VENKAT RAO MAJJI (MAJJI VENKAT WRONGLY MENTIONED IN ORDERS) v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
WPS/1600/2025 · 2025-03-04
Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 11300 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 11300 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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2025:CGHC:10528 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 1600 of 2025 Venkat Rao Majji (Majji Venkat Wrongly Mentioned In Orders) S/o Nagaiya Majji Aged About 37 Years R/o Village - Gogla, Tahsil And P/S - Gangaloor, District Bizapur Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Home (Police) Department, Atal Nagar, Mantralaya, Nawa Raipur, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - The Inspector General Of Police Bastar Range, Civil Line Lalbag Jagdalpur, District - Bastar Chhattisgarh 3 - The Superintendent Of Police Bijapur, District Bizapur Chhattisgarh
... Respondents (Cause Title is taken from CIS System) For Petitioner : Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Pandey and Mr. Amitesh Kumar Pandey, Advocates. For State / Respondents : Mr. Vivek Sharma, Additional Advocate General with Ms. Akanksha Verma, Panel Lawyer
Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
Order on Board 04.03.2025
1. Heard Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Pandey assisted by Mr. Amitesh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Vivek Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Ms. Akanksha Verma, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondents.
2. The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking following reliefs :
“10.1 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2025.03.18 18:45:33 +0530
2 pleased to call the entire records pertaining to the case of petitioner from the respondents. 10.2 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to decide the appeal Anneuxre P/1 as per provision of law.
10.3. That any other relief / order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case, including cost of the petition may kindly be awarded to the petitioners.”
3.
Learned counsel for petitioner would submits that petitioner has moved an appeal before Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Civil Lines, Lalbag Jagdalpur on 15.10.2020 against the order of punishment dated 06.10.2020, which, according to petitioner, has not been decided yet. It is further contention of learned counsel for petitioner that petitioner is seeking limited relief to the extent that respondent No. 2 / Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Civil Lines, Lalbag Jagdalpur may kindly be directed to decide the appeal as it is pending since 15.10.2020. 4. Learned State counsel submits that she has no objection to the limited prayer made by learned counsel for petitioner for a direction to respondent No. 2 / Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Civil Lines, Lalbag Jagdalpur to decide the appeal. 5. In view of the submission made by learned counsel for the respective parties, respondent No. 2 / Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Civil Lines, Lalbag Jagdalpur is directed to decide the
3 appeal in accordance with law, expeditiously preferably within a period of 10 days from the date of production of a copy of this order and to inform this Court about the decision on the appeal. It is made clear that this Court has not commented anything on merits of the case. 6. With the aforesaid observation, writ petition stands disposed of. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Later on
1. In the post-lunch session, Mr. Vivek Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General along with Ms. Akanksha Verma, learned Panel Lawyer appears with an order, by which, it has been stated that the appeal has already been decided on 04.03.2022, respondent No.2 / Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Civil Lines, Lalbag Jagdalpur. 2. In the first round in the pre-lunch session, when the matter was called out, Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that against the punishment order dated 06.10.2020, he has moved an appeal before the Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range on 15.10.2020 however, till date it has not been decided, therefore, a direction may be issued to the respondent No.2 / Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Civil Lines, Lalbag Jagdalpur to decide his pending appeal. 3.
The Court has taken it to be serious matter because the appeal was filed way back in the year 2020 and according to petition, it had not
4 been decided till date, and accordingly, this Court has passed aforesaid
order directing the respondent No. 2 / Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Civil Lines, Lalbag Jagdalpur to decide the appeal in accordance with law, expeditiously preferably within a period of 10 days from the date of production of a copy of this order and to inform this Court about the decision on the appeal. Thereafter, on that premise, the Additional Advocate General was directed to communicate about the
order passed by this Court to the concerned Inspector General of Police.
4. From the perusal of the said order dated 04.03.2022 passed by the appellate authority i.e. the Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Civil Lines, Lalbag Jagdalpur, it seems that the petitioner has suppressed the material fact and the learned counsel for the petitioner has not taken due care while drafting the petition and making
submissions in this regard.
5. Accordingly, since there is suppression of fact by the petitioner as from perusal of the document, it goes to show that the petitioner has received the copy of the said order, and this fact has not been disclosed either by the petitioner or by his counsel, and relying upon the submission made by the learned counsel for petitioner, order as aforesaid order was passed in pre-lunch session.
6. It is the sacrosanct principle of getting relief from the Court that the party should have come with clean hands. Suppression of fact is a serious matter and no litigant should be allowed to come to the Court while suppressing material fact. Time and again Hon’ble Supreme Court
5 as well as this Court has passed several orders while imposing cost upon the litigants who suppressed material facts in order to get any
order in their favour. The course adopted by the petitioner is impermissible as his application is based on misrepresentation of law and facts. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a license to file misconceived or frivolous petition. It is well settled law that the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and the petitioner who approaches the Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts, if he fails to do so and suppresses the material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Hari
Narain
v.
Badri
Das reported in AIR 1963 SC 1558 has held in para 9 that :-
“9………….That may be so, but the fact still remains that two important statements which, if true, may have been of considerable assistance to the appellant in invoking the protection of S. 13(1) (a) even on the construction placed by the High Court on that section are found to be untrue, and that, in our opinion, is a very serious infirmity in the petition itself. It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or
6 misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. That is why we have come to the conclusion that in the present case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked. Accordingly, special leave is revoked and the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the respondent.”
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of G. Narayanaswamy Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. And Another vs. Govt.
of Karnataka and Another reported in AIR 1991 SC 1726 has held in para 2 as under:-
“2…….On December 16-17, 1987 two writ petitions were filed by the respective petitioners in the Karnataka High Court challenging the acquisition on the ground that the awards were not made within the stipulated time. In these two writ petitions, the Karnataka High Court granted interim stay of further proceedings in respect of the acquisition of the said lands. These petitions were dismissed by a learned single Judge of that High Court on November 29, 1988. Appeals against the decision of a learned single Judge were dismissed by the Karnataka High Court on October 6, 1989, by a Division Bench of that High Court. The petitioners preferred these Special Leave
7 Petitions, namely S. L. P. Nos. 823 and 824 of 1990 against the decision of the Division Bench of that High Court, and obtained an interim stay of dispossession therein. Whatever the ultimate effect of the stay orders, in view of the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, to which we have already referred earlier, it is beyond dispute that the fact of the stay orders was highly material in the determination of these Special Leave Petitions. Curiously enough, there is no reference in the Specal Leave Petitions to any of the stay orders and we came to know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their counter affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and the nondisclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of material facts. On this ground alone, the Special Leave Petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well settled in law that the relief under Art. 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of
facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the Special Leave Petitions.”
9. Likewise, in the matter of Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao vs. V.K. Parasaran and Others reported in AIR 1996 SC 2687, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in 11 as under:-
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“11………….There is no "prima facie" material on the record from which any inference may be drawn that either respondent No. 1 or respondent No. 2 gave
"false evidence" or produced "false" or
"fabricated" evidence in the Court. Considering the submissions of the applicant, stripped to their bare essentials, the factual matrix on which allegations have been made against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 do not attract the provisions of Sections 191, 192 or 193, L.P.C. The filing of the present application appears to us to be an effort to get "reopened" the case even after this Court decided Criminal Appeals Nos. 275-277 of 1993 on 16-3-1993 and dismissed the review petition also more than three years ago. Finality must attach to some stage of judicial proceedings. The course adopted by the applicant is impermissible and his application is based on mis-conception of law and facts. No. litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived or frivolous petitions. After giving our careful
consideration to the submissions made at the bar as well as those contained in the memorandum of the application, we are of the opinion that this application is misconceived, untenable and has no merits whatsoever. It is accordingly dismissed.”
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of K.D. Sharma vs.
9 Steel Authority of India Limited and Others reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481 has held in paras 26 & 28 as under:-
“26. It is well settled that “fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal” proclaimed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries before. Reference was made by the counsel to a leading decision of v. Jagannath¹ wherein quoting the above observations, this Court held that a judgment/decree obtained by fraud this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu has to be treated as a nullity by every court.
28. So far as the proposition of law is concerned, there can be no two opinions. The learned counsel for the respondents also did not dispute the principles laid down in the above decisions as also in several other judgments. They, however, stated that on the
facts and in the circumstances of the case, the ratio laid down in the above cases has no application.”
11. The Supreme Court in the case of Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 has held as under:-
“1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. “satya” (truth) and “ahimsa” (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-Independence era and
10 the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood,
misrepresentation
and suppression of facts in the court proceedings. 2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final. 3. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR 1963 SC 1558] this Court adverted to the aforesaid rule and revoked the leave granted to the appellant by making the following observations: (AIR p. 1558)
“It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution,
11 care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading.
Thus, if at the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material statements made by the appellant in his application for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterises as misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked.”
4. In Welcom Hotel v. State of A.P. [(1983) 4 SCC 575 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 872 : AIR 1983 SC 1015] the Court held that a party which has misled the Court in passing an order in its favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case. 5. In G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka [(1991) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1991 SC 1726] the Court denied relief to the appellant who had concealed the fact that the award
12 was not made by the Land Acquisition Officer within the time specified in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act because of the stay
order passed by the High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, the Court observed: (SCC p. 263, para 2)
“2. ... Curiously enough, there is no reference in the special leave petitions to any of the stay orders and we came to know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their counter-affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and the non-disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of material facts. On this ground alone, the special leave petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the special leave petitions.”
6. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1 : JT (1993) 6 SC 331] the Court held that where a preliminary decree was obtained by withholding an important document from the court, the party concerned deserves to be thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
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7. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI [(2007) 8 SCC 449] it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty- bound to place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court referred to the
judgment of Scrutton, L.J. in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB 486 (CA)] , and observed: (Prestige Lights Ltd. case [(2007) 8 SCC 449] , SCC p. 462, para 35) In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, then the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material
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facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.”
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav and others v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society and others reported in (2013) 11 SCC 531 has held as under:-
“44. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision-making to the court. True, there is a mention of the order dated 2-5-2003 in the
order dated 24-7-2006 passed by the JCC, but that is not enough disclosure. The petitioners have not clearly disclosed the
facts and circumstances in which the order dated 2-5-2003 was passed or that it has attained finality. 45. We may only refer to two cases on this subject. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR 1963 SC 1558] stress was laid on litigants eschewing inaccurate, untrue or misleading statements, otherwise leave granted to an appellant may be revoked. It was observed as follows: (AIR p. 1560, para 9)
“9. ... It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or
15 misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. That is why we have come to the conclusion that in the present case, special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked. Accordingly, special leave is revoked and the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the respondent.”
46. More recently, in Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India [(2010) 14 SCC 38 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 889] the case law on the subject was discussed. It was held that if a litigant does not come to the court with clean hands, he is not entitled to be heard and indeed, such a person is not entitled to any relief from any judicial forum. It was said: (SCC p. 51, para 21)
“21. The principle that a person who does not come to the court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums.
The object underlying the principle is that every court is not only
16 entitled but is duty-bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have a bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case.”
47. A mere reference to the order dated 2-5- 2003, en passant, in the order dated 24-7- 2006 does not serve the requirement of disclosure. It is not for the court to look into every word of the pleadings, documents and annexures to fish out a fact. It is for the litigant to come upfront and clean with all material facts and then, on the basis of the
submissions made by the learned counsel, leave it to the court to determine whether or not a particular fact is relevant for arriving at a decision. Unfortunately, the petitioners have not done this and must suffer the consequence thereof.”
13. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of All India EPF Staff Federation vs. Union of India and Others reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1629 has held in para 4 that :-
“4. The present Special Leave Petitions challenging the orders dated 20th March, 2024 and 25th April, 2024 was filed on 14th June, 2024. The Delhi High Court's website shows that on 3rd May, 2024, the petitioner moved an application being CM Application No. 26033/2024 for early hearing of the
17 Petition. It was obvious that the prayer for early hearing was made as the interim relief was refused and a longer date in September, 2024 was fixed. The order dated 3rd May, 2024 passed on the said application shows that the Advocate appearing for the petitioner, after arguing the matter for some time, did not press the said application and, therefore, the same was dismissed. Therefore, the High Court directed that the case shall be listed on 5th September, 2024. Most importantly, in these Special Leave Petitions, which are filed on 14th June, 2024, the material fact of filing CM Application No. 26033/2024 was suppressed and even the
order dated 3rd May, 2024 passed on the said application was suppressed.”
14. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of K. Jayaram and Others vs. Bangalore Developmenet Authority and Others reported in (2022) 12 SCC 815 has held in paras 10 & 14 as under:-
“10. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands and put forward all facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything. A litigant is bound to state all facts which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds some vital or relevant material in
order to gain advantage over the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud with
18 the court as well as with the opposite parties which cannot be countenanced.
14. In order to check multiplicity of proceedings pertaining to the same subject- matter and more importantly to stop the menace of soliciting inconsistent orders through different judicial forums by suppressing material facts either by remaining silent or by making misleading statements in the pleadings in order to escape the liability of making a false statement, the parties have to disclose the details of all legal proceedings and litigations either past or present concerning any part of the subject-matter of dispute which is within their knowledge. In case, according to the parties to the dispute, no legal proceedings or court litigations were or are pending, they have to mandatorily state so in their pleadings in order to resolve the dispute between the parties in accordance with law.”
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Amar Singh vs. Union of India & Others reported in (2011) 7 SCC 69 has held in para 57 as under:-
“57. In one of the most celebrated cases upholding this principle, in the Court of Appeal in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commr., ex p Princess de Polignac [(1917) 1 KB 486 (CA)] K.B. Scrutton, L.J. formulated as under:
“……...and it has been for many years
19 the rule of the court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts-facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it-the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the
facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.”
16. In light of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, it is apparent that the petitioner has deliberately suppressed the material facts regarding disposal of his appeal before the competent authority, the said facts have been intentionally and deliberately suppressed by the petitioner in
order to get the order. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indian is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ Court must come with clean hands and put-forth all facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything. A litigant is bound to state all facts which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds some vital or relevant material in order to gain advantage over the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud with the Court as well as with
20 the opposite parties which cannot be countenanced.
17. Therefore where, material facts are suppressed, then the Court can refuse to exercise its equitable jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the suppression of material fact by the petitioner is a misconduct and this Court takes a serious note of the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner with regard to suppression of material fact and in order to discourage such practice, this Court deems it proper to impose an exemplary cost upon the petitioner to the tune of Rs.1,00,000/- (One Lac) for acting mischievously with the Court. The petitioner is directed to deposit a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (One Lac) before the Registry of this Court within a period of one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order, failing which the Registrar General shall not only initiate proceedings for recovery of cost, but shall also register a case for contempt of Court.
18. A copy of this order be placed before the Registrar General for necessary action and compliance.
19. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition is
disposed of.
20. Before parting with the order, it would be apposite to issue a word of caution to the learned counsel appearing in this case to take due care while making submissions with respect to facts of the case. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh / Shayna