2025:JHHC:29774-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(C) No.3985 of 2025 ------ Pritam Jaiswal, aged about 49 years, son of Dinanath Jaiswal, resident of Village Lakrapahari, P.O. Lakrapahari, P.S. Jama, District Dumka, PIN-814101 (Jharkhand). …. …. Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand, through its Secretary, Department of Mines and Geology, having its office at Yojna Bhawan (Nepal House), P.O. and P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand, PIN- 834002. 2. The Mines Commissioner, Ranchi, Department of Mines and Geology, having its office at Yojna Bhawan (Nepal House), P.O. and P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand, PIN-834002. 3. Deputy Commissioner, Pakur, having its office at District Collectorate, Pakur, P.O. & P.S. Pakur, District Pakur, Jharkhand, PIN-816107. 4. District Mining Officer, Pakur, having its office at District Collectorate, Pakur, P.O. & P.S. Pakur, District Pakur, Jharkhand, PIN-816107. ..... .... Respondents CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI ------ For the Petitioner : Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate Mr. Ranjeet Kushwaha, Advocate Ms. Shruti Shekhar, Advocate For the State : Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Advocate General Mr. Mohan Kr. Dubey, AC to AG C.A.V. on 29.08.2025 Pronounced on 23/09/2025 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking therein for the following reliefs: - (i) For issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction, including Writ of Certiorari for quashing/setting aside the order contained in Memo No. 1212/MC, Ranchi 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 2 dated 10.07.2024 [Annexure-11] passed by Mines Commissioner, Ranchi in Revision Case No. 103 of 2023, wherein direction has been given to petitioner to deposit 50% of the disputed demand for further hearing of Revision Application as being wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of Rule 62 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004. (ii) For issuance of further appropriate writ/order/direction, including Writ of Mandamus, directing Respondent-Mines Commissioner, Ranchi to hear and dispose of the Revision Application of petitioner without insisting for deposit of 50% of the disputed demand amount, especially because in terms of statutory provisions contained under Rule 62 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, there is no requirement of making any pre-deposit for maintainability and hearing of Revision Application before Mines Commissioner, Ranchi. (iii) In alternative to prayers no.(i) and (ii) above, petitioner prays for issuance of appropriate writ/order/direction including Writ of Certiorari for quashing/setting aside order contained in Letter No. 1279/M dated 26.05.2018 [Annexure-3] passed by District Mining Officer, Pakur, wherein in alleged exercise of power under Rule 54(6) of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, penalty amounting to Rs. 1,47,52,440/- being twice the value of mineral allegedly illegally extracted by petitioner has been imposed and, further, penalty under Rule 42(1) of the JMMC Rules, 2004 of Rs. 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 3 3,98,000/-has been imposed for allegedly filing incorrect monthly returns. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, required to be enumerated, which read as under: - (i) It is the case of the writ petitioner that the petitioner was having a mining lease pertaining to already broken mines for the period 08.09.2011 to 07.09.2021 over a piece of land situated at Mouza Phatehpur, Thana Hiranpur, Survey No. 110, Plot No. 228/P, having total area of 4 acres. (ii) The petitioner was carrying out its mining activity strictly in accordance with law but a notice was issued to petitioner whereby petitioner has been informed that inspection and demarcation of his mining lease area would be undertaken for the period 07.04.2018 upto 12.04.2018. (iii) An inspection-cum-demarcation of mining lease area of petitioner was undertaken by a team of Respondent authorities and during the said inspection, no alleged illegal mining was found and, on the contrary, it was only observed that certain pillar and fencing work in the mines area have not been undertaken and petitioner was issued a notice vide letter no. 940/M dated 23.04.2018, wherein 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 4 petitioner was directed to carry out work of pillaring and fencing of its mining lease area within a period of one week, failing which, it was stated that mining activity of petitioner would be stopped. (iv) It is the further case of the petitioner that the petitioner subsequent to the aforesaid notice, undertook the work of pillaring and fencing of its mining premises and there is no dispute in respect to the same. However, a demand order contained in letter no. 1279/M dated 26.05.2018 was issued to the petitioner wherein it was alleged that during inspection, it was found that out of total 4 acres of mining lease area of petitioner, petitioner has done mining only upon 1.59 acres of land and has only excavated quantity of 15,92,989 cubic feet of stone, whereas in the monthly return, total excavation of stone was reflected as 25,01,970 cubic feet. (v) Thus, it was alleged that petitioner excavated 9,08,981 cubic feet of stone from some place other than its mining lease area and has illegally transported the same. On the basis of the above, penalty under Rule 54(6) of JMMC Rules being twice the value of mineral amounting to Rs. 1,47,52,440/- was imposed upon petitioner and, 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 5 further, penalty @ Rs. 2,000/-per month, total amounting to Rs. 3,98,000/- for incorrect filing of monthly returns was imposed upon petitioner under Rule 42(1) of JMMC Rules, 2004. (vi) Thereafter, petitioner filed writ petition before this Hon'ble Court being W.P.(C) No. 4986 of 2018 challenging demand notice dated 26.05.2018 issued by Respondent-District Mining Officer, Pakur, however, the said writ petition was disposed of by this Hon'ble Court giving liberty to petitioner to file Revision Application before Mines Commissioner, Ranchi. (vii) Thereafter, petitioner preferred Revision Application in the Court of Mines Commissioner, Ranchi which was registered as Revision Case No. 26 of 2019; but the said Revision Application was dismissed on the ground of limitation vide order contained in Memo No. 1561/MC, Ranchi dated 19.07.2023. (viii) Thereafter, petitioner again preferred writ application before this Hon'ble Court being W.P.(C) No. 4143 of 2023 and the said writ petition was allowed by this Hon'ble Court and the order passed by Mines Commissioner, Ranchi was set aside and a direction was given to hear the revision on its own merits. 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 6 (ix) Thereafter, petitioner filed another Revision application being Revision Case No. 103 of 2023 but in the said Revision Application, an order contained in Memo No. 1212/MC dated 10.07.2024 was passed by Respondent-Mines Commissioner, Jharkhand, wherein petitioner has been directed to deposit 50% of the disputed demand amount and, thereafter, it has been directed that further date of hearing shall be scheduled after compliance of the order of deposit of 50% of the amount. (x) Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 10.7.2024 the present writ petition has been preferred wherein prayer for quashing of the order dated 10.07.2024 has been sought for and in alternative to aforesaid prayer, the quashing of the order dated 26.05.2018 has been sought for. Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner 3. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that the revisional authority has committed gross error in passing the order by directing the writ petitioner to deposit the 50 per cent of the amount and it is only then, the revision will be heard on merit. 4. It has been submitted that under the provision of Rule 62 of the JMMC Rules, 2004 amended in 2017, there is no condition to entertain the revision, subject to deposit of 50 per cent of the 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 7 amount but without taking into consideration the aforesaid requirement, the revisional authority has rejected the revision on the aforesaid pretext. 5. It has been contended that depositing 50 per cent of the amount which is also not proper on the part of the revisional authority to come to such conclusion, reason being that, when this Court has granted liberty to prefer the revision, then, it should have been heard on merit. 6. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the issue so raised, therefore, needs interference by also interfering with the order passed by the revisional authority, as there in this writ petition. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted by pressing the alternative prayer made in the writ petition that the demand may be interfered by exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, since, the said demand as per the impugned demand notice is not based upon the proper calculation. Submissions of the learned counsel for the Respondent-State 8. Per contra, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent-State has submitted that the revisional authority has not committed any error, since, the revisional authority on its suo motu power as also the power conferred on the application made by the party aggrieved, has exercised both the powers 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 8 simultaneously and while exercising the suo motu power, 50 per cent, being the requisite amount for entertaining the appeal, in view of the provision of Rule 65 of the JMMC Rules, 2004, was not deposited and based upon the aforesaid ground, the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal. 9. However, the said order has been quashed by this Court by again giving liberty to the petitioner to approach before the revisional authority but that does not mean that the requirement as provided under the statutory provision as Rule 65(3) for depositing the 50 per cent amount, is waived out in any circumstances. 10. The writ petitioner does not want to deposit the pre-requisite amount and straightaway wants adjudication and if the said prayer of the writ petitioner, will be allowed, then the provision of Rule 65(3) of Rules, 2004 will become redundant. 11. Learned Advocate General has submitted that the petitioner had also approached the Hon'ble High Court in W.P.(C) No. 977 of 2020, wherein the petitioner had challenged the demand notice dated 26.05.2018 and the entire certificate proceeding but the said writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 06.08.2025, as such the scope of alternate prayer is now not available for the petitioner. 