APHC010137872009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] THURSDAY,THE FOURTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1614/2009 Between: KAMANA HARIGIRIDHARA GOPALAKRISHNA, S/. BHASKARAHARINATH, KHANDAVALLI VILLAGE, YERAVALI MANDAL, WEST GODAWARI DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER AND 1.ADDIGARLA SRINU AND 6 OTHERS, S/O. CHULNA NARAYUDU, CULTIVATION, KHANDAVALLI VILLAGE, WEST GODAVARI DISRICT. 2.ADDIGARLA GOVINDU, S/O. GANGAIAH, CULTIVATION, KHANDAVALLI VILLAGE, WEST GODAVARI DISRICT. 3.ATHIKALA SAKTHI NAGESU, S/O. VENKANNA, CULTIVATION, KHANDAVALLI VILLAGE, WEST GODAVARI DISRICT. 4.ADDIGARLA CHINNA YERRAIAH, S/O. PEDA NARAYUDU, CULTIVATION, KHANDAVALLI VILLAGE, WEST GODAVARI DISRICT. 5.ADDIGARKA VENKATASWAMY, S/O. PULLAIAH, CULTIVATION, KHANDAVALLI VILLAGE, WEST GODAVARI DISRICT. 6.ELL ANNAVARAM DUVVA ANNAVARAM, KHANDAVALLI VILLAGE, WEST GODAVARI DISRICT. 7.STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP BY PUBILC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD ...RESPONDENT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner: 2 1.ANUP KOUSHIK KARAVADI 2.LEGAL AID Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 2.GANDHAM SR PRASAD 3.LEGAL AID The Court made the following: ORDER: The Criminal Revision Case has been preferred by the de-facto complainant under Sections 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) challenging the judgement of acquittal dated 27.05.2009 in C.C.No.415 of 2003 on the file of learned II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tanuku, whereby and whereunder the Respondent Nos.2 to 6/Accused were found not guilty under Section 248(1) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ for the charge punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C.,’). 2. Mr. 2. Mr. Anup Koushik Karavadi, learned Counsel for the Petitioner while reiterating the grounds of the revision argued that the judgment rendered by the learned Magistrate in C.C. No. 415 of 2003 warrants interference, being contrary to settled legal principles and the weight of evidence adduced during trial; the acquittal of the accused, based solely on minor discrepancies in the testimony of eyewitnesses, fails to account for the natural lapse of memory over time and overlooks the consistency in core allegations; the trial Court failed to properly appreciate the probative value of the injury certificate issued 3 by P.W.9, which unequivocally establishes that the Petitioner sustained simple injuries, and erred in placing undue reliance on the omission of the Investigating Officer to elicit the precise nature of the weapon used; moreover, the independent testimony of P.W.3, who categorically confirmed the assault on the Petitioner by the Accused, lends further corroboration to the prosecution's case; the adverse inference drawn due to the absence of details regarding the cause of injuries in the medical record is legally untenable; the evidence, taken holistically, clearly substantiates the commission of an offence under Section 324 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and the learned Magistrate’s failure to convict on the said charge renders the judgment irregular, perverse, and liable to be set aside. 3. On the other hand, Sri Gandham SR Prasad, learned Legal Aid Counsel for Respondent Nos.1 to 6 argued that upon a meticulous scrutiny of the case record and the testimonies tendered by the prosecution, the Trial Court was correct in arriving at a judgment of acquittal in favour of the Respondent Nos.1 to 6/Accused. The prosecution’s failure to establish the essential ingredients of Section 324 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ that is, the voluntary infliction of hurt by dangerous weapons or means, was manifest throughout the trial proceedings. The discrepancy between the charge sheet and the primary evidence, particularly regarding the alleged weapons used in the assault, proved fatal to the prosecution’s case. While the charge sheet implicated iron rods and sticks, P.W.1, the alleged injured person, testified to having been attacked with "bricks". However, the material objects recovered comprised mere stones, with 4 no trace of the initially alleged weapons. This inconsistency rendered the prosecution’s narrative unreliable and cast significant doubt on the alleged mode and gravity of assault. 4. He further argued that the evidentiary framework collapsed under the weight of non-corroborative medical documentation and tainted witness testimony. The absence of any wound certificate for P.W.2, coupled with the medical officer’s inability to clinically connect the nature of injuries sustained by P.W.1 to the assault as described, highlighted a critical shortfall in forensic corroboration. The depositions of P.W.3 and P.W.5, both projected as material witnesses, were found to be vitiated by embellishments not reflected in their earlier statements under Section 161 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ thereby diminishing their evidentiary value. The unexplained non-examination of other independent villagers present at the scene, and the hostility of P.W.4, further eroded the prosecution’s case. Investigative lapses, such as the failure to recover blood- stained clothing or adequately document the crime scene, compounded these deficiencies, creating substantial doubt that touched the core of criminal liability. The learned Trial Court, applying the established principle that benefit of doubt must accrue to the Accused where reasonable uncertainty persists, rightly acquitted them of all charges. The judgment of the learned Trial Court is not only consistent with settled jurisprudence, but also a reaffirmation of the doctrine that conviction must rest on unimpeachable proof, not conjecture or incomplete investigation. 