1 2025:CGHC:15125 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Judgment reserved on: 22.01.2025 Judgment delivered on: 28.03.2025 CRA No. 47 of 2005 1 - Poonam Ram Bargah (Yadav), S/o Dilbodhram Bargah, Aged about 32 years, occupation- Driver, Mahamaya Road Ambikapur, Thana- Ambikapur, District- Surguja (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1 – The State of Chhattisgarh, Through the Station House Officer, Police Station Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.). ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Siddharth Pandey, Advocate For Respondent(s) - State : Mr. Akhilesh Kumar, G.A. Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey CAV Judgment 1. This appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 12.01.2005 passed by learned V Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) Ambikapur, District- Surguja, C.G. in Sessions Trial No.211/2004 whereby, the trial Court acquitted the co-accused persons 2 of the alleged offence and also acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 304B of IPC but convicted and sentenced him as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 306 of IPC R.I. for 7 years and to pay fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for one year Under Section 498-A of of IPC R.I. for 3 years and to pay fine of Rs. 250/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 6 months . (Both the sentences to run concurrently) 2. As per the prosecution story, the deceased Mithila was married to the present appellant 6 years prior to the date of the incident and they were residing in Mahamaya Para Ambikapur. Soon after the marriage, the appellant/husband- Poonam Ram, mother-in-law Fulmatiya, Sister in law Vijay Laxmi and brother-in-law Guruprasad used to harass the deceased Mithila on account of demand of dowry. Prior to the incident, the deceased Mithila used to reside separately with the present appellant/husband in Namnakala, Ambikapur. Despite living separately, the deceased was harassed by her mother-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law and her husband. On 10.07.2003, the appellant along with the deceased and their children had gone to Mahamaya Para, Ambikapur to meet his mother- Fulmatiya Bai. The sister-in-law and brother-in-law were also there. The sister-in-law of the deceased Vijay Laxmi made tea, and after taking it, the deceased along with her husband left the home and was going to her house in rickshaw. On the way, the deceased vomited blood and thereafter died. The brother-in- law Guru Prasad gave information to the Police Station. Thereafter, a Morgue was registered and the post-mortem of the dead body was 3 conducted. The clothes and viscera of the deceased were examined and it was found that the deceased had died due to consuming poison. Thereafter, FIR was registered. During investigation, seizures were made from the accused/appellant. Spot map was prepared. Statements of the witnesses were recorded. After due investigation, the charge- sheet was filed before the learned trial Court under Sections 304-B and 498A of IPC followed by framing of charges by the learned trial Court accordingly, to which the appellant along with other co-accused abjured his guilt and prayed for trial. 3. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses. Statements of the accused persons were also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which they denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against them & pleaded innocence and false implication in the case. However, they did not adduce any evidence in their defence. 4. The trial Court after hearing counsel for the respective parties and considering the material available on record, acquitted the accused persons namely Fulmatiya Bai, Vijay Laxmi and Guruprasad of the alleged offence whereas the accused/appellant- Poonam Ram Bargah was also acquitted of the offence under Section 304B of IPC but he was convicted and sentenced as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is contrary to law, fact and material available on record. The learned trial Court erred in holding the guilt of the appellant as the prosecution has totally failed to establish the ingredients of offence and also failed to prove motive of the appellant in 4 commission of the offence. The learned trial Court also overlooked the statements of the independent witnesses and relied the evidence of only interested witnesses in convicting the appellant. The learned trial Court did not appreciate oral and documentary evidence properly in recording the findings against the appellant. It is clear from statements of all witnesses that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kahkashan Kausar @ Sanam & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.; 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 141, Mariano Anto Bruno & Anr. Vs. The Inspector of Police; 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 834, Abhishek Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh; 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 731, Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and Others Vs. State of Gujarat; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3679 & Dara Lakshmi Narayan and Others Vs. State of Telangana and Another; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682. 6. Per contra, supporting the impugned judgment it has been argued by the State counsel that the conviction of the accused/appellant is strictly in accordance with law and there is no infirmity in the same. 7. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record minutely. 8. It is clear from record of the learned trial Court that the learned trial Court framed charges under Sections 304B and 498 A of IPC against the appellant and three other co-accused persons and after appreciating oral and documentary evidence, learned trial Court acquitted the accused persons namely Fulmatiya Bai, Vijay Laxmi and 5 Guruprasad of the alleged offence & also acquitted the appellant of the offence under Section 304B of IPC & convicted and sentenced the appellant under Section 306 and 498 A of IPC. 9. It is not disputed before the learned trial Court that the deceased- Mithila Bai was wife of the appellant- Poonam Ram Bargah and their marriage was solemnized before 6 years from the date of the incident and it is also not disputed that the deceased- Mithila Bai was died unnatural death within 7 years of her marriage. 10.Dr. Faisul Hassan Firdausi (P.W.-8) stated that he conducted the post mortem of the deceased- Mithila Bai and he suspected that cause of death is due to consuming poisonous substance and advised for chemical examination of viscera and gave his report (Ex.P/8) in this regard. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he did not find any external injury over the body of the deceased and he denied this suggestion that symptoms of poisoning in the body also occur due to stomach disease. 11. As per FSL report (Ex.P/13), Endosulfan (Organochlorine) pesticide was found in the viscera of the deceased. Thus, the prosecution has successfully proved that the deceased was died within 7 years of her marriage. 12.Rampati (P.W.