him when according to the P.W.-1/Rajeev Kumar and P.W.-3/Santosh Kumari, he was at Lucknow at his job and was not present at his house where the deceased has died he was in no position to explain what had happened with the deceased at that particular time in his house situated for away from Lucknow, and surprisingly the trial court considering separate living of other accused persons, in the same house, have acquitted them from all the charges. It is not clear as to why the same principle as has been placed against the appellant, was not applied against them when they were living in the same house though separately as they would have been in a better position than the appellant to explain the circumstances under which the deceased had died. Hence the burden on appellant to explain the circumstances, under which the deceased has died, in the considered opinion of this Court, has been wrongly placed on the appellant. 40. The law with regard to appreciation of circumstantial evidence has been clearly enunciated in the case of Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0037/1952 wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "12 ...It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the Accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the Accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the Accused" -28- Hon'ble Apex Court in the case Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR, 1984 SC 1622 laid down that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused based on circumstantial evidence can be said to be fully established; "1. the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. 2. the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; 3. the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; 4. they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and 5.there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." In Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa, MANU/SC/0586/1991 : (1991) 3 SCC 27, it was held that even if the offence is a shocking one, the gravity of offence cannot by itself overweigh as far as legal proof is concerned. In cases depending highly upon the circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that the conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The court has to be watchful and ensure that the conjecture and suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of evidence should be established clearly and that the completed chain must be such as to Rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the Accused. It is further held that in Para 8, in order to sustain the conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the following three conditions must be satisfied: -29- i.) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; ii.) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; and iii.) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else, and it should also be incapable of explanation on any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. In Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala, MANU/SC/0295/1993, it was held that suspicion is not the substitute for proof. There is a long distance between 'may be true' and 'must be true' and the prosecution has to travel all the way to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, keeping in view the above settled legal position the law pertaining to cases based on circumstantial evidence can be summarized in following terms: 1. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution which lead to an inference to the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond doubt; 2. The circumstances should unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused; 3. The circumstances should be linked together in such a manner that the cumulative effect of the chain formed by joining the links is so complete that it leads to only one conclusion i.e. the guilt of the accused; 4. That there should be no probability of the crime having been committed by a person other than the accused. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rishi Pal V State of Uttarakhand, MANU/SC/0081/2013 held that requirement in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that not only should all the circumstances sought to be proved against the accused be established beyond reasonable doubt but also that such -30- circumstances form so complete a chain as leaves no option for the Court except to hold that the accused is guilty of the offences with which he is charged. 41. The above placed law would sufficiently demonstrate that before a case against an accused can be said to have been fully established the circumstances from which the conclusion of his guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793 where following observations were made “19. …..Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” 42. The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty and the proved circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and lastly there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 43. If the case of the prosecution is assessed on the touch stone of aforesaid principles it would emerge that prosecution has miserably failed to prove the presence of the appellant inside the house, where the deceased was found dead and thus, in the considered opinion of this court it could not be in the specific knowledge of the appellant as to how the deceased has died. Thus the burden to explain the circumstances under which the deceased has died or has been done to death, could not have been shifted on the appellant by invoking section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, a patent perversity is emerging in the judgment -31- passed by the Trial Cout as the chain of circumstances is also not complete against the accused-appellant. This Court concludes that the order of conviction and sentencing passed by the learned Trial Court is not liable to be sustained in the eye of law and is liable to be set-aside. 44. Keeping in view the reasons given herein-before, we allow the criminal appeal filed by the appellant - Jainendra Kumar @ Deepu. The impugned judgment and order dated 10.02.2022 passed by learned Special Judge (E.C. Act)/Additional Sessions Judge, Barabanki in Sessions Trial No.434 of 2018 (State vs. Shiv Singh and another), arising out of Case Crime No.182 of 2018, under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 316, 302 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Jaidpur, District Barabanki is set aside and the appellant is acquitted of all the charges framed against him. 45. Appellant - Jainendra Kumar @ Deepu appears to be in jail, therefore, it is directed that the appellant shall be released from the prison forthwith, however, he shall file his personal bond along with two sureties of Rs.25,000/- before the trial court within 30 days from today, as provided under Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Now Section 481 of the B.N.S.S.). 46. A copy of this order along with the record of the trial court be immediately sent to the trial court for compliance. (Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan, J.) (Sangeeta Chandra, J.) Order Date:- 22.01.2025 Anupam S/- Digitally signed by :- ANUPAM SINGH PATEL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench