-1- 2025:CGHC:12828 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 441 of 2022 1 - Ajay Jain S/o Shri Anupchand Jain, Aged About 57 Years, Residence of Jaishri Bihar, Mandira 5B/C, 109 Pandaritarai, Raipur District - Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - Ashok Jain S/o Shri Anupchand Jain, Aged About 53 Years, Residence of Dl/53 Sector - 2, Salt Lack Kolkata Bengal Vidhannagar (North) Kolkata. 3 - Urja Jain D/o Shri Ajay Jain, Aged About 27 Years, Residence of Jaishri Bihar, Mandira 5B/C, 109 Pandaritarai, Raipur District - Raipur Chhattisgarh. ...Applicants/Petitioners versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Sirgitti District - Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - Arvind Garg S/o Shri Vishwamitra Prasad Garg, Aged About 55 Years, Resident of Siddhivinayak Height Rajennagar Chowk, Bilaspur District - Bilaspur Chhattisgarh (Complainant) ---- Non-applicants/Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners – Mr. Apoorva Tripathi, Advocate. For State/Respondents No.1 – Mr. Hariom Rai, Panel Lawyer. For Respondent No.2 – Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 18-03-2025 Digitally signed by MOHAMMAD AADIL KHAN -2- 1. In the present petition the petitioners have challenged registration of FIR against the petitioners/applicants on the complaint made by respondent No.2. 2. The present petition has been filed with the following prayer:- “It is therefore prayed that, this Hon’lbe Court may kindly be pleased to allow the petition and quash the FIR registered under Crime No.0164/2022 for the offence U/s 420, 409 and 34 of the I.P.C. under the crime No. 0164/2022 on the written complaint made by respondent no. 2 before the station house officer P.S. Sirgitti, Dist. - Bilaspur (C.G.) in the interest of justice.” 3. Brief facts of the case as mentioned in the petition are that, the petitioners/applicants have been allegedly engaged in the business of trading and outsourcing through the alleged firm M/s Serirra Infraventure Pvt. Ltd. situated at BL 162, Sector -II, Salt Lake City – Kolkata West Bengal -7000901 also having its registered regional office at 5 B/c Mandira Apartment, 109 Panditarai Marnin Jaishri Vihar, P.S. Devendra Nagar Raipur C.G. It is alleged that respondent No.2 namely Arvind Garg who is said to be proprietor of his firm M/s R.K. Automotives, is also engaged in the business of supplying automotive parts through his firm which is said to be situated at 43 A/2, Rotary Marg, Tifra Industrial Area, Bilaspur (C.G.). The respondent No.2 filed a written -3- complaint wherein it has been alleged that he has been in the business relationship with the petitioners since 19-08-2020. He alleged that he supplied lubricants and other materials to the petitioners from 14-02-2021 to 27-05-2021 amounting to Rs.23,64,420/-, out of which only Rs.1,30,342/- has been paid to him by the petitioners on 12-02-2021 and the rest amount total Rs.22,34,117/- has not been paid till date. The entire transactions are allegedly claimed to be maintained in ledger books of respondent No.2. It has been alleged by respondent No.2 that when on several request made by him remaining amount was not paid, the respondent No.2 along with his list of payment of remaining amount submitted written complaint on 26-02-2022 before respondent No.1. On account of which the offence under Section 420, 409 and 34 of the IPC has been registered against the petitioners. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners/applicants submits that even if the entire allegations of the respondent No.2 are taken on its face value, they do not disclose a criminal offence under Section 420 or 406 of the IPC. A breach of promise or a breach of obligation/contract does not constitute an offence under Section 420 or 409 of the IPC. He further submits that a mere failure to keep a promise does not create any presumption of dishonest intention amounting to a criminal breach of trust under Section 409 or cheating under Section 420 of the IPC. There is no averment in the -4- entire FIR that the petitioner had an intention to cheat or dishonestly induce the respondent No.2 at the time of purchase of the lubricants. It has been further argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the allegations contained in the FIR are purely contractual disputes of civil nature but respondent No.2 has given a criminal colour to it and that breach of contract does not come within the purview of cheating as defined in the IPC. In addition to it, the transaction in question between the parties as revealed from the FIR was purely a sale transaction or what may be called as a commercial transaction, therefore the question of cheating does not arise at all. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that in the matter of Vir Prakash Sharma Vs. Anil Kumar Agrawal and another, (2007) 7 SCC 373 it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that where allegations contained in complaint petition even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety do not disclose an offence, the complaint can be quashed and he places reliance on para 8 of that judgment which reads as under:- “8. The dispute between the parties herein is essentially a civil dispute. Non-payment or under-payment of the price of the goods by itself does not amount to commission of an offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance -5- upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of R.K. Vijayasarathy Vs. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 16 SCC 739, Uma Shankar Gopalika Vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336 and submits that as per the contents of the FIR, no offence as alleged is made out, therefore, the petition may be allowed. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that required ingredients for the offence alleged are present in the FIR as well as the complaint and as there is order of no coercive steps in favour of the petitioners, investigation could not be completed and charge sheet has not been filed. The matter needs investigation and at this stage no interference is required. Therefore, the petition may be dismissed. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 -6- of the CrPC should be exercised, which are as under: - “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as -7- contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar Sharma and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, (2016) 9 SCC 1 held as under:- “35. While discussing the scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Code, a similar view has been taken by a -8- Division Bench of this Court in Rajiv Thapar and others vs. Madan Kal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330 wherein it was held as under:- “29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far- reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the -9- accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 30.1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the -10- charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arisingt therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 9. In the matter of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, the Supreme Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code -11- of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. It was held as under: “12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.” (emphasis supplied) 10. Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), the Supreme Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. -12- 11. In the matter of Thermax Limited and others Vs. K.M. Johny and others, (2011) 13 SCC 412, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 37 of that judgment as under:- “37. It is settled law that the essential ingredient for an offence under Section 420, which we have already extracted, is that there has to be dishonest intention to deceive another person. We have already quoted the relevant allegations in he complaint and perusal of the same clearly shows that no such dishonest intention can be seen or even inferred inasmuch as the entire dispute pertains to contractual obligations between the parties. Since the very ingredients of Section 420 are not attracted, the prosecution initiated is wholly untenable. Even if we admit that allegations in the complaint do make out a dispute, still it ought to be considered that the same is merely a breach of contract and the same cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction. Inasmuch as there number of documents to show that the appellant Company had acted in terms of the agreement and in a bona fide manner, it cannot be sad that the act of the appellant Company amounts to a breach of contract.” 12. From perusal of the impugned FIR, it appears that the allegations relate to payment of balance amount Rs.22,34,117/-. There were many deals between the parties. Even otherwise, the FIR does not disclose the ingredients of any cognizable offence under Sections 420, 409 of the IPC and the dispute appears to be of civil nature. It is not mentioned that the petitioners had intention -13- to cheat the respondent No.2 from the very inception and non- payment or under-payment of the price of goods by itself does not amount to commission of an offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust. Hence, the allegations made in the impugned FIR are absurd and do not constitute a cognizable offence. 13. Considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), we are of the considered opinion that the contents of the FIR do not disclose the commission of any offence as alleged and make out a case against the petitioners herein. 14. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed and the impugned FIR registered under Crime No.0164/2022 for offence under Section 420, 409 and 34 of the IPC (Annexure P-1) at Police Station Sirgitti, District Bilaspur (C.G.) against the petitioners/applicants is hereby quashed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil