2025:HHC:25492 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 497 of 2012 Reserved on: 04.07.2025 Date of Decision: 31.07.2025 Mohan Lal ...Appellant Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Appellant : Mr. N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate. For the Respondent/State: Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 30.11.2012 and order of sentence dated 03.12.2012 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court) Una, District Una, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which appellant (accused before the learned Trial Court) was convicted for the 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. P a g e | 2 2025:HHC:25492 commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 325 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and was sentenced as under: Section Sentence 325 of IPC Convict was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and was directed to pay a fine of ₹1000/-, and for want of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. 323 of IPC Convict was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and was directed to pay a fine of ₹500/-, and for want of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for fifteen days. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 307, 341, 323, and 506 of the IPC. It was asserted that the police received an information on 28.04.2011 that Tilak Raj (PW-5) was brought in an injured condition to the Hospital. The police recorded an entry (Ext.PW-6/A) and sent ASI Manmohan Singh (PW-15), HHC Hoshiar Singh, and HHC Vinod Kumar to CHC Daulatpur to verify the correctness of the information. ASI P a g e | 3 2025:HHC:25492 Manmohan Singh (PW-15) filed an application (Ext.PW-11/B) for ascertaining the opinion of the Medical Officer regarding the competence of the injured to make a statement. Dr. Sandeep Narula (PW-11) certified that the injured was unable to make the statement. Dr. Sandeep Narula (PW-11) conducted the medical examination of injured Tilak Raj and found that he had suffered multiple injuries. He advised X-ray of the skull/CT scan of the head. ASI Manmohan Singh recorded the statement (Ext.PW-1/A) of Vijay Laxmi (PW-1), who stated that the land of Sehdev, father of the accused and Tilak Raj, was jointly held; however, Khatas were separated during the consolidation. Sehdev had obtained demarcation of his land in November. The Court demarcated the land and advised him to file an appeal if he was not satisfied with the demarcation. Mohan Lal started abusing the informant party on 28.04.2011 in the morning and claimed that the land belonged to him. Tilak Raj went to the spot and requested the accused, Mohan Lal, not to hurl abuses. Mohan Lal inflicted injuries on the head of Tilak Raj with the stick (Ext.P-3). Tilak Raj fell and became unconscious. Mohan Lal threatened to kill the informant and his family members. Balwant Singh (PW-2) and Amar Singh carried the injured to the hospital. The statement was sent to the Police P a g e | 4 2025:HHC:25492 Station, where an F.I.R. (Ext.PW-10/A) was recorded. ASI Manmohan conducted the investigation. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-15/A) and took the photographs (Ext.PW-15/B to Ext.PW-15/E) of the spot. He filed an application (Ext.PW-11/C) for obtaining the final opinion of the Medical Officer, who stated that the final opinion would be issued after the receipt of the X-ray and CT scan report. A CT Scan of the injured was conducted by Dr. R.K. Sharma (PW-4), who found a fracture in the left temporal region. He issued the CT scan report (Ext.PW4/A). Blood-stained shirt (Ext.P-1) and Payjama (Ext.P-2) were put in a parcel, and the parcel was sealed with seal ‘M’. These were seized vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). Sample seal (Ext.PW15/F) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to Balwant Singh (PW-2) after its use. The accused made a disclosure statement (Ext.PW-8/A) stating that he had concealed the stick in the heap of bricks near the under-construction House. Stick (Ext.P-3) was got recovered by the accused. The stick was put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with five impressions of seal ‘K’. The seal, after retaining a sample (Ext.PW15/G), was given to Puran Singh (PW-8). The photographs of the recovery of the stick (Ext.PW-15/H to Ext.PW15/K) were taken. The stick was seized P a g e | 5 2025:HHC:25492 vide memo (Ext.PW-3/B). An application (Ext.PW-11/E) was filed before the Medical Officer for obtaining the final opinion regarding the nature of injuries sustained by Tilak Raj. The Medical Officer took out the stick and resealed the stick with the hospital seal. Dr. Sandeep Narula (PW-11) issued his final opinion stating that the injured had suffered simple and grievous injuries. One of the injuries was dangerous to life. He issued an MLC (Ext.PW-11/A). An application (Ext.PW-12/A) was filed before the Tehsildar, Amb, District Una, H.P., and copies of the demarcation report (Ext.PW-12/B and Ext.PW-12/C) were taken. CT Scan report (Ext. PW-4/A), x-ray films (Ext.PW-3/A and Ext.PW-3/B), and CT Scan film (Ext.C-1) were taken into possession. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, the police prepared the challan and presented it in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.2, Amb, District Una, H.P., who committed it to learned Sessions Judge, Una for trial. Learned Sessions Judge assigned the matter to learned Additional Session Judge, Fast Track Court, Una, District Una, H.P. (the learned Trial Court) for disposal in accordance with law. P a g e | 6 2025:HHC:25492 3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 307, 323, 341, and 506 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses to prove its case. Vijay Laxmi (PW-1) is the informant and eyewitness. Balwant Singh (PW-2) and Bachitter Singh (PW-7) are the eyewitnesses to the incident. J.B. Shashi Kapoor (PW-3) conducted the X-ray of the injured Tilak Raj. Dr. R.K.Sharma (PW-4) issued the CT scan report of the injured. Tilak Raj (PW-5) is the injured. Constable Rajinder Kumar (PW-6) proved the entry in the daily diary. Puran Singh (PW-8) and HC Kuldeep Singh (PW-9) are the witnesses to the recovery of the stick. HC Ram Saroop (PW-10) was working as an MHC who signed the F.I.R. and deposited the case property in Malkhana. Dr.Sandeep Narula (PW-11) conducted the medical examination of the injured. Satpal Singh (PW-12) produced the report of the demarcation. Onkar Nath Sharma (PW-13) conducted the demarcation. Jatinder Kumar, Deputy Superintendent of Police (PW-14), prepared the challan. ASI Manmohan Singh (PW-15) conducted the investigation. P a g e | 7 2025:HHC:25492 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, denied that he had any boundary dispute with the injured. He stated that witnesses deposed falsely against him because they are relatives and friends of the informant party. He claimed that a false case was made against him. He tendered various documents in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the statement of the injured was corroborated by the testimonies of eyewitnesses. The evidence on record did not satisfy the ingredients of Section 307 of the IPC. However, it was proved that the injured had sustained grievous injuries. There was no evidence that the injured was restrained from going in any direction where he had a right to proceed. The evidence was not sufficient to prove the ingredients of Section 506 of the IPC. Hence, the accused was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. 6. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused/appellant has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The prosecution's story was highly improbable. The complainant admitted that he had a P a g e | 8 2025:HHC:25492 dispute with the informant over the land. The complainant party wanted to encroach upon the land of the accused, and he was falsely implicated in the present case. The prosecution witnesses suppressed the material facts from the Court. The incident had taken place on the land of the accused, and the accused had also sustained injuries. No explanation for the injuries was provided by the prosecution. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 7. I have heard Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 8. Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, submitted that the accused is innocent and he was falsely implicated. It was duly established by the statements of the prosecution witnesses that there was a land dispute between the parties. The place of the incident was not fixed by the Investigating Officer by conducting any demarcation. The defence version that the incident had taken place on the land of the P a g e | 9 2025:HHC:25492 accused was highly probable. The accused had also sustained injuries, which were not explained by the prosecution. The neighbours were not examined, and an adverse inference should have been drawn against the prosecution. Bachitter Singh was a chance witness whose presence on the spot was not established. The possibility of sustaining the injuries by way of a fall cannot be ruled out. He submitted, in the alternative, that the injuries sustained by the victim cannot be said to be grievous, and the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC. At the worst, an offence punishable under Section 323 of the IPC was made out against the accused. The accused remained inside the jail during the trial. He is a first offender, and the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to him. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 9. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, supported the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that no interference is required with them. P a g e | 10 2025:HHC:25492 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. Tilak Raj (PW-5) stated that he and his wife were present in the house on 28.04.2011. The accused came at about 6:15 a.m. and started hurling filthy abuses. He told the accused not to do so, but in vain. The accused had a long stick in his hand, and he inflicted a stick blow on the head of the informant, Tilak Raj. The blood came out, and he fell. His wife shouted for help. Balwant Singh (PW-2), Amar Singh, and Bachitter Singh (PW-7) came to the spot. He became unconscious and regained consciousness on 29.04.2011 in the Hospital. He stated in his cross-examination that he had disclosed the obscene gesture to the police. He was confronted with his statement, where this fact was not recorded. Balwant Singh (PW-2) had told him that he had given a stick to the police. He did now know that Sehdev had filed a civil suit in the year 1987 against him and his father which was decreed. He had filed a civil suit against Sehdev and his son Mohan Lal in the year 2006 about Khasra Nos. 173 and 171, which was decreed in their favour. Bachitter Singh, son of Amin Chand, was his witness. He became unconscious and could not say that how many people had gathered on the spot first. He could not say P a g e | 11 2025:HHC:25492 whether Amar Singh or Balwant Singh had reached the spot. Sehdev had encroached upon his land despite the stay order. He admitted that the land on which Sehdev has constructed the house is proclaimed by him to be his own. He volunteered to say that Sehdev had encroached upon his land by constructing his Abadi. He denied that a false case was made against the accused. 12. It was submitted that the testimony of this witness is not reliable. He was confronted with his previous statement, wherein there was no mention of an obscene gesture, which shows that he has materially improved upon his version, and his testimony should be discarded due to the material improvements. This submission cannot be accepted. ASI Manmohan Singh (PW-15) was never asked whether Tilak Raj had told him about the obscene gesture or not. Further, the witness had nowhere stated anything about the obscene gesture in his examination-in-chief, and it was impermissible to contradict him by asking a question and thereafter confronting the witness with the statement. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012:1959 SCC OnLine SC 17 that it is impermissible for the defence to ask a question about what he had P a g e | 12 2025:HHC:25492 told the police and thereafter confront him with his previous statement. It was observed: “13….The second part of S. 145 of the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple procedure to be followed. To illustrate: A says in the witness-box that B stabbed C; before the police, he had stated that D stabbed C. His attention can be drawn to that part of the statement made before the police which contradicts his statement in the witness-box. If he admits his previous statement, no further proof is necessary; if he does not admit, the practice generally followed is to admit it, subject to proof by the police officer. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned Counsel may be illustrated thus: If the witness is asked, "Did you say before the police officer that you saw a gas light?" and he answers "yes", then the statement which does not contain such recital is put to him as a contradiction. This procedure involves two fallacies: one is that it enables the accused to elicit by a process of cross- examination what the witness stated before the police officer. If a police officer did not make a record of a witness's statement, his entire statement could not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of cross-examination, the witness's oral statement could be brought on record. This procedure, therefore, contravenes the express provision of S. 162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that by the illustration given by the learned Counsel for the appellants, there is no self-contradiction of the primary statement made in the witness-box, for the witness has not yet made on the stand any assertion at all which can serve as the basis. The contradiction, under the section, should be between what a witness asserted in the witness-box and what he stated before the police officer, and not between what he said he had stated before the police officer and what he actually said before him. In such a case, the question could not be put at all: only questions to contradict can be put, and the question here posed does not contradict; it leads to an answer which is contradicted P a g e | 13 2025:HHC:25492 by the police statement. This argument of the learned Counsel based upon S. 145 of the Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in considering the express provisions of S.162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (emphasis supplied) 13. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the contradiction in the statement of this witness, and his statement cannot be rejected simply because he has not told the police about the obscene gesture. Further the statement was never get perused from the Investigating Officer. 14. Proviso to section 162 of Cr.P.C. permits the use of the statement recorded by the police to contradict a witness. It reads: Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination. 15. Thus, it is apparent that the defence can use the statement to contradict a witness if the statement is proved. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court about a century ago in Emperor vs. Vithu Balu Kharat (1924) 26 Bom. L.R. 965 that the P a g e | 14 2025:HHC:25492 previous statement has to be proved before it can be used. It was observed: “The words "if duly proved" in my opinion, clearly show that the record of the statement cannot be admitted in evidence straightaway but that the officer before whom the statement was made should ordinarily be examined as to any alleged statement or omitted statement that is relied upon by the accused for the purpose of contradicting the witness; and the provisions of Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act apply to this case, as well as to any other similar ease. Of course, I do not mean to say that, if the particular police officer who recorded the statement is not available, other means of proving the statement may not be availed of, e.g., evidence that the statement is in the handwriting of that particular officer.” 16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muthu Naicker and Others, etc. Versus State of T.N. (1978) 4 SCC 385 that if the witness affirms the previous statement, no proof is necessary, but if the witness denies or says that he did not remember the previous statement, the investigating officer should be asked about the same. It was observed: - “52. This is the most objectionable manner of using the police statement, and we must record our emphatic disapproval of the same. The question should have been framed in a manner to point out that from amongst those accused mentioned in examination-in-chief there were some whose names were not mentioned in the police statement and if the witness affirms this no further proof is necessary and if the witness denies or says that she does not remember, the investigation officer should have been questioned about it.” P a g e | 15 2025:HHC:25492 17. The Gauhati High Court held in Md. Badaruddin Ahmed v. State of Assam, 1989 SCC OnLine Gau 35: 1989 Cri LJ 1876, that if the witness denies having made the statement, the portion marked by the defence should be put to the investigating officer and his version should be elicited regarding the same. It was observed at page 1880: - “13. The learned defence counsel has drawn our attention to the above statement of the Investigating Officer and submits that P.W. 4 never made his above statement before the police and that the same, being his improved version, cannot be relied upon. With the utmost respect to the learned defence counsel, we are unable to accept his above contention. Because, unless the particular matter or point in the previous statement sought to be contradicted is placed before the witness for explanation, the previous statement cannot be used in evidence. In other words, drawing the attention of the witness to his previous statement sought to be contradicted and giving all opportunities to him for explanation are compulsory. If any authority is to be cited on this point, we may conveniently refer to the case of Pangi Jogi Naik v. State reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 205: (1965 (2) Cri LJ 661). Further in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1959 SC 1012: (1959 Cri LJ 1231) it was also held that the statement not reduced to writing cannot be contradicted and, therefore, in order to show that the statement sought to be contradicted: was recorded by the police, it should be marked and exhibited. However, in the case at hand, there is nothing on the record to show that the previous statement of the witness was placed before him and that the witness was given the chance for explanation. Again, his previous statement was not marked and exhibited. Therefore, his previous statement before the police cannot be used. Hence, P a g e | 16 2025:HHC:25492 his evidence that when he turned back, he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from his chest is to be taken as his correct version. 14. The learned defence counsel has attempted to persuade us not to rely on the evidence of this witness on the ground that his evidence before the trial Court is contradicted by his previous statement made before the police. However, in view of the decisions made in the said cases we have been persuaded irresistibly to hold that the correct procedure to be followed which would be in conformity with S. 145 of the Evidence Act to contradict the evidence given by the prosecution witness at the trial with a statement made by him before the police during the investigation will be to draw the attention of the witness to that part of the contradictory statement which he made before the police, and questioned him whether he did, in fact, make that statement. If the witness admits having made the particular statement to the police, that admission will go into evidence and will be recorded as part of the evidence of the witness and can be relied on by the accused as establishing the contradiction. However, if, on the other hand, the witness denies to have made such a statement before the police, the particular portions of the statement recorded should be provisionally marked for identification as B-1 to B-1, B-2 to B-2 etc. (any identification mark) and when the investigating officer who had actually recorded the statements in question comes into the witness box, he should be questioned as to whether these particular statements had been made to him during the investigation by the particular witness, and obviously after refreshing his memory from the case diary the investigating officer would make his answer in the affirmative. The answer of the Investigating Officer would prove the statements B-1 to B- 1, B-2 to B-2, which are then exhibited as Ext. D. 1, Ext. D. 2, etc. (exhibition mark) in the case and will go into evidence, and may, thereafter, be relied on by the accused as contradictions. In the case in hand, as was discussed above, the above procedure was not followed while cross- P a g e | 17 2025:HHC:25492 examining the witness to his previous statements, and, therefore, we have no alternative but to accept the statement given by this witness before the trial Court that he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from his chest to be his correct version.” 18. Andhra Pradesh High Court held in Shaik Subhani v. State of A.P., 1999 SCC OnLine AP 413: (1999) 5 ALD 284: 2000 Cri LJ 321: (1999) 2 ALT (Cri) 208 that putting a suggestion to the witness and the witness denying the same does not amount to putting the contradiction to the witness. The attention of the witness has to be drawn to the previous statement, and if he denies it, the statement is to be proved by the investigating officer. It was observed at page 290: - “24… As far as contradictions put by the defence are concerned, we would like to say that the defence Counsel did not put the contradictions in the manner in which it ought to have been put. By putting suggestions to the witness and the witness denying the same will not amount to putting contradiction to the witness. The contradiction has to be put to the witness as contemplated under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. If a contradiction is put to the witness and it is denied by him, then his attention has to be drawn to the statement made by such witness before the Police or any other previous statement and he must be given a reasonable opportunity to explain as to why such contradiction appears and he may give any answer if the statement made by him is shown to him and if he confronted with such a statement and thereafter the said contradiction must be proved through the Investigation Officer. Then only it amounts to putting the contradiction to P a g e | 18 2025:HHC:25492 the witness and getting it proved through the Investigation Officer.” 19. The Calcutta High Court took a similar view in Anjan Ganguly v. State of West Bengal, 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 22948: (2013) 2 Cal LJ 144: (2013) 3 Cal LT 193: (2013) 128 AIC 546: (2014) 2 RCR (Cri) 970: (2013) 3 DMC 760 and held at page 151: - “21. It was held in State of Karnataka v. Bhaskar Kushali Kothakar, reported as (2004) 7 SCC 487 that if any statement of the witness is contrary to the previous statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. or suffers from omission of certain material particulars, then the previous statement can be proved by examining the Investigating Officer who had recorded the same. Thus, there is no doubt that for proving the previous statement Investigating Officer ought to be examined, and the statement of the witness recorded by him, can only be proved by him and he has to depose to the extent that he had correctly recorded the statement, without adding or omitting, as to what was stated by the witness. 23. Proviso to Section 162(1), Cr.P.C. states in clear terms that the statement of the witness ought to be duly proved. The words, if duly proved, cast a duty upon the accused who wants to highlight the contradictions by confronting the witness to prove the previous statement of a witness through the police officer who has recorded the same in the ordinary way. If the witness in the cross-examination admits contradictions, then there is no need to prove the statement. But if the witness denies a contradiction and the police officer who had recorded the statement is called by the prosecution, the previous statement of the witness on this point may be proved by the police officer. In case the prosecution fails to call the police officer in a given situation Court can call this witness, or the accused can call the police officer to give evidence in defence. There is no P a g e | 19 2025:HHC:25492 doubt that unless the statement as per the proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 162, Cr.P.C., is duly proved, the contradiction in terms of Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be taken into consideration by the Court. 24. To elaborate on this further, it will be necessary to reproduce Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. “S. 145. A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” 25. Therefore, it is appropriate that before the previous statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. is proved, the attention of the witness must be drawn to the portion in the statement recorded by the Investigating Officer to bring to light the contradiction, a process called confrontation. 26. Let us first understand what is proper procedure. A witness may have stated in the statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. that ‘X murdered Y’. In Court witness states, ‘Z murdered Y’. This is a contradiction. Defence Counsel or Court, and even prosecution if the witness is declared hostile, having resiled from a previous statement, is to be confronted to bring contradiction on record. The attention of the witness must be drawn to the previous statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C., where it was stated that ‘X murdered Y’. Since Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act uses the word being proved, therefore, in the course of examination of the witness, a previous statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. will not be exhibited but shall be assigned a mark, and the portion contradicted will be specified. The trial Court, in the event of contradiction, has to record as under. 27. The attention of the witness has been drawn to portions A to A of the statement marked as 1, and confronted with the portion where it is recorded that ‘X murdered Y’. In this P a g e | 20 2025:HHC:25492 manner, by way of confrontation, contradiction is brought on record. Later, when the Investigating Officer is examined, the prosecution or defence may prove the statement, after the Investigating Officer testifies that the statement assigned mark was correctly recorded by him, at that stage the statement will be exhibited by the Court. Then contradiction will be proved by the Investigating Officer by stating that the witness had informed or told him that ‘X murdered Y’ and he had correctly recorded this fact. 28. Now a reference to the explanation to Section 162, Cr.P.C., which says that an omission to state a fact or circumstance may amount to contradiction. Say, for instance, if a witness omits to state in Court that ‘X murdered Y’, what he had stated in a statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. will be material? Contradiction, for the Public Prosecutor, as the witness has resiled from the previous statement, or if he has been sent for trial for the charge of murder, omission to state ‘X murdered Y’ will be a material omission, and amount to contradiction so far defence of ‘W is concerned. At that stage, also attention of the witness will also be drawn to a significant portion of the statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., which the witness had omitted to state, and note shall be given that attention of the witness was drawn to the portion A to A wherein it is recorded that ‘X murdered Y’. In this way, the omission is brought to record. The rest of the procedure stated earlier, qua confrontation, shall be followed to prove the statement of the witness and the fact stated by the witness. 29. Therefore, to prove the statement for the purpose of contradiction, it is necessary that the contradiction or omission must be brought to the notice of the witness. His or her attention must be drawn to the portion of the previous statement (in the present case statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C.).” P a g e | 21 2025:HHC:25492 20. It was submitted that he admitted the pendency of a civil dispute with the accused, and the prosecution's case should be rejected due to the civil dispute. This submission cannot be accepted. Enmity is a double-edged weapon; while it furnishes a motive for false implication, it also furnishes the motive for the commission of crime. Therefore, not much advantage can be derived from the enmity. 21. Testimony of Tilak Raj (PW-5) is corroborated by Vijay Laxmi (PW-1). She stated that she and her husband were present at home. The accused Mohan Lal accused came at about 6:15 a.m. and started hurling filthy abuses. Tilak Raj asked the accused not to do so. The accused was armed with a stick, and he inflicted 3-4 injuries on Tilak Raj. She shouted for help. Balwant Singh, Bachitter Singh, and Amar Singh came to the spot. Tilak Raj became unconscious and fell. Blood came out of the head of Tilak Raj. She, Balwant Singh, Bachitter Singh, and Amar Singh took Tilak Raj to the hospital. She stated in her cross-examination that she and her brother-in-law telephoned Kala to bring a vehicle. She had told the police that Bachitter Singh had also visited the spot. She was confronted with her previous statement (Ext.PW-1/A), wherein this fact was not recorded. The House of Sher Singh was P a g e | 22 2025:HHC:25492 located adjacent to her house. Abadi of Neelam is located opposite her house, but nobody resides in the house. Balwant, Bachitter Singh, and Amir Singh came to the spot simultaneously at about 6:15 a.m. The vehicle arrived after about 10 minutes of the incident. Up-Pardhan and Balwant Singh were with the police when the police had reached the spot for the first time. The police visited the spot once. She and Balwant Singh were present at the time of production of the clothes. She had seen the proceedings of the recovery of the stick from inside the house. Sehdev had filed a civil suit and stopped them from raising construction. She volunteered to say that her husband had obtained a stay order. Sehdev had raised the construction of Abadi in April 2011 up to 4-5 feet above the ground level. She claimed that construction was on her land. She admitted that the pyjama of Tilak Raj was blood- stained. She denied that the accused had not given any injury or that her husband had fallen and sustained injuries. 22. Her testimony corroborates the statement of Tilak Raj in material particulars. There is no major contradiction in the statement of Tilak Raj and this witness. She was confronted with her previous statement recorded by the police, but the P a g e | 23 2025:HHC:25492 Investigating Officer was not asked about those facts, and her credit has not been impeached. 23. Balwant Singh (PW-2) supported the prosecution's version. He stated that he heard the cries of Vijay Laxmi (PW-1). He, Amar Singh, Bachitter Singh, came to the spot. He saw Mohan Lal inflicting injuries on the head of Tilak Raj, who became unconscious and fell. The accused threatened to kill all the people. He arranged the vehicle and took the injured to the hospital with Vijay Laxmi and Amar Singh. He stated in his cross-examination that the injured is his real brother and the accused is his real nephew. He and Amar Singh were working in Khasra No. 175. The blood was oozing out of the head of Tilak Raj. The police came to the spot in the evening. The police did not record his statement. Sehdev had raised the construction to the plinth level. Somebody had called the vehicle to take the injured to the hospital. Bachitter Singh was passing through the road at the time of the incident. The police recorded his statement and the statement of Vijay Laxmi at CHC Daulatpur. About 10 people, including children, had gathered on the spot. The House of Sher Singh is located adjacent to the house of the injured, and his house is at a distance of 25 meters. He denied that no injuries were caused by the accused. He P a g e | 24 2025:HHC:25492 admitted the land over which foundations have been erected by Sehdev is proclaimed by Tilak Raj to be his own. He admitted that no demarcation of land was obtained by him. 24. It was submitted that he is the brother of the injured and, therefore, he is an interested witness. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laltu Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2019) 15 SCC 344: (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 275: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 2 that a related witness is not an interested witness and his testimony cannot be rejected on the ground of interestedness. It was observed: “12. As regards the contention that the eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. This Court has elucidated the difference between “interested” and “related” witnesses in a plethora of cases, stating that a witness may be called interested only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would mean that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the accused punished due to prior enmity or other reasons, and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the accused (for instance, see State of Rajasthan v. Kalki [State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752: 1981 SCC (Cri) 593]; Amit v. State of U.P. [Amit v. State of U.P., (2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590] and Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy [Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 298 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 182] ). P a g e | 25 2025:HHC:25492 13. Recently, this difference was reiterated in Ganapathi v. State of T.N. [Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793], in the following terms, by referring to the three-Judge Bench decision in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki [State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752: 1981 SCC (Cri) 593] : (Ganapathi case [Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793], SCC p. 555, para 14) “14. “Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be “interested”. 14. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence on the scene of the offence would be natural. The evidence of such a witness cannot automatically be discarded by labelling the witness as interested. Indeed, one of the earliest statements with respect to interested witnesses in criminal cases was made by this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab [Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145: AIR 1953 SC 364: 1953 Cri LJ 1465], wherein this Court observed : (AIR p. 366, para 26) “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.” 15. In the case of a related witness, the Court may not treat his or her testimony as inherently tainted and P a g e | 26 2025:HHC:25492 needs to ensure only that the evidence is inherently reliable, probable, cogent, and consistent. We may refer to the observations of this Court in Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry) [Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry), (2010) 1 SCC 199: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 966]: (SCC p. 213, para 23) “23. We are of the considered view that in cases where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses, but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.” 25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thoti Manohar vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 7 SCC 723 that the court cannot discard the testimony of a witness on the ground of a relationship. It was observed: “31. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision of this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 364, wherein Vivian Bose, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows: - “We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eye- witnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely P a g e | 27 2025:HHC:25492 related to the deceased, we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan (1952) SCR 377 at p. 390 = (AIR 1952 SC 54 at page 59).” 32. In the said case, it was further observed that: “A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has a cause, such as an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true that when feelings run high and there is a personal cause for enmity, there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but the foundation must be laid for such criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth.” 33. In Masalti v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 202, it has been ruled that normally close relatives of the deceased would not be considered to be interested witnesses who would also mention the names of the other persons as responsible for causing injuries to the deceased. 34. In Hari Obula Reddi and others v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 82, a three-judge Bench has held that evidence of interested witnesses is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itself is not a valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. It can be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of interested witnesses should be subjected to scrutiny and accepted with caution. If, on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently P a g e | 28 2025:HHC:25492 probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction thereon. 35. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar (1996) 1 SCC 614, it has been opined that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness, for the term ‘interested’ postulates that the witness must have some interest in having the accused, somehow or the other, convicted for some animus or some other reason. 36. In Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2006 SC 3010, while dealing with the liability of interested witnesses who are relatives, a two- judge Bench observed that: “It is well settled that evidence of a witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is either partisan or interested or a close relative to the deceased if it is otherwise found to be trustworthy and credible.” The said evidence only requires scrutiny with more care and caution, so that neither the guilty escapes nor the innocent is wrongly convicted. If, on such scrutiny, the evidence is found to be reliable and probable, then it can be acted upon. “If it is found to be improbable or suspicious, it ought to be rejected. Where the witness has a motive to falsely implicate the accused, his testimony should have corroboration in regard to material particulars before it is accepted.” 26. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150, wherein it was observed at page 222: “Related and interested witness 31. A related witness cannot be termed as an interested witness per se. One has to see the place of occurrence along P a g e | 29 2025:HHC:25492 with other circumstances. A related witness can also be a natural witness. If an offence is committed within the precincts of the deceased, the presence of his family members cannot be ruled out, as they assume the position of natural witnesses. When their evidence is clear, cogent, and withstands the rigour of cross-examination, it becomes sterling, not requiring further corroboration. A related witness would become an interested witness, only when he is desirous of implicating the accused in rendering a conviction, on purpose. 32. When the court is convinced with the quality of the evidence produced, notwithstanding the classification as quoted above, it becomes the best evidence. Such testimony being natural, adding to the degree of probability, the court has to make reliance upon it in proving a fact. The aforesaid position of law has been well laid down in Bhaskarrao v. State of Maharashtra [Bhaskarrao v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 591: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 374]: (SCC pp. 603-604, paras 32- 36) “32. Coming back to the appreciation of the evidence at hand, at the outset, our attention is drawn to the fact that the witnesses were interrelated, and this Court should be cautious in accepting their statements. It would be beneficial to recapitulate the law concerning the appreciation of evidence of a related witness. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab [Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, (1953) 2 SCC 36: 1954 SCR 145: AIR 1953 SC 364], Vivian Bose, J. for the Bench observed the law as under: (AIR p. 366, para 26) ‘26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to P a g e | 30 2025:HHC:25492 drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.’ 33. In Masalti v. State of U.P. [Masalti v. State of U.P., (1964) 8 SCR 133: AIR 1965 SC 202], a five-Judge Bench of this Court has categorically observed as under: (AIR pp. 209- 210, para 14) ‘14. … There is no doubt that when a criminal court has to appreciate evidence given by witnesses who are partisan or interested, it has to be very careful in weighing such evidence. Whether or not there are discrepancies in the evidence; whether or not the evidence strikes the court as genuine, whether or not the story disclosed by the evidence is probable, are all matters which must be taken into account. But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. Often enough, where factions prevail in villages and murders are committed as a result of enmity between such factions, criminal courts have to deal with evidence of a partisan type. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to the failure of justice. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence, but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.’ P a g e | 31 2025:HHC:25492 34. In Darya Singh v. State of Punjab [Darya Singh v. State of Punjab, (1964) 3 SCR 397: AIR 1965 SC 328], this Court held that evidence of an eyewitness who is a near relative of the victim should be closely scrutinised, but no corroboration is necessary for acceptance of his evidence. In Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana [Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 195: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1213], this Court observed that: (Harbans Kaur case [Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 195: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1213], SCC p. 198, para 7) ‘7. There is no proposition in law that relatives are to be treated as untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, reason has to be shown when a plea of partiality is raised to show that the witnesses had reason to shield the actual culprit and falsely implicate the accused.’ 35. The last case we need to concern ourselves is Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra [Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 773], wherein this Court after observing previous precedents has summarised the law in the following manner: (SCC p. 164, para 38) ‘38. … it is clear that a close relative cannot be characterised as an “interested” witness. He is a “natural” witness. His evidence, however, must be scrutinised carefully. If on such scrutiny, his evidence is found to be intrinsically reliable, inherently probable, and wholly trustworthy, conviction can be based on the “sole” testimony of such a witness. A close relationship of the witness with the deceased or victim is no ground to reject his evidence. On the contrary, close relatives of the deceased would normally be most reluctant to spare the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent one.’ 36. From the study of the aforesaid precedents of this Court, we may note that whoever has been a witness before the court of law, having a strong interest in result, if allowed to be weighed in the same scales with those P a g e | 32 2025:HHC:25492 who do not have any interest in the result, would be to open the doors of the court for perverted truth. This sound rule, which remains the bulwark of this system and which determines the value of evidence derived from such sources, needs to be cautiously and carefully observed and enforced. There is no dispute about the fact that the interest of the witness must affect his testimony is a universal truth. Moreover, under the influence of bias, a man may not be in a position to judge correctly, even if they earnestly desire to do so. Similarly, he may not be in a position to provide evidence in an impartial manner when it involves his interest. Under such influences, man will, even though not consciously, suppress some facts, soften or modify others, and provide favourable colour. These are the most controlling considerations in respect to the credibility of human testimony, and should never be overlooked in applying the rules of evidence and determining its weight in the scale of truth under the facts and circumstances of each case.” (emphasis in original and supplied) 33. Once again, we reiterate with a word of caution, the trial court is the best court to decide on the aforesaid aspect, as no mathematical calculation or straitjacket formula can be made on the assessment of a witness, as the journey towards the truth can be seen better through the eyes of the trial Judge. In fact, this is the real objective behind the enactment itself, which extends the maximum discretion to the court.” 27. Similar is the judgment in M Nageswara Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2022 (5) SCC 791 wherein it was observed: “10. Having gone through the deposition of the relevant witnesses -eye-witnesses/injured eye-witnesses, we are of the opinion that there are no major/material contradictions in the deposition of the eye-witnesses and injured eye- witnesses. All are consistent insofar as accused Nos. 1 to 3 P a g e | 33 2025:HHC:25492 are concerned. As observed hereinabove, PW6 has identified Accused Nos. 1 to 3. The High Court has observed that PW1, PW3 & PW5 were planted witnesses merely on the ground that they were all interested witnesses, being relatives of the deceased. Merely because the witnesses were the relatives of the deceased, their evidence cannot be discarded solely on the aforesaid ground. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has materially erred in discarding the deposition/evidence of PW1, PW3, PW5 & PW6 and even PW7.” 28. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Jabbar Ali v. State of Assam, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1440, that merely because the witnesses are related to each other is no reason to discard their testimonies. The Court is required to see their testimonies with due care and caution. It was observed: 55. It is noted that great weight has been attached to the testimonies of the witnesses in the instant case. Having regard to the aforesaid fact that this Court has examined the credibility of the witnesses to rule out any tainted evidence given in the court of Law. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecution failed to examine any independent witnesses in the present case and that the witnesses were related to each other. This Court, in a number of cases, has had the opportunity to consider the said aspect of related/interested/partisan witnesses and the credibility of such witnesses. This Court is conscious of the well-settled principle that just because the witnesses are related/interested/partisan witnesses, their testimonies cannot be disregarded; however, it is also true that when the witnesses are related/interested, their testimonies have to be scrutinised with greater care and circumspection. In the case of Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381, P a g e | 34 2025:HHC:25492 this Court held that the testimony of such related witnesses should be analysed with caution for its credibility. 56. In Raju alias Balachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 12 SCC 701, this Court observed: “29. The sum and substance is that the evidence of a related or interested witness should be meticulously and carefully examined. In a case where the related and interested witness may have some enmity with the assailant, the bar would need to be raised, and the evidence of the witness would have to be examined by applying a standard of discerning scrutiny. However, this is only a rule of prudence and not one of law, as held in Dalip Singh [AIR 1953 SC 364] and pithily reiterated in Sarwan Singh [(1976) 4 SCC 369] in the following words: (Sarwan Singh case [(1976) 4 SCC 369, p. 376, para 10) “10. … The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the courts require, as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses have a ring of truth, such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration.” 57. Further delving into the same issue, it is noted that in the case of Ganapathi v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2018) 5 SCC 549, this Court held that in several cases when only family members are present at the time of the incident and the case of the prosecution is based only on their evidence, Courts have to be cautious and meticulously evaluate the evidence in the process of trial. P a g e | 35 2025:HHC:25492 29. This position was reiterated in Baban Shankar Daphal v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 137, wherein it was observed: “27. One of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the eyewitnesses to the incident were all closely related to the deceased, and for prudence, the prosecution ought to have examined some other independent eyewitnesses as well who were present at the time of the unfortunate incident. This was also the view taken by the Trial Court, but the High Court has correctly rejected such an approach and held that merely because there were some more independent witnesses also, who had reached the place of the incident, the evidence of the relatives cannot be disbelieved. The law nowhere states that the evidence of the interested witness should be discarded altogether. The law only warrants that their evidence should be scrutinised with care and caution. It has been held by this Court in the catena of judgments that merely if a witness is a relative, their testimony cannot be discarded on that ground alone. 28. In criminal cases, the credibility of witnesses, particularly those who are close relatives of the victim, is often scrutinised. However, being a relative does not automatically render a witness “interested” or biased. The term “interested” refers to witnesses who have a personal stake in the outcome, such as a desire for revenge or to falsely implicate the accused due to enmity or personal gain. A “related” witness, on the other hand, is someone who may be naturally present at the scene of the crime, and their testimony should not be dismissed simply because of their relationship to the victim. Courts must assess the reliability, consistency, and coherence of their statements rather than labelling them as untrustworthy. 29. The distinction between “interested” and “related” witnesses has been clarified in Dalip Singh v. State of P a g e | 36 2025:HHC:25492 Punjab,3, where this Court emphasised that a close relative is usually the last person to falsely implicate an innocent person. Therefore, in evaluating the evidence of a related witness, the court should focus on the consistency and credibility of their testimony. This approach ensures that the evidence is not discarded merely due to familial ties, but is instead assessed based on its inherent reliability and consistency with other evidence in the case. This position has been reiterated by this Court in: I, Md. Rojali Ali v. The State of Assam, Ministry of Home Affairs through Secretary (2019) 19 SCC 567; ii. Ganapathi v. State of T.N. (2018) 5 SCC 549; iii. Jayabalan v. Union Territory of Pondicherry (2010) 1 SCC 199. 30. Though the eyewitnesses who have been examined in the present case were closely related to the deceased, namely his wife, daughter, and son, their testimonies are consistent with respect to the accused persons being the assailants who inflicted wounds on the deceased. As is revealed from the sequence of events that transpired, one of the family members was subjected to an assault. It was thus quite natural for the other family members to rush on the spot to intervene. The presence of the family members on the spot and thus being eyewitnesses has been well established. In such circumstances, merely because the eyewitnesses are family members, their testimonies cannot be discarded solely on that ground. 30. Therefore, the relationship cannot be used to doubt the testimony of this witness. The relationship may put the Court on guard, but it is not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. 31. The name of Balwant Singh (PW-2) was mentioned in the statement (Ext.PW-1/A), which was recorded on the same day P a g e | 37 2025:HHC:25492 at 7:40 a.m. He, Vijay Laxmi and Amar Singh had carried the injured to the hospital, and their presence on the spot cannot be doubted, and his testimony cannot be discarded because he is related to the injured. Further, he stated that he is related not only to the injured but also to the accused. Therefore, a mere relationship will not make his testimony doubtful. 32. It was submitted that this witness stated about the presence of ten persons; however, the prosecution did not examine any independent person, and the prosecution's case is highly doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. There is no evidence that the persons had visited the spot before the incident. The mere presence of a person after the incident would not have proved the prosecution's case. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, 1988 Supp SCC 241: 1988 SCC (Cri) 559 that the prosecution's case cannot be doubted due to the non-examination of the independent witnesses. It was observed at page 245: “11. In light of these principles, we may now consider the first contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellants. The contention relates to the failure of the prosecution to examine independent witnesses. The High Court has examined this contention but did not find any infirmity in the investigation. It is no doubt true that the P a g e | 38 2025:HHC:25492 prosecution has not been able to produce any independent witness to the incident that took place at the bus stand. There must have been several such witnesses. But the prosecution's case cannot be thrown out or doubted on that ground alone. The experience reminds us that civilised people are generally insensitive when a crime is committed even in their presence. They withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves away from the court unless it is inevitable. They think that a crime, like a civil dispute, is between two individuals or parties, and they should not involve themselves. This kind of apathy of the general public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere, whether in village life, towns, or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with which the investigating agency has to discharge its duties. The court, therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution's case for want of an independent witness, must consider the broad spectrum of the prosecution's version and then search for the nugget of truth with due regard to probability, if any, suggested by the accused.” 33. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pohlu v. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 196: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1496: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 1393, that the intrinsic worth of the testimony of witnesses has to be assessed by the Court and if the testimony of the witnesses appears to be truthful, the non-examination of other witnesses will not make the testimony doubtful. It was observed at page 199: - “10. It was then submitted that some of the material witnesses were not examined, and, in this connection, it was argued that two of the eye-witnesses named in the FIR, namely, Chander and Sita Ram, were not examined by the prosecution. Dharamvir, son of Sukhdei, was also not P a g e | 39 2025:HHC:25492 examined by the prosecution, though he was a material witness, being an injured eyewitness, having witnessed the assault that took place in the house of Sukhdei, PW 2. It is true that it is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witnesses if it prefers to rely upon the evidence of eyewitnesses examined by it, which it considers sufficient to prove the case of the prosecution. However, the intrinsic worth of the testimony of the witnesses examined by the prosecution has to be assessed by the Court. If their evidence appears to be truthful, reliable, and acceptable, the mere fact that some other witnesses have not been examined will not adversely affect the case of the prosecution. We have, therefore, to examine the evidence of the two eye witnesses, namely, PW 1 and PW 2, and to find whether their evidence is true, on the basis of which the conviction of the appellants can be sustained.” 34. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Srichand K. Khetwani v. State of Maharashtra, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 32: (1967) 1 SCR 595: AIR 1967 SC 450: 1967 Cri LJ 414: (1967) 2 SCJ 178, that an adverse inference can be drawn for withholding certain evidence and not for failure to obtain the evidence. It was observed:- “8. Further, an adverse inference against the prosecution can be drawn only if it withholds certain evidence and not merely on account of its failure to obtain certain evidence. When no such evidence has been obtained, it cannot be said what that evidence could have been, and therefore, no question of presuming that that evidence would have been against the prosecution, under Section 114, illustration (g) of the Evidence Act, can arise.” P a g e | 40 2025:HHC:25492 35. Thus, the prosecution's case cannot be doubted because no independent witness was not cited. 36. Bachitter Singh (PW-7) stated that he was going to the Bhadarkali bazaar. He reached near the house of Tilak Raj and saw that the accused hurling abuses at Tilak Raj. When Tilak Raj objected, the accused gave him a beating on the head by way of a stick. The blood oozed from the head of Tilak Raj. He fell on the ground and became unconscious. He stated in his cross- examination that he resided at a distance of 1 KM from Bhadarkali. He was going to Bhadarkali to purchase wheat and sugar on the ration card. Tilak Raj sustained injuries on the right side of the head. 37. Tilaj Raj (PW-5) admitted in his statement that this witness (Bachittear Singh-PW-7) had appeared as a witness in the civil suit filed by him; therefore, he is a convenient witness. He (PW-7) has given the reason for his presence that he wanted to purchase ration, and he was going to Bhadarkali for this purpose. Bhadarkali is located at one kilometre from his village. It is difficult to believe that he was going to purchase rations at 6:15 a.m; therefore, he is to be considered a chance witness. It was P a g e | 41 2025:HHC:25492 laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harbeer Singh v. Sheeshpal, (2016) 16 SCC 418: (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 503: 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1164 that the chance witnesses have a habit of appearing suddenly at the place of incident and thereafter disappearing. Their testimonies should be seen with due care and caution. It was observed at page 427: 23. The defining attributes of a “chance witness” were explained by Mahajan, J., in Puran v. State of Punjab [Puran v. State of Punjab, (1952) 2 SCC 454: AIR 1953 SC 459: 1953 Cri LJ 1925]. It was held that such witnesses have the habit of appearing suddenly on the scene when something is happening and then disappearing after noticing the occurrence about which they are called later on to give evidence. 24. In Mousam Singha Roy v. State of W.B. [Mousam Singha Roy v. State of W.B., (2003) 12 SCC 377: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 429], this Court discarded the evidence of chance witnesses while observing that certain glaring contradictions/omissions in the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 and the absence of their names in the FIR has been very lightly discarded by the courts below. Similarly, Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan [Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] and Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107] are authorities for the proposition that deposition of a chance witness, whose presence at the place of incident remains doubtful, ought to be discarded. Therefore, for the reasons recorded by the High Court, we hold that PW 5 and PW 6 were chance witnesses and their statements have been rightly discarded. P a g e | 42 2025:HHC:25492 38. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150, that the testimony of a chance witness is to be seen with due care and caution, and his presence on the spot should be satisfactorily established. It was observed: “Chance witness 29. A chance witness is one who happens to be at the place of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the said place. A person walking on a street, witnessing the commission of an offence, can be a chance witness. Merely because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed, though a little more scrutiny may be required at times. This again is an aspect that is to be looked into in a given case by the court. We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid position of law which has been laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy [State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy, (2003) 12 SCC 660: 2005 SCC (Cri) 817]: (SCC pp. 665-66, paras 12- 13) “12. Criticism was levelled against the evidence of PWs 4 and 9, who are independent witnesses, by labelling them as chance witnesses. The criticism about PWs 4 and 9 being chance witnesses is also without any foundation. They have clearly explained as to how they happened to be at the spot of occurrence, and the trial court and the High Court have accepted the same. 13. Coming to the plea of the accused that PWs 4 and 9 were “chance witnesses” who had not explained how they happened to be at the alleged place of occurrence, it has to be noted that the said witnesses were independent witnesses. There was not even a suggestion to the witnesses that they had any animosity towards any of P a g e | 43 2025:HHC:25492 the accused. In a murder trial, by describing the independent witnesses as “chance witnesses”, it cannot be implied thereby that their evidence is suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passers-by will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere “chance witnesses”. The expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle, and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite an unsuitable expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of explaining their presence.” 30. The principle was reiterated by this Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107]: (SCC p. 725, paras 21-23) “21. In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. [Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 105] this Court while considering the evidentiary value of the chance witness in a case of murder which had taken place in a street and a passer-by had deposed that he had witnessed the incident, observed as under: If the offence is committed in a street, only a passer-by will be the witness. His evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly or viewed with suspicion on the ground that he was a mere chance witness. However, there must be an explanation for his presence there. The Court further explained that the expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle, and P a g e | 44 2025:HHC:25492 everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite an unsuitable expression in a country like India, where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of explaining their presence. 22. The evidence of a chance witness requires very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence (Satbir v. Surat Singh [Satbir v. Surat Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 192: 1997 SCC (Cri) 538], Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 11 SCC 253: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 28], Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala [Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] and Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh [Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 188] ). Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of incident remains doubtful should be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan [Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] ). 23. Conduct of the chance witness, after the incident, may also be taken into consideration, particularly as to whether he has informed anyone else in the village about the incident (vide Thangaiya v. State of T.N. [Thangaiya v. State of T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1284]). Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) met the informant Darshan Singh (PW 4) before lodging the FIR, and the fact of conspiracy was not disclosed by Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) and Darshan Singh (PW 4). The fact of conspiracy has not been mentioned in the FIR. Hakam Singh, the other witness on this issue, has not been examined by the prosecution. Thus, the High Court was justified in discarding the part of the prosecution's case relating to conspiracy. However, in the factual situation of the present case, the acquittal P a g e | 45 2025:HHC:25492 of the said two co-accused has no bearing, so far as the present appeal is concerned.” 39. Therefore, it is difficult to rely upon his testimony. 40. Dr. Sandeep Narula (PW-11) conducted the medical examination of the injured and found multiple injuries. He stated that the injuries could have been caused by means of a stick. He admitted in his cross-examination that injuries could be caused by way of a fall on a hard surface. It was submitted that this admission makes the prosecution's case highly doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. A mere alternative possibility admitted by the Medical Officer will not make the testimony doubtful. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086 that when the testimonies of the witnesses are found credible, the medical evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404: 22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their P a g e | 46 2025:HHC:25492 credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation. 41. Therefore, the prosecution’s case cannot be rejected due to alternative possibilities in the medical evidence. 42. Dr. Sandeep Narula (PW-11) stated that he found a laceration of size 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm on the left parietal region of the skull of the accused, which could have been caused by a blunt weapon. It was submitted that the prosecution has not explained the injury sustained by the accused, which makes the prosecution's case highly suspect. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1697: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 794 that non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution will not affect the prosecution's case where the injuries sustained by the accused are superficial or minor. It was observed at page 655: P a g e | 47 2025:HHC:25492 “24. One of the pleas is that the prosecution has not explained the injuries to the accused. The issue is, if there is no such explanation, what would be its effect? We are not prepared to agree with the learned counsel for the defence that in each and every case where the prosecution fails to explain the injuries found on some of the accused, the prosecution's case should automatically be rejected, without any further probe. In Mohar Rai v. State of Bihar [AIR 1968 SC 1281: (1968) 3 SCR 525: 1968 Cri LJ 1479] it was observed : (AIR p. 1284, para 6) “In our judgment, the failure of the prosecution to offer any explanation in that regard shows that evidence of the prosecution witnesses relating to the incident is not true or at any rate not wholly true. Further, those injuries probably support the plea taken by the appellants.” In another important case Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar [(1976) 4 SCC 394: 1976 SCC (Cri) 671] after referring to the ratio laid down in Mohar Rai case [AIR 1968 SC 1281: (1968) 3 SCR 525: 1968 Cri LJ 1479] this Court observed: (SCC p. 401, para 12) “[W]here the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on the accused, two results follow: (1) that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is untrue; and (2) that the injuries probabilise the plea taken by the appellants.” It was further observed that: (SCC p. 401, para 12) “[I]n a murder case, the non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course of an altercation is a very important circumstance from which the court can draw the following inferences: (1) that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version; (2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying P a g e | 48 2025:HHC:25492 on the most material point, and therefore their evidence is unreliable; (3) that in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused, it is rendered probable so as to throw doubt on the prosecution's case. The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution.” 25. In Mohar Rai case [AIR 1968 SC 1281: (1968) 3 SCR 525: 1968 Cri LJ 1479] it is made clear that the failure of the prosecution to offer any explanation regarding the injuries found on the accused may show that the evidence related to the incident is not true or at any rate, not wholly true. Likewise, in Lakshmi Singh's case [(1976) 4 SCC 394: 1976 SCC (Cri) 671], it is observed that any non-explanation of the injuries on the accused by the prosecution may affect the prosecution's case. But such a non-explanation may assume greater importance where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution. But where the evidence is clear, cogent, and creditworthy and where the court can distinguish the truth from falsehood, the mere fact that the injuries are not explained by the prosecution cannot by itself be a sole basis to reject such evidence, and consequently, the whole case. Much depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P. [(1990) 3 SCC 190: 1990 SCC (Cri) 378: AIR 1990 SC 1459] 26. Non-explanation of injuries by the prosecution will not affect the prosecution case where injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it outweighs the P a g e | 49 2025:HHC:25492 effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. As observed by this Court in Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar [(1973) 3 SCC 881: 1973 SCC (Cri) 563: AIR 1972 SC 2593], the prosecution is not called upon in all cases to explain the injuries received by the accused persons. It is for the defence to put questions to the prosecution witnesses regarding the injuries to the accused persons. When that is not done, there is no occasion for the prosecution witnesses to explain any injury to the person of an accused. In Hare Krishna Singh v. State of Bihar [(1988) 2 SCC 95: 1988 SCC (Cri) 279: AIR 1988 SC 863], it was observed that the obligation of the prosecution to explain the injuries sustained by the accused in the same occurrence may not arise in each and every case. In other words, it is not an invariable rule that the prosecution has to explain the injuries sustained by the accused in the same occurrence. If the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution are believed by the court to prove of guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the question of the obligation of the prosecution to explain injuries sustained by the accused will not arise. When the prosecution comes with a definite case that the offence has been committed by the accused and proves its case beyond any reasonable doubt, it becomes hardly necessary for the prosecution to again explain how and under what circumstances injuries have been inflicted on the person of the accused. It is more so when the injuries are simple or superficial in nature. In the case at hand, trifle and superficial injuries on the accused are of little assistance to them to throw doubt on the veracity of the prosecution's case, particularly when the accused, who claimed to have sustained injuries, has been acquitted. 43. It was held in Thoti Manohar v. State of A.P., (2012) 7 SCC 723: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 449 that non- explanation of injuries is not always fatal to the prosecution case. It was observed at page 731: P a g e | 50 2025:HHC:25492 29. Quite apart from the above, the non-explanation of injuries of the accused persons is not always fatal to the case of the prosecution. In this context, we may usefully refer to Shriram v. State of M.P. [(2004) 9 SCC 292: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1453] wherein it has been held that mere non- explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may not affect the prosecution case in all cases and the said principle applies to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested and so probable, consistent and creditworthy that it far outweighs the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. Hence, we repel the said submission of the learned counsel for the appellants. 44. In the present case, also injuries sustained by the accused were simple, and the failure to explain the same will not make the prosecution's case suspect. 45. It was submitted that the place was not demarcated, and this makes the prosecution's case highly suspect. This submission is also not acceptable. Onkar Nath Sharma (PW-13) stated that he conducted the demarcation on 19.02.2010 of Khasra numbers 172 and 173, and he issued a report (Ext.PW-12/C). It was laid down by this Court in Radha Swami Satsang Beas Vs. State of H.P. ILR 1984 (HP) 317 that the report given by a revenue officer while demarcating the land is final, and a fresh demarcation cannot be conducted unless the previous demarcation is set aside. It was observed: P a g e | 51 2025:HHC:25492 “Be it realised that a Revenue Officer exercising powers under S.107 of the Act is a statutory authority exercising powers and discharging functions entrusted to him under the enactment and that the powers so vested are exercisable by him and none other. If the Revenue Officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or has committed any illegality or irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction, such excess, error or irregularity is curable in the exercise of revisional powers conferred by S.17 of the Act but any attempt to do so in the purported exercise of powers conferred by S.12 will be wholly lacking in power, authority and jurisdiction. It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the submission of the learned Advocate General that the impugned direction ordering fresh demarcation on the basis that the previous delimitation was not proper could have been issued by the second respondent in the exercise of the powers vested in him under S.12 of the Act. 46. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. Vs. Mangat Ram AIR 1995 Supreme Court 665 wherein it was held: “15. It is not denied before us that Assistant Collector II Grade is a Revenue Officer as defined under Section 4(17) read with Section 7 (Classification of Revenue Officers). Therefore, such an Assistant Collector II Grade is the competent authority to exercise statutory powers under the Act. He can define the limits of any estate or any holdings, fields, or other portions of any estate. 16. The revisional powers of the Financial Commissioner could not be exercised merely because the Assistant Collector, IInd Grade, has stated that the demarcation could be verified from the Senior Revenue Officer. The revisional powers of the Financial Commissioner are circumscribed by the statutory provision. 47. This position was reiterated in Jeet Lal vs. Sita Ram 2002 P a g e | 52 2025:HHC:25492 H.L.J. 1173, wherein it was held: “14. In the present case, the plaintiff-petitioner filed a suit alleging that a part of his land was being encroached upon by the defendant. He obtained demarcation from the competent Revenue Officer (Assistant Collector IInd Grade), who found that there was no such encroachment. As noticed earlier, the demarcation report given by the competent Revenue Officer is final unless it is set aside in the appeal. Section 107 of the HP. Land Revenue Act empowers the Revenue Officer to demarcate the land and define the boundaries. In Gulaba vs Hari Ram, 1982 Sim. L.C. 85 interpreting the provisions of section 107 of the Revenue Act, it was observed that the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade is a competent person to effect the demarcation, and his report is final unless set aside in appeal. It was also observed that even if the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade himself states in his report that the demarcation could be verified by the senior Revenue Officer, such a report cannot be set aside in the revisional power of the Financial Commissioner on that ground.” 48. Similarly, it was held by this Court in Shashi Pal vs. Kuldeep 2018(2) Himachal Law Reporter 1135 that a fresh demarcation cannot be ordered without setting aside the previous demarcation. It was observed: 5. Learned Counsel submits that the demarcation report already placed on record by the defendant cannot be relied upon, being contrary to the instructions issued by the Financial Commissioner. Such submissions, however, are contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in State of H.P. vs. Mangat Ram, (1995) AIR(Supreme Court) 665 and Radha Swami Satsang Veas vs. State of H.P., (1984) ILR(HP) 317 which has been considered by learned trial Judge while arriving at a conclusion that unless and until the P a g e | 53 2025:HHC:25492 demarcation conducted earlier is not set aside by appointing another revenue official, no fresh demarcation can be ordered. Whether the demarcation report already on record is contrary to the instructions or the law applicable has to be seen by the learned trial Court at an appropriate stage during the course of further proceedings in the suit. Therefore, at this stage, when the demarcation report dated 20.12.2010 already exists on record, no fresh demarcation of the land could have been ordered, more particularly, when the demarcation conducted previously was acceptable to the petitioner-plaintiff also. Learned trial Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the application filed by the petitioner with a prayer to appoint a local commissioner for demarcation of the suit land. 49. Therefore, it was impermissible to carry out the fresh demarcation without setting aside the demarcation by Onkar Nath Sharma (PW-13), and no adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution for not conducting the demarcation. 50. Dr. R.K. Sharma (PW-4) noted a fracture in the left temporal region. Section 320, clause seventh of the IPC provides that fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth falls within the definition of a grievous injury. Hence, the injury sustained by Tilak Raj was grievous, and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC. 51. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court did not extend the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused P a g e | 54 2025:HHC:25492 and the judgment is bad. This submission cannot be accepted. The injuries were caused to the vital part of the body, and the Medical Officer stated that it was dangerous. Therefore, keeping in view the nature of injuries and the part of the body where such injury was caused, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused. 52. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and pay a fine of ₹1000/-which is not excessive, keeping in view the relationship, injuries and the part of the body where the injuries were inflicted. Hence, no interference is required with the sentence. 53. No other point was urged. 54. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. 55. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith, along with a copy of this judgment. ( Rakesh Kainthla ) Judge 31st July 2025 (Ravinder)