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2025 DAILYLAW 11630 (HP)

SAHIL SHARMA v. STATE OF HP

CRMPM/798/2025 · 2025-06-24

Virender Singh

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Judgment text

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2025:HHC:19540 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MP(M) No.   :  798 of 2025 Reserved on : 5 th   June, 2025 Decided on : 24 th   June, 2025 Sahil Sharma …Applicant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Another …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1   Yes For the applicant   : Applicant in person with Mr. Ashok Sharma,   Senior   Advocate,   assisted by Ms. Anubhuti Sharma, Advocate. For the respondent   : Mr. Tejasvi   Sharma,   Additional Advocate   General,   with   Mr. Rohit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, assisted   by   ASI   Nikhil   Kumar, Women   Police   Station,   Chamba, District Chamba. Respondent   No.2,   in   person   with Ms. Kritika Sharma & Mr. Gaurav Kumar, Advocates. Virender Singh, Judge Applicant   Sahil   Sharma,   apprehending   his arrest,  in   case   FIR   No.14   of   2025,   dated   05.04.2025, registered, under Section 376 of the Indian Penal  Code 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:19540 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC’), and Section 4 of the Protection   of   Children   from   Sexual   Offences   Act,   2012 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the POCSO Act’),  has filed the present application,  under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’),  with   a   prayer   to   direct   the   Police/Investigating Officer of Women Police Station Chamba, District Chamba, H.P., to release him on bail, in the event of his arrest. 2. The relief, as claimed in the application,  has been sought on the ground that the entire case against the applicant is false and fabricated. 3. It is the further case of the applicant that the complainant had developed intimacy with the applicant in the   year   2023,   when,   he   had   gone   to   Chamba,   in connection with health issues of his father. 4. According   to   the   applicant,   he   is   ordinarily resident of Mumbai and working in a private Company at Mumbai. 5. It   is   the   case   of   the   applicant   that   the complainant met him, for the first time, in the year 2023 and she had disclosed her age as 22 years. 3 2025:HHC:19540 6. It is the specific case of the applicant that the so called incident of December, 2021, has been concocted with an ulterior motive to bring the case within the ambit of POCSO Act. 7. The applicant has given certain undertakings, for which, he is ready to abide by, in case, any direction is issued under Section 482 BNSS to the I.O.,/Police. 8. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the application as prayed for. 9. When   put   to   notice,   the   police   has   filed   the status report, disclosing therein, that  on 05.04.2025, the complainant,   aged   about   20   years,   appeared   before   the police   of   Women   Police   Station,   Chamba,   disclosing therein, that she is resident of village ‘X’. According to her, she   had   developed   relationship   with   applicant   Sahil Sharma. 9.1. Said   Sahil   Sharma,   according   to   the complainant, on the pretext of marrying her, had developed physical relations with her. The relations were firstly made in the month of December, 2021, in ‘Y’ Hotel, which is situated near bus stand ‘Z’. 4 2025:HHC:19540 9.2. According to the complainant, her age at that time was 17 years, as she has mentioned her date of birth in the complaint as 7.7.2005. 9.3. It is the further case of the police that according to   the   complainant,   thereafter,   they   used   to   meet   each other oftenly and in the month of March 2024, they again met   in   the   same   Hotel,   where   the   victim   had   again discussed with the applicant about their marriage. Again, on the pretext of marriage, the applicant had developed physical relations with her. 9.4. As   per   the   status   report,   on   21.03.2025, applicant Sahil Sharma and the victim met at Hotel ‘A’ at Chandigarh. They stayed there from 21st  March 2025 to 27th  March, 2025, for seven days, where applicant made physical relations with her. 9.5. At Chandigarh also, Sahil Sharma, had assured the complainant to marry her. From 2023, applicant is stated to have assured her to solemnize marriage. From the month of August, 2023, the applicant and complainant were planning to solemnize their marriage on 3.4.2025. 5 2025:HHC:19540 9.6. On   01.4.2025,   the   complainant   and   the applicant   had   discussed   this   issue   and   applicant   had discussed   the   matter   with   the   family   members   of   the victim. However, according to her, on 2.4.2025, his mobile phone was found to be switched off. Despite best efforts to contact him, she could not contact him, nor he has made any call to her. As such, she has prayed that action be taken against the applicant. 9.7. On   the   basis   of   the   above   facts,   the   police registered   the   FIR,   in   question   and   criminal   machinery swung into motion. 10. During   investigation,   on   5.4.2025,   the complainant was medico­legally examined at Hospital ‘X’ and her statement, as  well as, that  of her  mother  was recorded, under Section 180 of the BNSS. On 7.4.2025, victim was produced before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate   First   Class,   Chamba,   where   her   statement under Section 183 of the BNSS, was recorded. 11. On   7.4.2025,   the   complainant   had   identified room No.201 of Hotel ‘Y’ and from the spot, bed sheet and billow cover were taken into possession. Videography and 6 2025:HHC:19540 photography of the spot was conducted. Statements of the witnesses under Section 180 of BNSS were recorded. 12. Lastly, a stand has been taken that in the year 2021,   when   the   applicant   had   allegedly   made   physical relations with the victim on the pretext of marriage, at that time, she was about 17 years and 4 months. As such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 13. On   the   basis   of   the   stand   so   taken,   interim protection was given to the applicant and the matter was adjourned for 30.04.2025. 14. On   30.04.2025,   the   police   filed   the supplementary status report, according to which, as per the   stand   taken   by   the   victim   in   her   statement   under Section   180   of   BNSS,  applicant  had   developed   physical relations with her at Hotel ‘Z’ at Chandigarh. As such, on 13.04.2025, the victim, in the custody of her mother had identified the said place at Chandigarh. 15. A   photocopy   of   the   relevant   register   was obtained,   along   with   photocopies   of   the   Aadhar   Card, submitted by the victim and  applicant  for obtaining the room on rent. As per the photocopy of the visitor’s register, 7 2025:HHC:19540 in the Aadhar Card, submitted for obtaining the room on rent, at Chandigarh, victim’s date of birth was found to be 6.6.2005. 16. On 21.04.2025, birth certificate of the victim, along with photocopy of relevant register, was obtained. Victim   has   also   produced   the   photocopies   of   the matriculation   examination   certificate,   Aadhar   Card,   and per those documents, the date of birth of the victim was found to be 7.7.2005. However, as per the Aadhar Card, submitted for obtaining the room on rent at Chandigarh, her date of birth was found to be 6.6.2005. 17. It   has   further   been   mentioned   in   the   status report   that   accused   Sahil   Sharma   (applicant),   during investigation also disclosed that on 6.7.2024, the victim, through e­mail, has forwarded a copy of the Aadhar Card, containing year of her birth as 2001. Hence, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 18. In view of the request made by the Investigating Officer, the applicant was directed to join the investigation on 1.5.2025, at 4.00 p.m. and the matter was adjourned to 15.5.2025. 8 2025:HHC:19540 19. On 15.5.2025, when the victim appeared, along with her counsel, in this case, then, she was ordered to be impleaded in the present case as party­respondent No.2. 20. On  15.05.2025,  status   report   has  been   filed, according to which, the victim was found to be the member of Scheduled Caste community, whereas, the accused is from general category. As such, provisions of Section 3(2) (v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of   Atrocities)   Act,   1989   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   ‘the SC&ST Act’), were added, in this case, and investigation was thereafter entrusted to Additional Superintendent of Police on 8.5.2025. 21. In the status report, another apprehension has been put forth that in case, the application is allowed, in that eventuality, the applicant may coerce the witnesses and there are chances that he may destroy the evidence against him. As such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. On that day, the matter was adjourned to 22.5.2025. 22. On 22.5.2025, supplementary status report was filed and the matter was adjourned for 29.5.2025. 9 2025:HHC:19540 23. In this case, victim­respondent No.2, has also filed objections, in which, she has taken a stand that she and the applicant met, for the first time, in the year 2021 and they were in romantic relationship with each other. According to her, at the relevant time, she was about 17 years of age and the applicant has disclosed his age as 26 years. She   has   categorically   denied   the   claim   of   the applicant that he met with respondent No.2­victim, in the year 2023. 24. According   to   the   complainant,   physical relations  were   made  by  the  applicant   on  the  pretext  of solemnizing marriage with her. She has asserted that the applicant frequently took her to ‘X’ Hotel, owned by his friend at ‘Z’. He also took her to Chandigarh on various occasions, where, they engaged in physical intimacy. Their relationship was in the knowledge of their family. 25. The complainant has further asserted the fact that applicant is in the habit of consuming alcohol and he used to utter derogatory and casteist remarks against the victim as ‘Chamar’ and ‘Churi’. However, the victim was 10 2025:HHC:19540 allegedly affectionate towards him, as such, she has not objected to such remarks. 26. It is the further case of the complainant that in the   month   of   April,   2025,   the   applicant   had   made   a proposal   to   the   victim   to   solemnize   marriage   with   her, upon   which,   both   of   them   had   mutually   agreed   to solemnize   the   marriage,   on   3.4.2025. The   applicant allegedly   suggested   a   Court   marriage   in   Dalhousie, expressing his intent to keep the marriage confidential due to opposition from his family. He also assured the victim that he would disclose the factum of marriage to his family after 5­6 months. However, on 2.4.2025, when the victim attempted to contact the applicant, he failed to respond. As   such,   the   applicant   has   violated   the   promise   and abandoned the complainant. 27. Not   only   this,   according   to   the   victim,   the applicant has fabricated the copy of Aadhar Card of the victim, altering the year of birth from 2005 to 2001. It is her further case that the sister of the applicant had offered monetary compensation to her to withdraw the complaint and not only this, his brother had alleged false allegations 11 2025:HHC:19540 that the victim is demanding Rs.45,00,000/­ to settle the matter. Highlighting the fact that the police have added Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act, as such, a prayer has been   made   that   the   present   application   is   not maintainable. Along with the objections, printout of the social media App, have also been annexed. 28. On the basis of the above facts, Shri Tejasvi Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, Ms. Kritika Sharma and Mr. Gaurav Kumar, Advocates have prayed that the present application with the addition of Section 3(2)(v)  of  SC&ST  Act,  has  become  non­maintainable,  as such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application, being not maintainable. 29. Perusal of the record reveals that on 9.5.2025, after receiving the caste certificate of victim, as well as of the applicant, Police has added Section 3(2)(v) of SC & ST Act and thereafter, the investigation was handed over to Additional Superintendent of Police. 30. Perusal   of   the   record   also   shows   that   on 6.5.2025, the victim has made a supplementary statement, disclosing therein, that her family belongs to a scheduled 12 2025:HHC:19540 caste community, whereas, applicant Sahil Sharma is from Pandit family (general category). Applicant is stated to be knowing the fact that the victim is from scheduled caste community. Initially, the applicant has alleged that  he does   not   believe   in   castism   and   when   child   victim   has allegedly persuaded him to have a discussion about their marriage   with   his   family   members,   upon   which,   he disclosed   that   his   family   members   will   not   accept   the marriage. As such, he has persuaded her to solemnize Court   marriage   on   3.4.2025   and   according   to   her, applicant assured her that he will disclose this fact to his family members. 31. Later   on,   the   complainant   has   however,   got recorded that on 2.4.2025, when, she called the applicant, his mobile phone was found switched off and according to her, applicant Sahil Sharma, is putting off marriage with her, on account of the fact that she belongs to Scheduled Caste   community. Lastly,   she   has   disclosed   that   the applicant was having evil design, in his mind and getting the said evil design, fulfilled, on the pretext of marriage, sexually exploited her. 13 2025:HHC:19540 32. In the FIR, Section 3 (2)(v) of the SC&ST Act has not been mentioned, nor, the same has been mentioned in the status reports, which have been filed from time to time i.e. on 8.4.2025, and 30.4.2024. The provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC&ST Act have been added only on 7.5.2025 and   thereafter,   the   investigation   of   the   case   has   been entrusted to Additional Superintendent of Police, Chamba. 33. The statement of the victim was recorded on 06.05.2025,   in   which,   she   has   alleged   that   she   was allegedly raped by the applicant on the ground that she belongs to scheduled caste community. Admittedly, in the FIR,   which   was   registered   on   the   complaint   of   the complainant­victim, who is not an illiterate person, but, an educated girl, as well as, in the initial two status reports, filed in this Court, there is no reference with regard to the provisions of SC&ST Act, what to talk about the fulfillment of necessary ingredients to constitute the said offence. 34. At the time of deciding the question of granting the   relief   to   the   person,   who   is   approaching   the   Court under   Section   482   of   the   BNSS,   only   the   allegations 14 2025:HHC:19540 mentioned in the FIR have to be evaluated in order to find out, by taking the allegations at their face value. 35. In   the   FIR,   the   complainant   has   not   even whispered   about   her   caste,   nor   alleged   that   she   was allegedly   raped   on   the   pretext   of   being   member   of Scheduled Caste community. 36. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shajan Skaria versus  State of Kerala & Another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, has held that if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for the applicability of the provisions of SC&ST   Act,  the   Court   would   not   be   precluded   from granting   pre­arrest   bail   to   the   accused   persons. The Hon’ble   Supreme   Court  has   also  held   that  if   necessary ingredients to constitute the offence under the SC&ST Act, are not made out upon the reading of the complaint, no case can be said to exist prima facie. Relevant paragraphs 35 to 39, 47 and 48 of the judgment, are reproduced as under:­ “35. Thus, the decision in  Prathvi Raj Chauhan (supra)   makes   it   abundantly   clear   that   even while upholding the validity of  Section 18­A  of the  Act, 1989,  this  Court  observed  that  if  the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for applicability of the provisions of the Act, 1989 15 2025:HHC:19540 then the bar created by Sections 18 and 18­A(i) shall not apply and thus the court would not be precluded   from   granting   pre­arrest   bail   to   the accused persons. 36. Justice   Ravindra   Bhat,   in   his   concurring judgment, observed that while considering any application seeking pre­arrest bail in connection with an offence alleged to have been committed under the provisions of the Act, 1989, the courts should balance two interests – On one hand they should ensure that the power is not exercised akin to the jurisdiction under Section 438 of the CrPC while on the other hand they should ensure that the power is used sparingly in exceptional cases where no prima facie offence is made out as shown in the FIR or the complaint. It was observed   that   in   cases   where   no   prima   facie materials   exist   in   a   complaint   which   would warrant   the   arrest   of   the   accused,   the   court would have the inherent power to direct a pre­ arrest bail. 37. The applicability of Section 438 of the CrPC to cases registered under the Act, 1989 was also dealt with by a two­Judge Bench of this Court in Vilas Pandurang Pawar and Another v. State of Maharashtra   and   Others  reported   in   (2012)   8 SCC   795. The   specific   issue   framed   and answered by this Court was whether an accused charged   with   various   offences   under   the  IPC along with offences under the Act, 1989 would be entitled for an anticipatory bail under Section 438 of CrPC. 38. It was observed by this Court that although Section 18  of the  Act, 1989  creates  a bar for invoking Section 438 of the CrPC yet the courts are entrusted with a duty to verify the averments in   the   complaint   and   to   find   out   whether   an offence under the Act, 1989 is prima facie made out or not. It was further observed that while considering the application for anticipatory bail, the scope for appreciation of evidence and other material   is   limited   and   the   courts   are   not expected   to   undertake   an   intricate   evidentiary 16 2025:HHC:19540 inquiry of the materials on record. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow: “9. Section 18 of the SC/ST Act creates a bar for invoking Section 438 of the Code. However, a duty is cast on the court to verify the averments in the complaint and to   find   out   whether   an   offence   under Section 3(1)  of the SC/ST Act has been prima facie made out. In other words, if there   is   a   specific   averment   in   the complaint, namely, insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate by calling with caste name, the accused persons are not entitled to anticipatory bail. 10. The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the grant   of   anticipatory   bail. When   an offence   is   registered   against   a   person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no Court   shall   entertain   application   for anticipatory   bail,   unless   it   prima   facie finds that such an offence is not made out. Moreover,   while   considering   the application for bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. Court is not expected to indulge in   critical   analysis   of   the   evidence   on record. When   a   provision   has   been enacted in the  Special Act  to protect the persons   who   belong   to   the   Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and a bar   has   been   imposed   in   granting   bail under   Section   438   of   the   Code,   the provision   in   the  Special   Act  cannot   be easily   brushed   aside   by   elaborate discussion on the evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 39. A three­Judge Bench of this Court in Rahna Jalal v. State of Kerala reported in (2021) 1 SCC 733 while discussing in the context of Section 7 of   the  Muslim  Women  (Protection  of  Rights   on 17 2025:HHC:19540 Marriage)   Act,   2019,   elaborated   on   the requirement of the existence of a prima facie case under Section 18 of the Act, 1989 for the bar of anticipatory   bail   to   become   applicable,   as follows: “25. Thus,   even   in   the   context   of legislation, such as the Scheduled Castes and   Scheduled   Tribes   (Prevention   of Atrocities)   Act  1989,   where   a   bar   is interposed by the provisions of Section 18 and Sub­section (2) of Section 18­A on the application of  Section 438  of the  CrPC, this Court has held that the bar will not apply where the complaint does not make out   “a   prima   facie   case”   for   the applicability of the provisions of the Act. A statutory exclusion of the right to access remedies for bail is construed strictly, for a purpose. Excluding access to bail as a remedy,   impinges   upon   human   liberty. Hence, the decision in  Chauhan  (supra) held   that   the   exclusion   will   not   be attracted where the complaint does not prima facie indicate a case attracting the applicability   of   the   provisions   of   the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989.” (Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx 47. Prima facie is a Latin term that translates to “at first sight” or “based on first impression”. The expression “where no prima facie materials exist warranting arrest in a complaint or FIR” should be   understood   as   “when   based   on   first impression, no offence is made out as shown in the FIR or the complaint”. This means that when the   necessary   ingredients   to   constitute   the offence under the Act, 1989 are not made out upon the reading of the complaint, no case can be said to exist prima facie. 48. As a sequitur, if the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence under the Act, 1989 are not 18 2025:HHC:19540 disclosed   on   the   prima   facie   reading   of   the allegations levelled in the complaint or FIR, then in   such   circumstances,   as   per   the   consistent exposition by various decisions of this Court, the bar of Section 18 would not apply and the courts would not be absolutely precluded from granting pre­arrest bail to the accused persons.” 37. Judging   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the present   case,   in   the   light   of   the   above   decision   of   the Hon’ble   Apex   Court,   in   the   complaint,   on   the   basis   of which, the FIR, in question, has been registered, there is no reference with regard to the provisions of SC&ST Act, nor the same has been mentioned in the status reports, which   have   been   filed   by   the   Police,   in   this   case,   on 8.4.2025 and 30.04.2025. The provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act, were added only on 7.5.2025, on the basis   of   the   caste   certificates   of   the   complainant   and applicant, which was obtained by the I.O. Thereafter, the supplementary statement of the complainant was recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS. 38. As stated above, in the FIR, in question, there is no reference with regard to the fact that the victim was allegedly   raped   on   the   ground   that   she   belongs   to scheduled caste community. If there is no reference with 19 2025:HHC:19540 regard to ingredients of the SC&ST Act, in that eventuality, the bar as created by Section 18 of the SC&ST Act, does not come in the way of this Court to grant relief to the applicant. 39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court  in  Dr. Subhash Kashinath   Mahajan  versus  State   of   Maharashtra   & Another, (2018) 6 Supreme Court Cases, 454, has held that if no prima facie case is made out, then the relief of anticipatory   bail   can   be   granted   in   cases   under   the Atrocities Act. Relevant paragraph 79.2 of the judgment is reproduced as under:­ “79.2. There is no absolute bar against grant of anticipatory bail in cases  under the Atrocities Act if no prima facie case is made out or where on judicial scrutiny the complaint is found to be prima   facie   mala   fide. We   approve   the   view taken and approach of the Gujarat High Court in Pankaj D Suthar and Dr. N.T. Desai and clarify the   judgments   of   this   Court   in  Balothia  and Manju Devi.” 40. Similar view has again been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in  Prithvi Raj Chauhan  versus Union of India and Others, 2020 (4) Supreme Court Cases   727. Relevant   paragraphs   11,   31   to   33   of   the judgment are reproduced as under:­ 20 2025:HHC:19540 11. Concerning the applicability of provisions of section 438 Cr.PC, it shall not apply to the cases under Act  of 1989. However, if the complaint does   not   make   out   a   prima   facie   case   for applicability of the provisions of the Act of 1989, the bar created by section 18 and 18A (i) shall not apply. We have clarified this aspect while deciding the review petitions. xxx xxx xxx 31. These facts, in my opinion ought to be kept in mind by courts which have to try and deal with offences under the Act. It is important to keep   oneself   reminded   that   while   sometimes (perhaps   mostly   in   urban   areas)   false accusations are made, those are not necessarily reflective   of   the   prevailing   and   wide   spread social   prejudices   against   members   of   these oppressed classes. Significantly, the amendment of 2016, in the expanded definition of ‘atrocity’, also lists pernicious practices (under  Section 3) including forcing the eating of inedible matter, dumping of  excreta near the  homes  or in the neighbourhood of members of such communities and  several  other forms  of humiliation, which members of such scheduled caste communities are   subjected   to. All   these   considerations   far outweigh the petitioners’ concern that innocent individuals   would   be   subjected   to   what   are described as arbitrary processes of investigation and   legal   proceedings,   without   adequate safeguards. The   right   to   a   trial   with   all attendant   safeguards   are   available   to   those accused of committing offences under the Act; they remain unchanged by the enactment of the amendment. 