5 5. Mrs. P.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor also argued that on the similar lines of the learned Legal Aid Counsel for Respondent Nos.1 to 6 and submits that appreciation of the evidence is not feasible in exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 and 401 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ inasmuch as the learned Trial Court having appreciated the evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution on correct perspective, disbelieved the story of the prosecution and acquitted Respondent Nos.1 to 6 and it is urged to dismiss the Criminal Revision Case. 6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 7. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in C.C.No.415 of 2003 dated 27.05.2009, passed by the learned II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tanuku, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 8. While deciding a Criminal Revision Case filed against acquittal of accused, it is apposite to refer the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar1 wherein at Paragraph No.13 it is held as under: “13. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of 1(2002) 6 SCC 650 6 justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla2 at Paragraph No.10 held as under: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt. has o right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.” 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP3, at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the 2AIR 1951 SC 196 3AIR 1962 SC 1788 7 appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 11. In Mahendra Pratap Singh v Sarju Singh4, at paragraph Nos.7 and 8 it is held as under: “7. In revision, the learned Judge in the High Court went into the evidence very minutely. He questioned every single finding of the learned Sessions Judge and gave his own interpretation of the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it. He discounted the theory that the weapon of attack was a revolver and suggested that it might have been a shot gun or country made pistol which the villagers in the position of Kuldip and Sarju could not distinguish from a revolver. He then took up each single circumstance on which the learned Sessions Judge had found some doubt and interpreting the evidence de novo held, contrary to the opinion of the Sessions Judge that they were acceptable. All the time he appeared to give the benefit of the doubt to the prosecution. The only error of law which the learned Judge found in the Sessions Judge's judgment was a remark by the Sessions Judge that the defence witnesses who were examined by the police before they were brought as defence witness ought to have been cross-examined with reference to their previous statements recorded by the police, which obviously is against the provisions of the Code. Except for this error, no defect of procedure or of law was discovered by the learned judge of the High Court in his appraisal of the judgment of the Sessions Judge. As stated already by us, he seems to have gone into the matter as if an appeal against acquittal was before him making no distinction between the appellate and the revisional powers exercisable by the High Court in matters of acquittal except to the extent that instead of convicting the appellant he only ordered his retrial. In our opinion, the learned judge was clearly in error in proceeding as he did in a revision filed by a private party against the acquittal reached in the Court of Session. 4AIR 1968 SC 707 8 8.The practice on the subject has been stated by this Court on more than one occasion, In D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, 1951 SCR 254 = (AIR 1951 SC 196), only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 = (AIR 1951 SC 316), this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is "perverse" or "lacking in true correct perspective". It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788), it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” 12. In Ram Kishan v. Harmit Kaur5, at paragraph No.9 it is held as under: “9. It is true that the High Court as an appellate Court can set aside an order of acquittal. In doing so, the High Court has to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 5AIR 1972 SC 468 9 The High Court is to consider the views of the trial Judge as to credibility of the witnesses. The High Court is also to keep in view the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the right of the accused to the benefit of doubt. Finally the High Court is to give reasons that the acquittal was not justified. The acquittal by the Sessions Judge cannot be said to be against the evidence or in disregard of evidence. Nor can the acquittal be said to be in violation of the principles of criminal jurisdiction.” 13. In Kotaiah v. G. Venkateshwara6, at paragraph Nos.19, 20 & 21 it is held as under: “19. We are of the opinion that the entire approach made by the High Court in dealing with the Criminal Revision filed against acquittal by the private party is contrary to the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above. Notwithstanding the fact that sub-section (4) of Section 439 does not authorise the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it has in fact contravened this provision by recording a finding of guilt against the accused and directing the Trial Court to convict them after a retrial. There is no question of lack of jurisdiction in the Trial Court to try the case; nor was any attack made that any evidence has been shut out at the trial. Whether the dying declaration, Ext. P. 15, by Ratnababu can be taken into account regarding the attack on Koteswara Rao, is a matter which the Trial Court was entitled to decide one way or the other. If its view was wrong, the High Court could have gone into that aspect and differed from this opinion of the Sessions Court if the State had filed an appeal against acquittal. Further the mere fact that the learned Trial Judge held that this piece of evidence is not relevant, while considering the attack on Koteswara Rao, does not amount to shutting out of evidence at the trial. In fact that evidence had already come on record. Therefore, in this case there has been no shutting out at the trial of any evidence which the prosecution wanted to adduce or the defence wanted to lead. All available evidence has been let in by both the prosecution and the accused. 20. Nor can it be stated that there has been any glaring defect in the procedure or a manifest error on a point of law and consequently leading to a flagrant miscarriage of justice. As mentioned earlier, sub-section (4) of Section 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction by an indirect method of ordering retrial when the High Court itself cannot directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. The High Court, in our opinion, has missed these very important limitations on its power to set aside the finding of acquittal in revision which could be done only in very exceptional 6AIR 1973 SC 1274 10 circumstances. In the case on hand, the High Court was not justified in considering the evidence in such detail if it was really going to order a retrial. Such a detailed consideration of evidence and an expression of opinion about the guilt of the accused, in our opinion, has really loaded the dice against the accused when the case goes back for retrial. Much stress has been laid by the High Court that though substantive charges had been framed against the accused read with Section 34 or alternatively with Section 149 I.P.C. the Trial Court has not recorded any finding in this regard. Here again, the High Court's view is erroneous. We have already referred to the finding recorded by the Trial Court that in view of the definite case of the prosecution and the nature of the evidence, none of the accused can be held constructively liable. It is on that ground that the Trial Court has not found the accused constructively guilty. 21. We have indicated the reasons, which promoted the High Court to order a retrial. The consequence of this will be to put considerable strain on the accused who have already gone through a trial at considerable stress and expense. After going through the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, we cannot certainly say, particularly in view of the evidence on record that either the acquittal of the twenty-two accused or the acquittal of the eight convicted accused of the rest of the charges was not justified. At any rate, it may be safely stated that the learned Sessions Judge has taken into account all the relevant circumstances. It may be that there are slight mistakes in some of the reasons given by him but the judgment asa whole shows that he has really applied his mind to the various pieces of evidence before passing the order of acquittal in the manner he has done. In the particular circumstances of this case, the interference in revision by the High Court at the instance of the private party was not justified. The two appeals filed by the convicted accused, namely, Criminal Appeals Nos. 201 and 202 of 1969 have not been dealt with by the High Court on merits. The appellants therein have a right to have those appeals heard and disposed of by the High Court according to law.” 14. In Akalu Ahirv. Ramdeo Ram7, at paragraph No.10 it is held as under: “10. No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial Judge in the case in hand is not perfect or free from flaw and a Court of appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is entitled to re-appraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and then order a re- trial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village Mukhia, 7AIR 1973 SC 2145 11 should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court.” 15. In Ramesh Chandra v. A.P. Jhaveri8, at paragraph Nos.6, 7 it is held as under: “6. In the case of K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1963) 3 SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788) this Court mentioned the circumstances under which an order of acquittal can be set aside in revision by the High Court and observed in this context: "We may however indicate some cases of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; and in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4)." It would follow from the above that where an acquittal is based on the compounding of an offence and the compounding is invalid under the law, the acquittal would be liable to be set aside by the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers. As the acquittal of the appellant by the trial court in the present case was based upon the compounding of an offence which was not compoundable, the High Court in our view rightly set aside the acquittal of the appellant. 7. It is no doubt true that the High Court acted suo motu in setting aside the acquittal of the appellant, but that fact would not show that there was any irregularity in the procedure adopted by the High Court. The opening words of Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, viz., "in the case of any proceedings the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders or which otherwise comes to its knowledge", as observed by this Court in the case of The State of Kerala v. Narayani Amma Kamala Devi, (1962) Supp 3 SCR 943 = (AIR 1962 SC 1530) produce the result that revisional jurisdiction can 8AIR 1973 SC 84 12 be exercised by the High Court by being moved either by the convicted person himself or by any other person or suo motu on the basis of its own knowledge derived from any source whatsoever without being moved by any person at all. All that is necessary to bring the High Court's powers of revision into operation is such information as makes the High Court think that an order made by a Subordinate Court is fit for the exercise of its powersof revision.” 16. In Amar Chand v. Shanti Bose9 at Paragraph No.20 it is held as under: “20. Even assuming that the High Court was exercising jurisdiction under Section 439, in our opinion, the present was not a case for interference by the High Court. The Jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised normally under Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, only in exceptional cases, when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of the justice. The High Court has not found any of these circumstances to exist in the case before us for quashing the charge and the further proceedings.” 17. In SatyendraNath v. Ram Narain10 at Paragraph No.16 it is held as under: “16. The High Court has thus transgressed the narrow limits of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The judgment of the Sessions Court did not suffer from any manifest illegality and the interests of justice did not require the High Court to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court. Any fair assessment of the evidence of the eye-witnesses would show that the acquittal of the appellants led to no miscarriage of justice.” 18. In Pathumma v. Muhammad11 at Paragraph No.6 it is held as under: “…We are afraid, the learned Judge of the High Court, committed an error in making a re-assessment of the evidence and coming to a finding that the appellant No. 2 was not the illegitimate child of the respondent. We have ourselves considered the evidence on record and we agree with the learned Magistrate, who had taken much pains in analysing the evidence, that the appellant No. 2 was the illegitimate child of the respondent. The High Court in its 9AIR 1973 SC 799 10AIR 1975 SC 580 11AIR 1986 SC 1436 13 revisional jurisdiction was not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact.” 19. Keeping in view of all the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra, I shall proceed to decide this Revision Case without there being any iota of re-appreciation of evidence by sitting like a Second Appellate Court. Therefore, appreciation of the evidence is not practically possible and feasible in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 20. The facts emerging from the case record disclose that the dispute originated from a monetary transaction concerning a purchase of banana bunches by A1/Srinu from P.W.1/K.H. Giridhara Gopala Krishna. The transaction allegedly involved a payment of Rs.70/- against a total value of Rs.170/-, with a promise to remit the remaining Rs.100/- subsequently. On 07.03.2003 at around 2:30 PM, when P.W.1 approached A1 to demand the unpaid sum, the accused allegedly denied liability, which led to a quarrel that escalated into physical violence. The accused, including A1 to A6, allegedly attacked P.W.1 using iron rods, sticks, and a knife, thereby causing bodily injuries. P.W.2/Y.Satyavathi, who intervened, was also allegedly assaulted by the accused. The arrival of other individuals facilitated the dispersal of the accused from the scene. 21. P.W.1 and P.W.2 were immediately admitted to a Government hospital for treatment. The Station House Officer, Tanuku Town Police Station, upon receiving intimation, recorded the statement of P.W.1. In view of jurisdictional limitations, the statement was forwarded to Peravali Police Station, which 14 registered Crime No.20/03 under Sections 324 read with 34 of ‘the I.P.C.’ The Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police undertook the investigation by examining witnesses and conducting a site inspection on 08.03.2003, during which brick- bats allegedly used in the offence were seized under the cover of a mediator report. Upon receipt of the wound certificate for P.W.1 and the conclusion of other procedural steps, a charge sheet was filed against the accused under Section 324 of ‘the I.P.C.’ 22. The learned Trial Court took cognizance of the offence on 05.08.2003 and issued summons against A1 to A5, while a Non-Bailable Warrant was issued for A6, who was declared absconding. On 05.09.2003, all accused appeared and were furnished with the case documents in accordance with Section 207 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ On 21.10.2007, the accused were examined under Section 239 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and charges framed under Section 324 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ were explained to them in Telugu. Each accused denied the allegations and opted to face trial. 23. During the trial, the prosecution examined nine witnesses (P.W.1 to P.W.9), produced six documentary exhibits (Exs.P1 to P6), and submitted five material objects (M.Os.1 to 5) in support of its case. On 18.03.2009, the accused were examined under Section 313(1)(b) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ regarding the incriminating evidence brought forth during trial. All accused denied the allegations and declined to produce any evidence in their defence. 24. The learned Trial Court acquitted the accused after identifying substantial discrepancies, omissions and contradictions in the prosecution’s 15 case. A key issue was the mismatch between the alleged assault weapons and the physical evidence recovered. While the charge sheet mentioned iron rods, knives, and sticks, P.W.1 stated he was beaten with "brick bats," yet the items seized (M.Os.1–5) were ordinary stones and concrete but not bricks. Medical evidence was vague and lacked key documentation. P.W.1’s injuries were certified as "simple" without details linking them to specific weapons, and no medical records were provided for P.W.2. The investigating officer failed to obtain clarifications from the treating doctor, leaving critical gaps in establishing a medical link to the alleged assault. 25. The evidence of witness testimonies further undermined the case. P.W.3 and P.W.5 introduced dramatic and previously unreported claims, such as P.W.1 being dragged and his head struck against a wall, deemed improvements and thus inadmissible. P.W.2 didn’t corroborate P.W.1’s version about stone pelting, and P.W.4, an independent witness, turned hostile. The prosecution also failed to examine neutral villagers, despite P.W.1 and P.W.2 acknowledging their presence during the incident. Additionally, bloodstains and bloodstained clothing weren’t recovered, basic investigative steps that were overlooked. In light of these inconsistencies, weak medical evidence, and investigative lapses, the learned Trial Court was constrained to conclude that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, and acquitted the accused/Respondents. 26. The learned Trial Court rightly acquitted the accused/Respondents after finding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 16 The learned Trial Court observed glaring inconsistencies in the description of weapons used, with P.W.1 claiming assault by brick bats while the seized items were stones and concrete, unrelated to the charge sheet’s mention of iron rods and sticks. Medical evidence was vague, failing to link injuries to the alleged assault, and no wound certificate was produced for P.W.2. The key witnesses introduced inadmissible improvements, an independent witness turned hostile, and crucial investigative lapses, such as the absence of bloodstains and independent eyewitnesses further weakened the prosecution’s case. 27. On a careful perusal of the entire impugned judgment of acquittal, there was neither flagrant miscarriage of justice nor there were material irregularities. There is no jurisdictional incompetency. There was neither improper exclusion of evidence nor any failure on the part of the learned Trial Court to consider material evidence. Therefore, the judgment of the learned Trial is required to be upheld by dismissing the Revision Case. 28. For the above reasons, the Criminal Revision Case fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. ________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Dt: 04.09.2025 VTS 17