[2025:RJ-JP:12530] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 499/2005 Dharm Singh S/o Ramcharan, aged about 22 years, R/o Village Kishanpura Kakda, Police Station Bamanwas, District Dholpur (Rajasthan). ----Complainant/Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Rajasthan through PP ----Non-petitioner 2. Sher Singh S/o Devi Singh, 3. Jal Singh S/o Dilsukh, 4. Charan Singh S/o Dilsukh, 5. Smt. Ramoti wife of Charan Singh, 6. Preetam Singh S/o Devi Singh Nos. 2 to 6 all R/o Village Kishanpura Kukda, Police Station Bamanwas District Sawai Madhopur (Rajasthan) ----Accused/respondents For Complainant- Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rahul Sharma for Mr. Rajneesh Gupta For Accused- Respondent(s) For State : : Mr. Yunus Khan Mr. N.S. Dhakad, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA Order 19/03/2025 1. By filing this criminal revision petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C. read with Section 401 Cr.P.C., the complainant-petitioner- Dharm Singh has challenged the judgment of acquittal dated 17.05.2005 passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (2 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] Judge, Gangapur City, District Sawai Madhopur (for short 'the trial Court') in Sessions Case No.14/04 (52/03), 'State Vs. Dharm Singh & Ors.', whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused-respondent Nos. 2 to 6 from the offences punishable under Sections 147, 341, 323, 323/149, 325 & 325/149 of IPC. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the complainant-petitioner Dharm Singh, gave a Parcha Bayan to the effect that on 27.05.2003 at about 2.00 pm when he was at his home, the accused non-petitioner No. 2 Sher Singh came to his house and stated that his uncle Charan Singh has called him to the house for the payment. Almost one year back the complainant-petitioner advanced a loan of Rs. 10,500/- to Charan Singh, the accused non petitioner No.4. At the demand raised by the complainant- petitioner on 26.05.2003, accused-Charan Singh came to his house and stated that Rs. 1500/- may be adjusted against the payment of Rs. 10,500/-. Upon this he asked the accused Charan Singh to make the payment of balance amount. Then all the accused non-petitioners who came with common object started to give severe beatings to the complainant-petitioner. On the basis of aforesaid Parcha Bayan of the complainant petitioner, the Police registered an F.I.R. No. 83/2003 at Police Station Bamanwas, District Sawai Madhopur for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 323 & 448 of I.P.C. The Police during investigation prepared the site plan and medico legal report of the injured persons. After investigation the Police filed charge- sheet for the offences under Sections 147, 149, 323, 341 & 325 IPC. [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (3 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] 3. The learned trial Court framed the charge against the accused non petitioners for the offence under Sections 147, 341, 323, 323/149, 325, 325/149 I.P.C. The charges were read over to the accused non petitioners, who denied the same and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution examined as many as 7 witnesses and also exhibited 12 documents. Thereafter the learned trial Court recorded the statements of the accused non petitioners under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In defence also one person, namely, Dr. G.V. Singh was examined as DW-1 and the statement recorded by the Police during investigation under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were marked as Exhibit-D/1 to D/14. 5. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gangapur-city District Sawai Madhopur vides its impugned judgment and order dated 17.05.2005 acquitted all the accused non petitioners from the charges levelled against them. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the complainant petitioner submits that the impugned judgment and order dated 17.05.2005 passed by the learned trial Court by which the accused non petitioners were acquitted is patently illegal, erroneous and contrary to the evidence available on record, as such, the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. Counsel submits that the learned trial Court has committed serious error of law while not appreciating the evidence of the prosecution in the right perspective. All the witnesses have categorically stated that accused non petitioners have committed an offence in furtherance of their common object and the same is also proved by the prosecution evidence. [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (4 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] Counsel submits that the learned trial Court has committed serious error of law while acquitting the accused non petitioners from all the charges. The prosecution has successfully proved the charges against all the accused non petitioners. Counsel submits that in the earliest version of the occurrence given by the injured Dharm Singh, PW-1, in his Parcha Bayan recorded, names of all the accused non petitioners have been specifically mentioned. Counsel submits that the trial Court disbelieved the prosecution story for the reason that prosecution witnesses have failed to explain each and every injury received by the injured persons and further failed to consider that three persons sustained 15 injuries in total. The injured Dharm Singh has sustained fracture of proximal phalanx. It is settled proposition of law that the First Information Report is not encyclopedia of incident but it is merely information with respect to an offence committed by the accused persons. Counsel submits that PW-6 Dr. Satya Narayan Sharma has submitted in his statement that injury No. 7 may also cause due to kick of the hard surface. However, it is not a case of accused non petitioners. Even it is not submitted by the accused non petitioners in their statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. However, the accused non petitioners have come only with a defence that present incident is a counterblast to the First Information Report and took the plea of right of private defence. Counsel submits that the learned trial Court has also disbelieved the prosecution story for the reason that injured Lakhan explained his three injuries, whereas he sustained five [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (5 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] injuries. Here it may be submitted that it is not possible for an injured person to see that who is causing the injuries to him and instead of taking note of the same the injured person is very much interested for his rescue first. Counsel submits that the prosecution has successfully proved that accused non petitioners are members of unlawful assembly and have committed the offence in furtherance of their common object. Each and every witnesses who are the eye witnesses to the incident have submitted that in furtherance of their common object they have gave severe beating to Dharm Singh and when the injured Lakhan Singh and Ganga Sahay came for his rescue, then the accused non petitioners gave severe beatings to them also. Counsel submits that the learned trial Court has wrongly disbelieved the statements of the prosecution witnesses on flimsy and untenable grounds and have thus, failed to appreciate the prosecution evidence in correct perspective. 7. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State has supported the arguments advanced by counsel for the complainant- petitioner. Mr. Yunus Khan, learned counsel appearing for the accused-respondents submits that the trial Court after properly evaluating and considering the statements of the prosecution witnesses and the material made available to it, has rightly passed the impugned judgment of acquittal. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court warrants no interference by this Court. [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (6 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] 8. Considered the submissions advanced by the respective counsels and carefully scanned and scrutinized the entire material made available to the Court. 9. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention the facts discernible from the record of the trial Court, as are required for a proper decision of the present petition. 10. The complainant-witness-Dharm Singh (PW1), in his cross- examination before the Court has deposed as to certain injuries like the one inflicted by accused-Charan Singh on his shoulder, the one inflicted by accused-Sher Singh on the complainant’s left ear, the one inflicted by accused-Preetam Singh on his back and the one inflicted by accused-Jal Singh on his thumb; however, he has not mentioned the factum of these injuries either in his statement before the police or in the Parchya Bayan. Thus, this instills a contradictory difference in the statement of this witness. 11. On similar lines, all the prosecution witnesses, including PW2 Lakhan Singh, PW3 Ganga Sahay and PW4 Janki have, in their statements, insinuated that they had deposed to the exact happenings of the occurrence of the incident; however, the same has not been recorded, neither in their statements before the Police nor in the FIR and further that they do not know why the same has not been recorded. 12. Further, as per the medical opinion of the doctors, the injuries apparently sustained by the complainant (PW1) and the other prosecution witnesses, are so minor, so as to have been stated as bruises (neelgu) and scratches (kharoachnuma). As regards the alleged fractures sustained by the complainant-victim- Dharam Singh (PW1), the doctors have opined that it cannot be [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (7 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] definitively said that the fractures were sustained by him during the altercation in question and further that they could have in fact been sustained as a result of any other activity or by any other means. 13. The prosecution witnesses, in their statements at every stage have deposed to the fact that the accused-respondents came to their house and they created ruckus at the house; whereas the police in the site plan has mentioned a spot ‘X’, which is located around a public road, to be the place of incident. Thus, there is a discrepancy that comes out as regards the spot/place of incident due to the contradiction in the statements of the prosecution witnesses themselves when compared to the spot as mentioned in the site plan on record. 14. Moreover, PW4-Janki and PW3-Ganga Sahay, in their statements to the Police have stated that accused-Preetam Singh was not present at the spot at the time when the incident took place. For this reason, it cannot be said that all the 5 accused persons had approached the complainant (PW1) and the other prosecution witnesses with the common object of causing injury to them, for one simple reason that Section 149 IPC would not be applicable in case the number of accused-persons is less than five. 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a multitude of cases including the recent case of K. Ravi v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. (2024 INSC 642) has adjudicated on the scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts u/s 397 CrPC (now 438 BNSS). The dictum as laid down is that revisional jurisdiction shall be exercised where the exercise of revisional power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (8 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a plethora of cases has laid down the law as regards the issue of conversion of an acquittal into conviction in the exercise of the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction. At this stage, it is paramount for the Court to produce the relevant extracts of the pertinent judgments, hence, the same are listed herein below:- A. Joseph Stephen v. Santhanasamy reported as (2022) 13 SCC 115 “9. Now so far as the first issue, whether in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, the High Court can convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and what is the procedure to be followed by the High Court, as such, the said issue is now not res integra. On the aforesaid, few decisions of this Court, referred to hereinabove, are required to be considered. 9.1. In K. Chinnaswamy Reddy [K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1962 SC 1788] , while considering the similar provision under the old Code, namely, Section 439(4) CrPC, it is observed and held that “though sub-section (1) of Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code authorised the High Court to exercise in its discretion any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal by Section 423, yet sub-section (4) specifically excludes the power to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction”. It is observed that “at that stage the Revisional Court stops short of finding the accused guilty and passing sentence on him by ordering a retrial”. What order should be passed by the High Court in a revision application against the order of acquittal, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction, has been [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (9 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] dealt with and considered in para 11, which reads as under :- (AIR p. 1794) “11. The next question is what order should be passed in a case like the present. The High Court also considered this aspect of the matter. Two contingencies arise in such a case. In the first place there may be an acquittal by the trial court. In such a case if the High Court is justified, on principles we have enunciated above, to interfere with the order of acquittal in revision, the only course open to it is to set aside the acquittal and send the case back to the trial court for retrial. But there may be another type of case, namely, where the trial court has convicted the accused while the appeal court has acquitted him. In such a case if the conclusion of the High Court is that the order of the appeal court must be set aside, the question is whether the appeal court should be ordered to rehear the appeal after admitting the statement it had ruled out or whether there should necessarily be a retrial. So far as this is concerned, we are of opinion that it is open to the High Court to take either of the two courses. It may order a retrial or it may order the appeal court to rehear the appeal. It will depend upon the facts of each case whether the High Court would order the appeal court to rehear the appeal or would order a retrial by the trial court. Where, as in this case, the entire evidence is there and it was the appeal court which ruled out the evidence that had been admitted by the trial court, the proper course in our opinion is to send back the appeal for rehearing to the appeal court. In such a case the order of the trial court would stand subject to the decision of the appeal court on rehearing. In the present case it is not disputed that the entire evidence has been led and the only defect [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (10 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] is that the appeal court wrongly ruled out evidence which was admitted by the trial court. In the circumstances we are of opinion that the proper course is to direct the appeal court to rehear the appeal and either maintain the conviction after taking into consideration the evidence which was ruled out by it previously or to acquit the accused if that is the just course to take. We should like to add that the appeal court when it rehears the appeal should not be influenced by any observations of the High Court on the appreciation of the evidence and should bring to bear its own mind on the evidence after taking into consideration that part of the evidence which was considered inadmissible previously by it. We therefore allow the appeal subject to the modification indicated above.” 9.3. Again, in Sheetala Prasad [Sheetala Prasad v. Sri Kant, (2010) 2 SCC 190 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] , it is reiterated that Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits conversion of a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and in such cases retrial or rehearing of the appeal might be ordered. 9.4. In Ganesha [Ganesha v. Sharanappa, (2014) 1 SCC 87 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 8] , it is observed in paras 10 to 12 as under :- (SCC pp. 91-92) “10. Section 386(a) thus authorises the appellate court to reverse an order of acquittal, find the accused guilty and pass sentence on the person found guilty. However, sub-section (3) of Section 401 of the Code contemplates that the power of revision does not authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. On the face of it, the High Court while exercising the powers of revision can exercise all those powers [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (11 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] which have been conferred on the court of appeal under Section 386 of the Code but, in view of sub-section (3) of Section 401 of the Code, while exercising such power, cannot convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. 11. However, in a case where the finding of acquittal is recorded on account of misreading of evidence or non- consideration of evidence or perverse appreciation of evidence, nothing prevents the High Court from setting aside the order of acquittal at the instance of the informant in revision and directing fresh disposal on merit by the trial court. In the event of such direction, the trial court shall be obliged to reappraise the evidence in light of the observation of the Revisional Court and take an independent view uninfluenced by any of the observations of the Revisional Court on the merit of the case. By way of abundant caution, we may herein observe that interference with the order of acquittal in revision is called for only in cases where there is manifest error of law or procedure and in those exceptional cases in which it is found that the order of acquittal suffers from glaring illegality, resulting into miscarriage of justice. The High Court may also interfere in those cases of acquittal caused by shutting out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. In such an exceptional case, the High Court in revision can set aside an order of acquittal but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into that of an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial. 12. The view, which we have taken finds support from a decision of this Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (12 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] v. State of Bihar [Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1448] , in which it has been held as follows :- (SCC pp. 654-55, para 12) ‘12. … Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the Revisional Court, prohibiting it from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a retrial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party.” 10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and on a plain reading of sub- [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (13 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] section (3) of Section 401CrPC, it has to be held that sub-section (3) of Section 401CrPC prohibits/bars the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Though and as observed hereinabove, the High Court has revisional power to examine whether there is manifest error of law or procedure, etc. however, after giving its own findings on the findings recorded by the court acquitting the accused and after setting aside the order of acquittal, the High Court has to remit the matter to the trial court and/or the first appellate court, as the case may be. 12. Therefore, in the present case, the High Court has erred in quashing and setting aside the order of acquittal and reversing and/or converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and consequently convicted the accused, while exercising the powers under Section 401CrPC. The order of conviction by the High Court, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401CrPC, is therefore unsustainable, beyond the scope and ambit of Section 401CrPC, more particularly sub-section (3) of Section 401CrPC. Issue (i) is answered accordingly.” B. C.N. Shantha Kumar Versus M.S. Srinivas judgment dated September 02, 2024 (Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 4370/2023). “6. Whether a particular case merits conviction or not is not the issue before us in the present proceedings. The sub- section (3) of Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. clearly says that the High Court does not have the authority to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction while exercising its Revisional power. But that precisely was done by the High Court under the impugned judgment dated 19.01.2023. [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (14 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] 7. The impugned decision of the High Court is therefore found to be unsustainable. If the High Court was convinced about a wrongful acquittal, the High Court in Revision could not have ordered for conviction. It ought to have remitted the matter back to the appellate court to re-appreciate the matter. This course was not adopted.” C. Mahabir & Ors. Versus State of Haryana judgment dated January 29, 2025 reported as 2025 INSC 120. “42. This Court in Ganesha v. Sharanappa & Anr. reported in (2014) 1 SCC 87, in para 11, clarifies that : “… Interference with the order of acquittal is called for only in exceptional cases – where there is manifest error of law of procedure resulting into miscarriage of justice, and, where the acquittal has been caused by shutting out evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. In such exceptional cases, the High Court can set aside an order of acquittal, but it cannot covert it into one of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exception cases, is to order retrial” 43. This Court in Santhakumari & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. reported in (2023) 15 SCC 440, laid down that the order passed by the High Court is in the teeth of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 401 of the CrPC as interpreted by this Court in Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia & Anr. v. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel & Ors. reported in (2012) 10 SCC 517. Paras 5 and 6 respectively read thus:- “5. Having considered the submissions, since it is not in dispute that the proposed accused were not served notice of the revision proceedings, the order passed by the High Court is in the teeth of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 401 of the Code as interpreted by this Court in Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia [Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia v. [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (15 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel, (2012) 10 SCC 517 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 218]. 6. The decision in Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia [Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia v. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel, (2012) 10 SCC 517 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 218] has also been followed in Bal Manohar Jalan v. Sunil Paswan [Bal Manohar Jalan v. Sunil Paswan, (2014) 9 SCC 640 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 256] , wherein it was held : (Bal Manohar Jalan case [Bal Manohar Jalan v. Sunil Paswan, (2014) 9 SCC 640 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 256] , SCC p. 644, para 9) “9. In the present case challenge is laid to the order dated 4-3- 2009 at the instance of the complainant in the revision petition before the High Court and by virtue of Section 401(2) of the Code, the accused mentioned in the first information report get the right of hearing before the Revisional Court although the impugned order [Sunil Paswan v. State of Bihar, 2011 SCC OnLine Pat 600] therein was passed without their participation. The appellant who is an accused person cannot be deprived of hearing on the face of the express provision contained in Section 401(2) of the Code and on this ground, the impugned order [Sunil Paswan v. State of Bihar, 2011 SCC OnLine Pat 600] of the High Court is liable to be set aside and the matter has to be remitted.” 46. Thus, it is as clear as a noonday that the High Court committed an egregious error in reversing the acquittal and passing an order of conviction in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and that too without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellants herein.” 17. Owing to the apparent inconsistencies and differences in the statements of the prosecution witnesses when compared with the other statements and evidence on record, it cannot be said that the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the accused- persons. Interference with the present order of acquittal is not called for since there is no manifest error of law of procedure resulting into miscarriage of justice. Moreover, only in exceptional cases the High Court can set aside an order of acquittal, but it [2025:RJ-JP:12530] (16 of 16) [CRLR-499/2005] cannot convert it into one of conviction. However, this Court finds no irregularity or illegality in the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court. 18. Accordingly, the criminal revision petition filed by the complainant-petitioner is dismissed and the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 17.05.2005 passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gangapurcity, District Sawai Madhopur in Sessions Case No.14/04 (52/03), State Vs. Dharam Singh & Ors. is affirmed. (GANESH RAM MEENA),J DIVYA SAINI /6