1 2025:CGHC:41963 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR Reserved on 23.06.2025 Pronounced on 20.08.2025 FA No. 31 of 2006 1 - Devendra Kumar S/o Ramsharan Kurmi, Aged About 20 Years Through Guardian Ramsharan As Presently Unfit (Due To Mental Disorder), R/o Village Bemcha Pass Mahasamund, Tahsil And District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 2 - Mayank Kumar, S/o Ramsharan Kurmi, Aged About 18 Years R/o Village Bemcha Pass Mahasamund, Tahsil And District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Manharan Lal (Died) Through Lrs 1.1 - Deleted (Ram Bai), Honble Court Order Dated 03/01/2022. 1.2 - Chandrahas S/o Late Shri Manharan Lal, Aged About 50 Years R/o Purana Rawan Bhatha, Near Old Government Hospital, Ward No. 12, Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh), District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 1.3 - Hemant Kumar (Died) Through Legal Heirs 1.3.1 - Smt. Lata Chandrakar, W/o Late Shri Hemant Kumar, Aged About 49 Years R/o Village Purana Ravan Bhatha, Near Old Government Hospital, Ward No. 12, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh), District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 1.3.2 - Sakshi D/o Late Shri Hemant Kumar Aged About 27 Years R/o 2 Village Purana Ravan Bhatha, Near Old Government Hospital, Ward No. 12, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh), District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 1.3.3 - Pragya D/o Late Hemant Kumar, Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Purana Ravan Bhatha, Near Old Government Hospital, Ward No. 12, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh), District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 1.3.4 - Kritika D/o Late Hemant Kumar, Aged About 21 Years R/o Village Purana Ravan Bhatha, Near Old Government Hospital, Ward No. 12, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh), District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 1.4 - Naveen Chandrakar S/o Shri Manharan Lal, Aged About 44 Years R/o Purana Rawan Bhatha, Near Old Government Hospital, Ward No. 12, Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh), District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 1.5 - Ajay Chandrakar S/o Shri Manharan Lal, Aged About 42 Years R/o Purana Rawan Bhatha, Near Old Government Hospital, Ward No. 12, Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh), District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 1.6 - Dr. Savita Chandrakar, D/o Late Manharan Lal, Aged About 46 Years R/o Purana Rawan Bhatha, Near Old Government Hospital, Ward No. 12, Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh), District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Radhika Bai, W/o. Ramsharan, Aged About 43 Years R/o Village Bemcha Pass Mahasamund, Tahsil And District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 3 - State Of MP (Now Cg) Through The Collector Mahasamund, Tahsil And District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondents For Appellants : Mr. P.N. Bharat, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Mayank Chandrakar, Advocates For R1(A) to 1(F) : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Mr. Anurag Singh and Mr. Sandeep Patel, Advocates R2 : Mr. Roop Naik and Mr. Sabyasachi Bhaduri, Advocates For State : Ms. Saumya Sharma, Panel Lawyer 3 Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas CAV Judgment 1. This is plaintiffs’ first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC challenging the judgment and decree dated 05.10.2005 passed by the learned first Additional District Judge, Mahasamund (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 12-A/2001 by which the learned trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs. 2. For convenience the description of the plaintiffs and defendants are referred to as it exists before the learned trial Court. 3. The brief facts as reflected from the plaint’s averments are that A. The plaintiffs filed a civil suit for declaring the sale deed 14.09.1995 as null and void and also claimed relief of possession contending that the land situated in village Bemcha P.H.No. 141, Tehsil Mahasamund, Khasra No. 310/2 area 1.327 (hereinafter referred to as suit property) was recorded in the name of the plaintiffs in the revenue records as the plaintiffs' maternal uncle had purchased the same in the name of the plaintiffs. On 14/09/95 mother of the plaintiffs, Radhika Bai, who is defendant No. 2 in this case, without any need or interest and without any permission from the competent Court has sold part of the suit land measuring 0.805 by executing a sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1 for sale consideration of Rs. 60,000/- whereas the actual value of land was Rs. 1,00,000/-. It has been further contended that at the time of execution of sale deed the plaintiffs were minors i.e. the age of plaintiff 1 was 15 years and the age of plaintiff 2 was 13 years. It has also been contended that the sale consideration was not for benefits of the plaintiffs, therefore, sale 4 deed is null and void. B. It has been further contended that the plaintiffs' mother defendant No.2 before executing the sale deed has already purchased the land in her name from Nirmala Rai and Kamleshwari on 27.01.1989 and from the amount received from the sale deed in respect of defendant No. 1, did not buy any land in the name of the plaintiffs as the land has been purchased prior to 14.09.1995, therefore, it cannot be said that the purchase of the suit property was not out of the sale receipts therefore, prayed for declaration of the sale deed to be null and void. 4. The defendant No. 1 has filed his written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint mainly contending that from the sale of of the suit property, the defendant No. 2 has purchased fertile land from Nirmala and Kamleshwari on 15.09.1995 just after a day after execution of sale deed on 14.09.1995, therefore, the sale deed is binding on the plaintiffs and it cannot be said that the land was sold without any benefit of the plaintiffs. It has been further contended that the suit is barred by limitation as the plaintiff No.1 attained maturity in 1999, as such, the suit should have been filed within three years from the date of knowledge of the sale or within 21 years of age of the plaintiff No.1, therefore the suit is liable to be dismissed on the count of delay and latches. 5. Defendant No. 2 filed her written statement supporting the case of the plaintiff contending that defendant No. 1 was money lender and her husband had taken loan of Rs. 40,000/- from defendant No.1 after mortgaging the suit property for Rs. 60,000/- which includes interest on the amount paid by defendant No. 1. It has also been 5 contended that the said sale deed was written towards surety of the loan given by defendant No. 1 whereas the value of the property is Rs. 1,00,000/-. The defendant No. 2 has also admitted the age of the plaintiffs as 15 and 13 years respectively. It has also been contended that since the said property belongs to the minors, therefore, it cannot be sold without the permission of the Collector. It has also been contended that in the suit property the plaintiffs are in possession and they were not aware about the execution of the sale deed till they attained the age of majority. It has also been contended that the plaintiffs have been made aware about the sale deed dated 14.09.1995 on 08.04.1999, as such the suit is within limitation and has prayed for cancellation of the sale deed. 6. The learned trial Court on the pleadings of the parties framed as many as 6 issues and 2 additional issues have also been framed. Issue No. 1,2, 3 are relevant, therefore, they are extracted below:- 1- D;k oknhx.k dh eka jkf/kdkckbZ us fcuk fdlh t:jr] fgr ,oa vuqefr ds oknhx.k ds [kljk uacj & 310@2 jdck 1-327 gsDVs;j Hkwfe ds VqdM+k jdck 0-805 gsDVs;j dks lkB gtkj :i;s dher n’kkZdj ,oa oknhx.k dk oyh cudj izfroknh dza0&1 dh fcdzhukek }kjk fodz; fd;k x;k gS\ 2- D;k izfroknh dza0&2 }kjk izfroknh dza0&1 dks csph x;h tehu ls xzke ijlnk esa fueZyk jk; ,oa deys’ojh ls 0-61 gsDVs;j ,oa 0-30 gsDVs;j Hkwfe dz; dh x;h gS\ 3- D;k mDr fodz; ls izkIr jde oknhx.k ds fgr ykHk esa [kkfjt ugha fd;s tkus ij mDr fcdzhukek ‘kwU; gksus ls oknhx.k ij ca/kudkjh ugha gS\ 7. The plaintiffs to substantiate their case have examined Mahendra Kumar Chandrakar as PW-1, Ramsharan Chandrakar as PW-2, 6 Yadram as PW-3 and exhibited documents namely Sale deed as Exhibit P-1, Kistbandi Khatauni as Exhibit P-2, Sale Deed as Exhibit P-3 and P- 4. 8. The defendant No.1 examined himself as DW-1, Hemlal Bhargav as DW-2, Manrakhan Lal Nirmalkar as DW-3, Madanlal Chandrakar as DW-4, Radhika Chandrakar as DW-5 and exhibited documents Transfer Certificate as Exhibit D-1& 2, Sale deeds Exhibit D-3 to5, copy of orders in Civil Suit as Exhibit D-6, certificate of Dastawej Lekhak as Exhibit D-7, Written Statement as Exhibit D-8. 9. Learned Trial Court on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record passed the impugned judgment dated 05.10.2005 whereby the suit filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed. Learned trial Court while dismissing the suit recorded its finding that the suit land was sold for purchase of fertile land and further recorded its finding that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the suit land was purchased by their maternal uncle in their name therefore, there is no need to take permission from the court and the sale deed is binding on the plaintiffs, however, recorded its finding that the suit has been filed within limitation. Being aggrieved with the the judgment and decree dated 05.10.2005, the plaintiffs have filed the first appeal. 10. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellants vehemently criticized the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and would submit that learned trial Court has committed grave error in recording its finding that the suit land has been sold for need and interest of the plaintiffs and from the sale consideration of sale of the suit land, defendant No. 2 has purchased the land from Nirmala Rai and 7 Kamleshwari. He would further submit that though the learned trial Court has held that suit property was recorded in the name of the plaintiffs who were minors still finding recorded by the learned trial Court that no permission from the court is required, is in contravention of the provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Thus, he would pray for allowing the appeal and declaring the sale deed to be null and void. 11. He would further submit that defendant No. 1 is a money lender and the father of the plaintiffs had obtained a loan of Rs. 40,000/- and defendant No. 1 fraudulently got her signature showing the same to be mortgage deed. On the date of the alleged sale deed, the value of the property was Rs. 1,00,000/-, therefore, it can not be said that defendant No.2 has sold the land, as such he would pray for allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. To substantiate his submission he would refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Saroj vs. Sunder Singh & Others {(2013) 15 SCC 727}, Badat and Co. Bombay vs. East Indian Trading Co. {AIR 1964 SC 538} and judgment passed by this Court in case of Ku. Jyoti Singh Bais and Others vs. Premlal Halwai and Another { S.A. No. 160/2003 dated 14.11.2019}. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1(A) to (F) would submit that the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is legal and justified and does not warrant interference by this Court. He would further submit that learned trial Court has rightly recorded its finding that the suit property was the joint Hindu family property 8 therefore, no prior permission is required for execution of the sale deed. He would further submit that learned trial Court has rightly recorded its finding that the sale deed was executed in the interest of the plaintiffs as from the sale consideration two fertile lands have been purchased, as such the findings of the trial Court are legal, justified and would pray for dismissal of the appeal. To substantiate his submission he would refer to the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of K.B. Saha and Sons Pvt. Ltd. vs. Development Consultant Ltd. {(2008) 8 SCC 564}, Korukonda Chalapathi Rao vs. Korukonda Annapurna Sampath Kumar {(2022) 15 SCC 475}, Paul Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Amit Chand Mitra and Anr {2023 SCC OnLine SC 1216} and judgment of this Court in Ku. Jyoti Singh Bais (Supra). 13. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 would support the contention of the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants and would pray for allowing the appeal. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and record of the Court below with utmost satisfaction. 15. From the submissions made by the parties the point emerged for determination is “Whether the finding recorded by the trial Court that since defendant No. 2 has purchased the property through Sale deeds Ex.D/3 and Ex.D/4 from the sale consideration of suit property Ex.P/1, as such, no permission from the competent Court is required before sale of the minors’ property as the interest of the minors is protected”? 16. Before adverting to the legal submission made by the appellants and 9 respondents it would be expedient for this Court to extract relevant provisions which are applicable for deciding the present controversy raised in the appeal. Section 8 of the Act of 1956: Powers of natural guardian.— (1)The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of this section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection or benefit of the minor’s estate; but the guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. (2)The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the court,—(a)mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor; or(b)lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority. (3)Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or by any person claiming under him. (4)No court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) except in the case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. (5)The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), shall apply to and in respect of an application for obtaining permission of the court under sub-section (2) in all respects as if it were an application for obtaining the permission of the court under section 29 of that Act, and in particular—(a)proceedings in connection with the application shall be deemed to be proceedings under that Act within the meaning of section 4A thereof;(b)the court shall observe the procedure and have the powers specified in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 31 of that Act; and(c)an appeal shall lie from an order of the court refusing permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) of this section to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of that court.(6)In this section “court” means the city civil court or a district court or a court empowered under section 4A of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable property in respect of which the application is made is situate, and where the immovable property is situate within the jurisdiction of more than one such court, means the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate. 10 101 of the Evidence Act :Burden of proof. Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. 17. The learned trial Court while deciding issue No. 2 has given its finding that the property described in Ex.D/3 and Ex.D/4 have been purchased from the sale receipts of the suit property, as such, the interest of the appellants who were minors has been protected. This finding cannot be said to be perverse as in the agreement Ex.P/3 and Ex.P/4 though the property has been purchased from the same sellers, description i.e. Khasra No., boundaries and area are different, as such different properties have been purchased on 15.09.1995. The defendant No.2 has not led any evidence from where she has generated the funds to purchase these properties which is within the special knowledge of defendant No.2. Even otherwise, it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to examine the seller of both the properties before the trial Court to justify that the sale deed dated 15.09.1995 is the outcome of the agreement dated 27.01.1989 which they miserably failed to prove the same and unable to discharge their burden of proving the factum. The said finding is in accordance with law that one who asserts the affirmative averments it has to be proved by him only by recording evidence thereafter, the burden is shifted to the opposite party to rebutt the same. The burden of proof is subject matter of deliberation and consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Rangammal vs. Kuppuswami {(2011) 12 SCC 220} wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- 11 31. Application of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872 thus came up for discussion in this matter and while discussing the law on the burden of proof in the context of dealing with the allegation of sham and bogus transaction, it was held that party which makes allegation must prove it. But the court was further pleased to hold wherein the question before the court was "whether the transaction in question was a bona fide and genuine one" so that the party/plaintiff relying on the transaction had to first of all prove its genuineness and only thereafter would the defendant be required to discharge the burden in order to dislodge such proof and establish that the transaction was sham and fictitious. This ratio can aptly be relied upon in this matter as in this particular case, it is the plaintiff/respondent No.1-Kuppuswami who relied upon the alleged sale deed dated 24.2.1951 and included the subject- matter of the property which formed part of the sale deed and claimed partition. This sale deed was denied by the defendant/appellant on the ground that it was bogus and a sham transaction which was executed admittedly in 1951 when she was a minor. 32. Thus, it was the plaintiff/respondent No.1 who should have first of all discharged the burden that the sale deed executed during the minority of the appellant was genuine and was fit to be relied upon. If the courts below including the High Court had felt satisfied on this aspect, only then the burden could be shifted on the defendant/appellant to dislodge the case of the plaintiff that the sale deed was not genuine. But when the plaintiff merely pleaded in the plaint but failed to lead any evidence - much less proof, that the sale deed was genuine and was executed in order to discharge the burden of legal necessity in the interest of minor, then the High Court clearly misdirected itself by recording in the impugned order that it is the defendant/appellant herein who should have challenged the genuineness of the sale deed after attaining majority within the period of limitation. 33. Since the High Court has misplaced burden of proof, it clearly vitiated its own judgments as also of the courts below since it is well established dictum of the Evidence Act that misplacing burden of proof would vitiate judgment. It is also equally and undoubtedly true that the burden of proof may not be of much consequence after both the parties lay evidence, but while appreciating the question of burden of proof, misplacing of burden of proof on a particular party and recording findings in a particular way definitely vitiates the judgment as it has happened in the instant matter. This position stands reinforced by several authorities including the one delivered in the case of Koppula Koteshwara Rao vs. Koppula Hemant Rao, 2002 AIHC 4950 (AP). 34. It has been further held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of J & K vs. Hindustan Forest Company, 2006 12 (12) SCC 198, wherein it was held that the onus is on the plaintiff to positively establish its case on the basis of material available and it cannot rely on the weakness or absence of defence to discharge onus. 35. It was still further held by this Court in the matter of Corporation of City of Bangalore vs. Zulekha Bi, 2008 (11) SCC 306 (308) that it is for the plaintiff to prove his title to the property. This ratio can clearly be made applicable to the facts of this case for it is the plaintiff who claimed title to the property which was a subject-matter of the alleged sale deed of 24.2.1951 for which he had sought partition against his brother and, therefore, it was clearly the plaintiff who should have first of all established his case establishing title of the property to the joint family out of which he was claiming his share. When the plaintiff himself failed to discharge the burden to prove that the sale deed which he executed in favour of his own son and nephew by selling the property of a minor of whom he claimed to be legal guardian without permission of the court, it was clearly fit to be set aside by the High Court which the High Court as also the courts below have miserably failed to discharge. 36.The onus was clearly on the plaintiff to positively establish his case on the basis of material available and could not have been allowed by the High Court to rely on the weakness or absence of defence of the defendant/appellant herein to discharge such onus. The courts below thus have illegally and erroneously failed not to cast this burden on the plaintiff/respondent No.1 by clearly misconstruing the whole case and thus resulted into recording of findings which are wholly perverse and even against the admitted case of the parties. 18. Thus, from the evidence particularly evidence of PW/1 and DW/5 Radhika Bai who is defendant No. 2 in the suit, it is quite vivid that the plaintiffs have not discharged their burden to prove the fact that by purchase of the properties through EX.D/3 and Ex.D/4 their interest has not been protected or by sale of suit property is detrimental to the interest of the plaintiffs. Thus, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the plaintiffs have not discharged their burden does not suffer from perversity or illegality which warrants interference by this Court. 19. So far as, further submission of the learned counsel for the appellants 13 that the suit property has been sold in violation of Section 8 of the Act, 1956 without permission from the Court is being considered by this Court. The evidence adduced before the trial Court clearly demonstrates that plaintiffs have not proved that by purchasing the property through Ex.D/3 and Ex.D/4 or the property which is alleged to have been purchased through Ex.P/3 and Ex.P/4(which are not sale deeds) their interest is adversely affected. Even the description of the properties in all the documents are different. Thus, they cannot take shelter of Section 8 of the Act of 1956. 20. The provisions of Section 8 of the Act of 1956 has come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Manik Chand And Anr vs Ramachandra Son Of Chawriraj {(1980) 4 SCC 22} wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “4. A minor has no legal competence to enter into a contract or authorise someone else on his behalf to enter into a contract. But under the Hindu Law the natural guardian is empowered to enter into a contract on behalf of the minors and the contract would be binding and enforceable if the contract is for the benefit of the minor. One of the earliest cases which dealt with the right of the guardian to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor, is Krishnaswami v. Sundrappayyar, where a Bench of the Madras High Court held that S.11 of the Contract Act does not exclude the power of the guardian of a minor to represent him and enter into contracts on his behalf either beneficial or necessary to the minor under Hindu Law and that the English Law that a minor cannot claim specific performance which proceeds on the ground of want of mutuality, has no application to this country. The position under the Hindu Law is that a guardian has legal competence to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor for necessity or for the benefit of the estate. Dr. Chitale, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that he does not dispute the competence of a guardian to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor if it is for necessity or for the benefit of the estate, but contended that the right can only be confined to sale of property and would not extend to the purchase of property. His submission is that regarding the purchase of the property, it involves a minor into an obligation of making a payment and that it would amount to personal covenant by the guardian binding the minor. In support of his 14 contention, he strongly relied on a decision of the Privy Council in Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mohomad Chowdhury, which reversed the view of a Bench of the Calcutta High Court which held that there was no want of mutuality in the case and that the agreement is enforceable against the minors and that the acts of the guardian in this country bind the minor though there is no difference between his position and powers and those of a manager. The Privy Council held that they were unable to accept the view of the Division Bench that there was no difference between the position and powers of the manager and those of a guardian. Holding that it is not within the competence of a manager of a minor's estate or of a guardian of a minor to bind the minor or the minor's estate by a contract for the purchases of immovable property and that the minor was not bound by the contract for want of mutuality, the Privy Council held that a decree for specific performance cannot be granted. The Privy Council in a later decision in Srikakulem Subrahmanyam and Anr. v. Kurra Subba Rao, held that a guardian of a minor is competent to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor so as to bind him if it is for the benefit of the minor. Though the decision of the Privy Council in Mir Sarwarian v. Fakhruddin Mohomed Chowdhury (supra) was brought to its notice, the Privy Council did not refer to it but referred to its earlier decision in Hanuoomanpersaud Pandey v. Mussumat Nabooee Munraj Koonwaree where it was stated that "the act of the mother and guardian in entering into a contract of sale was an act done on behalf of the minor appellant." A passage from Pollock and Mulla's Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts wherein the observation of the Privy Council in Mohori Bibee v. Dhuramodas Ghose, that "it is, however, different with regard to contract entered into on behalf of a minor by his guardian or by a manager of his estate," was referred to. In such a case it has been held by the High Courts of India, in cases which arose subsequent to the decision of the Judicial Committee, that the contract can be specifically enforced as being within the competence of the guardian to enter into on his behalf so as to bind him by it, if it is for the benefit to the minor. But if either of these two conditions is wanting, the contract cannot be specifically enforced at all. Though the earlier decision of the Privy Council in Mir Sarwarian v. Fakhruddin Mohmed Chowdhury (supra) was not referred to, the observations make it clear that it was not followed. In Srikakulam Subrahmanyan v. Kurra Subba Rao the Madras High Court expressed its view that it had no hesitation to hold that the considered judgment of the Judicial Committee in ILR 75 Mad. 115 must be taken as overruling all the previous decisions based on 32 Cal. 232 (P.C.). The same view was expressed by Subba Rao C.J. of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (as he then was) in Suryaprakasam v. Gangaraju, where he held that there could not be any essential distinction between the contract of sale and contract of purchase. It is unnecessary to go into this question any further as after the 15 passing of Hindu Minority Act, 1956, the guardian of a Hindu Minor has power to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for realisation, protection or benefit of the minor's estate. This provision, makes it clear that the guardian is entitled to act so as to bind the minor if it is necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor. The power thus conferred by the Section is in no way restricted than that was recognised under the Hindu Law. It is not disputed in this case that the contract entered into by the guardian is for the benefit of the minor. It appears quite strange that the respondent should plead that the transaction is not for the benefit of the minor when the minor is convinced it is in his benefit and that it is worth pursuing the litigation upto this Court. It is common knowledge that the prices of immovable property have been on the rise and there can be no doubt that the transaction is for the benefit of the minor. 21. The Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Thansingh vs. Barelal {AIR 1974 MP 24} has held as under :- “3. As regards the second issue about obtaining permission from the District Court both the sides frankly conceded before us that this view taken by the learned Courts below is absolutely unjustified. There is no question of obtaining permission of the District Court for the father guardian of minor plaintiff to acquire property for the benefit of the minor. Apparently, there is no such law where such permission was necessary when a father- guardian acquires property for the benefit of his minor son. Consequently, the decision on this issue of the learned Courts below cannot be maintained.” 22. Thus the finding recorded by the learned trial Court with regard to issue No. 2 which is the moot question for deciding the lis between the party has rightly been answered against the plaintiffs by the trial Court. Similarly, the learned trial Court has also recorded its finding that the property which has been sold is unproductive land whereas the lands which have been purchased are productive land which are required for maintaining the livelihood of the plaintiffs who were minors at the relevant time, therefore, even if permission from the competent court as provided under Section 8 of the Act, 1956 obtained before the sale, it cannot be held that by selling the suit property the interest of plaintiffs is adversely affected. 23. Considering the facts and law, I am of the view that the learned trial Court has not committed any illegality in dismissing the suit which warrants interference by this Court. 16 24. Consequently, the first appeal is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed. 25. A decree be drawn up accordingly. Sd/- (Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge Deshmukh KISHORE KUMAR DESHMUKH Digitally signed by KISHORE KUMAR DESHMUKH Date: 2025.08.20 16:37:07 +0530