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2025 DAILYLAW 11936 (CHH)

BHISHAM KUMAR SAHU @ DADDU SAHU v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

WPCR/128/2025 · 2025-03-06

Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

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Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:10988-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPCR No. 128 of 2025 Bhisham Kumar Sahu @ Daddu Sahu S/o Rajkumar Sahu Aged About 26 Years R/o Tikari, Police Station Arjunda, District Balod, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through- Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur (C.G) 2. Superintendent of Jail Central Jail, Durg, District- Durg (C.G.) 3. Collector District Balod (C.G.) 4. Superintendent of Police District Balod (C.G.) 5. Station House Incharge P.S Arjunda, District Balod (C.G.) ...Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Ms. Sweksha Sharma, Advocate. For Respondents/State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Deputy Government Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 06.03.2025 1. Heard Ms. Sweksha Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents/State. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.03.06 18:42:26 +0530 2 2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayers: “i. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the order dated 12.04.2024 (P/1) passed by the ofÏce of respondent No. 3 and direct the respondent No. 3 to release the petitioner on leave as applied by him for a period of 14 days. ii. Any other relief, which this Hon’ble Court deems, fit in the facts and circumstances may also be granted in favour of the petitioner.” 3. The petitioner's application for grant of leave (parole) has been rejected by the Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Balod, District Balod (C.G.) vide order dated 12.04.2024 on the recommendation of the concerned Superintendent of Police holding that the petitioner’s release is likely to lead quarrel and dispute by the petitioner on the ground that the victim’s family had expressed their apprehension that the petitioner could cause harm to life and property. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner has been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 363/34, 364/34, 364A/34, 368/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 25(1-ख)(ख) of the Arms Act, 1959, vide judgment dated 21.01.2020 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) and is languishing in jail since 05.02.2018. He would further submit that the application of the petitioner has been rejected by the ofÏce of respondent No. 3 summarily without following the relevant provisions of Rule 4 of the Chhattisgarh Prisoner's Leave Rules 1989 (in brevity 'the Rule, 1989') as well as Rules 6, 9 11 & 12 of the 3 Rules, 1989, therefore, the order passed by the District Magistrate dated 12.04.2024 is liable to be set aside and the petition deserves to be allowed. 5. On the other hand, learned State counsel supports the impugned order and opposes the prayer made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and the material available on record. 7. From perusal of the impugned order shows that the District Magistrate, Balod was swaying with the opinion of the concerned Superintendent of Police that if the petitioner is released on parole, there is likelihood that he would commit cognizable offence, hence he rejected the application of the petitioner. 8. Recently, in the matter of Shor v. State of UP decided on 05/08/2020 in WP(Cr.) No. 58/2020, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has granted the benefit of parole to those whose application was rejected on the ground that the crime is heinous and release of such a person would send a negative message against the justice system in the society. “... Merely repeating the fact that the crime is heinous and that release of such a person would send a negative message against the justice system in the society are factors de hors Section 2 of the United Provinces Prisoners Release on Prohibition Act, 1938. Conduct in prison has not been referred to at all and the Senior Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate confirming that the prisoner is not “incapacitated” from committing the crime is not 4 tantamount to stating that he is likely to abstain from crime and lead a peaceable life is released from prison…” 9. In the present case also merely on the basis of the vague report of the concerned Superintendent of Police, without considering the relevant rules, the District Magistrate has rejected the application of the petitioner. In view of the above matter and in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Shor (supra), the impugned order passed by the District Magistrate, Balod (Annexure P/1) is hereby set aside and the petitioner is directed to be released on parole. 10. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and the Collector-cum- District Magistrate, Balod, District Balod (C.G.) is directed to verify the surety submitted by the petitioner and issue necessary release order granting leave/parole to the petitioner for 14 days and the petitioner shall surrender before the concerned jail authority on completion of 14 days, at 11.00 a.m. positively. The District Magistrate, while allowing the application for grant of parole to the petitioner, may also seek surety of one family member of the petitioner as provided in Section 4(e) of the Rules, 1989 and may direct the petitioner to mark his presence before the District Magistrate, Balod, District Balod (C.G.) on each day during that period. 11. In the result, the present petition stands allowed with the above observations/directions. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan