1 2025:CGHC:37159-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 329 of 2021 1 - Devishanker @ Nanu S/o Madhuram Pando Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Basapara Ranai, Police Station Patna, District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh. 2 - Ramashanker @ Rama S/o Madhuram Pando Aged About 19 Years R/o Village Basapara Ranai, Police Station Patna, District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh. 3 - Mankunwar W/o Madhuram Pando Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Basapara Ranai, Police Station Patna, District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh. 4 - Ravishanker @ Bablu S/o Madhuram Pando Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Basapara Ranai, Police Station Patna, District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh. 5 - Vinod Kumar Pando @ Gulab S/o Hariram Pando Aged About 27 Years R/o Village Basapara Ranai, Police Station Patna, District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh. 6 - Madhuram @ Madhu S/o Late Ghasiram Pando Aged About 52 Years R/o Village Basapara Ranai, Police Station Patna, District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Patna, District Koriya (Baikunthpur) Chhattisgarh., District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.07.31 11:18:24 +0530 2 For Appellant(s) : Mr. Barun Kumar Chakrabarty, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Dy. A.G. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 30.07.2025 1. Heard Mr. Barun Kumar Chakrabarty, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the respondent / State. 2. Mr. Barun Kumar Chakrabarty, learned counsel states that he has been entrusted the present appeal through legal aid on behalf of all the appellant except appellant No.3- Mankunwar, W/o. Madhuram Pando, who is appellant No.6 in the present appeal. 3. Considering the fact that appellant No.6 i.e. husband of appellant No.3 is being represented by Mr. Barun Kumar Chakrabarty, hence we appoint Mr. Barun Kumar Chakrabarty, Advocate to appear on behalf of appellant No.3- Mankunwar as well. 4. This criminal appeal filed by the appellants under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.02.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, (FTC), Baikunthpur, District- Koriya (C.G.) in 3 Session Case No. 42/2018, whereby the appellants have been convicted for the offence punishable as under:- Conviction under Section Sentence (Rigorous imprisonment) Fine In default of payment of fine add. imprisonment Section 148 of the IPC 2 years Rs. 500/- 06 months Section 302/149 of the IPC Life imprisonment Rs.2000/- 06 months Section 307/149 of IPC 10 years Rs. 2,000/- 06 months All sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 5. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 15.12.2017, informant- Tuleshwar in the capacity of driver of the deceased- Rajesh had accompanied him. Deceased owned the vehicle make-Creta, bearing registration No. CG15CY4423. In the intervening night of 15th 16th December, 2017, at around 2.30 AM when they were returning from village- Jamri and had reached to village- Ranai, accused Mankunwar (appellant No.3) and Madhuram (appellant No.6) were quarrelling on the middle of the road. Driver blowed horn but they did not give way. Then the deceased- Rajesh got down from the car and persuaded them to give passage to his car, but they did not adhere to his advise. In the meantime other co- accused persons also gathered on the spot, and they all in concerted manner started beating the deceased with bamboo stick. Tuleshwar came down to rescue him, but the accused 4 Devishankar and Ravishankar got him apprehended and beaten him with stick. By the beatings having been given by the aforesaid accused persons, deceased fell down on the spot. Driver- Tuleshwar apprehending that he may also be beaten to death, managed to escape and got himself hidden in a nearby dark place. Не sustained multiple injuries over his body, including over head. The said accused persons assuming that deceased- Rajesh had succumbed to the said beatings, pushed him in nearby old pit. Deceased- Rajesh succumbed to the said injuries during course of his treatment at Bilaspur. Accused persons during such incident also robbed their mobile phone. 6. Based on such report initially FIR No. 310/2017 (Ex.P/1) under section 341, 147, 307, 397 Indian Penal Code (in short IPC) was registered. Upon further facts having been elucidated during investigation and upon death of deceased- Rajesh during course of treatment, section 149 and 302 IPC were added and further investigation was carried out. Accused persons were apprehended and other investigational aspects including seizure of articles, preparation of spot map, statement of witnesses etc. were carried out. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet U/s 341, 147, 307, 148, 149, 302 IPC was submitted before the Court of concerned Magistrate. 7. On 07.07.2018 charges under Section 341/149, 148, 307/149 397/149, 302/149 IPC were framed against the above named 5 accused persons, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, trial commenced. 8. To bring home charges, prosecution examined as many as 32 witnesses. After closing prosecution evidence, statement of accused persons under section 313 CrPC thereby putting incriminating material against them, were recorded, to which they denied the circumstances appearing against them and pleaded their false implication. Despite opportunity having been afforded, they chose not to examine any witness in defence. 9. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 02.02.2021, convicted the appellants for offence under Section 148, 302/149 and 307/149 of the IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been preferred by the accused / appellants. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants for offence under Section 302 of the IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that if the case of the prosecution is accepted as it is, then also the appellants are said to have caused injuries to the deceased in spur of moment. There was no motive or intention on the part of the appellants to cause death of the deceased and only on account of sudden quarrel, under heat of 6 passion and in anger, the appellants caused injuries to the deceased, which caused his death. Therefore, the case of the present appellants falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC and the act of the appellant is culpable homicide not amounting to murder and, therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part. 11. On the other hand, learned State counsel appearing for the respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the appellants have caused murder of deceased by deadly attacking him with bamboo sticks due to which, he succumbed to his injuries, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants under Section 148, 302/149 and 307/149 of the IPC and it is not a case where the appellants conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered/converted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC and as such, the instant criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed. 12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 13. The first question for consideration would be whether the deceased died under unnatural circumstances ? 7 14. With regard to this question, statements of Dr. Mukesh Kumar Hela (PW-31), Dr. Sandeep (PW-29), Dr. Ajay Bhaingra (PW-30) and Tuleshwar (PW-1) are taken into consideration. 15. Dr. Mukesh Kumar Hela (PW-31), Medical Officer posted at District Hospital, Baikunthpur has deposed that on 16.12.2017 deceased- Rajesh was brought before him under unconscious injured condition. While proving his report Ex.P-67A, he has deposed that during course of examination he had noticed multiple injuries over whole body of the deceased, including head injuries admeasuring 6 c.m.x1 c.m. on the left side occipital region and 2 c.m.x1 c.m. on the front side. Contusion was noticed on the left eye. On the left side from chest to stomach, there were multiple bruises including multiple linear bruises. Injury marks were also noticed over left palm. According to him, injury over head was dangerous to his life. He had also opined vide Ex.P/7 that injury to him could have been caused due to beatings having been given by seized lathis/dandas. 16. Dr. Sandeep (PW-29) who was posted as Medical Officer in neuro-surgery department at Apollo Hospital, Bilaspur has stated that on 16.12.2017 deceased- Rajesh was admitted in his hospital for treatment of head injury. Upon MRI having been performed grievous head injury was noticed, resulting into inside blood clottings. He has further stated that deceased expired during course of treatment on 18.12.2017. 8 17. Dr. Ajay Bhaingra (PW-30) has performed autopsy of the deceased. He has deposed that during examination, external and internal injuries, in addition to severe head injuries and abrasions on whole body of deceased were found. Black spots and contusion under eyes were fund. According to him, said injuries were ante- mortem, which might have been caused with hard and blunt object. Cause of death is stated to be head injury, which was homicidal in nature. 18. Tuleshwar (PW-1) has deposed that on the date of incident he along with the deceased was assaulted by the accused persons in which he and deceased had sustained injuries. Though, he survived but the deceased succumbed to the said injuries. 19. Thus, there is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the medical witnesses PW-29, PW-30 and PW-31. Hence, the trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record particularly relying upon the statement of Dr. Ajay Bhaingra (PW- 30), who conducted the postmortem of the dead body of the deceased and PM report (Ex.P-31) has come to the conclusion that the deceased died under unnatural circumstances and the nature of injuries was homicidal. 20. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions advanced by them, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that the deceased Rajesh died under unnatural circumstances is the 9 finding of fact based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. 21. Now, the question for consideration would be whether the accused-appellants herein are the perpetrator of the crime in question? 22. In this regard, the eyewitness injured of the case Tuleshwar (PW- 1) has deposed that he was working as driver with the deceased. On the date of incident, being on duty, he had accompanied the deceased and had gone to village- Jamdi (P.S.- Patna). While back on the way to Vishrampur, at around 1A.M. in the night, when they reached near main road of village- Ranai, accused Madhuram (Appellant No.6) and Mankunwar (Appellant No.3) were quarrelling on the road itself. He blow horn, but they did not give way. Then the deceased got down of the vehicle and persuaded them for passage. However, instead of adhering to his request, started shouting, in consequence of which other accused persons arrived there, and started beating the deceased with bamboo sticks. Looking into the situation, he also got down for help, however, he was caught hold by accused Devishankar and Ravishankar. Both the accused persons started beating him with the stick. PW-1 and deceased were beaten in the hands of the accused persons. Deceased, on account of beatings having been extended, fell down on the spot. PW-1 somehow managed to escape and got himself isolated in nearby field. In the morning 10 hours, he moved ahead and informed the incident to police station at Bhaiyathan. Pursuant to information, he was provided first-aid at the instance of said police station and thereafter the matter was reported to the concerned police station. He has further admitted of having consumed alcohol by him and deceased. 23. Sumeri Lal (PW-2) has stated that on the morning hours of date of incident he had noticed an injured person in unconscious state. Later on police had reached on the spot and injured was taken by them. He has proved on record Seizure Memo Ex.P/7 whereby plain and blood stained soil of the place of incident was seized. 24. Ramchandra Sahu (PW-3) has stated that PW-2 had informed him about an injured person, based on which he intimated the concerned police station. Ravi Prakash Singh (PW-4), Madan (PW-5) and Ram Singh (PW-8) have stated that on the day of incident deceased along with his driver-PW/1 had visited their village and had returned in the late night. PW-4 is also witness to the identification parade and has proved on record such proceedings vide Ex.P/4 and P/5. During cross-examination PW- 4, PW-5 and PW-8 have admitted that deceased and PW-1 were under influence of alcohol before starting their departure. 25. Benchuram (PW-6) has stated that he had found a mobile phone near the place of incident, to which he had handed over to his contractor Ram Narain (PW-7). PW-7 has endorsed receipt of such mobile phone from PW-6 and stated about handing over to 11 police and seizure thereof vide Ex.P/8. 26. Shiv Prasad Dubey (PW-9) and Susharma Patel (PW-16) have stated that on the day of incident, in the morning hours they had noticed an injured person i.e. Tuleshwar (PW-1). Rachna Singh (PW- 11) is wife of the deceased, who apart from affirming death, has stated that deceased on such day had gone towards place of incident. Lalan Kumar Jha (PW-12) is witness to memorandum and seizure. He has proved on record memorandum statements of accused Ravishankar and Vinod vide Ex.P/10 and 11 alongwith seizure memos Ex.P/12 and 13, whereby bamboo sticks and blood stained cloths were got seized. He has also endorsed seizure of mobile phone vide Ex.P/8 from PW-7. 27. Dr. Ashish Singh (PW-28) had examined and provided first- aid to the injured Tuleshwar. He has proved on record his report Ex.P/38, according to which he had noticed injuries on his face, head, forehead and other parts of body. According to him, such injuries were expected to have been caused with some hard and blunt object, within 15-16 hours. He has further opined, that in the event of failure to treat promptly, death could have been a consequence. During cross-examination he has denied that injuries sustained were not dangerous to life. 28. Dr. Chandrika Singh (PW-18) examined PW-1. According to him, pursuant to his first-aid at Community Health Centre, Bhaiythan, he was examined by him, when he had noticed injuries over his 12 face, cheeks, left and right portion of head etc. He has proved on record his report (Ex.P/26). He had advised for his CT scan. During cross-examination he has admitted that when the injured was produced before him for examination, nothing material to substantiate that he was earlier treated at some hospital, was produced before him. He has further admitted that despite his advice, no CT scan report was produced before him, even later on. He has volunteered that the injured had refused for CT scan. He has further admitted, that in his report he has not mentioned nature of injuries. 29. Ramprakash Tiwari (PW-20) has taken the seized articles to FSL, Ambikapur. He has proved on record memorandum Ex.P/27 and receipt Ex.P/28. ASI, Shiv Kmar Yadav (PW-24) has proved recording of morgue intimation EX.P/34. Head Constable, Nirmal Singh Thakur (PW-25) has proved zero Morgue Intimation at Bilaspur vide Ex.P/35. There is no challenge to their statements, during cross-examination. Head Constable, Naresh Sahu (PW-26) has stated that he had prepared Body Panchnama Ex.P/30. 30. Pradeep Kumar Singh (PW-21) is witness to Body Panchnama vide Ex.P/21. Vijay Pratap Singh (PW-23) is brother of the deceased who has proved on record Body Supurdginama vide Exhibit-P/33. SI, Harishankar Singh upon receipt of information regarding occurrence had rushed to the spot along with Constable, Sagarlal. S.I., A.R. Manikpuri is I.O. of this case, who 13 has duly proved on record his part regarding manner of investigation. 31. Tuleshwar (PW-1), who happens not only an eye- witness but also an injured in such incident, appears to be most important, more particularly, when the incident is stated to be during mid night hours. Obviously, there were little chances to have public witnesses, during such hours. Injuries endorsed over person of PW-1 attaches weight to his statement and guarantees truth in his statement in so far as his presence at the place of occurrence is concerned. His company with the deceased on the fateful night stands proved from the statements of PW-4, PW-5 and PW-8. It is the case of defence that there were no previous animosity either with deceased or injured/PW-1. Therefore, there is no reason that PW-1 would falsely implicate the accused persons, while sparing his real assailants. He in no uncertain terms has stated that when the deceased was persuading accused Madhuram and Mankunwar, they called other accused persons by shouting. Upon their arrival, they started beating the deceased due to which he fell down. When PW-1 tried to help and intervene, accused Ravishankar and Devishankar caught hold of him and beaten. He managed to escape, otherwise he also could have been beaten to death. 32. PW-1 has, not only during identification parade, but also in trial Court, has identified the accused persons to be the perpetrator of 14 crime. Manmohan Pratap Singh (PW-22) Tehsildar/Executive Magistrate has specifically deposed and proved proceedings of identification of accused persons. His statement further finds corroboration from the statements of PW-4. As discussed above, company of PW-1 with the deceased on the day of incident stands proved from the statements of PW-4, PW-5 and PW-8 apart from, statement of PW-1. Injury over person of PW-1 guarantees truth in his statement, in as much as, in the absence of any motive, there was no reason to falsely implicate the accused persons, while sparing the real assailants. Accused persons total six in numbers, have been identified by PW-1. 33. So, it stands established that deceased and PW-1 were beaten by the accused persons with the intention of elimination, while remaining member of unlawful assembly having been formed by them on the spot. 34. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellants is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellants ? 35. The cause of death assigned in the post-mortem report of the deceased as already noticed are severe head injuries and abrasions on whole body. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” 15 is a genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh1. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances. 36. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu2 has made the following observations : “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.” 37. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act 1 (2012) 8 SCC 289 2 AIR 1956 SC 488 16 committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. 38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana3 has observed as under:- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances 3 (2002) 3 SCC 327 17 of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 39. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :- “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under : 4 (2009) 15 SCC 635 18 (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 19 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 40. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 41. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 5 (2012) 8 SCC 450 6 (2017) 3 SCC 247 20 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account 21 of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 42. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 43. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: (i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of 7 (2019) 6 SCC 122 22 passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 44. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under: “60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left 23 chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an 24 offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but 25 without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of 26 the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or 27 injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.” 45. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of principles of 28 law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that in the intervening night of 15th 16th December, 2017, at around 2.30 AM when the deceased and injured (PW-1) were returning from village- Jamri and had reached to village- Ranai, accused Mankunwar (appellant No.3) and Madhuram (appellant No.6) were quarrelling on the middle of the road. Then the deceased- Rajesh got down from the car and persuaded them to give passage to his car, but they did not adhere to his advise. In the meantime other co-accused persons also gathered on the spot, and they all in concerted manner started beating the deceased with bamboo stick. By the beatings having been given by the aforesaid accused persons, deceased fell down on the spot. Thus with the intention to cause death of deceased, the appellants caused such injuries and by doing so, they must have had the knowledge that such injuries inflicted by them would likely cause death of the deceased, as such, their case would falls within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of appellants herein completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 29 46. Considering the above-stated facts, further considering the evidence of injured eye-witness Tuleshwar (PW-1) and Medical witnesses Dr. Mukesh Kumar Hela (PW-31), Dr. Sandeep (PW- 29), Dr. Ajay Bhaingra (PW-30), taking into consideration the postmortem report of the deceased (Ex.P-31), FSL report (Ex.P- 58) and the material available on record, it would meet the end of justice that if the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 of the IPC is altered/converted to Section 304 Part-I of the IPC. 47. Accordingly, conviction of the appellants under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside, however, they are convicted under Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years. 48. The appellants are stated to be in jail. They are directed to serve out the sentence as modified above. 49. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. 50. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the Appellants are undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the Appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 30 51. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet