JUDGMENT : Sanjay Dhar, J. 1. The petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (hereinafter for short “the Act of 1997”), for setting aside award dated 27 th August, 2009 passed by the Arbitrator (Chief Executive, Wakaf Board). 2. The facts emanating from the pleadings of the parties reveals that an agreement came to be executed between the petitioner and the J&K Wakaf Board on 8th February, 2006, whereby the petitioner was allotted the work of construction of four storeyed shopping complex at Munawarabad Srinagar, at estimated cost of approximately Rs.36.00 lacs. As per clause 34 of the agreement, the differences or questions arising between the parties relating to or in respect or the agreement or the subject matter of the agreement were to be referred to the arbitration of the Chairman of Jammu and Kashmir Board for Specified Wakaf’s and Specified Wakaf Properties or his nominee whose decisions were made final and binding on the parties. 3. It seems that disputes arose between the petitioner and the respondent Wakaf Board, whereafter the petitioner filed arbitration petition No.02/2007 before this Court. Vide order dated 03.12.2007, this Court in the light of clause 34 of the agreement referred the matter for arbitration of the Chairman, Jammu and Kashmir Board for Specified Wakaf’s and Specified Wakaf Properties, with a direction to pass the award within two months. However, an application came to be filed by the respondent Wakaf Board before this Court praying therein that instead of the Chairman, his nominee may be appointed as the Arbitrator. Accordingly, on 13.02.2008, order dated 03.12.2007 was modified by providing that the matter shall be referred to the arbitration of the nominee of the Chairman of the Board and the award shall be made within two months. 4. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the Chairman of the Board in terms of order dated 13.03.2008, nominated Chief Executive Wakaf Board as Arbitrator in the matter. The arbitration proceedings were conducted by the Chief Executive and the time for making the award was extended by this court in terms of various orders passed from time to time. The last order for extension of time in making the award was passed by this Court on 29.07.2009 and the Arbitrator was permitted one month’s time to make the award. The last order for extension of time in making the award was passed by this Court on 29.07.2009 and the Arbitrator was permitted one month’s time to make the award. Thereafter impugned award dated 27th August, 2009 came to be passed by the Arbitrator which is under challenge in the present petition. 5. The main ground urged by the petitioner for impugning the award is that the petitioner was not permitted to lead evidence by the Arbitrator in support of his claims and, as such, the arbitral award is liable to be set aside being against the public policy of the State. 6. The respondent Wakaf Board has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this petition on the ground that the same is barred by limitation. It has been contended that the impugned award was made on 27 th August, 2009 but the present petition has been filed on 17.07.2013 and, as such, the same is hopelessly time barred 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record of the case. 8. Before proceeding to decide merits of the case, it would be necessary to advert to the preliminary objection raised by the respondents with regard to maintainability of this petition. 9. Learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner, has contended that the petitioner was never furnished the copy of the signed award as mandated under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1997, which is applicable to the present case, as such, the limitation period for assailing the impugned award would not run against him unless he is provided signed copy of the award. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. ARK Builders (P) Ltd. (2011) 4 SCC 616 . 10. There can be no dispute to the legal position that delivery of signed copy of an award in terms of Section 31(5) of the Act of 1997 to the parties is a mandatory requirement, which is substantive in nature. It sets in motion the limitation period, it also confers certain rights upon the parties and terminates the arbitral proceedings. 10. There can be no dispute to the legal position that delivery of signed copy of an award in terms of Section 31(5) of the Act of 1997 to the parties is a mandatory requirement, which is substantive in nature. It sets in motion the limitation period, it also confers certain rights upon the parties and terminates the arbitral proceedings. As per sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1997, an application for setting aside of an award cannot be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making the application has received the arbitral award, meaning thereby that the period of limitation of three months would start running from the date the party applying for setting aside of the award receives the signed copy of the arbitral award. 11. The claim of the petitioner is that he has never received the signed copy of the arbitral award. This is being disputed by the respondents and it has been submitted that the signed copy of the award has been received by the son of the petitioner. The receipt executed by Shri Sheikh Bilal Ahmad, the son of the petitioner, has been placed on record by the respondents and the same is also available in the record of arbitration. The record of arbitration further reveals that the petitioner has executed a Special Power of Attorney dated 24 th November, 2008, in favour of his son Sheikh Bilal Ahmad, whereby he has authorized him to participate in the arbitration proceedings and to sign and proceed with any motion for and on behalf of the petitioner including engagement of a counsel/lawyer. By virtue of this Power of Attorney, the petitioner has also authorized his aforenamed son to receive the amount that may be granted in terms of the award and to file appeal before the appropriate forum in respect of the arbitral award. 12. In the face of aforesaid document on record, which is not being disputed by the petitioner, it is clear that the Arbitrator has delivered a signed copy of the award to a duly authorized agent of the petitioner who happens to be his son. The delivery of signed copy of the award to a party would mean delivery of the same to a duly authorized agent of such party. The delivery of signed copy of the award to a party would mean delivery of the same to a duly authorized agent of such party. This would satisfy the requirement of sub- section (5) of Section 31 of the Act of 1997. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim that he has not received the signed copy of the impugned award. 13. The record of arbitration further reveals that the petitioner had applied for correction of the arbitral award in terms of Section 33(1)(a) of the Act of 1997. The application made by the petitioner in this regard was dismissed by the learned Arbitrator in terms of his order dated 19.10.2009 and a copy thereof was also furnished to the Attorney of the petitioner. 14. From the foregoing facts which have come to the fore, it is clear that the petitioner has received the signed copy of the arbitral award through his duly authorized agent on 27.08.2009 and the copy of order dated 19.10.2009 on the same day itself. Therefore, the time for filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 would start running against the petitioner from the aforesaid date(s) and not thereafter. 15. As per the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act of 1997, an application for setting aside the award has to be made within three months and if a party applying for setting aside of the award satisfies the Court that such party was prevented by sufficient cause from making an application within the period of three months, the period can be further extended by three months and not thereafter. Thus, the maximum period of limitation for challenging an award under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 is six months from the date copy of the arbitral award is received by the party challenging the award. 16. In the present case, the petitioner has filed the petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 after more than three years. The same is, therefore, hopelessly barred by limitation. 16. In the present case, the petitioner has filed the petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 after more than three years. The same is, therefore, hopelessly barred by limitation. Although the petitioner has not made any application seeking condonation of delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act, yet it would be pertinent to mention here that as per the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction Company , (2001) 8 SCC 470 , Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to a petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 as the scheme of the Act leads to exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, delay beyond six months cannot be condoned by recourse to Section 5. The aforesaid ratio has been reiterated and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & anr. (Civil Appeal No.336 of 2025 arising out of SLP(C) No.9996 of 2024 decided on January 10, 2025. 17. Thus, even if the petitioner is permitted to file an application for condonation of delay in filing petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1997, the same will not be of any help to his case. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the present petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997, filed by the petitioner is held to be hopelessly time barred and is dismissed as such. 19. The record of arbitration be returned.