12. Learned Advocate General, so far as it relates to the alternative prayer for interfering with the demand, has submitted that once the prayer for Writ of Certiorari has been made without issuance 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 9 of Writ of Certiorari, there cannot be any order said to be consequential by showing interference with the demand, which is the subject matter of the prayer made for issuance of Writ of Certiorari by quashing and setting aside the order of demand. 13. Learned Advocate General, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the revisional authority has taken into consideration all these issues and that led him to reject the revision, hence, the same suffers from no error. Analysis 14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the counter affidavit. 15. The issue which requires consideration in the present case, i.e., (i) Whether the revisional authority while passing the order requiring to deposit 50 per cent amount, in a case where the 50 per cent amount has not been deposited before the original authority exercising the power of appeal, in view of the provision of Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004, can it be said to suffer from an error, if the matter has been asked to be decided by this Court in view of the liberty granted to decide it in accordance with law. (ii) Whether the alternative prayer can be entertained 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 10 if the main prayer has been made for issuance of Writ of Certiorari, since, the outcome of the main prayer will govern the alternative prayer also herein. 16. Both the issues since are interlinked and as such, the same are being considered together. 17. But, before considering the aforesaid issues, the relevant provisions of the JMMC Rules, 2004 pertaining to the adjudicatory power conferred to the revisional and appellate authority, in view of the provision of Rule 62 and Rule 65 of the JMMC Rules, 2004, for ready reference, Rule 62 and Rule 65 of the JMMC Rules, 2004, are being quoted as under:- “62. पुनरीक्षण के लिए आवेदन-(1) आयुक्त स्वप्रेरणा पर किसी भी समय पर अभभलेख िे िारणों िो भलखखत रूप से अंकित िरते हुए एवं किसी व्यक्क्त िे समाहताा अथवा स्वीिृ तत पदाधििारी द्वारा इन तनयमों िे अंतर्ात पाररत आदेश से असंतुष्ट होने पर अथवा आवेदन दाखखल किये जाने पर आदेश से संसूचन िे 60 ददनों िे भीतर या समाहताा/स्वीिृ तत पदाधििारी द्वारा स्वतः अस्वीिृ त आदेश िे 75 ददनों िे भीतर यदद ऐसी स्वयं अस्वीिृ तत िी संसूचना नहीं िी र्यी है, इस आदेश िे पुनरीक्षण हेतु िायावाही प्रारंभ िरेंर्े। परन्तु यह कि पुनरीक्षण हेतु आवेदन उपरोक्त वखणात उपबंि िे बाद भी स्वीिार किया जा सिता है, यदद आवेदि आयुक्त िो इस तथ्य से संतुष्ट िरें कि उसिे ससमय आवेदन नहीं िरने िे यथेष्ट िारण थे। (2) खनन पट्टा स्वीिृ त िरने अथवा नवीिरण िरने से इंिार िरने वाले समाहताा िे आदेश िे ववरूद्ि उपतनयम (1) िे अंतर्ात चलने वाली प्रत्येि िायावाही में यदद उसी क्षेत्र 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 11 अथवा उस क्षेत्र िे किसी अंश में यदद किसी व्यक्क्त िो खनन पट्टा स्वीिृ त किया र्या है अथवा नवीिृ त किया र्या है तो उसे भी एि पक्षिार बनाया जायेर्ा। (3) उपतनयम (1) िे अंतर्ात आवेदन िे साथ आवेदि उपतनयम (2) िे पक्षिारों िी संख्या िे अनुरूप क्जतनी प्रततयां वांतित हो, देर्ा। (4) उपतनयम (2) िे अंतर्ात आवेदन तथा उसिी प्रततयां प्राप्त िरने िे पश्चात् आयुक्त आवेदन िी एि प्रतत एवं जहां स्वयं आयुक्त िी स्वप्रेरणा पर उपतनयम (1) िे अंतर्ात िायावाही प्रारंभ िी र्यी है, सभी पक्षिारों िो िायावाही प्रारंभ होने िी सूचना भेजेंर्े क्जसमें एि तारीख तय होर्ी क्जससे अथवा उसिे पूवा उस पुनरीक्षण आवेदन िे ववरूद्ि यदद वे चाहें तो प्रततनधित्व िर सिते हैं। तनयम-62(5) ["उपायुक्त या अन्य किसी प्राधििार, क्जसिा उल्लेख तनयम-2 में हो िे आदेश से संतुष्ट नहीं होने पर 1,000 (एि हजार) रूपये िा शुल्ि जमा िर पुनरीक्षण/अपील खान आयुक्त िे समक्ष िर सिे र्ा।)] 65. अपीि-(1) इन तनयमों िे अिीन किसी भी सक्षम पदाधििारी िो प्रदत्त शक्क्तयों िे अनुप्रयोर् में पाररत किसी आदेश से अर्र िोई व्यक्क्त असंतुष्ट है तो वह उस आदेश िे 30 ददनों िे भीतर संबंधित क्षेत्र िे उपतनदेशि खान िे पास अपील िर सिता है। (2) प्रत्येि अपील िे भलए 50 रूपये िा शुल्ि अदा िरना होर्ा। अपील िे ज्ञापन िे साथ िोषार्ार रसीद संलग्न होना चादहए क्जसमें यह प्रदभशात िरना होर्ा कि अपील िा शुल्ि सरिारी िोषार्ार में अथवा भारतीय स्टेट बैंि िी िोई भी शाखा जो राज्य सरिार िे खाते में िोषार्ार िे माध्यम से व्यवसाय िर रहा है, वे लेखा शीषा ["0853 अलौह िातु खनन और िातुिमा उद्योर्; 102-खतनजों संबंिी ररयायती फीस, किराये और रॉयल्टी" (1) खतनज ररयायत तथा नवीिरण स्वीिृ क्क्त िे भलए शुल्ि (2) खनन पट्टा एवं अनुज्ञक्प्त िारिों से प्राप्त लर्ान तथा स्वाभमस्व िे रूप में जमा किया 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 12 र्या हो। (3) तनयम 41(1) िे अंतर्ात सक्षम पदाधििारी द्वारा पाररत आदेश िे ववरूद्ि तब ति िोई अपील स्वीिार नहीं िी जाएर्ी जब ति कि आवेदि ने सक्षम पदाधििारी द्वारा तनिााररत राभश िा 50 प्रततशत भुर्तान नहीं िर ददया हो। (4) अपील सुनने वाले प्राधििारी अपील िे अंतर्ात आदेश िो, आवेदि िो सुनवाई िा पूरा अवसर देने िे बाद यदद आवश्यि हो तो संबंधित पदाधििारी िे प्रततवेदन पर ववचार िरने िे बाद उस आदेश िो अभभपुष्ट, संशोधित अथवा तनरस्त िर सिते हैं। (5) यदद अपील सुनने वाले प्राधििारी िे पाररत आदेश िो संशोधित िरते हैं तथा उस संशोिन द्वारा लर्ान स्वाभमस्व िे मामले में यदद राहत दी र्यी हो तो वह उस आदेश िी अभभप्रमाखणत प्रतत तथा तीन सच्ची प्रततभलवप खान आयुक्त िो भेजेंर्े।” 18. It is evident from the provision of Rule 65 that the appellate authority is to exercise power of appeal in a case where the party aggrieved approaches by the decision taken by the original authority, subject to condition as would be evident from sub-rule 3 of Rule 65 that the pre-requisite amount of 50 per cent is to be deposited mandatorily. 19. The provision of Rule 62 confers power upon the revisional authority, the Mines Commissioner, wherein, powers have been conferred, i.e., (i) the revisional authority can exercise power on its own, i.e., suo motu power vested upon him and; (ii) he can exercise the power of revisional jurisdiction or on an application made by the party aggrieved. 20. Herein, the admitted fact is that the demand notice has been 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 13 issued to the writ petitioner, against which, the appellant has preferred an appeal being Appeal No.08/2018 before the appellate forum as per the provision provided under Rule 65 of the JMMC Rules, 2004 but without complying with the pre- requisite condition as provided under Rule 65(3), Hence, the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal vide order dated 31.08.2018 due to non-compliance of the pre-requisite condition, as provided under Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004. 21. The petitioner came to this Court by filing a writ petition being W.P.(C) No.4986 of 2018 and thereafter, liberty was granted to him to prefer a revision. 22. The writ petitioner has preferred revision being Revision Case No.26 of 2019 before the revisional authority. The revisional authority has dismissed the revision vide order dated 26.05.2023 on the ground that the present revision case has been filed against the liberty granted by the High Court wherein liberty had been granted to move before the revisional authority within two weeks but the revision petition has been filed after delay of 197 days. 23. Being aggrieved, vide order dated 26.05.2023 passed in Revision Case No.26 of 2019, the writ petitioner filed W.P.(C) No.4143 of 2023. In the said writ petition, order dated 26.05.2023 was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the Court of learned Commissioner, Mines for consideration of the issue on 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 14 merit. 24. Thereafter, the petitioner filed another revision application being Revision Case No.103 of 2023. The Revisional Authority, vide order dated 28.06.2024, directed the writ petitioner to deposit 50 per cent of the demand in terms of Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004. 25. The question has been raised on behalf of the writ petitioner that the revisional authority has got no jurisdiction to ask the writ petitioner to deposit 50 per cent of the amount for the purpose of entertaining the revision. 26. This Court, in order to consider the aforesaid argument, needs to refer herein the power which has been vested upon the revisional authority, i.e., the revisional authority can exercise suo motu power against the order passed by the original authority or the appellate authority and on an application filed by the party aggrieved. 27. This Court is of the view that the moment, the suo motu power has been conferred to the revisional authority, the revisional authority can take cognizance on its own with respect to any error committed by the inferior authority in the hierarchy, meaning thereby, the inherent power has been vested upon the revisional authority to rectify the error on its own motion also in addition to the application filed by the party aggrieved. 28. Herein, the writ petitioner has preferred revision on the basis of 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 15 liberty granted by this Court but very surprisingly under the order passed by the Writ Court, we have found on its perusal which has been appended in the paper-book that reference of prayer made of challenging the demand notice and the order passed by the appellant authority is there in the very first paragraph, but, no reference is there in the said order that the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal due to non-depositing of the pre-requisite amount, for ready reference, relevant part of the order passed by the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 09.11.2023 passed in W.P.(C) No.4143 of 2023, is being referred as under:- “1.By filing this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:- “For the issuance of an appropriate Writ/Writs, Order/Orders, direction/directions or a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing of the memo No. 1561 dated 19.07.2023 (Annexure-7) passed by the Respondent No. 2 wherein the order dated 31.08.2018 (Annexure-4) passed by the Deputy Director, Mines, Santhal Pargana in Appeal No. 08/2018 has been upheld ignoring the fact that the Demand Notice dated 26.05.2018 suffers from material irregularities and bogus demand and both the appellate and revisional authorities has rejected the claim of petitioner on technical ground without going into the merit of case as the demand notice is an arbitrary order passed by the respondent No. 4 with ulterior motive and the same is against the principal of Natural Justice and against the mandate of articles 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.” 2) It is apparent from the order impugned, i.e., Annexure-7 to the writ application passed by the learned Mines Commissioner, Ranchi in Revision 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 16 Case No. 26 of 2019 on 26.05.2023, that the revision petition of the petitioner was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The learned Mines Commissioner held that the Revision Petition along with limitation petition had to be filed in the light of the order dated 19.11.2018 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 4986 of 2018, but the petitioner has filed the revision application after a delay of about 197 days and as per the order passed by this Court on 19.11.2018, the petitioner had to file revision petition before him within two weeks. It was submitted before the learned Mines Commissioner that the reason for delay in filing revision was that the petitioner was under treatment of doctor and the doctor advised him for 3-4 months complete rest during 15.01.2019 to 15.05.2019. The reasons assigned by the learned counsel for the petitioner was held by the learned Mines Commissioner to be not acceptable by him and then the revision application has been held not maintainable. 3) A supplementary affidavit has been filed in this writ application along with the medical certificate issued by Neelam Nursing Home, signed by Dr. Bindu Bhushan, M.S., that the petitioner was suffering from Hepatitis and its related complications since 15.01.2019 onwards and was under his treatment for a period 3 to 4 months and he was fit to resume duties on 16.05.2019. 4) Keeping in view the aforesaid document, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner was prevented from sufficient cause in approaching the revisional court in pursuance to the order passed by 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 17 this Court as above. We also take note of the ratio decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors, (1987) 2 SCC 107 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is con- doned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 5) In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the learned Mines Commissioner took an erroneous view and dismissed the revision application on merit. In that view of the matter, the impugned order dated 26.05.2023 is hereby set 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 18 aside. The matter is remitted back to the Court of learned Commissioner Mines for reconsideration on merit. 6) The respondents are at liberty to file their objections to the main application on merit. 7) With such observations the writ application is disposed of.” 29. The petitioner, in terms of the aforesaid order, has approached to the revisional authority by filing the Revision Case No.103 of 2023. 30. The revisional authority has entertained the same but while exercising the suo motu power on consideration of the fact vide order dated 28.06.2024 had directed the petitioner to deposit the pre-requisite amount of 50 per cent of the demand as per provision of Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004. 31. The emphasis of argument of the writ petitioner herein is that the revisional authority cannot be allowed to assume the power of the appellate authority to look into the issue, i.e., “as to whether 50 per cent required amount as per the provision of Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rule, 2004 has been deposited or not.” 32. But, we are not in agreement with such ground/submission, reason being that, when the revisional authority has been given suo motu power under the hierarchy of the adjudicatory forum under the JMMC Rules, 2004, then, the revisional authority is 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 19 competent enough to exercise the power of superintendence also upon the issue of adjudication either of the original authority or the appellate authority so that there may not be any miscarriage of justice. 33. This Court is further of the view that in an admitted case where the 50 per cent amount as required to be deposited at the time of filing of an appeal under Rule 65(3), has not been deposited and on that ground, the appeal has also been dismissed, whether, will it be proper for this Court to give go-by to the requisite requirement as per the statutory mandate as per the provision of Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004. 34. The answer of this Court is in negative, since, if the statutory mandate has been enacted, then, as per the position of law, the statutory body is to act strictly in pursuant to the provision as provided under the statute and if the statutory authority is not acting upon on the basis of the statutory mandate, then, in such circumstances, the High Court is to issue mandamus in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even, it is the admitted case where the statutory mandate has not been complied by not depositing the pre-requisite amount as required before filing of the appeal under Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004. 35. 35. This Court cannot be a silent spectator and if the view has been taken by the revisional authority under the power of 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 20 superintendence, then on its own motion, the requirement of depositing 50 per cent amount and if the amount has not been deposited, then, in such reason assigned by the revisional authority as one of the reasons for rejecting the revision, this Court is of the view that no Writ of Certiorari can be issued by showing interference with the decision so taken by the revisional authority. 36. It would be apt to refer herein that this Court in the Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.480 of 2024 (Shiv Shankar vs. The State of Jharkhand) in almost similar circumstances, has adjudicated the issue regarding the exercise of power by the revisional authority in a case of conferment of power to exercise suo motu as also on the basis of the application to be made by the party aggrieved pertaining to the matter arising out of a case of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2011 (in short ‘J.B.C. Act’, 2011) which contains a provision under Section 37 of the Act, 2011 conferring power to the revisional authority to exercise suo motu power against the order passed by the Controller or the appellate authority and on the application if filed by the party aggrieved. 37. The issue agitated in the said case was that whether the revisional authority has jurisdiction to straightway look into the propriety of the order passed by the Rent Controller, original authority. 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 21 38. Such issue was raised in a situation that the Rent Controller- cum-Sub- Divisional Officer, Sadar Ranchi has given a finding while answering the issue in a case of eviction of the tenant by coming to conclusion of breach of agreement, as provided under Section 19(1)(a) of the J.B.C. Act, 2011 and default in making payment of rent, as per the condition stipulated under Section 19(1)(d) of the Act, 2011. 39. The order of Controller was challenged before the appellate authority, the Deputy Commissioner, wherein, the appellate authority has only gone into the issue of default in making payment of rent. The arrear of rent has been paid and as such, the appellate authority has allowed the tenant to remain in the possession. 40. The tenant being aggrieved with the same, has approached to the revisional authority under the power conferred under Section 37 of the J.B.C. Act, 2011. 41. The revisional authority, in stead of considering the issue of default in making payment of rent, has considered the propriety of the order passed by the rent controller so far as it relates to breach of terms and conditions of the lease. 42. It has been contended in the said case that the revisional authority in excess of jurisdiction has straightaway entered into the finding of the order passed by the Rent Controller skipping the order passed by the appellate authority. 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 22 43. This Court has given finding by negating the said ground on the basis of conferment of power to the revisional authority as under Section 37 of the Act, 2011 along with suo motu power and also on the basis of the application filed by the party aggrieved. 44. The suo motu power has been dealt with by this Court by way of exercise of power to superintend and in that view of the matter, if the revisional authority has gone into the issue of condition of breach of lease, in the aforesaid pretext, the power which has been exercised by the revisional authority cannot be said to be unjust and improper. 45. However, the provision as provided under Section 37 of the Act, 2011 speaks that the order passed by the Controller or the appellate authority is to be looked into in exercise of suo motu power or the application filed by the party aggrieved. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are being referred as under:- “42. This Court before considering the aforesaid issue needs to refer herein, the provision of Section 37 of the Act, 2011, which is being referred as under:- “37. Revision-(1) The Commissioner may, either of his own motion or on application made to him in this behalf, revise any order passed by the Controller or by the Appellate Authority on appeal under this Act. (2) The exercise of the powers by the Commissioner under this section shall be subject to such rules as may be prescribed and for reasons to be recorded in writing. (3) Such revision application shall be disposed of within six months from the date of filing of such application.” 43. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the revisional authority, Commissioner has been conferred with the power to 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 23 exercise the revisional power of his own motion or on application made to him in this behalf, revise any order passed by the Controller or by the Appellate Authority on appeal under this Act. The exercise of the powers by the Commissioner under this section shall be subject to such rules as may be prescribed and for reasons to be recorded in writing. 44. It is evident that the revisional authority has been conferred with the power to exercise the same on his own motion or even on application made in this behalf and while doing so, the revisional authority can revise any order passed by the Rent Controller or by the appellate authority on appeal under this Act, meaning thereby, the revisional authority can also suo motu consider the order passed by the Controller independent to that of the order passed by the appellate authority that is very specific in the aforesaid provision that the moment the stipulation has been made under Section 37 of the Act, 2011 that the revisional authority may revise any order passed by the Controller or by the Appellate Authority on appeal. 