32. As far as the provision of Section 18­A and anticipatory bail is concerned, the judgment of Mishra, J, has stated that in cases where no prima facie materials exist warranting arrest in a complaint, the court has the inherent power to direct a pre­arrest bail. 21 2025:HHC:19540 33. I   would   only   add   a   caveat   with   the observation   and   emphasize   that   while considering   any   application   seeking   pre­arrest bail,   the   High   Court   has   to   balance   the   two interests: i.e. that the power is not so used as to convert the jurisdiction into that under  Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but that it is used sparingly and such orders made in very exceptional cases where no prima facie offence is made out as shown in the FIR, and further also that if such orders are not made in those classes of cases, the result would inevitably be a miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of law. I consider such stringent terms, otherwise contrary   to   the   philosophy   of   bail,   absolutely essential, because a liberal use of the power to grant pre­arrest bail would defeat the intention of Parliament. 41. This   view   has   again   been   followed   by   the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India versus State of Maharashtra   and   Others,   2020   (4)   Supreme   Court Cases 761. Relevant paragraphs 57 & 63 of the judgment are reproduced as under:­ 57. The   guidelines   in   paras   79.3   and   79.4 appear   to   have   been   issued   in   view   of   the provisions contained in Section 18 of the Act of 1989; whereas adequate safeguards have been provided by a purposive interpretation by this Court   in   the   case   of   State   of   M.P.   v.   R.K. Balothia,   (1995)   3   SCC   221. The   consistent view of this Court that if prima facie case has not been made out attracting the provisions of SC/ST   Act   of   1989,   in   that   case,   the   bar created   under  section   18  on   the   grant   of anticipatory bail is not attracted. Thus, misuse 22 2025:HHC:19540 of the provisions of the Act is intended to be taken care of by the decision above. In Kartar Singh  (supra),   a   Constitution   Bench   of   this Court has laid down that taking away the said right of anticipatory bail would not amount to a violation   of  Article   21  of   the   Constitution   of India. Thus, prima facie it appears that in the case   of   misuse   of   provisions,   adequate safeguards   are   provided   in   the   decision mentioned above. xxx xxx xxx 63. By the guidelines issued, the anomalous situation may crop up in several cases. In case the appointing authority forms a view that as there is no prima facie case the incumbent is not to be arrested, several complications may arise. For the arrest of an offender, maybe a public   servant,   it   is   not   the   provision   of   the general   law   of  Cr.PC  that   permission   of   the appointing   authority   is   necessary. No   such statutory protection provided to a public servant in the matter of arrest under the  IPC  and the Cr.PC  as   such   it   would   be   discriminatory   to impose such rider in the cases under the Act of 1989. Only in the case of discharge of official duties,   some   offence   appears   to   have   been committed, in that case, sanction to prosecute may be required and not otherwise. In case the act   is   outside   the   purview   of   the   official discharge   of   duty,   no   such   sanction   is required.” 42. The complainant has not bothered to mention the material facts in the complaint that she has been raped by   the   applicant   on   the   ground   that   she   belongs   to scheduled caste community nor any reference with regard to her caste has been made in the FIR. The same has been 23 2025:HHC:19540 mentioned   only   on   7.5.2025,   when   her   supplementary statement, under Section 180 of the BNSS was recorded. 43. In   the   factual   background,   the   material question, which arises for determination before this Court is whether the said statement can be said to be the part of the   FIR,   or   not,   in   which,   the   present   application   for anticipatory bail, under Section 482 of the BNSS has been made. 44. Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in  Allarakha   Habib Memon   &   Others  versus  State   of   Gujarat,   (2024)   9 Supreme Court Cases 546,  has held that even the FIR, which   is   prepared   after   reaching   the   spot,   after   due deliberations,   consultations   and   discussion,   cannot   be treated as FIR and it would be treated as a statement made during the investigation of a case and is hit by Section 162 Cr.PC. Relevant   paragraph   28   of   the   judgment,   is reproduced, as under:­ 28. This Court in the case of  State of A.P. v. Punati Ramulu and Others  held that when the police officer does not deliberately record the FIR on   receipt   of   information   about   cognizable offence and the FIR is prepared after reaching the  spot  after due  deliberations, consultations and   discussion,   such   a   complaint   cannot   be treated   as   FIR   and   it   would   be   a   statement 24 2025:HHC:19540 made during the investigation of a case and is hit by  Section 162  CrPC. The relevant paras of the   judgment   in   this   regard   are   reproduced hereinbelow: ­ “5. According to the evidence of PW 22, Circle   Inspector,   he   had   received information   of   the   incident   from   police constable   No.   1278,   who   was   on ‘bandobast’   duty. On   receiving   the information of the occurrence, PW 22 left for the village of occurrence and started the   investigation   in   the   case. Before proceeding  to  the   village  to  take   up  the investigation, it is conceded by PW 2 in his evidence,   that   he   made   no   entry   in   the daily diary or record in the general diary about the information that had been given to him by constable 1278, who was the first person to give information to him on the basis of which he had proceeded to the spot   and   taken   up   the   investigation   in hand. It  was  only when PW 1 returned from 1994  Supp (1) SCC 590  the  police station along with the written complaint to the village that the same was registered by the Circle Inspector, PW 22, during the investigation of the case at about  12.30 noon, as the FIR, Ex. P­1. In our opinion, the complaint, Ex. P­1, could not be treated as the FIR in the case as it certainly would be   a   statement   made   during   the investigation of a case and hit by Section 162  CrPC. As a matter of fact the High Court recorded a categorical finding to the effect that Ex. P­1 had not been prepared at   Narasaraopet   and   that   it   had   “been brought   into   existence   at   Pamaidipadu itself, after due deliberation”. Once we find that   the   investigating   officer   has deliberately   failed   to   record   the   first information   report   on   receipt   of   the information of a cognizable offence of the nature, as in this case, and had prepared 25 2025:HHC:19540 the first information report after reaching the   spot   after   due   deliberations, consultations   and   discussion,   the conclusion becomes inescapable that the investigation   is   tainted   and   it   would, therefore, be unsafe to rely upon such a tainted   investigation,   as   one   would   not know where the police officer would have stopped to fabricate evidence and create false  clues. Though  we  agree  that  mere relationship of the witnesses PW 3 and PW 4, the children of the deceased or of PW 1 and   PW   2   who   are   also   related   to   the deceased,   by   itself   is   not   enough   to discard   their   testimony   and   that   the relationship or the partisan nature of the evidence only puts the Court on its guard to scrutinise the evidence more carefully, we find that in this case when the bona fides   of   the   investigation   has   been successfully assailed, it would not be safe to   rely   upon   the   testimony   of   these witnesses either in the absence of strong corroborative   evidence   of   a   clinching nature,   which   is   found   wanting   in   this case.” (emphasis supplied) 45. Judging   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the present case, in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme   Court   in  Allarakha   Habib   Memon’s   case (supra), the statement of the victim, has been recorded, in this case, on 06.05.2025, under Section 180 of BNSS (161 Cr.PC) and as per the provisions of Section 162 Cr.PC, the same cannot be used for any other purpose except for the 26 2025:HHC:19540 same, which have been mentioned in Section 181 of the BNSS (Section 162 Cr.PC). Provisions of Section 181 of the BNSS (Section 162 Cr.PC) are reproduced, as under:­ 181. Statements to police and use thereof.– (1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made: Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement   has   been   reduced   into   writing   as aforesaid,   any   part   of   his   statement,   if   duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to   contradict   such   witness   in   the   manner provided   by   section   148   of   the   Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re­examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross­examination. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply   to   any   statement   falling   within   the provisions   of   clause   (a)   of   section   26   of   the Bharatiya   Sakshya   Adhiniyam,   2023;   or   to affect the provisions of the proviso to sub­section (2) of section 23 of that Adhiniyam. Explanation.­An omission to state a fact or circumstance in the statement referred to in sub­ section (1) may amount to contradiction if the same appears to be significant and otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which 27 2025:HHC:19540 such omission occurs and whether any omission amounts   to   a   contradiction   in   the   particular context shall be a question of fact.” 46. Once, it has been held that the said statement cannot   be   treated   as   part   of   the   FIR,   then,   to   the considered   opinion   of   this   Court,   there   is   no   legal hesitation   for   this   Court   to   entertain   the   present application. As such, mere addition of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC&ST Act, does not take away  the powers of this Court to grant relief, under Section 482 of the BNSS, as, from bare reading of the FIR, no case is made out, under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC&ST Act. 47. The view of this Court is being guided by the decision of a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court   in  V.K.   Mishra   &   Another  versus  State   of Uttarakhand   &   Another,   (2015)   9   Supreme   Court Cases   588. Relevant   paragraphs   15   to   19,   of   the judgment, are reproduced, as under:­ 15. Section 161 Cr.P.C. titled “Examination of witnesses   by   police”   provides   for   oral examination   of   a   person   by   any   investigating officer   when   such   person   is   supposed   to   be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. The purpose for and  the manner in which   the   police   statement   recorded   under 28 2025:HHC:19540 Section 161 Cr.P.C can be used at any trial are indicated   in  Section   162  Cr.P.C.  Section   162 Cr.P.C. reads as under: 162. Statements to police not to be signed–Use of statements in evidence.–(1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an   investigation   under   this   Chapter,   shall,   if reduced   to   writing,   be   signed   by   the   person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record   thereof,   whether   in   a   police   diary   or otherwise,   or   any   part   of   such   statement   or record,   be   used   for   any   purpose,   save   as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made: Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution   in   such   inquiry   or   trial   whose statement   has   been   reduced   into   writing   as aforesaid,   any   part   of   his   statement,   if   duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to   contradict   such   witness   in   the   manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872); and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also   be   used   in   the   re­examination   of   such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross­examination. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply   to   any   statement   falling   within   the provisions   of   clause   (1)   of  section   32  of   the Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872   (1   of   1872),   or   to affect the provisions of section 27 of that Act. Explanation.­   An   omission   to   state   a   fact   or circumstance in the statement referred to in sub­ section (1) may amount to contradiction if the same appears to be significant and otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which such omission occurs and whether any omission amounts   to   a   contradiction   in   the   particular context shall be a question of fact. 29 2025:HHC:19540 16. Section 162 Cr.P.C. bars use of statement of witnesses recorded by the police except for the limited   purpose   of   contradiction   of   such witnesses   as   indicated   there. The   statement made   by   a   witness   before   the   police   under Section 161(1) Cr.P.C. can be used only for the purpose of contradicting such witness on what he has stated at the trial as laid down in the proviso to Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. The statements under  Section 161  Cr.P.C. recorded during the investigation   are   not   substantive   pieces   of evidence   but   can   be   used   primarily   for   the limited purpose:­ (i) of contradicting such witness by an accused under  Section 145  of Evidence Act; (ii) the contradiction of such witness also by the prosecution but with the leave of the Court and (iii)   the   re­examination   of   the   witness   if necessary. 17. Court   cannot   suo   moto   make   use   of statements to police not proved and ask question with reference to them which are inconsistent with the testimony of the witness in the court. The   words   in  Section   162  Cr.P.C.   “if   duly proved”   clearly   show   that   the   record   of   the statement of witnesses cannot be admitted in evidence straightway nor can be looked into but they   must   be   duly   proved   for   the   purpose   of contradiction   by   eliciting   admission   from   the witness   during   cross­examination   and   also during the cross­examination of the investigating officer. Statement before the investigating officer can be used for contradiction but only after strict compliance   with  Section   145  of   Evidence   Act that   is   by   drawing   attention   to   the   parts intended for contradiction. 18. Section 145 of the Evidence Act reads as under: 145. Cross­examination   as   to   previous statements in writing.­ A witness may be cross­ examined as to previous statements made by him   in   writing   or   reduced   into   writing,   and 30 2025:HHC:19540 relevant   to   matters   in   question,   without   such writing  being  shown  to  him, or  being  proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his  attention must, before  the  writing can   be   proved,   be   called   to   those   parts   of   it which   are   to   be   used   for   the   purpose   of contradicting him. 19. Under Section 145 of the Evidence Act when it is intended to contradict the witness by his previous   statement   reduced   into   writing,   the attention of such witness must be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him, before the writing can be used. While   recording   the   deposition   of   a witness, it becomes the duty of the trial court to ensure that the part of the police statement with which it is intended to contradict the witness is brought to the notice of the witness in his cross­ examination. The attention of witness is drawn to that part and this must reflect in his cross­ examination   by   reproducing   it. If   the   witness admits  the  part  intended  to contradict him, it stands proved and there is no need to further proof of contradiction and it will be read while appreciating the evidence. If he denies having made that part of the statement, his attention must be drawn to that statement and must be mentioned in the deposition. By this process the contradiction is merely brought on record, but it is   yet   to   be   proved. Thereafter   when investigating officer is examined in the court, his attention   should   be   drawn   to   the   passage marked for the purpose of contradiction, it will then   be   proved   in   the   deposition   of   the investigating officer who again by referring to the   police   statement   will   depose   about   the witness   having   made   that   statement. The process   again   involves   referring   to   the   police statement and culling out that part with which the maker of the statement was intended to be contradicted. If the witness was not confronted with that part of the statement with which the defence wanted to contradict him, then the court 31 2025:HHC:19540 cannot   suo   moto   make   use   of   statements   to police not proved in compliance with Section 145 of Evidence Act that is, by drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction.” 48. Similar view has also been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parvat Singh & Others versus State of Madhya Pradesh, (2020) 4 Supreme Court Cases 33. Relevant   paragraphs   13.1   &   13.2   of   the   judgment,   are reproduced, as under:­ 13.1. It is required to be noted that it was a black night (Amavasya) at the time of incident. It was a dark night as the incident has happened between 4­5 a.m. PW8 in her statement recorded under  Section 161  Cr.P.C. has stated that she has seen all the accused in the light of the torch. She   has   stated   that   Bal   Kishan   –   original accused no.1 was having an axe and other four were armed with lathis. She had also stated in her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that Bal Kishan   –   original   accused   no.1   gave   the   axe blow on the neck of the deceased due to the enmity and earlier dispute and other accused were   telling   to   run   away   immediately   and thereafter all the five accused ran away from behind the cattle shed/house. She stated that she had identified all the accused in the light of the torch and  also by voice. According to her after   she   shouted,   other   persons   came. However, there is material improvement in her deposition before the Court. In her deposition, she   has   stated   that   accused   Santosh   and Rakesh caught hold of Bal Kishan – deceased. In her deposition, she has also stated that there was a chimney light in the cattle shed. She has also stated in her deposition that the accused ran away from the nearby agricultural field of 32 2025:HHC:19540 sugarcane. Therefore, the deposition of PW8 is full of material contradictions and improvements so   far   as   original   accused   Nos. 2   to   5   is concerned. It   is   required   to   be   noted   that   no other independent witness even named by PW8 has   supported   the   case   of   the   prosecution. Though,   according   to   PW8,   she   identified   the accused   in   the   light   of   the   torch,   there   is   no recovery of torch. There is material improvement so far as the chimney light is concerned. In her deposition, she has not stated anything that the appellants – original accused nos. 2 to 5 were having the lathis, though she has stated this in her   statement   under  Section   161  Cr.P.C.   The High   Court   has   observed   relying   upon   her statement   recorded  under  Section   161  Cr.P.C. that the appellants herein – accused nos. 2 to 5 were having lathis. However, as per the settled preposition of law a statement recorded under Section 161  Cr.P.C. is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be relied upon or used to convict the accused. As per the settled proposition of law, the   statement   recorded   under  Section   161 Cr.P.C.   can   be   used   only   to   prove   the contradictions and/or omissions. Therefore, as such, the High Court has erred in relying upon the   statement   of   PW8   recorded   under  Section 161 Cr.P.C. while observing that the appellants were having the lathis. 14.2 As observed hereinabove in her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., she has never stated that accused Santosh and Rakesh caught hold of  Bal  Kishan,  but  stated  that  the  appellants herein told to run away as other persons have woken. In the facts and  circumstances of the case,   there   are   material   contradictions, omissions and/or improvements so far as the appellants herein – original accused nos. 2 to 5 are   concerned   and   therefore   we   are   of   the opinion   that   it   is   not   safe   to   convict   the appellants on the evidence of the sole witness of PW8. The   benefit   of   material   contradictions, omissions and improvements must go in favour 33 2025:HHC:19540 of the appellants herein. Therefore, as such the appellants   are   entitled   to   be   given   benefit   of doubt. 14.3 Now, so far as the submission on behalf   of   the   State   that   relying   upon   the deposition   of   PW8,   the   original   accused   no.1 was   convicted   and   his   conviction   has   been confirmed   upto   this   Court   and   therefore   to dismiss the present appeal qua other accused is concerned   from   the   evidence   on   record   and having   observed   hereinabove   the   case   of   the appellants   –   original   accused   nos. 2   to   5,   is distinguishable   on   facts. There   are   material contradictions   and   omissions   so   far   as   the appellants  – original  accused  nos. 2 to  5 are concerned. So far as the original accused no 1 is concerned, PW8 is consistent in her statement under  Section   161  Cr.P.C.   as   well   as   in   her deposition   before   the   Court. There   was   a recovery   of   axe   used   in   commission   of   the offence   by   accused   no.1   at   the   instance   of accused no.1. Under the circumstances, the case of  the  original  accused  nos. 2  to   5  is   clearly distinguishable to that of original accused no.1. 49. Considering the fact that the investigation, in the present case, is complete and the applicant has joined the   investigation,   this   Court   is   of   the   view   that   the dismissal of the application would be nothing, but pre­trial punishment,  which  is   prohibited   under   the  law,  as   the presumption   of   innocence   is   available   to   the   applicant until proven guilty. 50. At   the   time   of   deciding   the   bail   application, detailed discussion of the evidence, so collected, by the 34 2025:HHC:19540 prosecution or about the defence, which has been taken, by the applicant, should be avoided, as, it would cause prejudice to the case of the prosecution, as well as, to that of the accused. 51. In   the   objections   filed   by   respondent   No.2­ complainant, a specific stand has been taken that she and applicant were in romantic relationship and it would be proved during trial, whether the physical intimacy between the   applicant   and   complainant   was   on   the   pretext   of marriage or the same was a consensual relationship. 52. It would also be proved during trial, whether the complainant and the applicant had crossed the sacred line,   in   the   year   2021,   when   the   complainant   has   not attained the age of majority, as different dates of birth of the   complainant   have   been   mentioned   in   the   visitor’s register of the hotel, where they had allegedly stayed for considerable long time. 53. Considering all these facts, the interim  order dated 08.04.2025, passed by this Court, is hereby made absolute. Therefore, it is ordered that the applicant be released on bail, in the event of his arrest, in case  FIR 35 2025:HHC:19540 No.14 of 2025, dated 05.04.2025, registered, under Section 376 of the IPC, and Section 4 of the POCSO Act, with Women Police Station Chamba, District Chamba, H.P., on his furnishing personal bond, in the sum of   5 ₹ 0,000/­, with  one surety of  the like amount, to the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer. 54. This   order,   however,   shall   be   subject   to   the following conditions :­ a)  That the applicant will join the investigation of the case, as and when, called for, by the Investigating Officer, in accordance with law; b)  That the applicant will not leave India, without prior permission of the Court; c) That the applicant will not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person, acquainted with the facts of the case, so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such facts to the Investigating Officer or the Court; and d) That the applicant shall regularly attend the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so seek exemption from appearance by filing appropriate application. 55. 55. Any   of   the   observations,   made   hereinabove, shall not be taken as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as these observations, are  confined, only, to the disposal of the present application. 36 2025:HHC:19540 56. The applicant is directed to move regular bail application,   when   charge   sheet   will   be   filed   in   the Competent Court of Law. 57. It is made clear that the respondent­State is at liberty to  move an appropriate application, in case, any of the bail conditions, is found violated by the applicant. 58. Record be returned to the quarter concerned. ( Virender Singh ) Judge June 24, 2025 (ps)