- 1 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA KALABURAGI BENCH DATED THIS 16TH DAY OF APRIL, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K NATARAJAN AND THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL WRIT APPEAL NO. 200051 OF 2024 C/W CIVIL CONTEMPT PETITION NO. 200156 OF 2024 IN WA NO.200051/2024: BETWEEN: 1. MANAGING DIRECTOR, GULBARGA ELECTRICITY SUPPLY CO. LTD., (CORPORATE OFFICE), SUPER MARKET ROAD, KALABURAGI – 585102. R/BY GENERAL MANAGER. 2. THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (ELE), O & M SUB-DIVISION, GESCOM, TALUK: SINDHANUR, DISTRICT: RAICHUR – 584128. 3. THE SECTION OFFICER, O & M SUB-DIVISION, GESCOM, TURVIHAL VILLAGE, TALUK: SINDHANUR, DISTRICT: RAICHUR – 584128. …APPELLANTS (BY SRI SUDARSHAN M., ADVOCATE) Digitally signed by RAMESH MATHAPATI Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 AND: MR. YANKANAGOUDA S/O HANUMAGOUDA AGE: 10 YEARS, OCC: STUDENT, PRESENTED BY HIS GUARDIAN FATHER SRI. HANUMAGOUDA S/O YANKANAGOUDA AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURIST, R/O H.NO.58/1-II, GUNJHALLI VILLAGE, TALUK: SINDHANUR, DISTRICT: RAICHUR – 584128. …RESPONDENT (BY SRI MAHANTESH PATIL, ADV.) THIS WA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 21.06.2023 PASSED IN WP NO.202965/2015 BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE. IN CCC NO.200156/2024: BETWEEN: MR. YANKANAGOUDA S/O HANUMAGOUDA AGE: 19 YEARS, OCC: STUDENT, R/O H.NO.58/1-II, GUNJHALLI VILLAGE, TQ: SINDHANUR, DIST: RAICHUR – 584128. ...COMPLAINANT (BY SRI MAHANTESH PATIL, ADV.) AND: 1. SRI. RAVINDRA KARILINGANAVAR, THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, GESCOM, KALABURAGI. 2. SRI. SRINIVAS GOLLAR, THE ASSISTANT EXECUTING ENGINEER (ELE), O & M SUB-DIVISION, - 3 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 GESCOM, TQ: SINDHANUR, DIST: RAICHUR – 584128. 3. BAJANA GOUDA, THE SECTION OFFICER, O & M SUB-DIVISION, GESCOM, TURAVIHAL VILLAGE, TQ: SINDHANUR, DIST: RAICHUR – 584128. ...ACCUSED (BY SRI SUDARSHAN M., ADVOCATE) THIS CCC IS FILED UNDER SECTION 11 & 12 OF THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT R/W ARTICLE 215 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO INITIATE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS/ACCUSED FOR HAVING DELIBERATELY AND INTENTIONALLY DISOBEYED, DISRESPECTED AND FOR NOT HAVING COMPLIED WITH THE ORDER DATED:21.06.2023 PASSED BY THIS HON’BLE COURT IN W.P.NO.202965/2023 (GM-KEB) VIDE ANNEXURE – A AND PUNISH THE RESPONDENTS/ACCUSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. THIS APPEAL AND PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 03.04.2025, COMING ON FOR “PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT” THIS DAY, THE COURT, PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K NATARAJAN AND HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL - 4 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 CAV JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL) W.A.No.200051/2024 is filed by the appellants- Gulbarga Electricity Supply Company Limited (for short ‘GESCOM’) challenging the order of the learned Single Judge dated 21.06.2023 passed in W.P.No.202965/2015 (GM-KEB), wherein the writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed. The contempt petition in CCC No.200156/2024 is filed by the respondent/original writ petitioner alleging wilful disobedience of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this appeal are that, the respondent sought writ in the nature of mandamus against the appellants - authorities to pay compensation of Rs.50,00,000/ for negligence and for injuries suffered by him. It is averred that the villagers of Gunjhalli submitted representation to the appellants - 5 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 requesting shifting of 11KV electric naked wires from the residential area. However, the same was not acted upon by the appellants. It is further averred that on 04.06.2013, the respondent while playing on the terrace of one Sri Tidigol Ramanna came in contact with a live wire, sustained grievous injuries and he was provided with treatment at St. John’s Hospital, Bengaluru for 37 days as inpatient. His right hand has been amputated and he has also suffered a disability to an extent of 90%. He sought compensation for the aforesaid injuries. 3. The appellants opposed the writ petition. The learned Single Judge issued writ in the nature of mandamus directing the appellant-authorities to pay a sum of Rs.26,35,800/ along with 6% interest from the date of accident till the realization of the amount and further directed to deposit the said amount within six weeks. Failing which, the interest payable shall stand enhanced to 9% per annum. Being aggrieved, this appeal. - 6 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 4. Sri. Sudarshan M., learned counsel appearing for the appellants-GESCOM submits that the writ petition filed by the respondent is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as there are disputed facts involved in the case. The respondent is required to establish the negligence of the appellants in the competent Civil Court by adducing evidence. It is further submitted that the respondent and his family members are illegally residing beneath the high tension line and they were asked to vacate. However, they have continued to reside illegally. Hence, for such a lapse, the appellants cannot be asked to pay compensation to the respondent without committing any wrong. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge has failed to consider that the respondent has not lodged the complaint with the Electrical Inspector as required under Section 161 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred as ‘the Act’), who would have conducted an enquiry and if aggrieved by the enquiry, the respondent could have filed an appeal against the said decision under Section 162 of the Act. It - 7 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 is contended that the incident has taken place in the year 2013 and writ petition is filed in the year 2015. Hence, there is delay and laches on the part of the respondent which has not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge. Hence, he seeks to allow the appeal by setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge. 5. Per contra, Sri. Mahantesh Patil, learned counsel appearing for the respondent supports the order of the learned Single Judge and submits that insofar as maintainability of the writ petition and other grounds urged in the appeal are concerned, the same have been answered by the learned Single Judge, considering the decision of another learned Single Judge in the case of Rekha and others vs. Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited and others1 which has been affirmed by the Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited vs. Rekha and others2. 1 2022 (6) KAR LJ 30 2 W.A.No.861/2022 and connected appeals DD:23.01.2025 - 8 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 Hence, he seeks to dismiss the appeal by punishing the appellants for wilful disobedience of the order of the learned Single Judge. 6. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants, learned counsel for the respondent and meticulously perused the materials available on record. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions advanced and the material available on record. 7. The undisputed facts are that on 04.11.2011, the villagers of Gunjhalli village submitted a written representation to the Executive Engineer of GESCOM, Sindhanur requesting to shift 11KV electric naked wires from the residential area of Gunjhalli village. A similar representation was submitted again on 11.11.2011. Admittedly, the appellants have not taken any decision on the said representations nor have they taken any steps to vacate the residents who are alleged to have constructed - 9 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 the houses illegally beneath the line. On 04.06.2013, the respondent while playing on the terrace of one Sri Tidigol Ramanna, came in contact with a live naked 11KV wire and sustained injuries. He was provided with treatment for 37 days as an inpatient in St. John’s Hospital, Bengaluru. The treated doctor has assessed the disability of the respondent at 90%. It is also not in dispute that the right hand of the respondent has been amputated at the shoulder due to the accidental injury. The respondent registered FIR in Cr.No.139/2013 dated 07.07.2013 before the Turvihal Police Station of Sindhanur Taluk against the appellants for the offences punishable under Sections 285 and 338 of IPC. The respondent also issued a legal notice to the appellants on 23.09.2013 seeking compensation for the injury suffered by him. The appellant-authorities replied to the said notice by denying the claim of the respondent. 8. Insofar as the contention of the appellants that the writ petition cannot be entertained as there are - 10 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 disputed facts involved in the case and the factum of negligence is concerned, the same is required to be proved. The learned Single Judge has recorded a clear finding that the appellants have not filed any objections disputing the plea of the respondent in the writ petition. It is further observed that there is no dispute with regard to the incident and injury suffered by the respondent, when he came in contact with the naked electric high tension wire and held that the writ petition is maintainable. The said view of the learned Single Judge is based on the enunciation of law laid down by this Court in the case of Rekha and others referred supra, which has been affirmed by the Co-ordinate Bench in the case Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited vs. Rekha and others referred supra. It would be useful to refer to the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited vs. Rekha and others referred supra, wherein at para 65 to 78, the Co-ordinate Bench has held as under: - 11 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 65. Insofar as maintainability of the writ petitions is concerned, the learned Single Judge has, in paragraphs No.7 to 19, dealt with the said issue and in paragraph No.20, has dealt with the issue of relegating respondents No.1 to a Civil Court. 66. According to learned Single Judge, once the liability of State entity is established by virtue of principle of absolute liability, the quantification is also made by the Courts in exercise of writ jurisdiction by relying upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhagyabai (supra) and Nagappa Manneppa Naik (supra), he held that the writ petitions are maintainable. On the issue of maintainability of writ petition, the issue need to be looked from the perspective that the Constitution provides for procedure to seek protection of fundamental rights as guaranteed under part-III of the Constitution. In State of Madras -Vs.- V.G. Row [(1952) 1 SCC 410], the Supreme Court recognized itself as a guardian of fundamental rights. In Nilabati Behera -Vs.- State of Orissa [(1993) 2 SCC 746], the Supreme Court evolved the concept of invoking public law remedy in cases of violation of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court held, the State cannot plead the defence of sovereign immunity available to it in private law. It held that, the Constitutional Courts while exercising powers under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India, are justified and are obligated to pass orders directing compensation in case of proven violation of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court in the case of MCD -Vs.- Uphaar Tragedy Victims Assn. [(2011) 14 SCC 481] after considering the judgment in the case of D.K. Basu -Vs.- State of W.B. [(1997) 1 SCC 416] held that, a claim made for compensation in public law is for compensating the claimants for deprivation of life and personal liberty which has nothing to do with claim in talk in an ordinary Civil Court. In Hindustan Paper Corpn. Ltd. - Vs.- Ananta Bhattacharjee [(2004) 6 SCC 213], the Supreme - 12 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 Court held that public law remedy for the purpose of grant of compensation can be resorted to only when the fundamental rights of citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India are violated and not otherwise. The contuse of the above constitutional guarantees expounded to not only to the protection against arbitrary deprivation of life, but also to ensure a minimum threshold standard of living. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that public law remedy can be resorted to and a monetary compensation can also be awarded in cases of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India 67. The connected question would be, what should be the standard of proof seeking compensation under public law remedy? The Supreme Court in the case of Sukamani Das (supra) on which reliance has been placed by Sri. Sriranga was considering the issue whether the High Court was justified in awarding compensation in a case of death on account of electrocution. It was held, where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 is not the appropriate remedy. 68. In the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has, on the maintainability of the writ petitions, in paragraphs No.7 to 10, stated as under: “7. There are instances also where the State Entities commit torts giving rise to claims for compensation which is sought to be asserted by way of a Writ Petition. Liability for torts committed by the agents of the State being an accepted principle, question whether a litigant is to be driven to avail of the remedy before the Civil Court is not a necessity. Once the liability of the State Entity is established as in the present case in light of discussion, by virtue of principle - 13 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 of absolute liability the quantification is also an aspect that has been made by the courts even in exercise of writ jurisdiction by resort to settled principles to monetarily quantify loss of life or injury to a person as is applied in motor vehicle accidents which is the methodology adopted by the Division Bench of this court in Baghyabhai (supra). The Co-ordinate Bench of this court has also adopted similar principles to calculate compensation and grant relief in case of death or injury due to electrocution in Shri Nagappa Manneppa Naik and Others (supra). 8. Accordingly, even in case of concurrent remedies being available for claim of compensation by tortious acts committed by State Entities, the invocation of writ jurisdiction cannot be objected to as the tort-feasor being State under Article 12 of Constitution of India, remedy against such tort-feasor is open to be asserted by invoking such jurisdiction. 9. In the present case it must be noticed that there is absolute liability as regards the activity of the corporation as accordingly under common law liability, State being liable, remedy to enforce compensation as a result of consequences following from such tortious acts is being asserted by the petitioners. That apart claim of compensation would also be construed to be consequences of breach of statutory obligation. 10. In an action for compensation arising out of wrongs by the State and if on available facts there is clarity regarding liability and - 14 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 quantification though partial, then to such extent, there is no reason for denial of remedy to claim compensation in writ proceedings.” (emphasis supplied) 69. We agree with the aforesaid conclusion of the learned Single Judge on the maintainability of the writ petitions. Sri. Sriranga has, in support of his submission that a writ petition in respect of prayer for compensation shall not be maintainable, had relied upon the judgments in the cases of Sukamani Das (supra) and Timudu Oram (supra). The said judgments have been distinguished by the learned Single Judge by holding that, as there were disputed questions of fact, the same were not entertained. But, in H.S.E.B. and others -Vs.- Ram Nath [(2004) 5 SCC 793], the Supreme Court has distinguished the judgment in the case of Sukamani Das (supra) and has granted compensation. 70. Even the judgments in the cases of Satish Kumar (supra), Dharampal (supra), Abdul Haque (supra), P. Malappa (supra) and Basavaraj (supra) will not help the case of the appellants, as the Courts in the said judgments have held, there being disputed facts, the parties need to be relegated to the Civil Court. Whereas in the cases in hand, the learned Single Judge has held that there are no disputed facts. In this regard, we have already reproduced the relevant paragraphs of the impugned order above. Similarly insofar as the cases of Smt Irudaya Mary (supra), Smt. Lakshmidevamma (supra) and Smt. Annapurna (supra) are concerned, there this Court relegated the parties to the Civil Court on the ground that it would not be appropriate to invoke the writ jurisdiction in such cases and arbitrarily determine compensation without any yardsticks or parameters. Whereas in the present cases, the learned Single Judge by relying upon the judgment - 15 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Bhagyabai (supra) which judgment has been upheld by the Supreme Court, held that the Court can calculate compensation adopting parameters applied under the Motor Vehicles Act. So, by stating compensation can be determined on defined parameters/yardsticks, the learned Single judge entertained the writ petition. 71. The issue which now arises is, whether the appellant was negligent for it to be liable for compensation to respondents No.1 in the appeals? The issue has been answered by the learned Single Judge by drawing a distinction between strict liability and absolute liability by holding, the exceptions to strict liability as propounded in Rylands -Vs.- Fletcher (supra) like Act of God; petitioners’ own default; and interference of third- party shall not be applicable when accidents are attributable to supply and distribution of electricity. 72. The submission of Sri. Sriranga was, the principle of absolute liability has no applicability to the facts in as much as the owner of the building was negligent against whom the proceedings have been initiated; even the BBMP was clearly negligent in its action. The aforesaid submission of Sri. Sriranga is unmerited because, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge more particularly paragraph No.31 which is reproduced as under, is very clear that the principles of absolute liability shall be applicable in as much as any enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and the accident is caused, then such enterprise is absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions: - 16 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 “31. We must also deal with one other question which was seriously debated before us and that question is as to what is the measure of liability of an enterprise which is engaged in an hazardous or inherently dangerous industry, if by reason of an accident occurring in such industry, persons die or are injured. Does the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] apply or is there any other principle on which the liability can be determined. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] was evolved in the year 1866 and it provides that a person who for his own purposes brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril and, if he fails to do so, is prima facie liable for the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. The liability under this rule is strict and it is no defence that the thing escaped without that person's wilful act, default or neglect or even that he had no knowledge of its existence. This rule laid down a principle of liability that if a person who brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do harm and such thing escapes and does damage to another, he is liable to compensate for the damage caused. Of course, this rule applies only to non- natural user of the land and it does not apply to things naturally on the land or where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger or the default of the person injured or where the thing which escapes is present by the consent of the person injured or in certain cases - 17 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 where there is statutory authority. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 45, para 1305. Considerable case law has developed in England as to what is natural and what is non-natural use of land and what are precisely the circumstances in which this rule may be displaced. But it is not necessary for us to consider these decisions laying down the parameters of this rule because in a modern industrial society with highly developed scientific knowledge and technology where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries are necessary to carry as part of the developmental programme, this rule evolved in the 19th century at a time when all these developments of science and technology had not taken place cannot afford any guidance in evolving any standard of liability consistent with the constitutional norms and the needs of the present day economy and social structure. We need not feel inhibited by this rule which was evolved in the context of a totally different kind of economy. Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the country. As new situations arise the law has to be evolved in order to meet the challenge of such new situations. Law cannot afford to remain static. We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialised economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any other foreign - 18 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order. We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build our own jurisprudence and we cannot countenance an argument that merely because the law in England does not recognise the rule of strict and absolute liability in cases of hazardous or inherently dangerous activities or the rule laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] as developed in England recognises certain limitations and exceptions, we in India must hold back our hands and not venture to evolve a new principle of liability since English courts have not done so. We have to develop our own law and if we find that it is necessary to construct a new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concommitant to an industrial economy, there is no reason why we should hesitate to evolve such principle of liability merely because it has not been so done in England. We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held - 19 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part. Since the persons harmed on account of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity carried on by the enterprise would not be in a position to isolate the process of operation from the hazardous preparation of substance or any other related element that caused the harm the enterprise must be held strictly liable for causing such harm as a part of the social cost of carrying on the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity. If the enterprise is permitted to carry on an hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity as an appropriate item of its overheads. Such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for private profit can be tolerated only on condition that the enterprise engaged in such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity indemnifies all those who suffer on account of the carrying on of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity regardless of whether it is carried on carefully or not. This principle is also sustainable on the ground that - 20 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 the enterprise alone has the resource to discover and guard against hazards or dangers and to provide warning against potential hazards. We would therefore hold that where in enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] .” (emphasis supplied) 73. We are also of the view that the learned Single Judge is justified in relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shail Kumari (supra) wherein in paragraph No.7, 8 and 13, the Court held as under: “7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of - 21 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the lookout of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps. 8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of - 22 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. xx xx xx xx xx 13. In the present case, the Board made an endeavour to rely on the exception to the rule of strict liability (Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861- 73) All ER Rep 1] ) being “an act of stranger”. The said exception is not available to the Board as the act attributed to the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any rate its consequences should have been prevented by the appellant-Board. In Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co. Ltd. [1936 AC 108 : 105 LJPC 18 : 154 LT 89] the Privy Council repelled the contention of the defendant based on the aforecited exception. In that case a hotel belonging to the plaintiffs was destroyed in a fire caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas. The gas had percolated into the hotel basement from a fractured welded joint in an intermediate pressure main situated below the street level and belonging to the defendants which was a public utility company. The fracture was caused during the construction involving underground work by a third party. The Privy Council held that the risk involved in the operation undertaken by the defendant was so great that a high- degree care was expected of him since the defendant ought to have appreciated the possibility of such a leakage.” (emphasis supplied) - 23 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 74. Similarly, the learned Single Judge has relied upon the judgment in the case of H.S.E.B. (supra), wherein in paragraph No.6, it is held as under: “6. The appellants are carrying on a business which is inherently dangerous. If a person were to come into contact with a high-tension wire, he is bound to receive serious injury and/or die. As they are carrying on a business which is inherently dangerous, the appellants would have to ensure that no injury results from their activities. If they find that unauthorised constructions have been put up close to their wires it is their duty to ensure that that construction is got demolished by moving the appropriate authorities and if necessary, by moving a court of law. Otherwise, they would take the consequences of their inaction. If there are complaints that these wires are drooping and almost touching houses, they have to ensure that the required distance is kept between the houses and the wires, even though the houses be unauthorised. In this case we do not find any disputed question of fact.” (emphasis supplied) 75. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case of Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (supra) has, in paragraphs No.39, 40, 47 and 49, held as under: “39. The decision in M.C. Mehta case [(1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086] related to a concern working for private profit. However, in our opinion the same principle will also apply to statutory authorities (like the Railways), public corporations or local bodies which may be social utility - 24 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 undertakings not working for private profit. 40. It is true that attempts to apply the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher against public bodies have not on the whole succeeded vide Administrative Law by P.P. Craig, 2nd Edn., p. 446, mainly because of the idea that a body which acts not for its own profit but for the benefit of the community should not be liable. However, in our opinion, this idea is based on a misconception. Strict liability has no element of moral censure. It is because such public bodies benefit the community that it is unfair to leave the result of a nonnegligent accident to lie fortuitously on a particular individual rather than to spread it among the community generally. xx xx xx xx xx 47. However, apart from the principle of strict liability in Section 124-A of the Railways Act and other statutes, we can and should develop the law of strict liability dehors statutory provisions in view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in M.C. Mehta case [(1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086] . In our opinion, we have to develop new principles for fixing liability in cases like the present one. xx xx xx xx xx 49. There are dicta both ancient and modern that the known categories of tort are not closed, and that novelty of a claim is not an absolute defence. Thus, in Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [(1994) 4 SCC 1 : JT (1994) 3 SC - 25 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 492] the Supreme Court observed: (SCC p. 10, para 8) “8. … law of torts being a developing law its frontiers are incapable of being strictly barricaded.” ” (emphasis supplied) 76. In the case of Nagappa Manneppa Naik (supra) in paragraphs No.32 to 34 referred by the learned Single Judge, it is held as under: "C) Nature of liability of Power Supply Company 32. The Power Supply Companies have sought to repudiate liability on the ground that the claimant by his/her acts of negligence was responsible for the accident and hence the company was not liable, that there were intervening acts by strangers/third parties which were responsible for the accident. All such contentions raised are no longer available for being canvassed in light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (supra). The facts of the case was that the deceased who was riding a bicycle rode over a live wire, lying on the road which was inundated with water and the victim died of electrocution. The defence taken was that one Hari Gaikwad had taken a wire from the main supply line to pilfer power and the line got unfastened from the hook and it fell over the road which caused the accident. While the court reiterated the applicability of strict liability but explicitly ruled the inapplicability of the defences available to - 26 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 'strict liability' including that of an "an act of stranger". 33. The Court while approving the law laid down in the case of M.C.Mehta v. Union of India reported in 1987 1 SCR 819 has in effect declared that there would be absolute liability i.e., strict liability as per the rule of Rylands and Fetcher without any of the exceptions. 34. This position of law has been reiterated by the Division Bench of this court in the case of Bhagyabai V. Principal Secretary, Department of Energy and Others in W.A.No.3249/2010 and W.A.No.3540-43/2010 dated 25.10.2010. Accordingly, the contention of the Power Supply Companies regarding absence of liability while raising defences is liable to be rejected." (emphasis supplied) 77. We may also, at this stage, deal with the submission of Sri. Sriranga that the judgments in the cases of Shail Kumari (supra) and Nagappa Manneppa Naik (supra), the Courts have not considered the aspect of contravention of Rules 80 and 82 of the Electricity Rules, 1956 and also in Shail Kumari (supra), the accident occurred due to snapping of electrical wires and leakage of electricity, which is not the case in these appeals. We are not in agreement with this submission of Sri. Sriranga for the reason the Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta (supra), has clearly held that the defendant is always liable for injuries regardless of fault. In strict liability, the defendants are only liable if they are negligent. So in that sense, an entity is liable in view of the usage of the dangerous substance which is not the case in strict liability. In this case, we find that the learned Single Judge has noted the statutory - 27 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 obligations of an electric company to ensure during transmission and distribution irrespective of the duties of the consumers. So in that sense, the plea that facts are disputed and cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction would be without merit and inconsequential when the liability is absolute. At this stage, we may reproduce the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta (supra), more specifically at paragraphs No.32, wherein the Supreme Court has held as under on the liability of an entity to pay compensation: “32. We would also like to point out that the measure of compensation in the kind of cases referred to in the preceding paragraph must be corelated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise.” (emphasis