45. The power conferred to the revisional authority by conferring suo motu power itself clarifies the power of the revisional authority, i.e., only in order to rectify if the error committed either by the Rent Controller or by the appellate authority. 46. The moment, the power has been conferred to the revisional authority to exercise the power of revision of an order passed by the Controller and as such, it is not incumbent upon the revisional authority to throw out the revision if it has been filed directly against the order passed by the Controller.” 46. It needs to refer herein that the aforesaid judgment was challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 14096 of 2025 and the same has been dismissed, vide order dated 16.05.2025. 47. Now coming to the instant case, it requires to refer herein that so far as the jurisdiction of District Mining Officer under Rule 54(6) 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 24 of JMMC Rules 2004 is concerned, this Court in the writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 2859 of 2022, vide order dated 18.09.2025 has categorically held that by virtue of Section 21(5) of the MMDR Act, 1957, the State Government has been conferred with the power to recover the mineral itself or its price if already sold, along with any rent, royalty, or tax owned for the unauthorized occupation of the land. It has further been observed that if the ratio of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Common Cause Vs. Union of India & Ors., [(2017) 9 SCC 499] will be taken into consideration along with the provision of Rule 54(6) as also the purport of Section 21(5) of the Act, 1957, it is evident that the power has been conferred to the State Government to recover the amount. Since the provision has been stipulated for recovery of the amount by the State Government which itself suggest that the authority, if conferred with the power, is having jurisdiction to raise the demand in exercise of Power conferred under Rule 54(6) of Rule 2004, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under: “81. It also requires to refer herein that by virtue of Section 21(5) of the MMDR Act, 1957, the State Government has been conferred with the power to recover the mineral itself or its price if already sold, along with any rent, royalty, or tax owned for the unauthorized occupation of the land. Herein, the State Government means the functionaries of the State, i.e., the executive authority. Accordingly, power has been conferred upon the DMO by virtue of the notification dated 6th May, 2025, although there was no notification prior to the 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 25 issuance of notification dated 6th May, 2025 that is the reason notification has been issued conferring power upon the representative(s) of the State Government and therefore, the State Government i.e., representative(s) of the State Government has power to raise demand under Section 54(6) of the Rules, 2004. 82. So far as the power which has been exercised by the District Mining Officer under the provision of Rule 54(8) now it is 54(6) is concerned wherein the ground has been taken that under Rule 54(6) the District Mining Officer has no jurisdiction, but if the ratio of the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Common Cause (Supra) will be taken into consideration along with the provision of Rule 54(6) as also the purport of Section 21(5) of the Act, 1957, it is evident that the power has been conferred to the State Government to recover the amount. Since the provision has been stipulated for recovery of the amount by the State Government which itself suggest that the authority, if conferred with the power, is having jurisdiction to raise the demand in exercise of Power conferred under Rule 54(6) of Rule 2004. 48. It needs to refer herein that the petitioner had also approached this Court in W.P.(C) No. 977 of 2020, wherein, the petitioner had challenged the demand notice dated 26.05.2018 and the entire certificate proceeding but the said writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 06.08.2025, for ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the order dated 06.08.2025 is being quoted as under: 1. The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against the demand notice dated 26.05.2018 whereby the petitioner has been directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,51,50,440/- including fine of Rs. 3,98,000/- and for quashing certificate 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 26 proceeding as well as order of issuance of distress warrant dated 22.01.2020 issued by respondent no. 2. 31. Admittedly, the petitioner was granted lease in mauza Fataipur for certain area. The petitioner received a demand notice dated 26.05.2018 issued by respondent no. 3-District Mining Officer, Pakur, against which the petitioner preferred an appeal before the respondent no. 2, which was dismissed vide order dated 31.08.2018 on the ground that the petitioner did not prefer the appeal within the limitation period, and further, the petitioner did not deposit 50% of the amount of demand as per Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rules. 35. The petitioner being aggrieved thereof has again approached this Court against the demand notice dated 26.05.2018 whereby the petitioner has been directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,51,50,440/- including fine of Rs. 3,98,000/- and for quashing certificate proceeding as well as order of issuance of distress warrant dated 22.01.2020 issued by respondent no. 2. 