APHC010131192024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3330] WEDNESDAY, THE TENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO WRIT PETITION No. 6927/2024 BETWEEN: 1. K VENKATA CHALAPATHI, S/o.K.SESHAIAH, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, R/o.D.No.9-171-A, BHAHADURPET, SRIKALAHASTI, TIRUPATI DISTRICT. 2. K. VISHNU VARDHAN, S/o. K.VENKATA CHALAPATHI, AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS, R/o. D.No.9-171-A, BHAHADURPET, SRIKALAHASTI-517644, TIRUPATI DISTRICT. 3. K. NARASA REDDY, S/o. K.RAMANA REDDY, AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS, R/O.KALAVAKURU VILLAGE AND POST, PELLAKUR MANDAL, SPSR NELLORE DISTRICT. 4. K. SUDHAKAR REDDY, S/o. K. RADHAKRISHNA REDDY, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, R/o.D.NO.5-335, M.G.STREET, SRIKALAHASTI, TIRUPATI DISTRICT. 5. B. HARIPRASAD REDDY, S/o. B. RAMANA REDDY, AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS, R/O.H.NO.8-5-173/1, ROAD No.3, MALLIKHARJUN COLONY, OLD BOYINAPALLI, SECUNDERABAD. 6. P. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY, S/o. GOPAL REDDY, AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS, R/O.FLAT No.302, SB RESIDENCY, BRUNDAVANAM COLONY, BOYINAPALLI, SECUNDERABAD. 7. N. SURESH, S/o. P.SESHAGIRI RAO, AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS, R/o. PLOT No.5, NORTH NCL, KOMPALLI, RANGA REDDY DISTRICT. 8. B. DEEPA RANI, W/o. N.BALA SUBRAMANYAM, AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, R/o.D.No.15-21-18/202, BALAJI NAGAR, KUKATPALLI, HYDERABAD. 2 9. PHANINDRUDU KAIYAMPUDI, S/o. K. NAGENDRUDU, AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS, R/o. FLAT No.C-303, HENADRI TOWERS, VIVEKANANDANAGAR KUKATPALLI, HYDERABAD. 10. K.SUBBA REDDY, S/o. K.RAMASUBBA REDDY, AGED 52 YEARS, R/o. PEDDAKANNALI VILLAGE, THOTTAMBEDU MANDAL, TIRUPATI DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER(S) AND 1. THE NATIONAL HIGH WAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA, (NHAI) REP. BY ITS CHAIRMAN, G5 G6, SECTOR-10, DWARAKA, NEW DELHI-10075 2. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR/ARBITRATOR, UNDER NH ACT, 1956, TIRUPATI DISTRICT, TIRUPATI. 3. THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY, (LA), (6 LANE) AND SUB COLLECTOR, TIRUPATI, RENIGUNTA-POYYA SECTION, NH- 71, CHITTOOR DISTRICT NOW TIRUPATI DISTRICT, TIRUPATI. ...RESPONDENT(S): Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue any appropriate Writ, Order or direction, preferably a Writ in the nature of Mandamus declaring the impugned orders of the 2nd respondent in dismissing the petitioners arbitration/appeal petitions vide impugned proceedings Rc.No.G6/15/2024/322 / Arbitration / LA/ NH -1 / Peddakannali (V)/Thottambedu(M) Rc.No.G6/15/2024/328/Arbitration of the petitioner 1st /LA/ NH- 1 / Peddakannali (V)/Thottambedu(M) of the 2nd petitioner Re. No. G6 /15/ 2024/325/Arbitration / LA/NH-1 / Peddakannali petitioner the 3rd(V) /Thottanibedu(M) of LA / NH -1 / PeddakannaliRc.No.G6/15/2024/332/Arbitration/ (V)/Thottambedu(M) of the 4th petitioner Rc.No.G6/15 / 2024/ 330 / Arbitration / LA/ NH-1 /Peddakannali (V)/ petitioner 5thof theThottambedu(M) /LA/NH-1/ PeddakannaliRc.No.G6/15/2024/331/Arbitration (V)/Thottambedu(M) of the 6th petitioner Rc.No.G6/15/ 2024/333 / Arbitration /LA/NH-1 / Peddakannali Thottambedu(M) of the 7th petitioner Rc.No.G6/15/2024/327/ Arbitration/ LA/NH-1/Peddakannali (V)/Thottambedu(M) of the (V)/ Rc.No.G6/15/2024/326/ Arbitration/LA/NH-8th petitioner 1/Peddakannali (V)/Thottainbedu(M) of the 9th petitioner Arbitration /LA/ NH-1 / PeddakannaliRc.No.G6/15/2024/329/ petitioner10ththeof(V) 3 /Thottambedu(M) Arbitration / LA/NH-1 / Peddakannali Rc.No.G6/ 15/2024/329/ (V)/Thottambedu(M) of the 10th petitioner dated 18.01.2024 on the within the limitation, as isconceived ground that same are barred by limitation though the petitioners appeals are illegal, arbitrary, violative of Article-14, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India and consequently set aside the aforesaid impugned orders of the 2nd respondent with a further direction to the 2nd respondent to determine the just compensation as per the provisions of NH Act, 1956 which is a expropriatory legislation and pass such other order or orders. Counsel for the Petitioner(S): 1. K RATHANGA PANI REDDY Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION 2. MUDUNURI ANAND KUMAR The Court made the following: 4 ORDER: The present Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following relief/s: “……to issue any appropriate Writ, Order or direction, preferably a Writ in the nature of Mandamus declaring the impugned orders of the 2nd respondent in dismissing the petitioners arbitration/appeal petitions vide impugned orders proceedings Rc.No.G6/15/2024/322/Arbitration/LA/NH-1/ Peddakannali (V)/ Thottambedu(M) of the 1st petitioner; Rc.No.G6/15/2024/ 328/Arbitration/LA/NH-1/Peddakannali(V) /Thottambedu(M) of the 2nd petitioner; Rc.No.G6/ 15/2024/ 325/Arbitration/LA/NH-1/Peddakannali(V)/ Thottambedu(M) of the 3rd petitioner; Rc.No.G6/15/2024/ 332/Arbitration/ LA/NH- 1/Peddakannali(V)/Thottambedu(M) of the 4th petitioner; Rc.No.G6/15/2024/330/Arbitration/LA/NH-1/Peddakannali (V)/ Thottambedu(M) of the 5th petitioner; Rc.No.G6/15/ 2024/331/ Arbitration/LA/NH-1/Peddakannali (V)/ Thottambedu (M) of the 6th petitioner; Rc.No.G6/15/2024/333/Arbitration/LA/NH-1/ Peddakannali (V)/Thottambedu(M) of the 7th petitioner; Rc.No.G6/15/2024/327/Arbitration/LA/NH-1/Peddakannali (V)/ Thottambedu (M) of the 8th petitioner; Rc.No.G6/15/ 2024/326/Arbitration/LA/NH-1/Peddakannali (V)/ Thottambedu (M) of the 9th petitioner; Rc.No.G6/15/2024/329/ Arbitration/ LA/NH-1/Peddakannali (V)/ Thottambedu(M) of the 10th petitioner; dated 18.01.2024 on the misconceived ground that same are barred by limitation though the petitioners appeals are within the limitation, as illegal, arbitrary, violative of Article- 5 14, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India and consequently set aside the aforesaid impugned orders of the 2nd respondent with a further direction to the 2nd respondent to determine the just compensation as per the provisions of NH Act, 1956 which is a expropriatory legislation and pass such other order or further orders ……. 2. Succinctly, the case of the petitioners is that they have purchased plots from the TUDA approved layout vide TLP No.1/2014/A, in Sy.No.477/2013A, with a fond hope that those plots will be useful to meet their financial necessities at the fag-end of their life and the compensation was treating the plots as agricultural lands, aggrieved for granting meager compensation, the petitioners have involved arbitration proceedings before the 2nd Respondent-Collector and he has dismissed the said applications on the misconceived ground that the petitioners’ applications are barred by limitation. The 2nd Respondent-District Collector passed impugned order dismissing arbitration/appeal petitions on the misconceived ground that the applications are barred by limitation by taking date of the award dt.16.11.2018, though as stated above the said award was behind back the petitioners and the 3rd Respondent paid the award amount only on 04.10.2021 vide proceedings No.LA/NHAI/Award No.01/Peddakkannali(V)/ Thottambedu(M) dt.04.10.2021 and they received the amount under protest as stated supra and limitation will start only from the date onwards and their applications are within the limitation, whereas in most misconceived and capricious manner the 2nd respondent dismissed the arbitration petitions 6 though the petitioners have lost their life for having departed their valuable house site in the approved layout purchase for valuable sale consideration. 3. In the recent Full Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Sterling Industries vs Jayprakash Associates Ltd.1, the Apex Court while dealing with a similar issue under MSMED Act, referred the earlier judgment of Apex Court in the case of SBP & Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr.2, and in paragraph No. 45 held as follows. "It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award including any in-between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the arbitral tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral tribunal is after all, the creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the arbitral tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, 1 (2021) 18 SCC 367 2 (2005) 8 SCC 618 7 therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the arbitral tribunal 3 is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible." 4. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of their grievance. 5. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Sri Ganesh Chandra Ghosh & Others Vs. State of West Bengal & Others3 has set aside the arbitration award passed by the Arbitrator comprised under the NHAI Act, as no notice of arbitration proceedings was provided to the parties therein. The Division Bench took a view that not issuing a notice is a flagrant violation of principles of natural justice and the remedy available under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Reconciliation Act, 1996, rather has remanded the matter back to the statutory arbitrator for fresh adjudication. 6. The petitioner is only questioning the arbitrary procedure followed by the Respondent No.2 while passing the impugned order and the manner in which the impugned order was passed is highhanded, preposterous, 3 M.A.T.No.784 of 2020 8 iniquitous and presumptuous and violative of Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution of India and in utter derogation and disregard to the provisions of the NHAI Act and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Therefore, it is submitted that the matter at hand also cannot be relegated to avail remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Reconciliation Act. 7. Hence, urged this Court to set aside the impugned proceedings and to remand the matter to the Arbitrator for fresh adjudication. 8. The Calcutta High Court held that disposing of arbitration proceedings without issuing a notice to the parties is “flagrant violation of principles of natural justice and statutory procedure” and resultantly the award under challenge therein was set aside. 9. Now the point that arises for consideration is, whether the impugned order in the present Writ Petition is sustainable or liable to be set aside? 10. Under Section 3G(6) of the National Highways Act 1956 (for short the Act), a landowner or claimant has the right to submit an application for increased compensation to the arbitrator. In this case, the application for enhancement of the compensation was rejected at the outset on the ground that it was filed beyond three years invoking Art 137 of the Limitation Act 1963. 11. Section 3G(6) of the Act subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act.(NHAI) 9 12. The writ petitioner has submitted an Arbitration application under Section 3G(6) of the National Highways Act, 1956 which was dismissed by the District Collector/Arbitrator on 18.01.2024 due to being barred by limitation. Observing in the following: “The limitation provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable in the matter of filing of an Arbitration Petition/application invoking the Arbitration, which is three (3) years from the date of cause of action (the date of award by CALA in regard to land acquisition under the N.H. Act, 1956. This is in accordance with the statutory provisions in NH Act, 1956 and Arbitration and Reconciliation Act, 1996”. 13. The writ petitioner specifically argues that even if an application is submitted under section 3G(6) of the Act after the limitation, the arbitrator has not provided an opportunity to present the case of the petitioner in which constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice. 14. Even the argument presented by the respondents that the claim is barred by limitation is accepted, the arbitrator cannot dismiss the application without seeking clarification from the petitioner regarding the maintainability of the appeal in light of the limitation issue. 15. In Dharampal Satyapal Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati4 the Apex court observed in the following: "Whether it is open to the authority, which has to take a decision, to dispense with the requirement of the principles of natural 4 (2015) 8 SCC 519 10 justice on the ground that affording such an opportunity will not make any difference? To put it otherwise, can the administrative authority dispense with the requirement of issuing notice by itself deciding that no prejudice will be caused to the person against whom the action is contemplated? Answer has to be in the negative. It is not permissible for the authority to jump over the compliance of the principles of natural justice on the ground that even if hearing had been provided it would have served no useful purpose. The opportunity of hearing will serve the purpose or not has to be considered at a later stage and such things cannot be presumed by the authority. 16. In view of my foregoing discussion as encapsulated above and the judgment of the Apex Court in Dharampal Satyapal Limited case (referred supra 2), I find merit in the contention raised by the petitioner’s counsel and the writ petition should be allowed in order to remand the matter to the arbitrator, directing the arbitrator to issue a notice that allows the petitioner an opportunity to put forth his case. 17. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any shall stand closed. ___________________________________ JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO Date: 10.09.2025 Harin 11 172 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO W.P.No. 6927 OF 2024 Date: 10-09-2025 Harin