supplied) 78. The aforesaid position of law has been reiterated in Parvati Devi’s case (supra), wherein in paragraph No.2, the Supreme Court has held as under: “2. The appellants moved the High Court of Delhi claiming compensation as the husband of Appellant 1 died on account of electrocution while walking on the road. That the death was on account of electric shock is established in view of the CFSL report from Calcutta. But as the appellants could not produce relevant materials indicating the negligence of any particular officer of the - 28 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 authority, the High Court refused to award compensation. It is against this order, the present appeal has been filed. Once it is established that the death occurred on account of electrocution while walking on the road, necessarily the authorities concerned must be held to be negligent, and therefore, in the case in hand, it would be NDMC who would be responsible for the death in question. It is found from the records that the appellant was serving as a machineman in The Statesman and was aged 54 years on the date of death, and the age of retirement is 60 years. Taking these factors into consideration, we direct that the appellants, who are the legal heirs of the deceased, be awarded compensation to the tune of Rs 1,00,000 and NDMC should pay the same within 3 months from today failing which it will carry interest at the rate of 12 %. This should be in total satisfaction of the compensation for the legal heirs of the deceased.” 9. The Co-ordinate Bench in the aforesaid judgment has rejected the similar contentions urged in this appeal. 10. Another contention of the appellants is that there are illegal occupants beneath the high tension wire and for their lapses, they cannot seek compensation, the - 29 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 records indicate that the villagers have submitted two representations dated 04.11.2011 and 11.11.2011. However, no steps have been taken to shift the high tension wire nor any precaution is taken to cover the same. Admittedly, the 11KV wires were without any cover and when the respondent came in contact with the live wire, he sustained grievous injury resulting in amputation of his hand. The appellants have sent a communication dated 26.09.2013 at Annexure-G1 which indicates that the appellants requested the villagers to vacate the premises alleging that they have illegally put up the construction. However, no material is placed on record to indicate that the respondent and others are residing illegally and if so, nothing has prevented the appellants from taking steps to vacate them, which has been rightly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while holding that the appellants are liable for negligence and directed them to pay the compensation. - 30 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 11. The third contention of the appellants is that the respondent has failed to intimate/file a complaint with the Electrical Inspector as required under Section 161 of the Act and failing to do so, is a lapse on the part of the respondent and that there is a delay in filing the writ petition which has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and hence, calls for interference. Such a contention of the appellants is liable to be rejected for the simple reason that immediately after the incident, FIR came to registered in Cr.No.139/2013 and legal notice dated 23.09.2013 came to be issued seeking for compensation. It is also not in dispute that the respondent has approached District Consumer Forum and only after closure of the proceedings, he has filed the writ petition. Hence, such a bona-fide act of the respondent cannot be turned as a wilful laches in filing the writ petition. The learned Single Judge considering the ratio of Rekha’s case and applying the principles of assessment of compensation under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, has awarded just compensation. - 31 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 12. In our considered view, the findings of the learned Single Judge are strictly in consonance with the law laid down by another learned Single Judge in the case of Rekha and others referred supra, which has been upheld by the Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited referred supra do not calls for any interference in this appeal. The elaborate findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are neither perverse nor contrary to the material available on record and the law calling for any interference in this appeal. Having held that the appeal is devoid of merit, the contempt proceeding is closed for the time being with a liberty to file a fresh contempt petition, if the appellants fail to comply with the order of the learned Single Judge within the extended time mentioned below. The time to comply the direction of the learned Single Judge is extended by eight weeks from today. 13. For the aforementioned reasons, we proceed to pass the following: - 32 - WA NO.200051 OF 2024 C/W CCC NO.200156 OF 2024 ORDER i) W.A.No.200051/2024 is dismissed. ii) The time to comply with the direction of the learned Single Judge is extended by eight weeks from today. iii) CCC No.200156/2024 is closed with the liberty to the respondent/complainant to file the contempt petition, if need arises. iv) No orders to cost. Sd/- (K NATARAJAN) JUDGE Sd/- (VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL) JUDGE MCR CT: PS