Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1
2025:CGHC:2363
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 1656 of 2020 1 - M.N. Prasad Rao S/o Late Shri M.J. Rao Aged About 63 Years R/o Aparkunj, State Bank Colony , Timber Market , Fafadih, Raipur , District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Food And Civil Supplies , Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited Through Board Of Directors , Sector 24, Office Complex , Block 7 - A , Iind Floor , Atal Nagar,Raipur,Chhattisgarh.,District:Raipur,Chhattisgarh 3 - Chairman Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited , Sector 24, Office Complex , Block 7 - A, Iind Floor , Atal Nagar , Raipur , Chhattisgarh.,District:Raipur,Chhattisgarh 4 - Managing Director Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited Sector 24, Office Complex , Block 7 - A, Iind Floor, Atal Nagar , Raipur,Chhattisgarh.,District:Raipur,Chhattisgarh 5 - General Manager (Administration) Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited Sector 24, Office Complex , Block 7 - A, Iind Floor, Atal Nagar, Raipur , Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For the Petitioner :Ms.Surya Kawalkar Dangi, Advocate. For State :Mrs. Mukta Tripathi, PL. For Respondents No. 2 to 5 : Mr. Syed Majid Ali, Advocate. NISHA DUBEY Digitally signed by NISHA DUBEY
2 S.B.: Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge
Order On Board 14/01/2025
1. Petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking following reliefs:-
“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the order dated 29.09.2016 (Annexure P/3), order dated 14.11.2017 (Annexure P/2) and decision taken on 21.10.2019 intimated to the petitioner on 03.12.2019 (Annexure P/1). 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to hold that no misconduct has been carried out by the petitioner in the selection process of direct recruitment of Assistant Managers initiated vide the advertisement issued in the year 2012. 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to pay the cost of the petition to the petitioner. 10.4 Any other relief that the Hon'ble court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be granted in favour of the petitioner against the respondents.”
2. Learned counsel for petitioner would submit that the petitioner while holding post of General Manager (Procurement/ Transport) in respondent No.2-department, published an advertisement on 30.7.2012 for direct recruitment of Assistant Manager. Total 15 posts of Assistant Manager have been published and after completion of selection process, appointment orders were issued for 14 posts in the month of November, 2012. After issuance of appointment order, a complaint was made stating that direct recruitment of 14 posts of Assistantf Manager has been made in violation of the recruitment rules. Prior to issuance of advertisement, proper sanction and approval of the State Government was not obtained and further that the petitioner was one of the
3 members of the Selection Committee. Pursuant to the complaint made, the Secretary conducted preliminary enquiry and based on the enquiry report dated 21.1.2014, entire selection process has been set aside vide order dated 28.2.2014 holding the entire selection process to be illegal. Services of the recruited Assistant Managers were terminated. Petitioner thereafter was served with a charge memo on 15.3.2016 levelling four charges. He contended that petitioner submitted reply to the charge memo, however, dissatisfied with the reply to the charge memo, Departmental Enquiry was initiated against him and after conclusion of Departmental Enquiry proceeding, petitioner was imposed with major penalty of compulsary retirement against which petitioner submitted an appeal before the appellate authority. 3.
She submits that during pendency of Departmental Enquiry proceeding, the Assistant Managers whose services were terminated, have filed writ petitions before this Court and the same came to be dismissed vide order dated 16.8.2016. The Enquiry Officer taking note of the observation made in the
order passed in the writ petition has submitted its report and on that basis, the disciplinary authority has passed an order of compulsary retirement of the petitioner. 4. She further contended that writ petitioners have challenged the order passed in writ petition by filing writ appeal before the the Division Bench, the same was allowed. In the order passed in writ appeal, allegations, which are in the form of charges levelled against the petitioners, have been dealt with and all the allegations have been found to be not proved. The authorities were directed to reinstate the petitioners therein in services with 50% of backwages. The order passed in writ appeal was put to challenge before Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP which was dismissed and thereby the observation and
4 finding recorded by the Division Bench in writ appeal became final. She submits that after passing of the order in writ appeal, petitioner submitted additional submissions before the appellate authority along with copy of writ appeal. However, the appellate authority has not taken note of the order passed in writ appeal and the observation made thereunder, and only considered the observation made in the order passed in the writ petitions and thereby committed error. She submits that the order passed in writ petition merged with the order passed in writ appeal, hence, the appellate authority could not have taken note of any observation made in writ petition and could have considered the observation made in writ appeal and the decisions of the Division Bench therein. In support of her contention she places reliance upon the dicision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kunhayammed and others v. State of Kerala and another, reported in (2000) 6 SCC 359. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner also contended that the controversy with respect to the charges levelled against the petitioner has also been considered and decided by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.433/2016 and other connected matters and it was held that allegations have not been found to be proved. Hence, it was incumbent upon the appellate authority to consider the order passed in writ appeal and the observation made therein with respect to the charges levelled against petitioner. The observation made in the decision of writ appeal was binding in nature.
In support of her contention she referred decision of Division Bench of the High Court of Gauhati in case of All Assam Graduate Hindi Sikshan Parangat( Equivalent B.Ed.) Teachers’ Association v. State of Assam and others, reported in 2014 SCC OnLine Gauhati 445. 5
6. She further submits that the then Managing Director was also charge-sheeted and similar charges were also levelled against the then Managing Director. However, after issuance of charge memo, he was repatriated to the Forest Department. She contended that after passing of the order by the Division Bench and taking note of the observation made by the Division Bench in the said order, the respondent No.1 has recommented for filing of the proceeding initiated against the then Secretary of Forest Department. Considering the letter of request/recommendation of filing of the proceedings initiated against the then Managing Director, has closed the case against him vide order dated 11.4.2018. She submits that as one of the senior employees who was earlier posted in the department i.e. Chhattisgarh State Civil Corporation Limited and holding the post of Managing Director has been exonarated from the charges by filing the proceeding against him, the petitioner herein is also entitiled for the similar benefit. In support of her contention, she places reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Raj Pal Singh, reported in (2010) 5 SCC 783 and Rajendra Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, reported in (2013)3 SCC 73. 7. She submits that as the order of the appellate authority is perverse to the material placed before it, therefore, this Court in exercise of power under writ jurisdiction can interfere with the order of punishment as also the appellate order. The order of Appellate Authority was put to challenge and the Second Appellate authority without application of mind had considered the grounds raised therein with respect to the decision of Division Bench as arbitrary and illegally and dismissed the appeal vide Annexure-P/1.
In support of her contention she places reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Yoginath D. Bagde vs State Of Maharashtra & another,
6 repoorted in (1999) 7 SCC 739. 8. Learned cousnel for respondents No.2 to 5 vehemently opposes the submissions made by counsel for petitioner and submits that the order of punishment of compulsary retirement has been imposed upon the petitioner after completion of full fledged Departmental Enquiry in which petitioner was given full opportunity to defend the charges. He submits that it is not the case of petitioner that the petitioner was not given proper opportunity of hearing in the Departmental Enquiry proceeding. The disciplinary authority considering the enquiry report wherein Enquiry Officer has found proved 3 out of 4 charges against him, has rightly passed the order of punishment after giving opportunity of hearing on the enquiry report submitted by the Enquriy Officer. There is no procedural illegality or the order has not been pased in violation of any of the provision as provided under Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Conduct and Appeal) Rules 1966(for short Rules, 1966’). He contended that in writ petition, learned Single Bench has categorized writ petitions in 3 categories; while deciding the writ petition of Category-C, it has been observed that eligible candidates for promotion were available, therefore, the submission of counsel for petitioner based on Rule 7(ii)(b) of Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited Rules(for short ‘the Rules’) is not acceptable. The proviso of Rule 7(ii)(b) of the Rules will not apply when the eligible candidates for promotion are not available. He also contended that the Division Bench in the order passed in writ appeal in para-6 & 25 has further held that remaining posts vacant would be filled up by the petitioners as mentioning Category-C. He also contended that as the disciplinary authority has passed the order of punishment based on the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, which is a factual finding based on the material evidence brought in
7 record by the parties, therefore, interference in exercise of review jurisdiction is not permissible.
In support of his contention he places reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Deputy General Manager (appellate authority) and others v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the documents enclosed along with record. 10. Copy of charge memo is enclosed as Annexure-P/6, which contains following charges:-
“ቦኍ एम.एन.्ቚसा द रा व, महा ्ቚबंधक, मख्या लया रा यापुरा क विवरु्ቍ अधिधराविपुत आरापु क विववराण पु्ቔ // ቦኍ एम.एन. ्ቚसा द रा व, महा ्ቚबंधक, मख्या लया रा यापुरा ቛኋ रा व्ቧ$ 2012 म% साहा याक ्ቚक्धक' क( भत* म% गंभरा अविनयाविमतत ए पु या गंया एव भत* विनयाम' क पु लन नहा, करात हा-ए विनयावि.या द गंया। जो विक कत$व्या' क ्ቚवित ल पुराव हा हा2 इसा क राण विनम्न नसा रा आरापु अधिधराविपुत विकया जो त हा5- आरापु क विववराण क
.-01
:- न गंरिराक आपु7वित$ विनगंम म% साहा याक ्ቚबंधक सावगं$ क क ल 34 पुद स्वक9 त हा2। पुरात स्वक9 त पुद' क विवरू्ቍ उसासा अधिधक पुद' पुरा विनयाविमत विनयावि.या क( गंई हा2। जो विक अविनयाविमतत क( ቦኍण म% आत हा2। अधिधक पुद' पुरा क( गंया विनयावि.
क शा सान/विव्ቈ विवभ गं सा अनमदन भ नहा, धिलया गंया । आरापु क विववराण क
.-02
- साहा याक ्ቚबंधक सावगं$ क पुद पुद्ቐवित क पुद हा2 पुरात इसा पुरा साध भवित$या क( गंया हा2। जोबंविक विनयाम नसा रा विनगंम म% क या$रात कविम$या' क पुद्ቐवित दकरा साहा याक ्ቚबंधक' क पुद भरा जो न था पुरात ऐसा न करात हा-ए आपुक ቛኋ रा साध भत* क ्ቚस्त व दकरा अन धिधक9 त रूपु सा भत* करा या गंया तथा शा सान ቛኋ रा
8 विशाक यात क साबंध म% जो नक रा म गं जो न पुरा गंलत औरा ्ቝविमत करान व ल जो नक रा दकरा गंमरा हा करान क ्ቚया सा विकया गंया । आरापु क विववराण क
.-3 .- ्ቚ ् आवदन' क( सामቌኋ आपुक ቛኋ रा भल-भ वित नहा, क( गंया एव एक्जो ई मरिराट सा7ची त2या रा नहा, क( गंया। इसाक क राण आराविቌኋत सावगं$ क क छ अभ्याथा* जो मरिराट क आध रा पुरा अन राविቌኋत ्ቚवगं$ म% स्था न ्ቚ ् करा साकत था क आराविቌኋत ्ቚवगं$ म% स्था न विदए जो न क क राण आराविቌኋत ्ቚवगं$ क अन्या अभ्याथा* चीयान सा वविचीत हा गंए। स्वक9 त पुद सा अधिधक भ्ቐ करान हात विवሺኋ पुन त2या रा करान एव आराቌኋण विनयाम' क पु लन नहा, करान क धिलए आपु धिजोम्मद रा हा5। याहा चीयान ्ቚविLया क( गंभरा ्ቔविट हा2 एव भत* विनयाम 2005 क उቤघन हा2। भत* क( याहा क या$व हा आपुधि्ቈ जोनक एव विनयाम विवरू्ቍ हा2। आरापु क विववराण क
.-4 .- विनयावि. पुश्ची तP अची नक ची रा नवविनया. साहा याक ्ቚबंधक' क पुरावቌኋ धन अवधिध म% क या$ सात्ቧजोनक नहा, हान क क राण बंत त हा-ए साव ए साम ् क( गंया हा2। साव ए साम वि् क पु7व$ उ. नवविनया. साहा याक ्ቚबंधक' क विकसा ्ቚक रा क( चीत वन अथाव क या$ म% साध रा भ बंतP कई सा7चीन नहा, द गंया। अची नक उनक( साव साम ् विकया जो न सादहा क( पुरिराधिध म% आत हा2 एव ्ቚशा साविनक दृविRकण सा अव2ध विनक क या$व हा क( गंया हा2। इसासा स्पुR हात हा2 विक विनयावि.या ्ቔविटपु7ण$ हा-ई हा2। उ. क9 त्या छ.गं. धिसाविवल साव (आचीराण) अधिधविनयाम 1966 क अतगं$त दण्डनया हा2।"
11.
So far as charge No.2 that the post on which the appointment was made pursuant to the advertisement issued by the petitioner for appointment of the Assistant Manager by direct recruitment were not the post for direct recruitment but for the promotional post is concerned, the rules on the basis of which the advertisement was issued for appointment of Assistant
9 Manager is the Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited Rules (for short ‘the Rules’). Rule 7 of the Rules provides ‘method of recruitment’. Rule No.7(ii) (b) as extracted in the order of writ appeal provides that the vacancies shall be filled in by rotation according to the number of posts fixed for direct recruits of persons to be taken on deputation or reappointment and promotees of deputations or re- appointment and the other three vanancies shall be filled in by promotees. As per proviso to Rule 7 (ii) (b) of the Rules, if suitable persons are not available for promotion, the remaining posts against promotion quota, shall be filled in by direct recruitment or deputation or re-appointment. 12. From the aforementioned rules, it is apparent that proviso to Rule 7(ii)(b) of the Rules gives jurisdiction to the appointing authority to fill-up promotional post by way direct recruitment or deputation or re-appointment if suitable persons for filing up the promotional posts are not available. Petitioner has also enclosed copy of the order dated 16.8.2016 passed in a batch of writ petitions filed by the petitioners whose appointments were cancelled. Some of the petitioners therein were discharged from service for unsatisfactory service during the probation period. In some writ petitions, petitioners have sought relief that respondents be directed to convene the meeting of Departmental Promotion Committee.In one of the petitions, relief is also sought for initiating disciplinary proceedings against respondent No.4 therein for illegal and irregular recruitment process and also to take disciplinary measure against respondent No.5 therein.
These writ petitions were dismissed and the order passed in writ petitions was put to challenge in writ appeals. The Division Bench of this Court allowed the batch of writ appeals and directed for reinstatement of group ‘A’ employees who were wrongly terminated. They were directed to be reinstated in service with
10 50% backwages with all consequential benefits. The Division Bench has considered with respect to issuance of advertisement for recruitment of Assistant Manager by direct appointment and has observed thus:-
“13. The Learned Single Judge relied heavily upon the fact that the file does not contain such note or resolution of approval prior to 30.7.2012, when the advertisement was issued. There was no decision taken by the appointing authority prior to 30.7.2012 that since suitable candidates were not available in the feeder category, the post of Assistant Manager was required to be filled up by way of direct recruitment. However, the Learned Single Judge held that after issuance of advertisement on 30.7.2012, a note was written by the General Manager on 4.9.2012 for obtaining sanction of the recruitment process. Thereafter, the note was placed before the Managing Director, who remarked that if post of Assistant Manager are filled by direct recruitment, it will improve the quality of the officers at the district level. It would also be pertinent to mention that since on previous occasions also, direct recruitments had been restored to fill up the post of Assistant Managers, this note was approved by the Chairman and Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies, Govt. of Chhattisgarh on 7.9.2012 and
14.9.2012. It would be apposite to note that the Secretary of the Corporation who approved the decision on 14.9.2012 was none other than Shri Vikash Sheel, who has also signed the letter dated 28.2.2014 cancelling the entire recruitment process. We fail to understand how the same officer could take two diametrically opposite view. We need not say anything further in this regard. 15.
However, the Learned Single Judge relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Meera Sahni Vs. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and others, (2008) 9 SCC 177, held that it is a settled proposition of the law that when an action to be taken in a particular manner as provided by a statue that action must be taken, done or
11 performed in the manner prescribed and in no other manner at all. According to the Learned Single Judge since the appointing authority has not assessed the suitability of the persons working in the Corporation, therefore, the decision had not been taken in the manner prescribed by the rules. With due respect to the Learned Single Judge, we are not at all in agreement with this view. The reason is that attention of the Learned Single Judge was not drawn to the fact that there were in fact no eligible candidates, in the feeder category available with the Corporation. 16. The question of assessing the suitability of the candidates would only arise if there are eligible candidates in the feeder category. When there were no eligible candidates, then there can be no assessment of their suitability. One cannot assesses suitability of non-existing candidates. Since there were admittedly no departmental candidate eligible for promotion at the time when the advertisement was issued, the question of assessment of their being suitable or not does not arise.”
13. The Division Bench in the aforementioned extracted paragraphs have clearly observed that on the date of issuance of advertisement, eligible candidates in the feeder category for promotion were not available. Further, in para-17 of the
judgment it was observed that;
“ it is now urged by the learned counsel appearing for them that they could not have challenged the process of advertisement in the year 2012 because they were not eligible in that year. This only supports the review which we have taken that if there have no eligible candidates, then the question of assesment of suitability of the candidates does not arise.”
14. While dealing with Charge No.2, the Enquiry Officer has considered the order passed in batch of writ petitions dated 16.8.2016 and held that in the context of the order of the High
12 Court, the petitioner has partly admitted this charge. The enquiry report is submitted on 31.8.2016 i.e. prior to the decision in writ appeals of the Division Bench which was passed on 9.11.2016. The finding of the Enquiry Officer is based on the observation made by the High Court in writ petitions.
15. So far as the charge No.3 is concerned, Division Bench has considered the said allegation in para-19, 20 & 21 of the
judgment, which are extracted below for ready reference:-
“ 19. Even with regard to the rules of reservation, we have a grave doubt whether the entire selection process could be set aside. On this count, it would be pertinent to mention that the advertisement was issued by the Corporation and ex post facto approval was taken from the Board including the Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies, Govt. of Chhattisgarh for issuing the advertisement. This means that the Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies, Govt. of Chhattisgarh must have seen the advertisement before giving his approval. He was thus aware that no provision has been made in the advertisement for horizontal reservation for women in the reserved category. No doubt, this is in violation of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Special Provision for Appointment of Women) Rules, 1997 which clearly provided for 33% reservation for women across the border. The issue that arises is whether if the employer makes a mistake in issuing the advertisement, can the employer himself set aside the selection process when no person has come to the Court for challenging the selection process. 20. No complaint was made to the employer with regard to violation of the reservation rules. The complaint was that posts have been filled up without prior approval/sanction and without following the rules. That complaint was inquired and the inquiry officer only gave a report that there were some irregularities which could be
13 rectified by re-drawing the combined merit list. This in our opinion, does not entitle the employer- Corporation or the Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies, Govt. of Chhattisgarh to set aside the entire selection process. We may also in this regard mention that out of 15 posts for which the selection were made, 6 posts have been filled up by the women, therefore, the representation of the women is 40% i.e. more than 33%. 21. The next question is whether women who were appointed under the unreserved category should be counted against the seats reserved for women. We are leaving this question open at this stage but it has been held by the Apex Court in case of Rajesh Kumar Daria Vs. Rajasthan Public Service Commission and others, (2007) 8 SCC 785, that the women selected on merit within the vertical reservation quota will be counted against the horizontal reservation for women.”
16.
Enquiry Officer in its enquiry report considered charge No.3 based on the explanation offered by pettioner and held the same to be proved recording that the appointment made pursuant to the advertisement was cancelled by the High Court in its decision dated 16.8.2016. 17. With respect to charge No.1, Enquiry Officer in its report considering the decision of the High Court has held the said charge to be proved. It was further held that no prior approval was obtained from the State Government for filling up one excess post. In the report, charge No.4 has been held to be not proved. The diciplinary authority upon considering the enquiry report dated 31.8.2016 has passed the order dated 29.9.2016 imposing punishment of compulsory retirement on the petitioner. 18. Enquiry Officer in concluding para has further considered that the Assistant Manager, who were appointed were given the show-cause notice, their appointment was enquired into and
14 the appointment of the Assistant Managers issued pursuant to the advertisement published by the petitioner were cancelled. Writ petition filed against cancellation of appointment was dismissed by the High Court, therefore, Charge Nos.1, 2 & 3 are proved. Departmental appeal preferred by petitioner was decided vide order dated 14.11.2017. 19. From the document Annexure-P/13, it is appearing that during pendency of appeal, petitioner had submitted representation dated 20.3.2017 to the President of Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation; Managing Director Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation mentioning therein that the Division Bench of the High Court has decided the appeal finally, found the appointment of the Assistant Manager to be in accordance with law and set aside the order of cancellation of the order of appointment. Hon’ble Supreme Court has also upheld the
order passed in writ appeal. Appellate authority had considered and decided the appeal on 14.11.2017.
20. From the order Annexure-P/2, it is appearing that petitioner was granted an opportunity of hearing on 26.9.2017 in which the petitioner has also submitted representation. The appellate authority has considered the order passed in WPS No.3255 of 2017, however, not considered the decision of the Division Bench of this Court and dismissed the appeal. Second appeal submitted by the petitioner also came to be dismissed vide
order dated 21.10.2019 and intimated on 3.12.2019.
