Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Uttarakhand · body

2025 DAILYLAW 11316 (UTT)

VIPIN KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

CRLR/638/2024 · 2025-02-27

Alok Mahra

body2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

No Date Office Notes, reports, orders or proceedings or directions and Registrar’s order with Signatures COURT’S OR JUDGES’S ORDERS ` CRLR No. 638 of 2024 Hon’ble Alok Mahra, J. Heard Mr. Shariq Khurshid, learned counsel for the revisionist and Mr. Akshay Latwal, learned Brief Holder for the State. 2. This criminal revision is preferred against the interlocutory order dated 21.08.2024 passed by learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun/Special Judge, Vigilance, District Dehradun in SST No. 02 of 2020, whereby, his application moved under Section 311 Cr.P.C. has been rejected. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the order under challenge. 4. Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) states that the power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. 5. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Girish Kumar Suneja Vs. CBI reported in (2017) 14 SCC 809 has held as follows:- “24. The second reason why Amar Nath is important is that it invokes the principle, in the context of criminal law, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Therefore, when Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference with interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to set aside an interlocutory order. This is what this Court held: “3. While we fully agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that where a revision to the High Court against the order of the Subordinate Judge is expressly barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code the inherent powers contained in Section 482 would not be available to defeat the bar contained in Section 397(2). Section 482 of the 1973 Code contains the inherent powers of the Court and does not confer any new powers but preserves the powers which the High Court already possessed. A harmonious construction of Sections 397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under Section 397(2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of Section 482 would not apply. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject-matter. Where there is an express provision, barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers. 25. This view was reaffirmed in Madhu Limaye when the following principles were approved in relation to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the context of Section 397(2) thereof. The principles are: (1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. Therefore, it is quite clear that the prohibition in Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. will govern Section 482 thereof. We endorse this view. 15. Sethuraman v. Raja Manickchand, (2009) 5 SCC 153. "5. Secondly, what was not realized was that the order passed by the Trial Court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. The Trial Court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent/accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant/complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The Trial Court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders, i.e., one on the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production of documents and other on the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable.” 6. Therefore, I do not find any good ground to entertain this criminal revision, as the present criminal revision has been filed against the interlocutory order, which is barred by Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. 7. Accordingly, this criminal revision is dismissed as not maintainable. (Alok Mahra J.) 27.02.2025 Ujjwal