IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No. 398 of 2018 Decided on: 11.08.2025 Thakur Dass … Petitioner Versus Mansa Ram and another … Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes ___________________________________________________________________ For the petitioner : Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, Advocate. For the respondents : Ms. Deepmala Sharma, Advocate vice Mr. Varun Chandel, Advocate. Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge (Oral) By way of this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner assails the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, dated 31.05.2018, in terms whereof, an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay preferred by the present petitioner, assailing the Counter Claim that was decreed by the learned Trial Court, stands rejected. The reasons assigned by learned Appellate Court while rejecting the application are quoted herein below:- “10. The accompanying appeal has been filed alongwith the present application after 1286 days, i.e. more than 3½ a half years from the judgment of the Ld. Trial Court, granting preliminary decree on the counter claim of the non-applicant. 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 11. From the appraisal of the evidence led by the parties, it becomes clear that the applicant was fully aware of the proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court, both in the counter- claim as well as the application for grant of final decree, filed thereafter. In both the proceedings, the applicant was duly represented by a counsel and thus, had legal advice available to him. As a matter of fact, it is not even the case of the applicant that he did not have knowledge of the proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court or the passing of the order impugned by way of accompanying appeal. The only ground projected for non filing of the appeal in time, is paucity of funds with the applicant. Suffice it to say in this behalf that the said ground cannot be taken to be a 'sufficient reason' to file the appeal after a delay of 3½ years, especially in view of the fact that the applicant had earlier been pursuing and prosecuting several stages of litigation with the non-applicant. No independent evidence has even been led by the applicant, in support of his contention that he did not possess adequate funds to prefer and appeal against the impugned judgment, within the period of limitation. In any case, such ground would otherwise not be available to him since in the event of his being unable to file the appeal due to poverty or indigence, he could have approached the 3 appropriate authority for grant of free legal aid. It is significant to note that no suggestion has been put to the non- applicant in cross-examination that the applicant was prevented from filing the appeal in time due to abject financial hardship. 12. There is no doubt that while considering a prayer for condonation of delay, liberal construction has to be given to the reasons afforded by the applicant. However, it is equally trite that at least the reason afforded should be prima-facie plausible and capable of explaining the delay. It is also to be borne in mind that the rights accrued to the other party in the meanwhile, have also be taken into consideration cannot be light heartedly disturbed merely at the asking of the applicant, especially after a delay as inordinate as 3½ years, as is the case here. Be that as it may, the explanation for the delay offered by the applicant does not bear even a semblance of sufficiency, and the evidence led in that behalf is grossly incapable of procuring any benefit to the cause of the applicant. As such, I see no reason, much less a sufficient reason to condone the delay in filing the accompanying appeal.” 4 2. During the course of arguments, learned Counsel for the petitioner could not demonstrate that the findings returned in the above quoted paras of the order passed by the learned Appellate Court were perverse and not borne out from the record of the case. His contention that learned Counsel representing the petitioner before the learned Trial Court did not apprise the petitioner about the decree passed in the Counter Claim cannot be accepted for the reason that it is evident from the findings returned in para-11 by the learned Appellate Court that the only ground for not filing the appeal either within the period of limitation or within some reasonable time thereafter was purportedly paucity of funds. The delay in filing the appeal was of more than 3½ years. The contention of the petitioner that the condonation of delay has to be construed liberally does not mean that someone who sleeps over his or her rights, can be entertained by the Court, after a considerable delay, until and unless the party is able to justify as to why it could not approach the Court, within the period of limitation provided in the statue, or within some reasonable time thereafter. There is a rationale as to why limitation has been provided for assailing orders/ judgments. The reason is that there has to be a finality attached to everything. After the Court decides a matter, obviously, the party aggrieved by the said adjudication has a right to challenge it, but then this right 5 has to be exercised within the period of limitation prescribed or within some reasonable time thereafter, in case, the party can satisfy as to what prevented it from approaching the Court within the period of limitation. A party, in whose favour the order is, obviously, within the period of limxitation, would be expecting the other party to assail the same, but if the order is not assailed by the aggrieved party either within the period of limitation or within some reasonable time thereafter, obviously, the party in whose favour the adjudication is, shall be legitimately expecting that now the adjudication has attained finality. This element of finality cannot be snatched by the stroke of a pen by condoning considerable delays, like in the present case, until and unless the party praying for condonation of delay, is able to satisfy the judicial conscious of the Court that there were justifiable grounds, on account whereof, the party could not approach the Court within reasonable time after the expiry of the period of limitation. As in the present case, the petitioner was not able to justify the delay in approaching the Court and the reasons as spelled out, obviously, were not such, so as to allow the condonation of delay of more than 3½ years, learned Appellate court rightly rejected the application praying for condonation of delay. 3. Thus, as the impugned order does not suffer from any 6 infirmity and further as this Court does not find any merit in the present petition, the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any also stand disposed of accordingly. (Ajay Mohan Goel) Judge August 11, 2025 (narender)