1 Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:13588 Court No. - 7 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 1401 of 2025 Petitioner :- Kulsum Nisha Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Civil And Supplies Lko. And 5 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashish Kumar Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia,J. 1. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 16.07.2024, whereby, the claim of the petitioner for being appointed as a fair price shop dealer on compassionate ground was rejected mainly on the ground that the petitioner is a married daughter and thus does not come within the definition of "family" as defined under Sub-clause (1) of Clause IV of the Government Order dated 05.08.2019. 3. The facts in brief are that the petitioner is the daughter of the licence holder, who was running a fair price shop being her mother. The petitioner was engaged with the mother in running the shop in question. As she has one sister, who was physically challenged and thus, the burden of maintaining the family was on the petitioner even during the life time of the mother and after the death of the mother, the petitioner applied for appointment on compassionate ground, which was rejected. 4. The submission of the Counsel for the petitioner is that the Division Bench this Court in the case of Smt. Vimal Srivastava vs State of U.P. and others (Writ-C No.60881 of 2015: Decided on 04.12.2015) while 2 interpreting a similar provision of the definition of "family" as contained for appointment of compassionate ground in a service matter has held that the exclusion of the married daughters from the definition of the family, is unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India and thus the word "unmarried" used in the definition of family was struck down. 5. The issue with regard to the claim of the married daughter arising in view of the definition of family as contained in the Government Order was considered by a Single Judge of this Court and was repealed vide judgment dated 29.11.2021 while deciding Writ-C No.21935 of 2021 (Smt. Kusumlata vs State of U.P. and others). The learned Single Judge, epelled the argument including the argument that the analogy drawn on the basis of the judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Vimala Srivastava (Supra) could not be applied, as the agreement, which is the license had come to an end and also considering the fact that the petitioner, who had claimed appointment on compassionate ground was residing in a separate village. The said judgment of the learned Single Judge was challenged in Special Appeal No.89 of 2022: Smt. Kusumlata vs State of U.P. and others, which also came to be dismissed vide order dated 21.02.2022 wherein this Court had held that the use of the word “unmarried daughter” in the definition of the family in the Government Order dated 05.08.2019 is not discriminatory. It was also held that the claim for appointment on compassionate ground flowing from the Government Order of 2019 cannot be interpreted in the manner in which, the provisions of an appointment under The Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974 of the Government Servants has been interpreted, in the case of Smt. Vimala Srivastava (Supra). A similar view was taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Saida Begum vs State of U.P. and others; 2023:AHC-LKO:11230-DB. 3 6. The Counsel for the petitioner at this instance relies upon a judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ranjana Murlidhar Anerao vs State of Maharashtra and others; 2014 (5) ABR 742 wherein, the Bombay High Court, considering the definition of "family" in the resolution issued by the State of Maharashtra under Licencing Order, 1979, considered this aspect and held that the exclusion of the married daughters are violative of Articles 14, 15 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It is further argued that in the State of Gujarat, the provisions contained in the relevant rules, which allows even the married daughters to stake claim for appointment on compassionate ground after the death of the licensee, who are the parents. It is further argued by the Counsel for the petitioner that in the judgments by the High Court, the petitioners were not the resident of the same village which aspect has weighed very heavily in the minds of the Court, however, in the present case, the petitioner is the resident of the same village and is also looking after the differently abled sister after the death of her mother, the sole bread earner. 7. Considering the fact that this High Court has taken a persistent view in the case of Kusum Lata (Supra) by Single Judge, in the special appeal in the case of Smt. Kusumlata (Supra) and the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Saida Begum (Supra), I am bound by the Division Bench’s judgment, sitting single. However, an important question arises with regard to the discrimination of married women from contention for appointment under the Dying-in-Harness Rules 1974 only because their married, appears to be affecting the rights of the married women across the broad spectrum. The Bombay High Court has taken a diametrically opposite view with regard to the ‘family’ and exclusion of married daughter, which has been held to be arbitrary and illegal. The State of Gujarat has also taken a view permitting for appointment under Dying-in-Harness after the death of the license holder, thus, the issue arising is of seminal importance, 4 considering the rights of the married daughters getting adversely affected solely on the ground that they had married, there being no such disability with the sons despite their marriage. In the present case, the petitioner was taking care of the family which includes a disabled sister, I deem it appropriate to grant a Certificate of appeal under Section 134-A of the Constitution of India to the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the ground that the issue involved is a substantial question of law of general importance as it affects the rights of married daughters only in some parts of India whereas, their rights are adjudicated to be vested in some parts of India and the fact that the rights of the married daughters have bearing on the inherent violation of Article 14, 15 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 8. The writ petition is dismissed. Order Date:05.03.2025 akverma (Pankaj Bhatia,J.) Digitally signed by :- ASHOK KUMAR VERMA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench