AABID MAJEED SHEIKH ALIAS RAJGADE v. UNION TERRITORY OF J AND K AND ORS. (HOME)
HCP/115/2025 · 2025-11-21
Sanjay Dhar
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 11367 (JK) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 11367 (JK) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
HCP No.115/2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR Reserved on: 13.11.2025 Pronounced on: 21.11.2025 Uploaded on: 21.11.2025 Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full HCP No.115/2025 AABID MAJEED SHEIKH @RAJGADE
...PETITIONER/APPELLANT(S) Through: - Mr. S. T. Hussain, Sr. Advocate, with Ms. Nida Nazir, Advocate. Vs.
UT OF J&K & ORS
…RESPONDENT(S) Through: - Mr. Mohsin-ul-Showkat Qadiri, Sr. AAG, with Mr. Furqan Yaqub Sofi, GA.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE.
JUDGMENT 1) The petitioner, through the medium of present petition, has challenged detention order bearing No.28/DMP/PSA/25 dated 03.05.2025, passed by District Magistrate, Pulwama- respondent No.2, whereby Aabid Majeed Sheikh @Rajgade (“the detenue”), has been placed under preventive detention with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State. 2) The petitioner has contended that the material forming basis of the grounds of detention and the translated version thereof has not been furnished to the detenue which disabled
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him from making an effective representation against his detention. It has been contended that the grounds of detention are vague and non-existent, on the basis of which no prudent person can make an effective representation. It has also been contended that the detenue was already in custody at the time of passing of the impugned detention
order and there was no need of passing an order of preventive detention. 3) The respondents have contested the writ petition by filing their reply affidavit, wherein they have contended that the activities of detenue are highly prejudicial to security of the State. It is pleaded that whole of the material relied upon by the detaining authority has been furnished to the detenue and the same was read over and explained to him and that the detenue was informed that he can make a representation to the government as well as to the detaining authority against his detention. It is further contended in the reply affidavit that all statutory requirements and constitutional guarantees have been fulfilled and complied with by the detaining authority and that the impugned order has been issued validly and legally. The respondents have produced the detention record to lend credence to the stand taken in the counter affidavit. HCP No.115/2025
4) I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 5) Although the petitioner has raised a number of grounds for assailing the impugned order of detention yet, during the course of arguments, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has laid much emphasis on the following grounds: (I) That the Government of Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir does not have competence to prescribe the period of detention under the provisions contained in Article 22(7) of the Constitution of India. It has been further contended that after the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India, the provisions contained in the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, could not have been applied. (II) That whole of the material forming basis of the grounds of detention has not been furnished to the petitioner nor translated version thereof was furnished to him so as to enable him to make an effective and suitable representation against the impugned order of detention. 6) So far as the first contention raised by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is concerned, it is to be noted that the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act has been enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir in the year 1978.
After coming
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into force of the Jammu and Kashmir Re-organization Act, 2019, certain enactments legislated framed by the erstwhile State Legislature have been repealed whereas certain other legislations framed by the erstwhile State Legislature have been saved for their application to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Table-4 of the Fifth Schedule of the J&K Re-organization Act gives the list of enactments which continue to remain in force in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh even after re- organization of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, is one of the enactments which finds mention in the said table. Therefore, the said Act continues to have application in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. 7) That takes us to the issue as to whether the State Legislature has the power to fix the period of detention, as, according to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, clause (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India vests such power only with the Parliament. This question came up for discussion before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Fagu Shaw vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 613. The Supreme Court while deliberating upon this issue observed as under:
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14. Under Entry 3 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, both Parliament and State Legislatures have plenary power to pass laws for preventive detention as respects the subjects mentioned therein. As ancillary to that power, or, as an inseparable part of it, Parliament and State Legislatures have power to fix the period of detention also. One cannot imagine a power to pass a law for detention unless that power carries with it the incidental power to provide for the period of such detention. Therefore, both Parliament and State Legislatures have power under the entry to provide for detention of a person for a specified period.
The purpose of Article 22(4)(a) is to put a curb on that power by providing that no law shall authorize the detention of a person for a period exceeding three months unless an Advisory Board has reported within the period of three months that there is sufficient cause for detention. And, what the proviso means is that even if the Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of three months that there is sufficient cause for detention, the period of detention beyond three months shall not exceed the maximum period that might be fixed by any law made by Parliament under Article 22(7)(b). The proviso cannot mean that even if Parliament does not pass a law fixing the maximum period under Article 22(7)(b), the State Legislatures, for example, cannot pass a law which provides for detention of a person beyond three months. The period of such detention viz. detention beyond the period of three months, would then be a matter within the plenary power of Parliament or State Legislatures, as the case may be, as such a power is incidental to the power to pass a law with respect to the topics covered by Entry 3 of List III. 15. It is therefore clear that, but for the proviso to clause (4)(a) of Article 22, the Act, as it provides for the opinion of the Advisory Board, can authorise detention of a person for any period, by virtue of the plenary character of the legislative power conferred by the Entry. Whether such a law is liable to
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be struck down on the ground that it imposes unreasonable restrictions upon the fundamental rights under Article 19 is an altogether different question.
The proviso says in effect that if Parliament fixes the maximum period under Article 22(7)(b), the power of Parliament and State Legislatures to fix the period of detention in a law passed under the Entry would be curtailed to that extent. 8) From the analysis of aforesaid legal position, it is clear that both Parliament and State legislatures have plenary power to pass laws for preventive detention and ancillary to that power, the Parliament and the State legislature have power to fix the period of detention also. In these circumstances, the contention of the petitioner that the State legislature did not have power to fix the period of detention is misconceived and is, therefore, without any merit. 9) The second contention that has been raised by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is with regard to non-furnishing of whole of the material relied upon by the detaining authority while framing the grounds of detention. In this regard a perusal of the detention record would show that the petitioner has received total 39 leaves comprising copy of detention warrant (01 leaf), notice of detention (01 leaf), grounds of detention (03 leaves), dossier (06 leaves) and other related documents (28 leaves). The detention record also contains a certificate of the Executing Officer, wherein he has declared that he has furnished the aforesaid documents to
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the petitioner and that he has read over and explained the contents of these documents to him in Urdu and Kashmiri languages. Another document, which is available in the detention record, reveals that the petitioner has not only been furnished the English version of the material but he has also been furnished Urdu versions of the grounds of detention and police dossier. The material available on the detention record clearly contradicts the contention raised by the petitioner that he has not been furnished whole of the material/documents forming basis of the grounds of detention or their translated version. The contention of the petitioner in this regard is, therefore, without any merit. 10) For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order of detention.
The petition lacks merit and is dismissed accordingly. 11) The detention record be returned to the learned counsel for the respondents. (Sanjay Dhar)
Judge Srinagar 21.11.2025
“Bhat Altaf-Secy” Whether the order is reportable: Yes/No