1 2025:CGHC:21412 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 347 of 2025 1 - Shubham Jaiswal S/o Anil Jaiswal Aged About 23 Years R/o Bagicha Police Station Bagicha District - Jashpur Chhattisgarh. 2 - Ajay Jaiswal S/o Late Shivnath Jaiswal Aged About 44 Years R/o Bagicha Police Station Bagicha District - Jashpur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Vivek Jaiswal S/o Anil Jaiswal Aged About 37 Years R/o Bagicha Police Station Bagicha District - Jashpur Chhattisgarh. 4 - Pratik Jaiswal S/o Ashok Jaiswal Aged About 26 Years R/o Bagicha Police Station Bagicha District - Jashpur Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioners versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Bagicha District - Jashpur Chhattisgarh. 2 - Kaushal Kumar Sharma S/o Shri Harinarayan Aged About 31 Years Occupation Shopkeeper R/o Bagicha Police Station Bagicha District - Jashpur Chhattisgarh (Complainant ). ... Respondent(s) For Petitioners : Shri Anshul Tiwari, Advocate. For State : Ms. Vaishali Mahilong, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Order on Board 08.05. 202 5 1. The present Criminal Revision under Section 438 read with Section 442 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, (in short “BNSS”) is filed by the petitioners against the order dated 11-12-2024 passed by Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2025.05.22 13:18:54 +0530 2 the learned Sessions Judge, Jashpur, District Jashpur, in Sessions Case No. 48/2024, whereby the charges under Sections 294, 506, 392/34, 341 and 307 read with Section 34 of IPC have been framed against the petitioners. 2. Brief facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings and documents annexed with the petition, are that on 03-01-2021, the complainant Kaushal Kumar lodged a report against the petitioners that at about 4.30 pm, when he was going to his friends, near Rouni Road, the petitioners/accused persons have raised quarrel and started beating him by hand and fists and kicks. They assaulted his body on the part where he underwent a surgical operation and tried to run a car over him. The people who were present there intervened and saved him. He lodged the report, and when he was being taken to the hospital for his treatment, they again started scuffling, and he was saved by the police. The FIR has been registered for the offence under Section 294, 506, 323, 392, 34 of the IPC. The complainant, Kaushal Kumar, was sent for his medical examination to the Community Health Centre, Bagicha. On being medically examined, the following injuries have been found on his body:- 1. Swelling with tenderness present over left thigh, 2. Abrasion, skin deep on the thumb of the left hand, 3. Abrasion middle finger of the left hand 4. Swelling with tenderness present on left hand 5. The injuries are caused by hard and blunt object, advised X-ray of left hand 6. In the X-ray, no bony injury was found, and opined that the injuries were simple in nature. 3 3. The accused persons/petitioners were arrested, and their memorandum statements were recorded. Statements of the witnesses have been recorded, and after completion of the investigation, the charge sheet has been filed against the petitioners/accused persons on 18-09-2023, for the offences under Sections 294, 506, 323, 392, 34, 341 and 307 of the IPC. 4. Since the offence of Section 307 of the IPC was added at the time of filing of charge sheet which is triable by the Court of Session, the case was committed to the learned Sessions Judge, Jashpur, for its trial. The learned trial court has framed charges on 21-11-2024 against the petitioners/accused persons for the offence under Sections 294, 506, 392/34, 341 and 307/34 of the IPC, which is under challenge in the present criminal revision. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners/accused persons have mainly challenged the charge under Section 307/34 of the IPC and would submit that there are no ingredients in the entire charge sheet to satisfy the requirements of the offence of attempt to murder the complainant. He would further submit that for the incident of 03-01-2021, the present petitioner/accused persons have also lodged the report against the complainant party for which the offence of Crime No. 04/2021 was registered at police station Bagicha, for the offence under Section 294, 506, 323 of the IPC in which the present complainant is charge sheeted and Criminal Case No. 428/2021 is pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bagicha. A counter report has been lodged by him against the present petitioners/accused persons for the 4 same incident for which the offence under Section 294, 506, 323, 392/34, 341 of the IPC was registered on 03-01-2021 whereas after about more than two years, the offence of Section 307 is added and charge sheet has been filed on 18-09-2023 only to make the offence more grievous. Only superficial abrasions were found on the hand of the complainant and the ingredients of the offence of Section 307 are completely missing. No bony injury is found. No injuries were found on any vital part of the body. It was a simple fight between two groups and both parties have lodged reports against each other. Filing of charge sheet after more than two years when the charge sheet in the counter FIR has already been filed in the year 2021 itself, that too by adding the offence of Section 307 against the present petitioner/accused persons, itself creates doubt on the prosecution’s case. He would also submit that simple altercation between the parties culminated into scuffling and assault by hand and fist and kicks. There was no intentional assault upon the complainant. He would further submit that from the statement of the witnesses, there is no incident of any attempt to run the Car over the complainant, but it is only a scuffle between the complainant and the accused persons. Even the witness Avinash Singh @ babu who accompanied the complainant have not stated about the incident of attempt to run the car over the complainant. Neither any statement of the presence of the car on the spot is there, nor any car has been seized in the case. Therefore, he prayed for quashing the charge under Section 307/34 of the IPC against the petitioners/accused persons. 5 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the state opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and has submitted that at the time of framing of charge only the prima facie case is to be considered as to whether from the material annexed with the charge sheet there is sufficient evidence for framing of the charge and to proceed with the trial or not. The trial court is not required to meticulously examine the evidence at the stage of framing the charge. In the present case there is allegation against the petitioners, who are the accused persons in the offence that they have brutally assaulted the complainant and injuries have been found on his body and by the behaviour and conduct of the petitioners and the manner in which the complainant is being assaulted, the ingredients of Section 307 IPC is satisfied. He would also submit that the revisional powers of Section 438 of BNSS should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution and the court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purposes of finding out whether or not a prima facie case has been made out against the accused. Therefore, the petition has no merit, and the same is liable to be dismissed. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material produced along with the petition. 8. While exercising the jurisdiction under Section 438 of the BNSS, 2023, at the stage of framing of charge, what would be the consideration of the trial court, principles have been alid down by the Hon’ble Supreme 6 Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak 2019 (13) SCC 62, wherein it has been held that at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. It is also held that the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and at the stage of framing charge, the court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence recorded is likely to be convicted or not. In the matter of Deepak (Supra), in its judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “14 It is of relevance to refer to certain judgements of this Court. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi) 7, the appellant and two other individuals were charged under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. It had been alleged that the appellant and the other accused persons had forcibly compelled the deceased to sign a settlement giving up a part of his share in the profits from the sale of certain land. This led to a dispute and as a result of the mental harassment suffered by the deceased, he committed suicide. The Court affirmed the framing of charges by the trial court. The two-judge Bench of this Court laid down the ingredients of the offence of abetment of suicide. Justice D K Jain held thus: “19. As observed in Ramesh Kumar [(2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] , where the accused by his acts or by a continued course of conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an “instigation” may be inferred. In other words, in order to prove that the accused abetted commission of suicide by a person, it has to be established that: (i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or willful omission or conduct which may even be a willful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, 7 (2009) 16 SCC 605 words or willful omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward direction; and (ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the 7 manner noted above. Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. After due consideration of the facts and circumstances, the Court noted that prima facie, the offence of abetment of suicide was made out: “22. In the present case, apart from the suicide note, extracted above, statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation, tend to show that on account of business transactions with the accused, including the appellant herein, the deceased was put under tremendous pressure to do something which he was perhaps not willing to do. Prima facie, it appears that the conduct of the appellant and his accomplices was such that the deceased was left with no other option except to end his life and therefore, clause Firstly of Section 107 IPC was attracted.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for “presuming” that the accused had committed the offence: “25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction.” 17. A two-judge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v State of U P 8 noted that in 8 (2006) 4 SCC 51 accordance with Section 227, the High Court must ascertain whether there is “sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” or there is ground for “presuming” that the offence has been committed. Justice G P Mathur held thus: “9. In Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, the Court while examining the scope of Section 227 held as under: “… Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of inquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that ‘the judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’. The ‘ground’ in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate inquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record, if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime.” 10. The High Court did not at all apply the relevant test, namely, whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the 8 accused or whether there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. If the answer is in the affirmative an order of discharge cannot be passed and the accused has to face the trial. The High Court after merely observing that “as the firing was aimed at the other persons and accidentally the deceased Pooja Balmiki was passing through that way and she was hit” and further observing that “the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was she aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled Caste” set aside the order by which the charges had been framed against Respondent 2. There can be no manner of doubt that the provisions of Section 301 IPC have been completely ignored and the relevant criteria for judging the validity of the order passed by the learned Special Judge directing framing of charges have not been applied. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied)” 9. In the matter of Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad Shattaf 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 of its judgement that:- “12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap. Relevant paras are extracted below: - “11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398, this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515, one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under: 9 “25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, Criminal Appeal No. 1399 of 2023 adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: ‘29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.” 10. Further, in the matter of State by SP through the SPE, CBI vs. Uttamchand Bohra, 2022 (16) SCC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 21 of its judgement that:- “21. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. K. Narayana Rao5 this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a criminal case, summarized the principles in the following terms: 12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 39] relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. “4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If ‘the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, 10 he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing’, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, ‘the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which— … (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused’, as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227. 13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan [(2010) 2 SCC 398 wherein it was held as under: (SCC pp. 401-02, paras 10-11) 5 (2012) 9 SCC 512 11 “10. … If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words ‘not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar [(2010) 9 SCC 368] , this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21) “19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. 12 (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.” 11.In view of the aforesaid judgements passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also under the facts and circumstances of the present case, it appears that there are allegations against the petitioners/accused persons that on the date of incident, there was a quarrel between the complainant and the accused persons and FIR has been lodged by both the sides and injuries have also been inflicted to both the parties. On the report made by the present petitioner, Shubham Jaiswal, an offence under Section 294, 323, 506 of IPC was registered against the complainant, Kaushal Sharma and charge sheet has been filed before 13 the learned JMFC, Bagicha, and Criminal Case No. 428/2021 is pending. The counter report has been lodged by the complainant Kaushal Sharma, which has also been registered against the present petitioners/accused persons for the offence under Section 294, 323, 506, 392, 34, 341 of IPC and after investigation charge sheet has been filed, including the offence under Section 307 of the IPC. As per report lodged by the petitioner Shubham Jaiswal against the complainant Kaushal Kumar, two persons namely Ajay Jaiswal and Anil Jaiswal were injured having numerous injuries over their bodies. There are allegations against each other for commission of the offence under Section 294, 323, 392 of the IPC and from the statement of the witnesses Kaushal sharma (complainant), Avinash Singh @ Babu, Nitesh Shrivastava @ Goldy, Bhuneshwar Yadav @ Munwa, Naveen Kumar Sinha, Devnish Tigga, Ankit Rajwade, Abhishek Tiwari @ Sonu and Arun Minj, prima facie ingredients are there to frame charge under Section 294, 506, 392 and 341 and to proceed with the trial. 12. So far as the charge under Section 307 of the IPC is concerned, this court finds difficulty in upholding the charge of Section 307 of the IPC. It is necessary here to quote the definition of Section 307 of the IPC which reads as under:- “307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is herein before mentioned. Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.” 14 13. The requirement for the offence of Section 307 of the IPC is that the act of the accused persons must have been with the intention or knowledge to cause death and in furtherance thereof, they acted. The Hon’ble Division Bench of this court has held in the case of “Sannu Kudami v. State of Chhattisgarh” 2022 SCC Online Chh. 2628, that:- “9. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 307 of the IPC which states as under: - "307. Attempt to murder.--Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life-convicts.--When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death." 10. The essential ingredients required to be proved in the case of an offence under Section 307 of the IPC are: (i) that the death of a human being was attempted; (ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of the act of the accused; and (iii) that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as: (a) the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or (b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused having no excused for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury. 11. The Supreme Court in the matter of Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh and others1 has held that under Section 307 of the IPC what the court has to see is, whether the act irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the provision. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. Without this ingredient being established, there can be no offence of "attempt to murder". Under Section 307 the intention precedes the act attributed to accused. Therefore, the intention is to be gathered from all circumstances, and not merely from the consequences that ensue. It has been further held that the nature of the weapon used, manner in which it is used, motive for the crime, severity of the blow, the part of the body where the injury 15 is inflicted are some of the factors that may be taken into consideration to determine the intention.” 14. In the matter of “(Smt.) Kaushalya Devi w/o Vijendrasingh Rathi (Jat) v. State of M.P. through Police Station, Neemuch”, 2003 SCC Online MP 672, it has been held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court that:- “10. The Apex Court has consistently held that if there is no legal evi-dence then framing of charge would be groundless, and compelling the accused for facing the trial is nothing but contrary to the procedure prescribed by law which is offending Article 21 of the Constitution of India. For this purpose, the Court has limited powers to look into and sift the evidence upto some extent. (See AIR 1990 SC 1962). Applying the tests as laid down by the Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that even if complete prosecution case is accepted, there is absolutely no material to make out prima facie case against the applicant.” 15. The aforesaid judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh”, 2024 (10) SCC 651. In para 25 of its judgment, it has been held that:- “25. Even after referring to the aforesaid decisions, we think it absolutely appropriate to refer to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Kaushalya Devi v. State of MP9. It was held in the said case that if there is no legal evidence, then framing of charge would be groundless and compelling the accused to face the trial is contrary to the procedure offending Article 21 of the Constitution of India. While agreeing with the view, we make it clear that the expression ‘legal evidence’ has to be construed only as evidence disclosing prima facie case, ‘the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith” 16. From the material produced in the present case, along with the charge sheet, it reveals that there was a fight between two groups with respect to the quarrel raised spontaneously and both parties were engaged in giving blows by their hands and fists and kicks and stones. Prior to the assault there was an altercation between them. The complainant, Kaushal Kumar has received superficial abrasions and swelling with 16 tenderness on his fingers and hand. No injuries were found on any other parts of the body. Even no bony injuries were found. The intention to commit murder could have been gathered from the weapon used, the part of the body where the assault was made, the impact of the injury and other surrounding circumstances under which the incident took place. In the present case, it is reflected that it is a quarrel between two groups and both of them have assaulted each other. Case and counter-case was registered against both the parties. The injuries found on the body of the complainant are simple in nature. Although the nature of injuries are not the relevant factor while considering the offence of Section 307 of IPC, but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the necessary ingredients of Section 307 of the IPC are missing and the material available in the charge sheet is not sufficient to frame charge of Section 307 of the IPC against the petitioners/accused persons. 17. There is no averment in the statement of the witness Avinash Singh @ Babu, Nitesh Shrivastava @ Goldy, Bhuneshwar Yadav @ Munwa, Naveen Kumar Sinha, Devnish Tigga, Ankit Rajwade, Abhishek Tiwari @ Sonu and Arun Minj that the petitioners/accused persons have tried to run a car over the complainant. There is no material in the charge sheet that at the earlier point in time the complainant had undergone any surgery or any injury was inflicted on that part of the body by the accused persons. Further, from the injury report of the complainant, there are no ingredients that he received any grievous injuries or that the injuries were fatal to life. 17 18. It is settled law that while exercising the powers under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., the judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court. The court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on the record and must be satisfied that the commission of the offence by the accused persons was possible. 19. Thus, from the material produced by the prosecution along with the charge sheet, it is held that no offence under Section 307 of the IPC prima facie appears to be made out to frame charge and to proceed with the trial of the case. Accordingly, the charge framed by the learned trial court for the offence under Section 307/34 of the IPC against the petitioners/accused persons is hereby quashed, and they are discharged from the offence under Section 307/34 of the IPC. However, instead thereof, they are being charged for the offence of Section 323/34 of the IPC along with the charge of other offences as has been framed by the learned trial court. The charge framed by the learned trial court for other offences is hereby affirmed. The learned trial court is directed to proceed with the case in accordance with the law. 20. The Criminal Revision is partly allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge inder