-1- 2025:CGHC:701 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No.1988 of 2018 1 - Hemsingh Navrang S/o Shri Nandram Navrang Aged About 35 Years Presently Working As Teacher ( Panchayat ) Government Middle School Guruwaine , Dabri , Block Lormi District Mungeli Chhattisgarh., District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh --- Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary Department Of School Education Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan Naya Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Collector, Mungeli District Mungeli Chhattisgarh. 3 - Chief Executive Officer , Zila Panchayat Mungeli District Mungeli Chhattisgarh. 4 - Block Education Officer , Lormi District Mungeli Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent(s) WPS No. 2299 of 2018 1 - Hemsingh Navrang S/o Shri Nandram Navrang Aged About 35 Years Presently Working As Teacher (Panchayat), Govt. Middle School, Guruwaine, Dabri, Block Lormi, District- Mungeli, Chhattisgarh., District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh ---Petitioner(s) Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of School Education, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Collector, Mungeli, District- Mungeli Chhattisgarh. 3 - Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Mungeli District- Mungeli, Chhattisgarh. Digitally signed by REKHA SINGH -2- 4 - Block Education Officer, Lormi District- Mungeli Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Akash Pandey, Advocate For State : Mr. Vedant Shadangi, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Shubham Mishra, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Akhilesh Kumar, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 06.01.2025 1) Heard. 2) In WPS No.1988 of 2018, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.1 Issue a writ of Mandamus and quash the order dated 25.01.2018 (Annexure P/1) whereby while revoking the suspension and reinstating the petitioner the respondents have held that a decision would be taken on his service aspects for the period of suspension as per decision of this Hon'ble Court as also after the departmental enquiry, in a most arbitrary and vindictive manner reflecting absolutely no application of mind at all by the respondents causing a great agony, as also loss of remuneration to the petitioner. 10.2 Issue a writ of Mandamus and direct the respondents to take a decision on the suspension period of the petitioner in view of effects of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Chaudhary Vs Union of India, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291, holding him entitled for regular salary from the date of passing of three months from the date of suspension till date and the arrears of difference of pay of the same. 10.3 Issue a writ of Mandamus and direct the respondents to pay appropriate interest over the arrears of difference of pay, as deemed fit by this Hon'ble Court. 10.4 Grant any other relief, which is deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case. -3- 3) In WPS No.2299 of 2018, the petitioner has sough the following relief(s):- “10.1 Issue a writ of Mandamus and quash the order/charge- sheet dated 20.02.2018 (Annexure P/1) for the same being based on incorrect facts, being absolutely arbitrary and vindictive, reflecting absolutely ill mindset of the respondents to cause a great mental agony as also loss of associated service/ benefits to the petitioner, despite making out no misconduct at all in terms of the Rules of 1998 governing service of the petitioner. 10.2 Issue a writ of Mandamus and direct the respondents to permit the petitioner to discharge his duties free of all encumbrances. 10.3 Grant any other relief, which is deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 4) Mr. Pandey, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would argue that at the relevant time, the petitioner, who was holding the post of Teacher (Panchayat), was placed under suspension vide order dated 21.05.2010 by respondent No.3. He would further submit that a criminal case was registered against the petitioner for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 of IPC pursuant to an FIR dated 28.01.2001. He would contend that the article of charge was issued against the petitioner on 07.01.2016 which contains two charges: (i) the petitioner suppressed the information regarding the registration of a criminal case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 of IPC and disclosed incorrect date of birth and (ii), the petitioner failed to join services pursuant to the suspension order dated 21.05.2010. He would further contend that the article of charge was issued after long 8 years and the delay has not been explained. He would state that in the criminal case, the petitioner has already been acquitted vide judgment dated 29.09.2023 in Sessions Trial No.36/2017 passed by the -4- learned Sessions Judge, Mungeli (C.G.). He would pray to quash the pending proceedings of the departmental inquiry against the petitioner. 5) On the other hand, Mr. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Pandey. He would submit that on account of the pendency of the criminal case, the departmental inquiry was not initiated and the article of charge was not issued. He would further submit that the delay part has already been explained in the return, particularly in para 3. He would contend that there are serious allegations against the petitioner, therefore, both petitions deserve to be dismissed. 6) Mr. Shadangi, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State would support the contentions made by Mr. Mishra. 7) I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 8) Admittedly, the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 21.05.2010. The article of charge has been issued on 20.02.2018. In the return, respondent No.3 has not explained the reason for initiating the departmental inquiry. It is not in dispute that there is an inordinate delay of 8 years in the initiation of the departmental proceedings. 