1 2025:CGHC:38927-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 434 of 2022 Ramchandra Yadav S/o Shri Sanatan Yadav, Aged About 50 Years R/o Sarkanda Seepat Chowk, Near Mukti Dham, P.S. Sarkanda, District Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh) At Present R/o Gupta Dhaba, Amasiwani, P.S. Vidhanshabha, Raipur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh) ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through The P.S. Vidhansabha, Tahsil And District Raipur Chhattisgarh. ---- Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) _________________________________________________________ For Appellant : Mr. Jameel Akhtar Lohani, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Swajeet Ubeja, Panel Lawyer ________________________________________________________ Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 06.08 .2025 1 This matter is listed for hearing on I.A. No.02, which is an application seeking appropriate orders for the release of the appellant on a personal bond, along with the PUD received from the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.). ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.08.06 18:20:46 +0530 2 2 The appellant could not be released on bail in pursuance of this Court’s order dated 23.01.2025 from the concerned jail as he was unable to arrange sureties. Hence, a prayer has been made for his release on a personal bond. 3 This Court, in CRA No.217/2022, on 29.01.2025, had passed the following order: “On 29.08.2024 when it transpires from the impugned judgment dated 12.11.2021 passed by learned trial Court that the co- accused Ajay Singh Baghel did not surrender and absconding, a permanent warrant of arrest was issued by the learned trial Court on 04.12.2020 and trial of the co-accused was separated then the Director General of Police was directed to show cause as to why the permanent warrant issued by the Court on 04.01.2020 against the co-accused Ajay Singh Baghel has not been complied with and to file his personal affidavit apprising this Court what steps have been taken by him for arresting of the said co-accused. On 09.09.2024 the Director General of Police has filed his affidavit in the case and it further transpires that some of the accused persons after being released on short-term bail/parole has not yet surrendered after expiry of his parole, the Director General of Police was further directed to provide a list of such accused person in the State of 3 Chhattisgarh who have been released on short-term bail/parole etc. and have not yet surrendered before the trial Court after their release, if any. On 30.09.2024 the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh has filed his affidavit and submitted the list of the accused persons who have been not surrendered before the concerned trial Court after expiry of the period of their short-term bail/parole and the details of the action/efforts made by police for arresting them and intimated that total 37 accused persons have been released, out of them 8 accused persons have been arrested, 1 accused has died and the Police officials are making their efforts for arresting the remaining 28 accused persons. It is also there in his affidavit that in all has under trial and after the conviction, total 83 accused persons who were released on short-term bail/parole and have not surrendered or absconded till date and then the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh has further directed to monitor the situation and to made efforts for their arrest and to file afresh affidavit. Again on 18.11.2024, the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh has filed his affidavit and submitted that out of 83 accused persons 10 have been arrested, 3 accused persons have been died and 70 accused persons are still absconding and they are 4 making their sincere efforts to get them arrested. The Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh was further directed to file afresh report regarding their efforts made for arresting the absconding accused persons. On 12.12.2024, an affidavit filed by the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh it has been informed that the total 63 accused persons are still absconding after releasing them on short-term bail/parole. When the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh again filed his another affidavit on 27.01.2025 with the following contents: 1. That, the present affidavit is being filed in compliance of the order dated 12/12/2024 passed by the Hon'ble Court. 2 That, in the matter, in compliance of the order dated 18/11/2024, an affidavit has been filed by the deponent. 3 That, subsequent to filing of the aforesaid affidavit, the present case was again listed before the Hon'ble Court for further hearing on 12/12/2024 and after going through the affidavit filed by the deponent in compliance of the order dated 18/11/2024, observing that 63 accused persons are still absconding after being released on short term bail/ parole and efforts are being made to get them arrested, vide order dated 12/12/2024, the Hon'ble Court was again pleased to direct the Director 5 General of Police, Police Headquarters Chhattisgarh, Raipur / deponent herein to file further affidavit with respect to the progress made by him for arrest of remaining accused who are still absconding. 4. That, in compliance of the order dated 12/12/2024 passed by this Hon'ble Court, the deponent respectfully submits that in earlier affidavit, it has been submitted that to comply with the order passed by the Hon'ble Court, the deponent, after receipt of the order as well as communication from the office of the Advocate General, Bilaspur requesting to comply with the order of the Hon ble Court, has immediately acted upon it and in continuation of the same wrote a letter dated 24/12/2024 to all Range Inspector General of Police Chhattisgarh and the Superintendent of Police of Districts Raipur Mahasamund. Gariyaband, Durg, Bemetara Balod Bilaspur Janjgir Champa Korba, Sarangarh Raigarh. Sakti Surguja, Jashpur, Surajpur, Balrampur, Jagdalpur, Kondagaon, Dantewada and Bijapur respectively directed them to supply the information about the further steps / efforts made for arrest of the absconded accused in Proforma -B by 10/01/2025 alongwith hard and soft copy thereof through the mail i.e. cidlawsection1@gmail.com / vidhansabha 6 cid cg@gov.in, by sending the list of names of remaining accused to be arrested and copy of the order dated 12/12/2024 Copy of the letter dated 24/12/2024 is being filed herewith as Annexure D/6. 5. It is respectfully submitted that the said communication was followed by another communication dated 15/01/2025 directing them to supply / provide the information regarding further steps / efforts made for arrest of the remaining accused by 19/01/2025 Copy of the letter dated 15/01/2025 is being filed herewith as Annexure D/7. 6. It is respectfully submitted that before 12/12/2024, total 22 accused, who have been released on short term bail and have not yet surrendered before the concerned Trial Court after their release. were absconded and not arrested despite best sincere and diligent efforts by the Police Officials It is submitted that as per the information received from 9 districts, 3 accused have been arrested and produced before the concerned Trial Court. The said 3 accused are from Garnyaband, Durg and Jashpur District respectively and 19 accused only remain for arrest and to arrest them the concerned Police Officials are making their best and sincere efforts To demonstrate this fact, copy of the chart is being filed herewith as Annexure D/8. 7 7. It is respectfully submitted that further information has been received from 5 Circle Jails of State and according to which, before 12/12/2024 there were 41 accused remained for arrest out of which 7 accused have been arrested and sent them behind the Bar and there are 34 accused remained for arrest. To demonstrate this fact copy of the chart is being fled herewith as Annexure D/9. 8. That, the deponent humbly submits that, the concerned Police Force are making their all sincere and possible efforts for arresting the said accused persons and as soon as the said accused persons are arrested, they would be produced." The affidavit filed by the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh by regular intervals and the latest affidavit dated 27.01.2025 goes to show that earlier there were 83 accused persons absconding presently 63 accused persons are still absconding, therefore, the situation needs regular monitoring. The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to register separate PIL on the issue which is involving in the present case with respect to the efforts made by the Police Authorities to arrest the absconding accused persons who were released on short-term bail/parole and placed a copy of this order in the said PIL which have been passed by this Court time 8 and again and along with the affidavit of Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh shall be made a part of the said PIL. The Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh is further directed to file fresh affidavit regarding the status of the 63 accused persons who are still absconding as to whether they have been arrested or not. The same shall be filed in the PIL which is to be registered separately. ” 4 In pursuance thereof, a suo motu Public Interest Litigation was registered as WPPIL No. 33/2025, and in the said petition, on 14.07.2025, this Court had taken note of the contents of the affidavit filed by the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh, wherein the DGP had informed that as many as 24 such prisoners who were released on bail as of 09.07.2025 were absconding, and efforts were being made to apprehend them. 5 Time and again, we have come across situations where the accused/convicts are released on bail / parole for a limited period, but taking advantage of their release order, some of the accused/ convicts flee and the Police has to make efforts to put them behind the bars for serving their sentence. 6 Considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter, we deem it appropriate to hear the appeal finally as the paper-book is ready and the learned counsel for the parties have also consented for 9 the same in view of the fact that the appellant is in jail since 29.04.2018. 7 Heard Mr. Jameel Akhtar Lohani, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Swajeet Ubeja, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the State/respondent. 8 The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 374(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) questioning the impugned judgment dated 14.01.2022 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, First Fast Track Special Court Raipur (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No.117/2018, whereby the trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant with a direction to run all the sentences concurrently in the following manner :- CONVICTION SENTENCE Under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Rigorous imprisonment for 03 years with fine amount of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 month. Under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Rigorous imprisonment for 03 years with fine amount of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 month. Under Section 376(AB) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Rigorous imprisonment for 20 years with fine amount of Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 06 months. Under Section 506 of Rigorous imprisonment for 01 years with 10 the Indian Penal Code, 1860 fine amount of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 15 days. 9 Learned State counsel submits that notice issued to the mother of the prosecutrix/victim (PW-2) has been served, but none has appeared on behalf of the prosecutrix/victim to contest the present appeal. 10 Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that, the complainant i.e. mother of the victim (PW-2) had lodged a report at the Police Station Vidhan Sabha, Raipur stating that her 12-year-old daughter had gone missing since 05:00 AM on 23.04.2018 without informing anyone. Despite searching in the neighborhood and amongst relatives, the victim was not found. Based on the mother's report, a missing person report No.33/18 was registered, and subsequently, FIR No. 144/2018 was registered under Section 363 IPC vide Ex.P/12, and the case was taken up for investigation. 11 After the recovery of the victim and her statement, along with other investigations, Sections 366 and 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’) were added to the case. 12 During the investigation, underwear of the prosecutrix was seized vide Ex.P/1 and statement of the victim under Section 164 of the 11 Cr.P.C. was recorded vide Ex.P/2. Crime details form has been prepared vide Ex.P/3 and after giving consent (Ex.P/4), prosecutrix was medically examined by Dr. (Smt.) Rajani Chourasia (PW-3) and gave its report vide Ex.P/5. The accused was also medically examined by Dr. S.K. Bhandari (PW-4) and its report is filed as vide Ex.P/7. Dakhil-kharij register of the Government Primary School, Baroda, District Raipur was seized vide Ex.P/10, a copy of which is E.P/9. The appellant was arrested vide arrest memo Ex.P/19. The seized articles were sent for its chemical examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur and the FSL report (Ex.P/26) is found to be positive. 13 Thereafter, statements of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. and, after due investigation, a charge sheet was prepared and presented in the Court of the Seventh Additional Sessions Judge (FTC). The case was later transferred to the Court of Sessions Judge on 06.01.2020 for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. On 05.09.2019, charges were framed against the accused under Sections 363, 366, 376AB, 506 IPC, and Section 6 of the POCSO Act and proceeded on trial. The appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated in the crime in question. 14 So as to prove the complicity of the accused/appellant in the crime in question, prosecution has examined as many as 7 12 witnesses vide PW-1 to PW-7 and exhibited 26 documents as Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/26 in support of its case. In support of the defence, appellant/accused has examined 2 witnesses. 15 The trial Court after completion of trial and after appreciating oral and documentary evidences available on record, by the impugned judgment dated 14.01.2022 convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner mentioned in the seventh paragraph of this judgment, against which this appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred by him calling in question the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 16 Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence led by the prosecution and has wrongly convicted the appellant. The prosecution failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The statements of the victim is full of conjectures and surmises and are highly unreliable. The age of the victim have not been proved and no ossification test for determining the age has been done which makes the whole case of prosecution doubtful. It is submitted that there is no cogent and clinching evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to the age of the victim, though it is stated that the victim is a minor girl aged about 12 years, but there is no legally admissible document to prove her age. In fact, she is a major girl. The school record has not been proved in accordance with law. She was 13 having love affair with the appellant and herself eloped with him without raising any objection. Even when she was allegedly subjected to rape by the appellant, she has not protested. He would further submit that though the allegation of rape has been levelled against the appellant, but her MLC report and FSL report have been found negative and no sperm and semen were found on her vaginal swab. Hence, the appeal be allowed and conviction is liable to be set aside. 17 On the other hand, learned State counsel for the State/respondent submitted that the appellant has committed a heinous crime of rape against a minor girl, who is aged about 12 years and the same has been duly proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that from the school record, the prosecutrix is found to be minor and aged about 12 years. She was being kidnapped and subjected to rape by the appellant. The injuries have been found on her body and MLC and FSL report was found to be positive. As such, the judgment of conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial Court is just and proper warranting no interference. 18 We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 14 19 The first question for consideration before this Court would be, whether the trial Court has rightly held that on the date of incident, the victim were minor? 20 When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the age of the victim is significant and essential ingredient to prove such charge and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the “child” which means any person below the age of eighteen years. 21 In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles for determining the age of a child, which read as follows: “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the 15 case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; 16 (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of 17 juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered 18 opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW- PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for 19 determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.” 22 In the present case, the prosecution has presented the Dakhil- kharij register of the victim (Ex.P/9), in which the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 05.06.2006. From the statements of the victim (PW-1) and mother of the victim (PW-2) also, it is clear that the date of the birth of the prosecutrix was 05.06.2006 and in cross-examination, the mother of the victim (PW-2) categorically denied the suggestion of the defence that the victim's birth certificate was not provided to the school and her date of birth was recorded based on assumptions. This denial suggests that the victim's age, as recorded in the school documents as 05.06.2006, is likely to be accurate and based on reliable evidence. The defence has not presented any oral or documentary evidence to refuse the said date of birth, therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the date of birth of the victim, as 05.06.2006 hence, we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly held that the date of birth of the victim is 05.06.2006 and the age on the date of incident i.e. 23.04.2018 was about about 12 years. 20 23 The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 363 of the IPC ? 24 The appellant has been convicted for offence under Sections 363, 366 and 376(AB) of the IPC, which is punishable for kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage. Kidnapping has been defined under Section 359 of the IPC. According to Section 359 of the IPC, kidnapping is of two kinds: kidnapping from India and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. Section 361 of the IPC defines kidnapping from lawful guardianship which states as under:- “361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.-Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship.” 25 The object of Section 359 of the IPC is at least as much to protect children of tender age from being abducted or seduced for improper purposes, as for the the protection of the rights of parents and guardians having the lawful charge or custody of minors or insane persons. Section 361 has four ingredients:- 21 “(1) Taking or enticing away a minor or a person of unsound mind. (2) Such minor must be under sixteen years of age, if a male, or under eighteen years or age, if a female. (3) The taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind. (4) Such taking or enticing must be without the consent of such guardian. So far as kidnapping a minor girl from lawful guardianship is concerned, the ingredients are : (i) that the girl was under 18 years of age; (ii) such minor was in the keeping of a lawful guardian, and (iii) the accused took or induced such person to leave out of such keeping and such taking was done without the consent of the lawful guardian. 26 The Supreme Court while considering the object of Section 361 of the IPC in the matter of S.Varadarajan v. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942 took the view that if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so and held that if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking, it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian and held as under:- 22 “It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. If evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfilment of the intention of the girl. But that part falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to “taking”.” 27 Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of ingredients of offence under Section 361 of the IPC which is punishable under Section 366 of the IPC & as well as principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of S.Varadarajan (supra), it is evident that on the date of incident, the victim was slept in the house after dinner at night and she wake up night to answer the nature’s call, then the accused took her after closing her mouth to the over-bridge in a Truck and thereafter, took her to the railway station in an Auto and later, took her to a deserted place, where the accused committed forceful sexual intercourse with her. As such, we are of the considered view that the trial Court is 23 absolutely justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC. 28 The next question for consideration before this Court is whether the appellant-accused has committed rape on minor victim? 29 It has been stated by the victim (PW-1) that prior to six/seven months, she was slept in the house after dinner at night and she wake up night to answer the nature’s call, then the accused took her after closing her mouth to the over-bridge in a Truck and thereafter, took her to the railway station in an Auto and later, took her to a deserted place, where the accused committed forceful sexual intercourse with her. After committing the above incident, the accused threatened her that if she told anyone about the said incident, then he would kill her and thrown her away. When the accused was tried to take her somewhere by train, she ran and sat in the Bus and the accused was followed her in an Auto. When the bus stopped at a place, she saw her brother, the accused also stopped there and tried to take her with him, but after seeing her brother, the accused ran away from the spot. Thereafter, she narrated the incident to her brother and mother. 30 Likewise, mother of the victim (PW-2) has deposed that the incident took place in the month of Phagun last year. On the date of the incident, someone kidnapped the victim, she was traced, and when she was not found anywhere, she went to the police 24 station Vidhan Sabha and registered a missing report of the victim. On returning home, victim told that the accused had lured her, taken her away and raped her as also threatened her to kill. 31 The irrefutable evidence of the victim that on the date of incident i.e. 23.04.2018, the accused kidnapped/abducted the victim without the legal protection of their parents and their consent, committing penetrative sexual assault on a victim’s urinary tract and committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the victim and the fact that the victim was raped has been found to be irrefutable. 32 In the case of Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573, the Supreme Court observed and held that that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. 33 In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575, it was observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It was further observed and held that sole testimony of prosecutrix should not be doubted by court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. 34 In the case of Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 34, the Supreme Court observed that testimony of the victim is 25 vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It was further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. 35 Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of the case on hand and as observed hereinabove, we see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the victim. She is found to be reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, without any further corroboration, the conviction of the accused relying upon the sole testimony of the victim can be sustained. 36 The view taken by the learned trial Court that the appellant is the author of the crime is a pure finding of fact based on evidence available on record and we are of the opinion that in the present case, the only view possible was the one taken by the learned trial Court. 37 From the above analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has been successful in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has not committed any legal or factual error in arriving at the finding with regard to the guilt of the appellant/convict. 26 38 Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Consequently, IA No. 02 also stands dismissed. 39 The appellant/convict is stated to be in jail. He shall serve out the sentence awarded by the trial Court by means of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.01.2022. 40 Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are undergoing their jail sentence to serve the same on the appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 41 Let a certified copy of this order alongwith the original record be transmitted to trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and action, if any. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu