1 2025:HHC:25023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. :   255 of 2011 Decided on :    28.07.2025 Kishori Lal …Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1   Yes. For the petitioner : Petitioner in person with  Mr. Vijay Chaudhary, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. H.S. Rawat & Mr. Varun Chandel, Additional Advocates General,   and   Mr. Rohit Sharma,   Deputy   Advocate General. Virender Singh, Judge. Petitioner­Kishori Lal has preferred the present revision   petition,   against   the   judgment,   dated   19th November, 2011, passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Appellate Court’), in Criminal Appeal No. 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:25023 24 of 2010, titled as Kishori Lal versus State of Himachal Pradesh. 2. Vide judgment, dated 19th November, 2011, the learned Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal of the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as ‘the convict’), which he had preferred against the judgment of conviction, dated 18th  February,   2010   and   order   of   sentence,   dated   22nd February, 2010, passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.I, Sundernagar, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial   Court’)   in   Police   Challan   No.752­I/2002   (322­ II/2002),   titled   as   State   of   Himachal   Pradesh   versus Kishori Lal. 3. The   learned   trial   Court,   vide   judgment   of conviction and order of sentence, as referred to above, has convicted  the convict  for  the offences  punishable under Sections   279,   337   and   338   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’), as under: (i)  For the  offence  punishable  under  Section 279  IPC, the convict has  been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of   500/­; ₹ 3 2025:HHC:25023 (ii) For the offence punishable under Section 337  IPC, the convict has  been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of   500/­; and ₹ (iii) For the offence punishable under Section 338  IPC, the convict has  been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of   500/­. ₹ In default of payment of fine, the convict has been   directed   to   further   undergo   simple imprisonment for a period of one month. The learned trial Court has also directed the sentences, so awarded, to run concurrently. 4. Today, the convict, vide his separate statement, has  stated that  he  does not  want  to  press the  present petition,   against   the   judgment   of   conviction,   dated   18th February,   2010,   however,   he   has   prayed   that   he   may kindly be released on probation, by modifying the order of sentence dated 22nd February, 2010. He has also deposed that he is the sole bread earner of his family, comprising his parents, wife and two children. 5. The   judgment   of   conviction,   dated   18th February,   2010  and   the   order   of   sentence,   dated   22nd February,   2010,   passed   by   the   learned   trial   Court, perused. 4 2025:HHC:25023 6. As per the said order, the learned trial Court, has not considered the question of releasing the convict on probation,   whereas,   the   learned   Appellate   Court   has considered this question. However, in view of the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh versus State of Haryana,  (2000)   5   Supreme   Court   Cases   82,   and Thakur   Singh  versus  State   of   Punjab,   (2003)   9 Supreme   Court   Cases   208,  the   said   relief   has   been declined to the convict. 7. In this case, the report of the Probation Officer has been called for. In the report, the Probation Officer has recommended to extend the benefit of probation to the convict, vide his report, dated 23rd June, 2025. 8. Now,   the   question,   which   arises   for determination, before this Court, is about the fact as to whether   the   relief   of   probation   can   be   extended   to   the convict. 9. As stated above, the learned Appellate Court, in this   case,   has   relied   upon   the   decision   of   the   Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Dalbir Singh’s case (supra), to decline the relief of probation, to the convict. 5 2025:HHC:25023 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in  Dalbir Singh’s case (supra), has categorically excluded Section 304­A IPC. Relevant   paragraphs­13   and   14   of   the   judgment,   are reproduced, as under: “13. Bearing in mind  the  galloping trend  in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences   visiting   the   victims   and   their families,   criminal   courts   cannot   treat   the nature of the offence under Section 304­A IPC as   attracting   the   benevolent   provisions   of Section 4 of the P.O. Act. While considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving   of   automobiles,   one   of   the   prime considerations   should   be   deterrence. A professional  driver pedals  the  accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal  of   a  vehicle   in locomotion. He   cannot and  should  not take  a chance  think that  a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not   necessarily   result   in   the   death   of   any human being; or even if such death ensues he might   not   be   convicted   of   the   offence;   and lastly that even if he is convicted he would be dealt   with   leniently   by   the   court. He   must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human  being due  to his  callous driving of vehicle he cannot escape from jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles. 6 2025:HHC:25023 14. Thus, bestowing our serious consideration on the arguments addressed by the learned counsel   for   the   appellant   we   express   our inability to lean to the benevolent provision to Section   4   of   the   P.O.   Act. The   appeal   is accordingly dismissed.” 11. Even,   in   the   said   judgment,   the   Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the power of the Court to extend the benefit of probation, depends upon the nature of offence committed. In this regard, relevant paragraphs­ 8 to 10, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “8. Parliament made it clear that only if the court forms the opinion that it is expedient to release him on probation for his good conduct regard being had to the circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances which cannot be sidelined in forming the said opinion is “the nature of the offence.” 9. Thus Parliament has left it to the court to decide when and how the court should form such opinion. It provided sufficient indication that   releasing   the   convicted   person   on probation of good conduct must appear to the court to be expedient. The word “expedient” had   been   thoughtfully   employed   by   the Parliament in the section so as to mean it as “apt   and   suitable   to   the   end   in   view”. In Black’s Law Dictionary the word expedient is defined   as   “suitable   and   appropriate   for accomplishment of a specified object” besides the other meaning referred to earlier. In State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabri , AIR (1974) SC 2233, a three Judge Bench of this Court has considered the word “expedient”. Learned Judges have observed in paragraph 21 thus: (SCC p. 145) 7 2025:HHC:25023 “Again,   the   word   ‘expedient’   used   in   this provisions, has several shades of meaning. In one dictionary sense, ‘expedient’ (adj.) means ‘apt and suitable to the end in view’, ‘practical and efficient’; ‘politic’; ‘profitable’; ‘advisable’, ‘fit, proper and suitable to the circumstances of the case’. In another shade, it means a device   ‘characterized   by   mere   utility   rather than principle conducive to special advantage rather than to what is universally right’ (see Webster’s New International Dictionary).” 10. It   was   then   held   that   the   court   must construe the said word in keeping with the context and object of the provision in its widest amplitude. Here the word “expedient” is used in Section 4 of the P.O. Act in the context of casting a duty on the court to take into account “the circumstances of the case including the nature   of   the   offence......…”. This   means Section 4 can be resorted to when the court considers   the   circumstances   of   the   case, particularly the nature of the offence, and the court forms its opinion that it is suitable and appropriate   for   accomplishing   a   specified object  that  the  offender can be  released  on probation of good conduct.” 12. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Dalbir Singh’s case (supra), has again been considered by the   Hon’ble   Supreme   Court,   in  State   through   Central Bureau   of   Investigation,   Anti   Corruption   Branch, Chandigarh versus Sanjiv Bhalla and  another,  reported in  (2015)   13   Supreme   Court   Cases   444. Relevant paragraph­28, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: 8 2025:HHC:25023 “28. To sum up: 28.1. For awarding a just sentence, the trial Judge   must   consider   the   provisions   of   the Probation of Offenders Act and the provisions on probation in the Criminal Procedure Code; 28.2   When   it   is   not   possible   to   release   a convict   on   probation,   the   trial   Judge   must record his or her reasons; 28.3. The grant of compensation to the victim of a crime is equally a part of just sentencing; 28.4. When   it   is   not   possible   to   grant compensation to the victim of a crime, the trial Judge must record his or her reasons; and 28.5. The Trial Judge must always be alive to alternative methods of a mutually satisfactory disposition of a case.” 13. The   Hon’ble   Supreme   Court,   in  Paul   George versus   State   of   NCT   of   Delhi,  reported   in  (2008)   4 Supreme Court Cases 185,  has released a person, who has been convicted, under Sections 279 and 304­A IPC. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paragraph­12 of the said judgment, as under: “12. This litigation has been going on for the last 20   years   and   has   been   fought   tenaciously through various courts, we are also told that the appellant who has had a good career throughout but   for   this   one   aberration   has   since   been dismissed   from   service   on   account   of   his conviction. We, therefore, while dismissing the appeal, feel that the ends of justice would be met if   we   direct   that   the   appellant   be   released   on 9 2025:HHC:25023 probation   under   Section   4   of   the   Probation   of Offenders Act, 1958 on conditions to be imposed by the trial court. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.” 14. This   Court,   in   cases,   titled   as  Ram   Rattan versus State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in 1989 (1) Sim.L.C. 359, and State of H.P. versus Khushal Singh & Anr.,  reported   in  1997   (2)   Cur. L.J.   (HP)   235,  has released   the   persons,   on   probation,   who   had   been convicted under Sections 279 and 304­A IPC. 15. Similarly,   in  Criminal   Revision   No.   151   of 2011, titled as  Nand Kishore versus State of Himachal Pradesh,  decided   on   4th  October,   2016,   this   Court   has released a person, who  was  convicted,  for  the  offences, punishable under Sections 279 and 337 IPC. 16. In view of the decisions, as referred to above, there is no legal hesitation for this Court to extend the benefit of probation, under Section 4 of the Probation of Offender’s Act, to the convict. 17. The report of the Probation Officer perused. 18. Perusal of the  report of the Probation Officer shows that FIR No.287/01, dated 3.9.2001, under Sections 10 2025:HHC:25023 201 IPC and Section 187 of MV Act, with Police Station Sundernagar and FIR No.131/13, dated 21.5.2013, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 IPC and Section 187 of the M.V. Act, with Police Station Sarkaghat, were registered against the convict, however, he has been acquitted in both the cases. 19. The Probation Officer has specifically mentioned that the conduct of the convict, during past years, in the society, is good. 20. The offences, for which, the convict has been convicted, are not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The convict is having the permanent abode in District Mandi, as per the report of the Probation Officer. The   convict   has   already   faced   the   agony   of   the   trial, including   the   pendency   of   the   appeal,   as   well   as   the revision petition, for the last twenty three years. 21. Our   Criminal   Jurisprudence   System   is reformatory in nature. With the passage of time, it has been   realized   that   sending   the   first   offender   to   jail,   to undergo   substantive   sentence,   does   not   produce   good 11 2025:HHC:25023 results,   as,   the   first   offender/convict,   sometimes,   may come in contact with the hardened criminals. 22. The   probation   is   a   kind   of   non­custodial sentence, by giving an opportunity to the convict to reform himself, while abiding by certain conditions, imposed by the Court, for a certain period. It is a reformatory measure to   achieve   the   object,   by   giving   an   opportunity   to   the convict,   to   reform   himself,   instead   of   directing   him   to undergo substantive sentence. 23. The convict  is the first offender and the sole bread earner of his family. Rejecting the prayer of the convict   to   release   him   on   probation,   would   amount   to punishing his family members, for the offences, committed by the convict. 24. Considering   the   nature   of   the   offences,   this Court is of the view that it would be expedient to release the   convict   on   probation   of   good   conduct,   instead   of directing him to undergo substantive sentence, as imposed by the learned trial Court. 25. Considering all these facts, the revision petition of   the   convict   is   dismissed   against   the   judgment   of 12 2025:HHC:25023 conviction,   however,   in   view   of   the   discussions   made above, the  order  of  sentence is  ordered  to be modified. Instead of directing the convict to undergo the substantive sentence, he is directed to be released on probation of good conduct, on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of 50,000/­, with one surety of the like amount,  to the ₹ satisfaction of the learned trial Court, to keep peace and be of good behaviour, for a period of two years and to receive the substantive sentence, as and when, called upon to do so, during the period of two years. 26. 26. The convict is also directed to deposit a sum of ₹ 20,000/­, which shall be in addition to the fine amount, already deposited by him, in this case, with the learned trial Court, within a period of one month from today. The said amount of   20,000/­ shall be paid to all the injured ₹ persons, in equal shares, as compensation, by the learned trial Court, after issuing notices to them, in this regard. 27. It is clarified that in case of violation of any of the   conditions,   so   imposed,   including   the   terms   and conditions of the requisite bonds, the order of sentence shall revive automatically, without reference to this Court. 13 2025:HHC:25023 In that eventuality,  the convict is directed to surrender before the learned trial Court, to undergo the substantive sentence. 28. In   view   of  the  above,   the   revision  petition  is partly allowed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are also disposed of accordingly. ( Virender Singh ) Judge July 28, 2025 ( ps )