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2025 DAILYLAW 11900 (AP)

M/s. Electrosteel Castings Limited, v. Union of India

WP/7136/2024 · 2025-08-29

Tarlada Rajasekhar Rao

body2025

Judgment text

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APHC01(f137352024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) SATURDAY,THE THIRTIETH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO WRIT PETITION NO: 7136 OF 2024 Between: M/s. Electrosteel Castings Limited, Merlapaka Village, Yerpedu Mandal, Chittoor District, Andhra Pradesh. Rep. by its Authorized Signatory, Sri. K. Dorai Raj ...PETITIONER AND 1. Union of India, Rep. by its Deputy Secretary^ Transport and Highways, New Delhi. 2. National Highways Authority of India, Rep. by its Project Director, Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh. 3. The District Collector and Arbitrator, Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh. 4. Ttiie Revenue Divisional Officer and Competent Authority (L.A), Tij-upathi, Renigunta - Poyya Section, NH-71, Chittoor District. 5. The Tahsildar, Yerpedu Mandal, Tirupati District. Ministry of Road ...RESPONDENTS Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased jo issue a writ or order or direction more particularly in the nature of a Writ of (Vlandamus declaring the impugned order dated 03.01.2024 vide Rc.No.Gp /Arbitration /296/LA/NH-71/Merlapaka(V)/Yerpedy(M) passed by the enhancement Authority Act ion of the petitioner for rejecting the application - under Section 3G(5) L irrationai, illegal, contrary to prihcples of National Highways Aothority Act 1957 an Violative of Articies 14, 21 and 300A oft No.3 / Respondent of compensation of the National Highways /7 of natural justice, 7 Limitation Act 1963 Constitution of India 1957 as arbitrary provisions besides being consequently set aside the same. and IA Kin-1 OF 2m. ina that in the circumstances stated Court may be pleased to petitioner by suspending /Arbitration/296/LA/NH- No.3 pending Section 151 CPC praying Petition under _ rpe affidavit rued in support of the petit,on, the H g reconsider the case of the Rc.No.G6 in interim order to order dated 71 /Merlapaka(V)/Yerpedy(M) disposal of the writ proceedings. grant an 03.01.2024 vide the Respondent the passed by CKR ASSOCIATES . rAVINDRA BABU (CENTRAL govt. COUNSEL) ;M/s Counsel for the Petitioner Counsel for the Respondent No.V.SR! A .CHAUDHARY and CHAUDHARY SOLICITORS LAW FIRM Counsel for the Respondent No.2; M/s advocates and ; GP FOR REVENUE counsel for the Respondent NOS.3 to 5: The court made the following order: / APHcjoi 0137352024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3330] [9k SATURDAY, THE THIRTIETH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO WRIT PETITION No. 7136 of 2024 Between: 1iM/s. ELECTROSTEEL CASTINGS LIMITED VILLAGE, YERPEDU MANDAL, ANDHRA PRADESH. REP. BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY, SRI. K. DORAI RAJ MERLAPAKA 1 j CHITTOOR DISTRICT, ...PETITIONER AND 1.UNION OF INDIA, REP. BY ITS DEPUTY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF ROAD TRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS DELHI. 2.NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA, REP. BY ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR, TIRUPATI, ANDHRA PRADESH. 3.THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR AND ARBITRATOR, TIRUPATI, ANDHRA PRADESH. 4.THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER AND COMPETENT AUTHORITYL A, TIRUPATHI, RENIGUNTA - POYYA SECTION, NH-71, CHITTOOR DISTRICT. 5.THE TAHSILDAR, YERPEDU MANDAL, TIRUPATI DISTRICT. ...RESPONDENT(S): NEW Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the drcumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue a writ or order or direction more particularly in the nature of a Writ of Mandamus declaring the impugned order dated 03.01.2024 vide Rc.No.G6 /Arbitration 71/Merlapaka(V)/Yerpedy(M) passed by the Respondent No.3 rejecting the Application of the Petitioner for enhancement of compensation under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Authority Act 1957 as arbitrary, irrational, illegal, contrary to principles of natural justice. /296/LA/NH- 2 provisions of National Highways Authority Act 1957 and Limitation Act 1963 besides being violative of Articles 14, 21 and 300A Constitution of India and consequently set aside the Counsel for the Petitioner: 1.CKR ASSOCIATES Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1.CHAUDHARY AND CHAUDHARY ADVOCATES AND SOLICITORS LAW FIRM 2.GP FOR REVENUE 3.A RAVINDRA BABU (CENTRAL GOVT COUNSEL) The Court made the following: of the same, and pass 3 ORbER: The present Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the I Constitution of India to declare the impugned order dated 03.01.2024, Rc.No.G6/Arbitration/296/LA/NH71/Merlapaka(V)/Yerpedy(M) vide passed by the Respondent No.3 rejecting the application of the petitioner for enhancement of compensation under Section 3G(5) of the NatiiDnal Highways Authority Act, 1957, as arbitrary, irrational, illegal, contrary to principles of natural justice provisions of the National Highways Authority Act, 1957, and the Limitation Act, 1963, besides being violative of Articles 14, 21 and 300A of the Constitution of India and consequently prayed to set aside and remand back to the Arbitrator. 2. The facts that are narrated in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition are as follows; The petitioner is the absolute owner and possessor of the land to extent of Ac.2.00 cents in Sy.No.308/4 by virtue of patta No. 199 (29491) and the petitioner has received a notice dated 17.08.2020, vide Ref. No. LA/NH I/Award No.07/Merlapaka (V)/ Yerpedu (M) on 02.08.2021, which indicates that an extent of 1942.56 square metres of land in Sy.No.308/4D1 belonging to the petitioner-company has been acquired for the purpose of National Highway-71 from Km. 128+200 to Km.163+400 (Renigunta to Poyya Section) in the District of Chittoor as per the National Highways Act, 1956, (for brevity hereafter called as Act) which was published, vide public notice dated 18.06.2018, I indicating that the compensation of Rs. 16,24,183-85 was fixed for an exteht of 1942.56 square metres which was computed at the rate of an 4 Rs.321.22 per square metre and directed to appear along with relevant documents and to hand over to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirupathi. Further directed to hand over the possession, failing which action would be taken as per Section 3E-(2)(a)(b) of the NHAI Act, 1956. 3. While being the situation, an amount of Rs, 16,24,184 was credited to the account of the petitioner on 14.03.2023 towards compensation for the land acquired. Despite the letters dated 23.08.2021 and 30.08.2021 addressed by the petitioner, the not considered by the respondents same were even provided opportunity of being heard. The petitioner was aggrieved by the meagre compensation or determined by the respondent No.4 in the notice dated 17.08.2020 and the petitioner has addressed a letter to the respondent Nos.4 and 5 23.08.2021, asserting that the compensation offered on was accepted under protest as the compensation was erroneously fixed, insufficient and not in accordance with the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. When the said land is commercial in nature the compensation at the rate of Rs.312.22 ps per square metre is very meagre and the subject land is located in prime area which is just three kms away from town of Srikalahasthi and the land is having more viability and the cost of the land as on today is Rs. 10,000/- per square mtr. If the same is calculated, the petitioner is entitled to extra amount of Rs.6,12,57,166/-. 4. The petitioner has filed an application under Section 3G(5) of the NHAI Act before the respondent No.3, vide Rc.No.G6/Arbitration/2 96/LA -T- 5 /NH-7/Merlapaka (V)A'erpedu (M) on 11.04.2023 for enhancement of corripensation as aforesaid and the same was rejected solely on the I grodnd of limitation, vide the impugned order dated 03.01.2024, vide j Rc.No.G6/Arbitration/296/LA/NH-71/Merlapaka (V)A'erpedu (M) clairjn petition was not filed within three years on the sole ground that, sincp no Article expressly prescribed the limitation to make such application, the residuary article under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted the District Collector/Arbitrator rejected the application filed by the petitioner to entertain the application for enhancement for compensation. as ' The said proceedings were assailed in the present Writ Petition in rejecting the application filed for enhancement of compensation under Section 3G(5) of the NHAI Act, on the ground that the limitation period unddr Article 137 of the Limitation Act. 1963. would be applicable in the matter of application filed under arbitration invoking arbitration and the . limitation prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act is three years from the date of cause of action and thus, without considering the samp, it was rejected and it is settled proposition of law that merely on technical ground, the case cannot be dismissed, when prima facie there appears to be valid case on merits and the award dated 13.11.2018 was not communicated to the petitioner and the same has come to know about the acquisition process only when the notice dated 17.08.2020 was Veceived by the petitioner on 02.08.2021, thereafter the petitioner has immediately addressed a letter dated 23.08.2021 to respondent Nos.4 and 5, requesting for appointment of Arbitrator to determine the compensation. Despite the compensation accepted only under protest. 5. i=—»» 6 the petitioner was not given a chance to putforth his defence that it is evident that the impugned order was passed without following'due process of law in violation of spirit of audi alterm partem principle. The entire proceedings that took place in the intervening Covid period and the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, [{2020) 19 SCC 10] has held that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Even assuming for the sake of argument without admitting that the limitation period has to be computed from the date of award, i.e., 13.11.2018, since the issue at hand is squarely covered by the above judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the order of this Court in W.P.No.4376 of 2024 dated 27.02.2024, wherein, a learned Single Judge of this Court, relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Re [(2021) 17 SCC 231], has remanded the matter to the authority concerned, i.e.. District Collector, Tirupati, to pass fresh orders on the petitioner’s application filed under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Authority Act. Hence, requested to pass similar orders in the present case. 7. The respondent No.2-National Highways Authority of India has filed its counter on the ground that the award cannot be challenged by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the challenge to Arbitration Award may only be made under Section 34 or Section 37 of the Arbitration Act and laying down the principle of law, the Hon’ble an 7 Supreme Court in the judgment dated 26.10.2005 in the case of M/s. S.BP. & Co. \/s. M/s. Patel Engineering Ltd., and another reported in (200^) 8 see 618 and also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 10.04.2024 in the case of PHR Invent Educational i Society Vs. UCO Bank and others, reported in (2024) 6 SCC 579 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court after reference of numerous previous judgnrients relating to the same principle of law, held that invoking of Article 226 of the Constitution of India particularly when an alternative statutory remedy is available, is impermissible in law. Hence, prayed to dismiss the Writ Petition. 8. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of disdretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reasoh why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. The respondent No.3 - District Collector, Tirupathi/Arbitrator filed j counter and stated that the issue has been examined in the Ministry and that the writ petitioner filed Arbitration Petition on 12.02.2023, whereas the Avyard was passed on 13.11.2018, i.e.. Arbitration Petition was filed after Igpse of 4 years 5 months and the National Highways Authority, vide letter dated 31.01.2022 communicated application of limitation clauses to all cases of acquisition under the NHAI Act, 1956, which reads is follows; 9. 8. -0^ "The issue has been examined in the Ministry and it is hereby clarified that limitation provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable in the matter of filing arbitration petition/application invoking the arbitration, which is three (03) years from the date of cause of action (the date of award by GALA in regard to land acquisition under the NH Act, 1956). This is in accordance with the statutory provision in NH Act, 1956 and Arbitration and Reconciliation Act, 1996 and the Project Director, NHAI, Tirupati, vide reference NHAI/PIU-TPT/070MP/LA/ARB/4/ 2023/1425, dated 06.11.2023 has also clarified that an arbitration petition should have been filed within three years from the date of passing of award and the date of issue of 3-E Notice is not the criterion." an 4 n I U. in the recent Full Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Sterling Industries \/s Jayprakash Associates Ltd. reported in (2021) 18 see 367, the Apex Court while dealing with under MSMED Act, referred the earlier judgment of Apex Court in the case of SBP & Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr, reported in (2005) 8 see 618 in Paragraph No. 45 held as follows; "It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award a similar issue 9 including any in-between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The pdrty aggrieved by any order Of the arbitral tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral tribunal is after all, the creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But thbt would not alter the status of the arbitral tribunal. It will still » j be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the arbitral tribunal 3 is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 2?6 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible." Ih the case of Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v. Chhabii Dass Agarwa reported in (2014) 1 SCC 603 the Hon’ble Apex court h^ld that: "Thus, while it can be said that this (Apex) Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy 'i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, j or when an order has been passed in total violation of the 11. 10 principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down inThansingh Nathmal case [AIR 1964 SC 1419] , Titaghur Paper Mills case [Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of ■ Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 : and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.” 12. Whereas the Award was passed on 13.11.2018 and therefore the petitioner has filed the Arbitration Petition after lapse of 4 years 5 months from the date of Award and hence the arbitration petition dismissed. was 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that in view of judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Re [(2021) 17 SCC 231] that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and no notice was issued to the petitioner and the same was admitted by the respondent No.3 in its counter. as may 14. The petitioner herein filed reply to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent No.2-NHAI and relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex 11 Court in Titagur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa [(1983) 2 SCC 433] for the proposition that non-entertainment of petitions under the writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation and it is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. 15. The petitioner also relied on the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Sri Ganesh Chandra Ghosh & Others \/s. State of West Bengal & Others [M.A.T.No.784 of 2020], where a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court has set aside the arbitration award passed by the Arbitrator comprised under the NHAI Act as no notice of arbitration proceedings was provided to the parties therein. The Division Bench took a view that not issuing a notice is a flagrant violation of principles of natural justice and the remedy available under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Reconciliation Act, 1996, rather has remanded the matter back to the statutdry arbitrator for fresh adjudication. Therefore, it is submitted that the matter at hand also cannot be relegated to avail remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Reconciliation Act. The petitioner is only questioning the arbitrary procedure followed by the respondent No.3 while passing the impugned order and the manner in which the impugried order was passed is highhanded, preposterous, iniquitous and presumptuous and violative of Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution of India and in utter derogation and disregard to the provisions of the NHAI Act and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Hence, urged this Court to set aside the impugned proceedings and to remancil the matter to the Arbitrator for fresh adjudication. 12 16. In the said case it is the contention of the petitioner therein is that no notice of arbitration was served upon them and the arbitral award was passed behind their back. The respondents therein have not been able to refute the said stand by producing any notice of arbitration served upon the writ petitioners. The Calcutta High Court held that the failure to serve such notice renders the entire arbitral process and the resultant award under challenge for being in violation of natural justice and statutory procedure and the award set aside. That is not the issue in the present case. 17. Now the point that arises for consideration is, whether the impugned order in the present Writ Petition is sustainable or liable to be set aside? 18. POINT: Admittedly, as per the assertions made in the affidavit, the petitioner has filed application under section 3G(5) of the NHAI Act before the respondent No.3, vide Arbitration Case Rc.No.G6/Arbitration/ 296/LA/NH-71/Merlapaka (V)/Yerpedy (M) on 11.04.2023. The said Arbitration application was rejected on the ground of limitation, as the said Arbitration application was filed beyond the period of limitation of three years. It is the contention of the petitioner that no notice was issued by the arbitrator before rejecting the application to the petitioner hence it amounts violation of principle of natural justice and writ is maintainable. 19. Under section 3G(6) of the National Highways Act 1956, a landowner or claimant has the right to submit an application for 13 increased compensation to the arbitrator. In this case, the application for enhahcement of the compensation was rejected at the outset on the ground that it was filed beyond three years invoking Art 137 of the limitation act 1963. 20. Section 3G(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act.(NHAI) 21. . The writ petitioner has submitted an Arbitration application under Section 3G(6) of the National Highways Act, which was dismissed by the District Collector/Arbitrator on 03.01.2024 due to being barred by limitatibn. On that date, cause of action for filing of application under section 3G(6) was barred by the period of three years as prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act^ 1963 Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it was the duty of the arbitrator to reject the claim as it was on the face of it, barred by the period of limitation. 22. The writ petitioner specifically argues that even if an application is submitted under section 3G(6) of the Act after the limitation, the arbitrator has not provided an opportunity to present the case of the petitioner in accordance with the judgment issued by the Supreme Court in the matter of Cognizance of Extension of Limitation (referred supra) which constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice. 23. Even the argument presented by the respondents that the claim is barred by limitation is accepted, the arbitrator cannot dismiss the 14 application without sooking clarification from th© pstitioner rsgarding th© maintainability of th© app©al in light of th© limitation issu©. 24. In Dharampal Satyapal Limit©d v. D©puty Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati [(2015) 8 SCC 519] th© Apex Court observed in the following: "Whether it is open to the authority, which has to take a decision, to dispense with the requirement of the principles of natural justice on the ground that affording such opportunity will not make any difference? To put it otherwise, can the administrative authority dispense with the requirement of issuing notice by itself deciding that prejudice will be caused to the person against whom the action is contemplated? Answer has to be in the negative. It is not permissible for the authority to jump over the compliance of the principles of natural justice on the ground , that even if hearing had been provided it would have served no useful purpose. The opportunity of hearing will serve the purpose or not has to be considered at a later stage and such things cannot be presumed by the authority." an no 25. In view of my foregoing discussion, as encapsulated above, and the judgement of the Apex Court in Dharampal Satyapal Limited (referred supra), I find merit in the contention raised by the petitioner’s counsel and the Writ Petition should be allowed in order to remand the matter to the Arbitrator, directing the Arbitrator to issue a notice that allows the petitioner an opportunity to putforth his case. 15 26. In the result, Writ Petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand dismissed. Sd/- B. PRASADA RAO ASSISTANT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To, 1. The Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Union of India, New Delhi. 2. The Project Director, National Highways Authority of India, Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh. 3. Ttle District Collector and Arbitrator, Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh. 4. Tt^e Revenue Divisional Officer and Competent AuthorityL A, Tirupathi, R^nigunta - Poyya Section, NH-71, Chittoor District. 5. The Tahfelld^r.'Ye'rpedu Mandal, Tirupati District. 6. Oihe CC to M/s. CKR Associates, Advocate [OPUC] 7. One CC to M/s.Chaudhary And Chaudhary Advocates and Solicitors Law Firm [OPUC] 8. Ope CC to Sri A. Ravindra Babu (Central Govt. Counsel) [OPUC] 9. Tvyo CCs to GP for Revenue, High Court of Andhra Pradesh [OUT] 10. Two CD Copies. ssb HIGH COURT DATED:30/08/2025 ORDER WP No. 7136 OF 2024 I 7 2 SEP 2025 - ^ . Current Section . Xa£fSPATCH^5- o\ ALLOWING THE W.P. WITHOUT COSTS