9) In para 3 of the return, respondent No.3 has stated as under:- “3. It is respectfully submitted that, in the impugned order (Annexure P/1) inadvertently it has been mentioned that 'the period of suspension would be decided after the decision of the Hon'ble High Court in place of learned Sessions Judge as -5- the trial against the petitioner is pending before the learned Sessions Court. It is submitted that, a charge sheet has already been issued against the petitioner on 20.02.2018 leveling two charges. Copy of the charge issued against the petitioner dated 20.02.2018 is filed and marked herewith as ANNEXURE R/3-1.” 10) A bare reading of para 3 of the return filed by respondent No.3 would make it clear that the article of charge was not issued on account of the pendency of a criminal case against the petitioner but the criminal case was concluded on 29.09.2023 whereas the article of charge was issued on 20.02.2018 before the conclusion of the criminal case, therefore, the reason assigned by respondent No.3 is not contrary to the pleadings. 11)The Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Gurdip Singh Virdi Vs. The Oriental Insurance Company Limited and others, Writ Appeal No.410 of 2021 dated 24.04.2024 while dealing with the issue with regard to a long delay in initiation and conclusion of departmental inquiry held as under:- “18. In M.V. Bijlani (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that long delay in initiation and conclusion of departmental enquiry should be considered by the disciplinary authority, and observed in paragraph 16 as under:- "16. The Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and they continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer." Their Lordships also held that disciplinary proceedings being quasi- criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge, though the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt. However, the disciplinary authority cannot take -6- into consideration the irrelevant facts and cannot shift the burden of proof and he cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with. 19. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Narinder Mohan Arya (supra) while dealing with similar allegations of antedating the insurance cover note by an employee, discussed the scope of judicial review in departmental enquiry and weightage to be given by the authorities in departmental proceedings to inter partes decision of civil court based on same facts and same evidence, and held in paragraphs 32 & 46 as under: - "32. The Appellate Authority, therefore, while disposing of the appeal is required to apply his mind with regard to the factors enumerated in sub-rule (2) of Rule 37 of the Rules. The judgment of the civil court being inter partes was relevant. The conduct of the appellant as noticed by the civil court was also relevant. The fact that the respondent has accepted the said judgment and acted upon it would be a relevant fact. The authority considering the memorial could have justifiably come to a different conclusion having regard to the findings of the civil court. But, it did not apply its mind. It could have for one reason or the other refused to take the subsequent event into consideration, but as he had a discretion in the matter, he was bound to consider the said question. He was required to show that he applied his mind to the relevant facts. He could not have without expressing his mind simply ignored the same. 46. The matter may be considered from another angle. The order of the disciplinary authority, in view of the statutory provisions, merged with the order of the Appellate Authority as also that of the Chairman-cum- Managing Director as the appellate proceedings are in continuation of the original proceedings and, thus, the doctrine of merger shall apply. (See KunhayammedV. State of Kerala.) 21. Thus, it is a case where the departmental proceeding has been initiated not only with a delay of 11 years which has caused serious prejudice to the appellant and would show complete lackadaisical approach attitude on the part of officers of the OICL and also ignoring the finding of the jurisdictional Claims Tribunal in which it has already been held that the Insurance Company is -7- liable to pay the amount of compensation, as it has failed to prove that the cover note was antedated and antetimed, which amounts to overreaching the order of the Claims Tribunal and which the appellate authority was bound to consider as relevant fact in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Narinder Mohan Arya (supra). 11 years' delay in Nobade initiating departmental enquiry is contrary contrar to law as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ajai Kumar Srivastava's case (supra) and N. Radhakishan's case (supra), as unexplained delay has caused prejudice. Furthermore, unexplained delay in initiating departmental enquiry, even of 7 years, has been held to be inordinate delay by the Supreme Court in the matter of Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and others". The Supreme Court in N. Radhakishan's case (supra) has deprecated the initiation of departmental enquiry after much delay that too without explaining the delay in initiating the same and held that if the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. In the matter of State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, inordinate delay of 12 years in issuing the charge memo and initiating the departmental proceedings was interfered with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and it has been held that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. 12) Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Gurdip Singh Virdi (supra), the disciplinary inquiry including the article of charge pending against the petitioner is hereby quashed. The respondent authorities are directed to decide the issue with regard to the period of suspension of the petitioner expeditiously. 13) With the aforesaid observation(s)/direction(s), both petitions are disposed of. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Rekha