38. Learned counsel for the respondent-State has taken the ground that even the prayer which was made in earlier round of litigation i.e., in W.P.(C) No. 4986 of 2018 has again been agitated in this case besides other prayer and the petitioner instead of pursuing the revision has again approached this Court for the self-same relief. 39. In view thereof, this Court has gone through order dated 19.11.2018 passed in W.P.(C) No. 4986 of 2018 and the prayer made in the present writ petition has found that in both the writ petition i.e., in earlier round of litigation and in the present one prayer for quashing the demand notice dated 26.05.2018 has been made but in the instant writ petition besides that prayer has also been made for quashing the certificate proceeding as well as order of issuance of distress warrant dated 22.01.2020 issued by respondent no. 2. 40. However, the fact remains that in view of liberty granted in W.P. (C) No. 4986 of 2018, the petitioner 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 27 preferred revision application being Revision Case No. 26 of 2019, which is still pending and during pendency of the said revision application the respondent-District Mining Officer filed a certificate proceeding being Certificate Case No. 2/18-19 for realization of certificate amount, in which distress warrant has been issued, which has been held to be issued in accordance with law. 41. Therefore, this Court does not find any merit in the case so as to make any interference with the order passed by the authorities concerned. 42. Accordingly, the instant writ petition sans merit is dismissed.” 49. It needs to refer herein that it is the settled connotation of law that the things are to be done as provided in the statute and there cannot be any deviation, reference may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Babu Verghese vs. Bar Council of Kerala, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 422, wherein, it has been held at paragraphs-31 & 32 as under: "31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under: "[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all." 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three- judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law.” 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 28 50. Reference may also be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. v. Regional Director ESIC Hyderabad (in Civil Appeal No. 5138-40/2007), reported in (2015) 7 SCC 690, wherein, it has been held at paragraph-14 as under: "14. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, it was held that : 26.... it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way." 51. In the instant case, herein the revisional authority has gone into the issue of pre-requisite amount to be deposited in terms of the provision of Section 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004 and if he has gone into the issue in order to maintain the mandate of the statutory command, it cannot be said that the revisional authority has exceeded its jurisdiction. 52. Accordingly, the issue no.(i) is answered herein against the petitioner. 53. Since the first issue itself has been answered against the writ petitioner, then there is no question to go into the alternative prayer as the same depends upon the issue no.(i) and accordingly, the same is hereby, rejected. 54. Further, the principle of issuance of Writ of Certiorari is well 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 29 settled, as per the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, reported in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477, wherein, at paragraph-7 it has been held as under: “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 30 would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” 55. Similarly, in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph-21 as hereunder: - “21. With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” 56. In the case of Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 31 Ors., reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868, their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13, as hereunder: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 57. This Court, applying the principle as laid down in these cases, is of the view that the order passed by the original authority exercising the power of appeal, in view of the provision of Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 58. So far as the issue of alternative prayer is concerned, once the Court has already taken the view that this case is not fit for issuance of Writ of Certiorari, then, no consequential direction can be passed in a case where the alternative prayer has been made as in the present case. Otherwise, if any direction will be passed 2025:JHHC:29774-DB 32 in the alternative prayer, then, dismissing the writ petition by declining to issue Writ of Certiorari, will become redundant. 59. This Court, considering the aforesaid fact and based upon the aforesaid reason, is of the view that the instant writ petition lacks merit. 60. In the result, the instant writ petition fails and is, dismissed. 61. In consequence thereof, pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) I Agree (Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.) 23/09/2025 Rohit/-A.F.R.