-3) stated that on the date of incident, she saw the deceased and her husband/appellant. She stated that the deceased used to tell her that her in-laws harassed her. On being asked, she told her that they did so as they want her husband to remarry. 6 In her cross-examination, she admitted that Mithila got married about 6 years ago. She further admitted that the marriage of the deceased and appellant went well. She denied this suggestion that the deceased did not tell her about the fight with her husband while living in her neighborhood. 13. Shamimunnisha (P.W.-4) stated that on the date of the incident, at around 5:00, P.M., she saw Mithila in a healthy state. At around 8:00- 9:00 p.m., when Poonam brought the deceased in Rickshaw, Mithila was dead. On being asked, Poonam told her that after drinking tea, Mithila’s condition got worsened. She further stated that the deceased and the accused- Poonam lived in a rented house in Namna. They used to meet her. At that time also, the deceased voluntarily told her about the marpeet committed by the appellant with her. 14. Halko @ Sefali Bai (P.W.-6) who is mother of the deceased, stated that her daughter (deceased) and the appellant got married before 6 years ago. After one month of the marriage, the appellant used to harass the deceased on account of dowry. She further stated that on the date of incident, at around 8:00 P.M., the accused along with children brought the deceased in an unconscious state to her house. The blood was oozing out from her nose and mouth. On being asked, accuse did not tell her anything and went back. After knowing about that the deceased got died, then they lodged the report at police station. In her cross-examination, she admitted that Mithila used to tell her that she does not get along well with her mother-in-law, father-in- law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law, so she does not go to her in-laws house. In para 6, she admitted that, they did not lodge any report at the 7 police station regarding dowry harassment from 2 years before the date of incident. 15. Learned trial Court only found that the deceased told some witnesses about the torture which was being given to her by her husband and on the basis of which, trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 306 of IPC. 16. In the matter of Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and others Vs. State of Gujarat; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3679, Hon’ble Apex Court held in para 26 as under:- “26……..Mere harassment and such issues between the wife and her husband along with the in-laws do not appear to create a scenario where she was left with no option other than to end her life. There is, therefore, absence of mens rea to instigate suicide of the deceased persons.” 17. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Mahendra Awase Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 107 held in paras from 11 to 16 and 18 as under:- 11. Section 306 of the IPC reads as under:- “306. Abetment of suicide. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." 12. Section 107 of the IPC reads as under:- "107. Abetment of a thing. A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First. -Instigates any person to do that thing; or 8 Secondly. -Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.-Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing." As is clear from the plain language of the Sections to attract the ingredient of Section 306, the accused should have abetted the commission of a suicide. A person abets the doing of a thing who Firstly -instigates any person to do that thing or Secondly engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or Illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing or Thirdly- intentionally aids, by any act or Illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 13. In Swamy Prahaladdas v. State of M.P., [1995 Supp (3) SCC 438], the appellant remarked to the deceased that 'go and die' and the deceased thereafter, committed suicide. This Court held that:- "3....Those words are casual nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarrelling people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The said act does not reflect the requisite 'mens rea' on the assumption that these words would be carried out in all events..…” " 14. In Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 8 SCC 628, this Court held that in order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC specific abetment as contemplated by 9 Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring about the suicide of the person concerned as a result of that abetment is required. It was further held that the intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for attracting Section 306. 15. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707, this Court held as under:- "12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of i ncitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. [Emphasis supplied] 16. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act 10 of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. 18. As has been held hereinabove, to satisfy the requirement of instigation the accused by his act or omission or by a continued course of conduct should have created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. It was also held that a word uttered in a fit of anger and emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 18. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, it is clear that no ground to convict the appellant under Section 306 of IPC, is made out as all witnesses stated about some fight between the appellant and his wife (deceased) and in cross-examination, witnesses also accepted suggestion of defence that the appellant and deceased were living separately from their house. Learned trial Court found that the ingredients of Section 304B of IPC are not proved against the appellant and thereby acquitted him of the alleged offence but only on the ground that wife was died unnatural death, trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 306 and 498A of IPC. Learned trial Court did not appreciate the essential ingredients of Section 498A and 306 of IPC. Thus, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are not based on proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. 11 19. Having considered the aforesaid facts of the case in juxtaposition with the judgments referred to above and upon appreciation of evidence of the witnesses and other material adduced by the prosecution, this Court is of the opinion that the learned trial Court wrongly convicted the appellant under Sections 498A and 306 of IPC. 20. As a result, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 306 and 498A of IPC cannot be legally sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment dated 12.01.2005 is set aside. Consequently, the appellant is acquitted of the charge under Sections 306 and 498-A of IPC. 21. The accused/appellant is reported to be on bail, therefore, his bail bond shall remain in operation for a period of six months from today in view of provisions of Section 481 of BNSS. 22. The record of the trial Court along with copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) JUDGE Ruchi RUCHI YADAV Digitally signed by RUCHI YADAV