21. Enquiry Officer has considered the decision passed in the batch of writ petitions in coming to the conclusion that the charges against petitioner has been proved based on observations made therein. As the enquiry report is based on the order passed in the writ petition, the finding of which in a writ appeal was set aside and therefore the finding recorded in writ petition is merged with order of Writ Appeal No.433 of
15 2016 dated 9.112016.
22. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kunhayammed (supra) has observed thus:-
“8. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Vs. M/s Amritlal Bhogilal and Co. AIR 1958 SC 868 this Court held :
“There can be no doubt that, if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law. If the appellate authority modifies or reverses the decision of the tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. In law the position would be just the same even if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the tribunal. As a result of the confirmation or affirmance of the decision of the tribunal by the appellate authority the original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement.;”
10. In M/s Gojer Brothers Pvt.Ltd. Vs. Shri Ratanlal AIR 1974 SC 1380 this Court made it clear that so far as merger is concerned on principle there is no distinction between an order of reversal or modification or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority; in all the three cases the
order passed by the lower authority shall merge in the order passed by the appellate authority whatsoever be its decision whether of reversal or modification or only confirmation. Their Lordships referred to an earlier decision of this court in U.J.S. Chopra Vs. State of Bombay AIR 1955 SC 633 wherein it was held.
“A judgment pronounced by a High Court in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction after issue of a notice and a full hearing in the presence of both the parties would replace the judgment of the lower court, thus constituting the judgment of the High Court the only final judgment to be executed in accordance with law by the
16 courts below.”
12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or
order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way - whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view. 23. Other grounds raised by counsel for petitioner is that the then Managing Director of the company has also been served with the charge memo, however, after passing of the order in writ appeal, respondent No.1 has written letter to the State Government, Forest Department for filing of the proceedings initiated against the then Managing Director. In the said letter, it is alo mentioned that against the order pased in writ appeal, Special Leave Petition was also field which also came to be dismissed. Copy of letter is filed as Annexure-P/17. Based on the letter Annexure-P/17 dated 21.2.2018, the Forest Department had issued order dated 11.4.2018 closing the proceeding initiated against the then Managing Director. Submission of counsel for petitioner is that there cannot be discrimination in taking action against two delinquents facing same charges. 24. In case of Rajpal Singh(supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus:-
17
“4. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that once the charges have been held to be established, it was not appropriate for the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment and judged from this standpoint, the order of the High Court cannot be sustained. In support of the said contention, reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. U.O.I, and Ors. and Secretary to Government, Home Department and Ors. v. Srivaikundathan. 5.
Though, on principle, the ratio in aforesaid cases would ordinarily apply, but in the case in hand, the High Court appears to have considered the nature of charges leveled against the 5 employees who stood charged on account of the incident that happened on the same day and then the High Court came to the conclusion that since the gravity of charges was the same, it was not open for the disciplinary authority to impose different punishments for different delinquents. The reasonings given by the High Court cannot be faulted with since the State is not able to indicate as to any difference in the delinquency of these employees. ”
25. In case of Rajendra Yadav (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus:-
“The doctrine of equality applies to all who are equally placed; even among persons who are found guilty. The persons who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be disproportionate while comparing the involvement of co-delinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident. The Disciplinary Authority cannot impose punishment which is disproportionate, i.e., lesser punishment for serious offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences. 26. Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case in particular the fact that the Enquiry Officer has based his enquiry report on the observation and finding of the High Court in writ petition which ultimately was set aside and
18 writ appeal filed by the petitioners therein were allowed.
The observation made in writ appeal was not considered by the appellate authority and further considering the afore discussed decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, I am of the considered view that the appellate authority fell into error in not taking note of the decision of the Division Bench in a batch of writ appeals, lead case being WA No.433/2016, wherein the allegation which are similar to the charges levelled against the petitioner have been considered and decided. The order of Division Bench has been challenged in SLP which came to be dismissed. In the opinion of this Court, the appeal filed by the petitioner herein before the appellate authority requires reconsideration. 27. Accordingly, the order passed Annexure-P/1 and Annexure- P/2 passed in second appeal and first appeal are quashed. Respondent No.3 is directed to reconsider the appeal filed by the petitioner along with the grounds raised in additional pleadings of appeal and in representation dated 20.3.2017 &
28.11.2016. 28. As the petitioner is retired employee the appellate authority is
directed to consider and pass an order afresh in the appeal, as observed above, within an outer limit of 3 months from the date of receipt of the order.
29. Certified copy as per rules. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Nisha