13 Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:46637-DB Court No. - 1 Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 41 of 2025 Appellant :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Revenue Deptt. Lko. And 2 Others Respondent :- Sarvesh Kumar Counsel for Appellant :- C.S.C. Counsel for Respondent :- Ajay Sharma Hon'ble Rajan Roy,J. Hon'ble Manjive Shukla,J. 1. The captioned Special Appeal has been filed assailing therein, the judgment and order dated 07.04.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ-A No.5812 of 2016 (Sarvesh Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and others). 2. The registry of this Court had reported that there is delay of 621 days in filing of the Special Appeal. 3 The appellants along with this Special Appeal have filed an application for condonation of delay in filing of the Special Appeal. 4. Heard Sri Mohit Jauhari, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellants/applicants. 5. The appellants in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay had stated that after receiving copy of the judgment and order dated 07.04.2023 along with the representation dated 18.04.2023, the matter was considered by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Purwa, District Unnao and an order had been passed on 22.05.2023 in purported compliance of the judgment and order dated 08.01.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ-A No.8358 of 2023. It has 13 further been stated that the opposite party challenged the order dated 22.05.2023 by filing a fresh writ petition bearing Writ-A No.8358 of 2023 and the learned Single Judge passed an order on 28.10.2023 and directed the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Purwa, District Unnao to file his personal affidavit. 6. In the aforesaid background, vide letter dated 04.11.2023 the matter was referred to the learned Chief Standing Counsel seeking legal opinion in the matter. Thereafter, vide letter dated 17.11.2023 the District Administration referred the matter to the State Government seeking permission to file Special Appeal against the order dated 07.04.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ-A No.5812 of 2016. The District Magistrate, Unnao sent a reminder to the State Government on 22.11.2023 for necessary permission to file the Special Appeal. 7. In the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, it has further been stated that the State Government vide its letter dated 11.12.2023 issued certain directions to the District Administration and thereafter, vide letter dated 21.12.2023, the learned Chief Standing Counsel was again requested to accord his legal opinion in the matter. The State Government issued another letter dated 08.01.2024 which was received in the office of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Purwa, District Unnao along with the letter of the District Magistrate, Unnao dated 11.01.2024. Vide letter dated 05.01.2024, again the matter was referred to the District Magistrate, Unnao and in turn, the District Magistrate, Unnao vide letter dated 03.02.2024 furnished the required information to the State Government and further vide letter dated 05.02.2024, the Naib Tehsildar was authorized to contact the State Government. The learned Chief Standing Counsel recorded his opinion on 23.02.2024. 13 8. The appellants in the affidavit filed in support of the application for the condonation of delay have further stated that on 16.03.2024, Model Code of Conduct for General Parliamentary Elections, 2024 was enforced and the entire machinery of the District Administration at Unnao was busy in the process of the elections. It has further been stated that the general parliamentary elections were over on 15.06.2024 and thereafter, the High Court remained closed due to summer vacations. In the month of July, 2024, the entire staff at Tehsil remained busy in taking necessary precautionary measures in flood affected areas. 9. The District Magistrate, Unnao wrote a letter dated 27.08.2024 to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Purwa, District Unnao and in turn, a letter was written by the Sub Divisional Magistrate on 28.08.2024 whereby, the Tehsildar Purwa, District Unnao was directed to take appropriate action in the matter. The Law Department of the Government of U.P. granted permission for filing of this Special Appeal on 30.09.2024 which was received in the office of the District Magistrate, Unnao along with the State Government’s letter dated 01.10.2024. The District Magistrate issued letters dated 04.10.2024, 28.08.2024 and 30.10.2024 and finally vide letter dated 10.11.2024, the matter was referred to the learned Chief Standing Counsel for filing of this Special Appeal. 10. In the affidavit, it has further been stated that the matter of filing of this Special Appeal remained with the office of the learned Chief Standing Counsel, High Court at Lucknow and the different authorities at Tehsil were involved in the process. The Special Appeal ultimately was presented for filing before the registry of this Court on 17.01.2025. 13 11. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellants/State has submitted that the delay of 621 days in filing of the Special Appeal has been explained in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay and the delay so caused in filing of this Special Appeal is due to procedure involved in the administration and the same is neither deliberate nor intentional as such, in the interest of justice, the delay of 621 days in filing of the Special Appeal is liable to be condoned. 12. We have considered the submissions made by the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants/State. We find that the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Purwa, District Unnao passed an order on 22.05.2023 in purported compliance of the judgment and order dated 07.01.2023 passed in Writ-A No.5812 of 2016. The opposite party challenged the order dated 22.05.2023 by filing a fresh Writ-A No.8358 of 2023 and the learned Single Judge in the said writ petition had passed an order on 28.10.2023 whereby direction was issued to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Purwa, District Unnao to file his personal affidavit. For ready reference, the order dated 28.10.2023 passed in Writ-A No.8358 of 2023 is extracted as under:- “1. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties. 2. Petition has been filed challenging order dated 22.05.2023 whereby petitioner's representation for compassionate appointment has been rejected on the ground that he is dis-entitled for same since his father was not a regularly appointed Collection Peon and therefore would not be covered by the U.P. Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servant (Dying in Harness) Rules of 1974. 3. It has been submitted that earlier petitioner had filed Writ A No.5812 of 2016 challenging order dated 13 04.03.2016 whereby earlier also his claim for compassionate appointment has been rejected on the ground that his father late Ramesh Chandra was a Seasonal Collection Peon. It is submitted that by means of judgment and order dated 07.04.2023, Coordinate Bench of this Court has recorded a specific finding that although petitioner's father was not regularized on the post of Seasonal Collection Peon but for the reasons indicated therein this Court came to the conclusion that the deceased would come within definition of Government of Servant under Rule 2 (a)(iii) of the Rules of 1974 whereafter directions was issued to opposite parties to consider petitioner's claim in the light of observations made therein. 4. It is submitted that the aforesaid judgment and order dated 07.04.2023 has not been challenged till date and has therefore attained finality but by means of impugned order, the opposite parties have again rejected petitioner's claim on the ground that his father did not come within definition of Government Servant. 5. A perusal of impugned order makes it evident that the same has been passed placing reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Special Appeal No.459 of 2006; State of U. P. Versus Raja Bhaiya Yadav to deny petitioner's claim on the ground that his father would not come within definition of a Government Servants in terms of Rules of 1974. 6. Prima facie, it appears that the impugned order is contemptuous in nature since the authority concerned has acted as if, it is sitting in appeal over judgment rendered by this Court without challenging the same in appellate proceedings. Such a course of action is clearly impermissible for an administrative authority. 7. In view of aforesaid, list this case on 07.11.2023, as fresh. 8. Opposite party no.3 i.e. Sub- Divisional Officer, Tahsil Purwa, District Unnao is directed to file his personal affidavit indicating reasons for not passing orders in accordance with directions issued by judgment and order 13 of this Court and as to why his case may not be referred to contempt Court.” 13. At the stage of passing of the order dated 28.10.2023 in Writ-A No.8352 of 2023, it appears that the authorities of the district administration thought that they should file Special Appeal against the judgment and order dated 07.04.2023 passed in Writ-A No. 5812 of 2016. 14. We find that from 04.11.2023 till 15.3.2024 the correspondence took place in between the officers of the District Administration, the State Government and the learned Chief Standing Counsel, High Court at Lucknow. We further find that from 16.03.2024 till 27.8.2024 the appellants have tried to explain the delay on the pretext of the General Parliamentary Elections, 2024 and the precautionary measures to be taken in the flood affected areas. 15. The appellants, for the period from 16.03.2024 till 27.8.2024, have not stated that who were the authorities deputed for filing of the Special Appeal in question and what was their engagement in the General Parliamentary Elections, 2024 and in the precautionary measures to be taken in the flood affected areas. 16. We find it difficult to believe that the entire state machinery i.e. the District Administration and the authorities of the State Government were involved only in the work of General Parliamentary Elections, 2024 and all other important works were at stand still during the said period. No doubt, we are of the view that the courts, in dealing with the matters of condonation of delay in filing the appeals by the State Government should take lenient view but the authorities of the State Government cannot be permitted to take lame excuses and seek condonation of delay 13 on the ground of the General Parliamentary Elections and the precautionary measures to be taken in the flood affected areas. 17. After the General Parliamentary Elections, 2024 and the end of the rainy season, the District Magistrate, Unnao vide letter dated 27.08.2024 again started process of filing of the Special Appeal but even this time the District Administration and the State Government took almost five months time to present the Special Appeal in the registry of this Court. 18. We find that there is huge delay of 621 days in filing of Special Appeal and proper explanation has not been given for the said delay. We further find that the authorities have attempted to explain the delay in filing of the Special Appeal by taking lame excuse of the General Parliamentary Elections, 2024 and the precautionary measures to be taken in the flood affected areas. The appellants even have not cared to come up before this Court as to who were the officers deputed for filing of the Special Appeal and in what manner they were engaged in the General Parliamentary Elections, 2024 and the precautionary measures to be taken in the flood affected areas. Even otherwise, it is difficult for this Court to comprehend that the entire District Administration and the State machinery were involved in the General Parliamentary Elections, 2024 and thereafter, in the precautionary measures to be taken in the flood affected areas and all other works were stand still. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment rendered in the case of Postmaster General and Others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 had categorically held that no doubt, the courts usually deal with the matters of delay with leniency but the State authorities cannot be permitted to take lame excuses for explanation of delay in filing 13 the appeals. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the judgment rendered in the case of Post Master General and Others (supra) are extracted as under: “(5) It is submitted that it is evident from the foregoing reasons that the delay caused in filing the petition was the result of all the necessary and unavoidable office formalities and was bona fide and not deliberate or intentional and the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the petition within the period of limitation. (6) It is further submitted that the petitioner humbly seeks leave to draw the kind attention of this Hon'ble Court to the views expressed by this Hon'ble Court that liberal approach may be adopted and that the Court should not take too strict and pedantic stand which will cause injustice while considering the application for condonation of delay, in terms of its judgments in Collector (LA) v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107] and Bhag Singh v. Major Daljeet Singh [1987 Supp SCC 685] . It is submitted that the principles for condonation of delay laid down in the abovecited cases may therefore be adopted in the present case also. (7) This Hon'ble Court in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer [(1988) 2 SCC 142] laid down that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. (8) In the matter of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132] , this Hon'ble Court observed and laid down as follows: (SCC p. 138, para 11) ‘11. … When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on [the] table for considerable time causing delay—intentional or otherwise—is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, 13 certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default, no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay.’ (9) This Hon'ble Court in Union of India v. Jain and Associates [(2001) 3 SCC 277] decided on 6-2-2001 has held that delay ought to be condoned when sufficiently explained particularly where party seeking condonation is the Government. It is further submitted that the Hon'ble High Court ought to have condoned the delay in considering the public revenue involved and also because of the genuine difficulties and circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner, on account of which special leave petition could not be filed within time.” 21. Before considering whether the reasons for justifying such a huge delay are acceptable or not, it is also useful to refer the decisions relied on by Mr Soli J. Sorabjee, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents. 22. In CWT v. Amateur Riders Club [1994 Supp (2) SCC 603], there was a delay of 264 days in filing the SLP by the Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay. The explanation for the delay had been set out in the petitioner's own words as under: (SCC p. 604, para 2) “2. … (g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Board on 24-6-1993 along with the case file. (h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on- Record on 9-7-1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on 20-9-1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on 1-10-1993.” After incorporating the above explanation, this Court refused to condone the delay by observing thus: (SCC p. 604, para 3) “3. … Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that the Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the 13 proverbial red tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest. (emphasis supplied) 23. In Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] the question was whether the respondent Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project had shown sufficient cause to condone the delay of 1724 days in filing appeals before the High Court. In para 17, this Court held: (SCC p. 455) “17. … The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and ‘do not slumber over their rights’.” 24. After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and the government undertaking, this Court observed as under: (Pundlik Jalam case [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] , SCC pp. 457-58, paras 29-30) “29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the court's discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which 13 they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.” 25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. [(2009) 8 AD 201 (Del)] as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. t is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a 13 question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.” 20. On overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the authorities of the District Administration and the State Government were not diligent in filing of the Special Appeal and that is why, there is huge delay of 621 days in filing of the Special Appeal. The explanation given by the appellants in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay is not a proper explanation and in fact, lame excuses have been taken to explain the delay. 13 21. In view of the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the delay of 621 days in filing of this Special Appeal is a wilful and deliberate delay and as such, it cannot be condoned. 22. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay in filing of this Special Appeal is hereby rejected and consequently, the Special Appeal is also dismissed. (Manjive Shukla, J.) (Rajan Roy, J.) Order Date :- 11.8.2025 akhilesh Digitally signed by :- AKHILESHWAR KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench