2025:HHC:28748 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No. : 572 of 2022 Reserved on :  08.08.2025 Decided on   :  26.08.2025 Prem Raj …Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Others …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh,  Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes For the petitioner     : Mr. Rajnish K. Lal, Advocate. For the respondents  : Mr.   Tejasvi   Sharma   and   Mr. Mohinder   Zharaick,   Additional Advocate General with  Ms. Ranjna Patiala, Deputy Advocate General for respondents No.1 to 3. None for respondent No.4. Mr.   Ranbir   Singh,   Advocate,   for respondents No.5 to 7. Virender Singh, Judge (oral). Petitioner–Prem   Raj  has  filed   the   present petition,   under   Section   482   of   the   Code   of   Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.PC’), for quashing of FIR No.67/2021, dated 13.06.2021 (hereinafter referred 2 2025:HHC:28748 to as the FIR, in question), registered with Police Station, Chirgaon, District Shimla, H.P., under Sections 188, 269, 270 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to   as   the   ‘IPC’),   as   well   as,   the   proceedings   resultant thereto, which are stated to be pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.II, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial Court’). 2. According   to   the   petitioner,   he   is   elected member   of   the   Gram   Panchayat   Ranol   and   the   private respondents are having political animosity with him.  Due to the said animosity, they had filed a frivolous complaint before respondent No.3, on the ground that the petitioner had   been   tested   positive   for   Covid­19,  in   the   month   of June, 2021, and as per the protocol, the petitioner was directed to remain under home isolation, from 06.06.2021 to 15.06.2021. They have alleged that despite being tested positive for Covid­19, the petitioner was moving freely, at the  Bus  Stand,  Ranol  and  when  objected  to  by  private respondents   No.4   to   7,   the   petitioner   allegedly   starting hurling abuses and quarreling with them. It   has   also 3 2025:HHC:28748 been mentioned in the complaint that they were beaten by the petitioner by a stick, hence, the complaint was made to the police against the petitioner, upon which, the FIR in question has been registered. 3. After completion of the investigation, charge­sheet has been filed before the learned trial Court. 4. The relief of quashing of the FIR in question, as well as,   the   proceedings   resultant   thereto,   pending   before   the learned trial Court, has been sought on the ground that the petitioner has been named as accused, in the above noted case, as the private respondents were having the political animosity with him. In order to wreck vengeance, the FIR in question has been lodged against them. 5. The relief of quashing has also been sought on the ground   that   the   petitioner   was   having   two   houses,   one   is situated in village Ranol and another at Bus Stand Ranol. The petitioner was tested positive for Covid­19 on 5.6.2021 and he was directed to remain under home isolation from 06.06.2021 to 15.06.2021. According to the petitioner, before 06.06.2021, he   was   in   Shimla   and   came  to  his   native   place   thereafter. During his home isolation period, he has started residing in his house, which was situated near Bus Stand, Ranol. 4 2025:HHC:28748 6. According to the petitioner, on 13.06.2021, he was on routine walk on the terrace of his house and the private   respondents,   specifically   respondent   No.4,   who belongs to the ruling party and his followers, respondents No.5 to 7, started hurling abuses from the Bus Stand to the petitioner, by stating that since he was tested positive for Covid­19, why he was roaming around freely, in his house. The petitioner has apprised them that there was no bar for him to roam around, in his terrace, and he was not violating any norms. 7. Highlighting   the   fact   that   the   petitioner   was also hurt in the scuffle, but, he was not medico­legally examined,   whereas,   medico­legal   examination   of respondents No.5 and 6 was conducted   and respondent No.5 was found to be under the influence of alcohol. 8. All these facts, have been pleaded to show that the commotion was started by the private respondents. 9. The relief of quashing of the FIR, in question, has also been sought, on the ground, that the present FIR, 5 2025:HHC:28748 is nothing, but, abuse of process of law, as, the petitioner has not violated any order promulgated by public servant. 10. According   to   the   petitioner,   compliance   of Section 195 Cr.PC, has not been done, as, cognizance of the offence, under Section 188 of the IPC, can only be taken, on the basis of a written complaint by the public servant concerned or the officer superior to him. 11. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the petition. 12. When put to notice, respondents No.1 to 3 filed status   report,   disclosing   therein,   that   on   13.06.2021, Diwan Singh, respondent No.4, moved a complaint before the police, disclosing therein, that on 13.06.2021, in Gram Panchayat Ranol, Prem Raj (petitioner), was moving freely, whereas, the said person was tested positive for Covid­19 for the last 9 days. He has further got recorded that when his   activities   had   been   objected   to,   then,   he   started quarreling with the villagers and beaten some of them. The persons,   who   had   been   beaten,   their   names   had   been mentioned as, Banka Ram son of Hukmi Chand, Rahi Ram son of Hukmi Chand, Durga Singh son of Hari Ram. The 6 2025:HHC:28748 said incident is stated to have happened on 13.01.2021, at about 1.30 p.m., as such, a request had been made to take action against the petitioner. 13. Thereafter,   the   police   has   conducted   the investigation. Both   the   injured   were   medico­legally examined and the injuries, on their persons, were declared as simple. The petitioner was arrested and released on bail. After obtaining the notification regarding Covid­19 Curfew, issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Section 270 IPC was added, in this case. 14. Lastly, it has been submitted that the matter is pending adjudication before the learned trial Court. 15. Police   has   filed   the   charge   sheet,   under Sections 188, 269, 270 and 323 of the IPC. The provisions of Section 188, 269, 270 of the IPC are reproduced, as under:­ 188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by  public servant.—  Whoever, knowing   that,   by   an   order   promulgated   by   a public   servant   lawfully   empowered   to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management,   disobeys   such   direction,shall,   if such   disobedience   causes   or   tends   to   cause obstruction,   annoyance   or   injury,   or   risk   of 7 2025:HHC:28748 obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully   employed,   be   punished   with   simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to two hundred   rupees,   or   with   both;and   if   such disobedience causes or trends to cause danger to   human   life,   health   or   safety,   or   causes   or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with   imprisonment   of   either   description   for   a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Explanation.—   It   is   not   necessary   that   the offender   should   intend   to   produce   harm,   or contemplate   his   disobedience   as   likely   to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the   order   which   he   disobeys,   and   that   his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm. Illustration An   order   is   promulgated   by   a   public   servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, directing   that   a   religious   procession   shall   not pass   down   a   certain   street. A   knowingly disobeys the order, and thereby causes danger of riot. A has committed the offence defined in this section. 269. Negligent act likely to spread infection of   disease   dangerous   to   life.—  Whoever unlawfully or negligently does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to be, likely to spread the infection of any disease dangerous   to   life,   shall   be   punished   with imprisonment   of   either   description   for   a   term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both. 8 2025:HHC:28748 270. Malignant   act   likely   to   spread infection   of   disease   dangerous   to   life.— Whoever malignantly does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to be, likely   to   spread   the   infection   of   any   disease dangerous   to   life,   shall   be   punished   with imprisonment   of   either   description   for   a   term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 16. The petitioner has sought the quashing of FIR on the ground of non­compliance of Section 195 Cr.PC. The provisions of Section 195 Cr.PC, are reproduced as under:­ 195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of  public  servants,  for offences  against  public justice  and  for offences relating to  documents given in evidence. (1) No Court shall take cognizance­ (a)(i)of   any   offence   punishable   under   sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or(ii)of any abetment of, or attempt   to   commit,   such   offence,   or(iii)of   any criminal   conspiracy   to   commit   such   offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant   concerned   or   other   public   servant   to whom he is administratively subordinate; (b)(i)of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of   1860),   namely,   sections   193   to   196   (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been   committed   in,   or   in   relation   to,   any proceeding in any Court, or (ii) of any offence described in section 463, or punishable   under   section   471,   section   475   or section 476 of the said Code, when such offence 9 2025:HHC:28748 is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document  produced  or  given  in  evidence   in  a proceeding in any Court, or (iii)   of   any   criminal   conspiracy   to   commit,   or attempt   to   commit,   or   the   abetment   of,   any offence specified in sub­clause (i) or sub­clause (ii),[except   on   the   complaint   in   writing   of   that Court   or by  such  officer of   the  Court  as   that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of   some   other   Court   to   which   that   Court   is subordinate.]   [Substituted   by   Act   2   of   2006, Section 3 for "except on the complaint in writing of that Court, of of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate" (w.e.f. 16­4­2006).] (2)Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under clause (a) of sub­section (1) any authority   to   which   he   is   administratively subordinate   may  order  the  withdrawal   of  the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court;   and   upon   its   receipt   by   the   Court,   no further   proceedings   shall   be   taken   on   the complaint   :Provided   that   no   such   withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded. (3)In   clause   (b)   of   sub­section   (1),   the   term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court and includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4)For the purposes of clause (b) of sub­section (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the   appealable   decrees   or   sentences   of   such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal   Court   having   ordinarily   original   civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate : 10 2025:HHC:28748 Provided that ­(a)where appeals lie to more than one   Court,   the   Appellate   Court   of   inferior jurisdiction   shall   be   the   Court   to   which   such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; (b)where   appeals   lie  to  a  Civil   and   also   to  a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be   subordinate   to   the   Civil   or   Revenue   Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed. [195­A.   Procedure   for   witnesses   in   case   of threatening, etc. ­ A witness or any other person may file complaint in relation to an offence under Section 195­A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]   [Inserted   by   the   Code   of   Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of 2009), Section 17. ] 17. Bare reading of the above provisions, makes out a case, according to which, the compliance of Section 195 Cr.PC, has not been done regarding the offence punishable under Section 188 of the IPC. In this case, the police has also filed charge­sheet under Sections 269, 270 and 323 of the IPC. 18. It   has   vehemently   been   argued   by   learned counsel   for   the   petitioner   that   all   the   offences   are interconnected and cannot be separated, as, they form part of the same transaction. 19. In   order   to   buttress   his   contention,   learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of 11 2025:HHC:28748 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in  C. Muniappan & Others versus State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 Supreme Court Cases, 567, wherein it has been held that the provisions of Section 195 Cr.PC, cannot be evaded, by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other Section of  the   IPC. Relevant   paragraph  29  of  the  judgment  is reproduced as under:­ 21. The test of whether there is evasion or non­ compliance   of  Section   195  Cr.PC   or   not,   is whether   the   facts   disclose   primarily   and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir­ul­Haq & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293; and Durgacharan Naik & Ors v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1775, this Court held that the provisions of this Section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable   under   some   other   sections   of   IPC, though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 Cr.PC. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by mis­describing it or by putting a wrong label on it. 20. Learned   counsel   for   the   petitioner   has   also relied upon the decision of this Court, in Ram Lal Thakur versus the State of Himachal Pradesh & Others, 2023 (2) Him.L.R (HC) 771, wherein it has been held, as under:­ “19. In   the   present   case,   the   offences   which have been alleged to have been committed by the   petitioner   besides  Section   188  of   Cr.P.C. 12 2025:HHC:28748 which is contained in Section 195 of Cr.P.C. are alleged   to   have   committed   in   the   same transaction and these offences form an integral part of the main transaction and even as per the prosecution, the offences committed were part of the same transaction that is the lodging of the FIR by the petitioner on the basis of a concocted and a created story. 20. That   being   the   case,   this   Court   is   of   the considered view that as the provision of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. was not followed while charging the   petitioner   for   commission   of   offence punishable under Section 188 of IPC along with other   offences,   the   proceedings   so   initiated against the petitioner are per se bad and liable to be quashed and set aside in terms of the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court. 21. This petition, accordingly, succeeds and as prayed for by the petitioner, the prosecution of the   petitioner   as   also   the   ensuing   criminal proceedings, arising out of FIR No.239 of 2018, dated   26.10.2018,   registered   under  Sections 143  and  188  of  IPC,  at  Police Station Sadar, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P., are ordered to be quashed and set aside, as these proceedings were not initiated in terms of the provisions of Section 195 of Cr.P.C.” 21. In a recent decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Criminal ) No.12373 of 2025, titled   as  Devendra   Kumar  versus  The   State   (NCT   of Delhi)   &   Another,   2025   INSC   1009,   has   elaborately discussed the provisions of Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.PC and held that where an accused commits some offences 13 2025:HHC:28748 which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section   195,   Section   195   will   affect   only   the   offences mentioned therein, unless such offences form an integral part, so as to, amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in such case, the other offences also would fall within the ambit of Section 195 of the Code. Relevant   paragraph   43   to   59   of   the   judgment,   are reproduced as under: “43. Section 195(1)(a)(i)  of the Cr.P.C. bars the court   from   taking   cognizance   of   the   offence punishable   under  Section   186  I.P.C.,   unless there   is   a   written   complaint   by   the   public servant   for   voluntarily   obstructing   him   from discharge of his public functions. The object of this   provision   is   to   provide   for   a   particular procedure in a case of voluntarily obstructing a public   servant   from   discharging   his   public functions. The   court   lacks   competence   to automatically take cognizance in certain types of offences   enumerated   therein. The   legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated   by   malice,   ill­will   or   frivolity   of disposition   and   also   to   save   the   time   of   the criminal   courts   being   wasted   by   endless prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rule contained under  Section 190  Cr.P.C. that any person can set the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognizance of certain   offences   until   and   unless   a   complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. Other   provisions   in   the  Cr.P.C.   like sections  196 and 198 respectively do not lay 14 2025:HHC:28748 down any rule of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are complied   with,   the   court   shall   not   take cognizance   of   an   offence   described   in   those Sections. [See:  Govind   Mehta   v.   The   State   of Bihar,   AIR   1971   SC   1708;  Patel   Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1971 SC 1935; Surjit Singh & Ors v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533; State of Punjab v. Raj Singh & Anr., (1998) 2 SCC 391; K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy   &   Ors.,   (2005)   7   SCC   352;  Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 2119] 44. The test of whether there is evasion or non­ compliance   of  Section   195  Cr.P.C.   or   not,   is whether   the   facts   disclose   primarily   and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir­ul­Haq   &   Ors.(supra)   and  Durgacharan Naik & Ors. (supra), this Court cautioned that the provisions of this Section cannot be evaded by   describing   the   offence   as   one   being punishable under some other sections of  I.P.C., though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in  Section 195  Cr.P.C. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by mis­describing it or by putting a wrong label on it. 45. In M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana & Anr. reported   in   AIR   2000   SC   168,   this   Court considered   the   matter   at   length   and   held   as under: ­ "[...] Provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. are mandatory and no court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned   therein   unless   there   is   a complaint   in   writing   as   required   under that section." (Emphasis supplied) 15 2025:HHC:28748 46. In  Sachida Nand Singh & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in (1998) 2 SCC 493, this Court while dealing with this issue observed as under: ­ "7. Section   190   of   the   Code   empowers "any magistrate of the first class" to take cognizance of "any offence" upon receiving a complaint, or police report or information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts   such   general   powers   of   the magistrate,   and   the   general   right   of   a person to move the court with a complaint to   that   extent   curtailed. It   is   a   well­ recognised   canon   of   interpretation   that provision curbing the general jurisdiction of the court must normally receive strict interpretation   unless   the   statute   or   the context requires otherwise." (Emphasis supplied) 47. In Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1962 SC 1206, this Court considered the nature of the provisions of  Section 195  of the Cr.P.C. In the said case, cognizance had been taken on the police report by the Magistrate and the   appellant   therein   had   been   tried   and convicted, though the concerned public servant i.e., the Tahsildar, had not filed any complaint. This Court held as follows: ­ "The cognizance of the case was therefore wrongly assumed by the court without the complaint in writing of the public servant, namely, the Tahsildar in this case. The trial was thus without jurisdiction ab initio and the conviction cannot be maintained. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the conviction of the appellant and the sentence passed on him are set aside." (Emphasis supplied) 16 2025:HHC:28748 48. Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarized to the effect that there must be a complaint   by   the   public   servant   who   was voluntarily   obstructed   in   the   discharge   of   his public   functions. The   complaint   must   be   in writing. The  provisions  of  Section  195  Cr.P.C. are   mandatory. Non­compliance   of   it   would vitiate   the   prosecution   and   all   other consequential orders. The Court cannot assume the   cognizance   of   the   case   without   such complaint. In the absence of such a complaint, the   trial   and   conviction   will   be   void   ab   initio being without jurisdiction. 49. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the   petitioner   would   submit   that   the   bar   of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., so far as the offence punishable  under  Section  186  of   the  I.P.C.   is concerned, is absolutely unlike Section 195 (1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. In other words, Section 195(1)(b) would   apply   provided   certain   conditions   are fulfilled,   and   if   those   conditions   are   not applicable, then it is open for the police to carry out the investigation after registering an F.I.R. 50. The heading of Chapter XIV of the  Code of Criminal Procedure  is "Conditions Requisite for Initiation of Proceedings". The first provision in this Chapter is Section 190 and it deals with the power of the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences. There are some other provisions in this Chapter which create an embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance of offences committed   by   persons   enumerated   therein except   on   the   complaint   in   writing   of   certain specified persons or with the previous sanction of certain specified authorities. 51. A plain reading of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. would   indicate   that   no   Court   can   take cognizance   of   an   offence   punishable   under Section   186  of   the   I.P.C.,   except   upon   a complaint   in   writing   of   the   public   servant concerned   or   of   some   other   public   servant   to 17 2025:HHC:28748 whom  he  is administratively subordinate. The opening words of the Section are “No Court shall take   cognizance”,   and   consequently,   the   bar created by the provisions is against taking of cognizance by the Court. There is no bar against the   registration   of   a   criminal   case   or investigation by the police agency or submission of a report by the police on completion of the investigation, as contemplated by Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. 52. This   Court   in  Iqbal   Singh   Marwah   v. Meenakshi   Marwah  reported   in   AIR   2005   SC 2119, while interpreting Section 195 Cr.P.C. has held as follows: ­ “9. [...]  This   being   the   scheme   of   two provisions or clauses of Section 195, viz., that the offence should be such which has direct bearing or affects the functioning or discharge   of   lawful   duties   of   a   public servant  or has  a direct  correlation with the proceedings in a court of justice, the expression "when such offence is alleged to have  been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in a Court" occurring in clause   (b)(ii)   should   normally   mean commission of such an offence after the document has actually been produced or given   in   evidence   in   the   Court. The situation or contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier and later on the document   is   produced   or   is   given   in evidence in Court, does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195 Cr.P.C. This indicates that clause (b) (ii)   contemplates   a   situation   where   the offences enumerated therein are committed   with   respect   to   a   document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any Court.” (Emphasis supplied) 18 2025:HHC:28748 53. This Court, referred to its earlier decision in Sachida   Nand   Singh  (supra),   wherein   it   had been held that  Section 195  Cr.P.C. is invoked where the offences affected the administration of justice. It   is   for   that   reason,   that   only   the concerned Court can take cognizance, and the procedure   under  Section   340  Cr.P.C.   also empowers   the   same   Court   before   whom   the offence   is   committed   in   respect   of   documents produced or given in evidence before that Court. The   reason   why   the   jurisdiction   to   take cognizance of such an offence is restricted to the concerned Court is also noted by this Court and the same is culled out from the previous decision in  Patel   Lalji   Bhai   Samabhai  (supra). The purpose underlying Section 195(1)(b) seems to be to control the temptation on the part of the private parties to start criminal prosecution on frivolous,   vexations   or   insufficient   grounds inspired   by   a   revengeful   desire   to   harass   or spite their opponents. These offences have been selected for the court's control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. It is the judicial process or the administration of public justice which is the direct and immediate object or the victim of these offences. As the purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime, the court is considered to be the only party   entitled   to   consider   the   desirability   of complaining against the guilty party. The private party who might ultimately suffer can persuade the Civil Court to file the complaint. 54. In  Iqbal Singh Marwah  (supra), this Court took note of the legal position that in view of the language used in Section 340 of the Cr.P.C., the Court   is   not   bound   to   make   a   complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to Section 195(1)(b), as the Section is conditioned by   the   words   “court   is   of   opinion   that   it   is expedient   in   the   interest   of   justice”. The concerned Court would file a complaint only if the   interest   of   justice   so   requires   and   not   in 19 2025:HHC:28748 every case. Even before making the complaint, the Court would hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interest of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to Section 195(1)(b). This expediency would be judged by the   Court   by   weighing   not   the   magnitude   of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged documents, but having regard to the effect or impact that such commission of offence as upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged documents or forgery may cause very serious or substantial injury to a person, inasmuch as, it may deprive him of very valuable property or status or the like. If it is held that in a case it would be the concerned Court alone, which would be entitled to lodge the complaint,   it   would   render   the   victim   of   such forgery   or   forged   documents   remediless. This Court held that any interpretation which leads to such a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless has to be discarded. This Court also took a note of the fact that the holding of a preliminary inquiry under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. by the concerned Court would normally get unduly delayed. This important aspect also dissuaded this Court from accepting the broad interpretation   sought   to   be   placed   on  Section 195(1)(b)(ii)  of   the   Cr.P.C.   to   the   effect   that Section 195 is a bar to private prosecution. This Court   held   that   an   enlarged   interpretation   to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the   said   provision   would   also   operate   where after   commission   of   an   act   of   forgery,   the document is subsequently produced in Court, is capable   of   great   misuse. After   preparing   a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a   person   may   manage   to   get   the   proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue Court either by himself or someone set up by him, or simply file the document in the said proceeding. If the broad interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii) is   accepted,   he   would   be   protected   from prosecution either at the instance of a private 20 2025:HHC:28748 party or the police, until the concerned Court, where the document is filed, itself chooses to file a   complaint. Such   an   interpretation   would   be highly detrimental to the interest of the society at large. This Court also took notice of the fact that   the   Courts   are   generally   reluctant   in directing filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. The Court held that it would  not  be fair and  appropriate  to  give  an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the   type   enumerated   in   Clause   (b)(ii)   is   not placed   for   trial   on   account   of   non­filing   of   a complaint  or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Such a broad interpretation would also lead to impracticable results, which should be avoided. 55. In  State of Punjab v. Raj Singh  reported in AIR 1998 SC 768, this Court further stated that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be seen as   prohibiting   the   entertainment   of,   and investigation   into   the   offence(s)   by   the   police. The   bar   comes   into   operation   only   when   the Court intends to take cognizance of the offence under  Section 190  Cr.P.C. In other words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the  Cr.P.C.   is   not   in   any   way   controlled   or circumscribed by  Section 195  Cr.P.C. The legal position was elaborated in the following words: ­ “2. We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the F.I.R. Lodged against  the respondents  alleging commission   of   offences   under Sections 419 ,     420 ,     467 and 468 I.P.C. by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From   a   plain   reading   of Section   195 Cr.P.C.   it   is   manifest   that   it   comes   into operation   at   the   stage   when   the   Court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) Cr. P.C.; and it has 21 2025:HHC:28748 nothing to do with the statutory power of the   police   to   investigate   into   an   F.I.R. which   discloses   a   cognizable   offence,   in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed   in,   or   in   relation   to,   any proceeding in Court. In other words, the statutory power of the Police to investigate under   the   Code   is   not   in   any   way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 Cr.P.C. It is of course true that upon the charge­sheet   (challan),   if   any,   filed   on completion  of  the  investigation  into  such an   offence   the   Court   would   not   be competent   to   take   cognizance   thereof   in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) Cr. P.C.,   but   nothing   therein   deters   the Court   from   filing   a   complaint   for   the offence on the basis of the F.I.R. (filed by the   aggrieved   private   party)   and   the materials   collected   during   investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in section 340 Cr.P.C. [...]” (Emphasis supplied) 56. A more elaborate discussion is found in M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka  reported in AIR 2004 SC 555, wherein this Court has held as follows: ­ “8. [...]  The question whether Sections 195 and 340 of   the   Criminal   Procedure   Code affect the power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence has already been considered   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of State   of   Punjab   v.   Raj   Singh reported   in 1998(2) SCC 391 [...] Not only are we bound by   this   judgment   but   we   are   also   in complete   agreement   with   the   same. Sections   195   and   340   do   not   control   or circumscribe   the   power   of   the   police   to investigate,  under  the Criminal  Procedure Code . Once investigation is completed then the   embargo   in   Section   195   would   come 22 2025:HHC:28748 into   play   and   the   Court   would   not   be competent to take cognizance. However that Court   could   then   file   a   complaint   for   the offence   on   the   basis   of   the   FIR   and   the material   collected   during   investigation provided the procedure laid down in Section 340 Criminal Procedure Code is followed. Thus   no   right   of   the   Respondents,   much less the right to file an appeal under Section 341, is affected. xxx xxx xxx 10. The law on the point is clear. At the stage of investigation Section 195 has no application. We are therefore not concerned with   the   question   whether   Section   195 applies   to   documents   forged/fabricated prior to their being produced in Court. That question only arises after the Court takes cognizance. At this stage the only question is   whether   the   investigation   should   be permitted   to   proceed   or   not. As   stated above   there   is   no   ground   or   reason   on which the complaint/FIR can be quashed.” (Emphasis supplied) 57. We   may   note   that   the   decision   of   the Constitution   Bench   in  Iqbal   Singh   Marwah (supra)   does   not   in   any   way   express   its disagreement with the view in Raj Singh (supra) and M. Narayandas (supra). On the contrary, a perusal of  Iqbal Singh Marwah  (supra) shows that the Court has leaned in favour of giving an interpretation, which limits the scope of  Section 195  of the Cr.P.C. There is no contradiction in invocation   of  Section   156(3)  by   the   learned Magistrate, the registration of the F.I.R. and the conduct of the investigation by the police, with Section 195 read with  Section 340  Cr.P.C. As noticed   in  M.   Narayandas  (supra)   once   the investigation   is   completed,   then   the   embargo under Section 195 would come into play and the Court   would   not   be   competent   to   take cognizance. However, the concerned Court could 23 2025:HHC:28748 then file the complaint for the offence mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) on the basis of the F.I.R. and the material collected during investigation and   by   following   the   procedure  laid   down   in Section 340 Cr.P.C. 58. The   procedure   contemplated   under   sub­ section (1) of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is limited to such cases, as are provided in clause (b) of sub­section (1) of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. only. Section 340  of the Cr.P.C. does not envisage a procedure with reference to an offence described in Section 195(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. However, the observations made in Raj Singh (supra) and M. Narayandas  (supra),   more   specifically   that Section   195 Cr.P.C   does   not   have   any application at the stage of investigation holds good   as   regards   both  Section   195(1)(a)  and 195(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. respectively. The overall bar contemplated  under Section 195  could  be said to kick in only at the stage of cognizance. E. CONCLUSION 59. We may summarize out final conclusion as under: (i)      Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. bars the   court   from   taking   cognizance   of   any offence   punishable   under   Sections   172   to 188 respectively of the I.P.C., unless there is a   written   complaint   by   the   public   servant concerned or his administrative superior, for voluntarily   obstructing   the   public   servant from   discharge   of   his   public   functions. Without a complaint from the said persons, the   court   would   lack   competence   to   take cognizance   in   certain   types   of   offences enumerated therein. (ii) If in truth and substance, an offence falls in the category of Section 195(1)(a) (i),   it   is   not   open   to   the   court   to undertake the exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the accused for the other distinct offences 24 2025:HHC:28748 disclosed   in   the   same   set   of   facts. However, it also cannot be laid down as a  straitjacket   formula   that   the  Court, under   all   circumstances,   cannot undertake the exercise of splitting up. It would   depend   upon   the   facts   of   each case, the nature of allegations and the materials on record. (iii) Severance of distinct offences is not permissible   when   it   would   effectively circumvent   the   protection   afforded   by Section 195(1)(a)(i)  of the Cr.P.C., which requires a complaint by a public servant for   certain   offences   against   public justice. This means that if the core of the offence falls under the purview of Section   195(1)(a)(i),   it   cannot   be prosecuted   by   simply   filing   a   general complaint   for  a different,  but  related, offence. The focus should be on whether the   facts,   in   substance,   constitute   an offence   requiring   a   public   servant’s complaint. (iv) In the aforesaid context, the courts must apply twin tests. First, the courts must   ascertain   having   regard   to   the nature of the allegations made in the complaint/FIR   and   other   materials   on record   whether   the   other   distinct offences not covered by Section 195(1)(a) (i) have been invoked only with a view to evade the mandatory bar of Section 195 of the I.P.C. and secondly, whether the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence for which a complaint of the court or a public servant is required. (v)  Where   an   accused   is   alleged   to   have committed some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195, Section 195 will affect only the offences 25 2025:HHC:28748 mentioned   therein. However,   the   courts should ascertain whether such offences form   an   integral   part   and   are   so intrinsically connected so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same   transaction,   in   which   case   the other   offences   also   would   fall   within the ambit of  Section 195  of the Cr.P.C. This would all depend on the facts of each case. (vi) Sections 195(1)(b)(i)(ii) & (iii) and 340 of the  Cr.P.C.   respectively   do   not   control   or circumscribe   the   power   of   the   police   to investigate,   under   the  Criminal   Procedure Code. Once investigation is completed then the embargo in Section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to   take   cognizance. However,   that   Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the   basis   of   the   FIR   and   the   material collected during investigation, provided the procedure  laid down in  Section 340  of the Cr.P.C. is followed.” (self emphasis supplied) 22. Now,   this   Court   would   proceed   further   to ascertain the fact as to whether the offences committed by the   accused,   in   this   case,   form   part   of   the   same transaction, for which, the prohibition, as contained under Section 195 Cr.PC, is applicable. 23. Admittedly,   in   this   case,   complaint   has   not been filed by a public servant, the same has been initiated at   the   instance   of   respondent   No.4,   Diwan   Singh. 26 2025:HHC:28748 Considering the allegations levelled by respondent  No.4, according to which, on 13.06.2025, petitioner Prem Raj was   roaming   freely,   despite   the   fact   that   he   had   been tested   positive   for   Covid­19   and   when,   the   villagers opposed, he had allegedly given beatings to them, the main offence is under Section 188 of IPC, as per the charge­ sheet, petitioner was ordered to quarantine himself from 6.6.2021 to 15.06.2021, as per the order passed by the Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Sandasu. In such situation, the remaining offences form integral part of the offence, punishable under Section 188 of the IPC and the same cannot be separated. All the offences had allegedly taken place in the same transaction. 24. When the offences punishable under Sections 269, 270 and 323 of the IPC, cannot be separated from Section 188 of the IPC, for which, the legislature, in its wisdom, has created a specific bar of taking cognizance, unless   or   until,   complaint   is   made   by   public   servant, cognizance of other offences cannot be taken by the Court. 25. In view of the above, due to the non­compliance of Section 195(1) Cr.PC., the FIR, in question, as well as, 27 2025:HHC:28748 the   proceedings,   resultant   thereto,   are   required   to   be quashed. Ordered accordingly. 26. The   present   petition   is   allowed   in   aforesaid terms, so also the pending application(s), if any. ( Virender Singh ) Judge August 26, 2025(ps)