( 2025:HHC:17624 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA CWPOA No.6664 of 2020 Reserved on: 29th May, 2025 Announced on: June 04, 2025 __________________________________________________________ Rattan Chand …..Petitioner Versus The State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondents Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge Whether approved for reporting? YES For the petitioner: Mr. Parav Sharma, Mr. Rahul Thakur and Ms. Vishali Lakhanpal, Advocates. For the respondents: Mr. Vishav Deep Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Ranjan Sharma, Judge Petitioner-Rattan Chand, a retired Inspector, Grade-I, from Cooperation Department of the State Government has come up before this Court, seeking the following relief(s):- (i) That the applicant may kindly be held entitled for promotion to the next posts of Sub Inspector and Inspector w.e.f. due date and also for benefits of increments due on upgradation of posts of Sub Inspector Auditor and from Auditor to Inspector ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 2 - with all benefits. (ii) That the rejection of the representation conveyed at Annexure A-2 may be quashed and set aside.” FACTUAL MATRIX: 2. Case as set up by Learned Counsel is that the petitioner was appointed as Sub Inspector in the Department of Cooperation, in State of Punjab in September, 1963 and after re-organization of States, the petitioner was allocated to Respondent-State. It is averred that though one Avtar Singh and Shayam Lal were appointed as Sub Inspectors, along with the petitioner on the same date in September 1963 but, these two incumbents were placed at seniority no. 63 and 64 whereas, petitioner was placed as junior at seniority no. 98 in the Tentative Seniority List of Sub Inspectors dated 17.05.1997, and against this, petitioner submitted representation on 2.8.1997, but same remained undecided. 2(i). Since no action was taken on representation dated 02.08.1997, the petitioner filed an Original ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 3 - Application No. 234 of 1997 and upon abolition of Tribunal, the matter was transferred to this Court as CWP-T No. 4699 of 2008, and the same was decided on 17.08.2010, Annexure A-1, directing respondents to decide representation dated 2.8.1997, by a speaking order within eight weeks. Petitioner asserts that Respondents-Competent Authority did not convey any speaking orders and it was in July 2018 that the petitioner obtained the copy of the speaking orders, whereby his case was rejected on 27.12.2010, [Annexure A-2]. It is averred that after the receipt of rejection orders dated 27.12.2010 in the month of July 2018, the petitioner submitted another representation on 05.08.2018, Annexure A-3 and this remained undecided till the filing of the instant Original Application No. 1550 of 2019 [which was renumbered as CWPOA No 6664 of 2020]. 2(ii). Based on above factual matrix, claim of the petitioner is that the rejection-speaking orders dated ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 4 - 27.12.2010, Annexure A-2, is not in accordance with law and secondly, the Tentative Seniority List of Sub-Inspector/Inspectors 17.05.1997, placing the petitioner as junior vis-à-vis Avtar Singh and Shyam Lal was not in consonance with law; and thirdly, after up-gradation of post of Sub Inspector to that of Auditor and further up-gradation from the post of Auditor to post of Inspector, the increments due on up-gradation were not given; and fourthly, though the petitioner belonged to a Scheduled Caste Category and despite 15% reservation for Scheduled Caste, he was not considered for promotion to the post of District Inspector Cooperation/District Audit Officer before his superannuation. In this background, instant petition has been filed, seeking quashing the rejection-speaking orders dated 27.12.2010, Annexure A-2; and claiming rectification of the Seniority List of Sub Inspector/ Inspectors; and benefit of increments due on up- ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 5 - gradation and further promotion as District Inspector /District Audit Officer, on the basis of reservation being a Schedule Caste category. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT: 3. Petitioner filed an Original Application No 1550 of 2019 before State Administrative Tribunal, in which notice was issued on 30.04.2019. After abolition of Tribunal in December, 2019, the Original Application stood transferred to this Court and was renumbered as CWPOA No.6664 of 2020 and the matter was listed on 20.10.2023 when, Respondent No.3 directed to file reply, which was ultimately filed on 20.04.2024. STAND OF STATE AUTHORITIES IN REPLY AFFIDAVIT: 3(i). Perusal of Reply-Affidavit dated 20.04.2024, of Joint Secretary Cooperation, Government of Himachal Pradesh, indicates that respondents have taken an objection qua the non-joinder of parties by not impleading the Registrar Co-operative Societies, as ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 6 - a necessary party. Reply-Affidavit indicates that the petitioner was appointed as Sub Inspector on 16.09.1963 and upon reorganization of States, the Final Seniority List of Sub Inspectors, showing the position as on 01.11.1966 was prepared in accordance with “Keystroke-Level Model" [KLM] formula which was circulated on 14.12.1973, Annexure R-1, placing the petitioner at Seniority No.212 whereas Avtar Singh and Shyam Lal were placed at Seniority No 165 and 166 of said Final Seniority List. The Reply-Affidavit states that though Final Seniority List of Sub Inspectors was issued on 14.12.1973, Annexure R-1, yet the petitioner submitted a representation on 02.08.1997, seeking correction in seniority list for first time after 24 years. Reply-Affidavit indicates that the representation dated 02.08.1997 was rejected by Competent Authority and the rejection was conveyed to petitioner on 09.09.1997, Annexure R-2. Reply- Affidavit indicates that despite the rejection, the ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 7 - Respondents in compliance to the orders dated 17.08.2010 Annexure-A-1 in CWP-T No. 4699 of 2008, the case of petitioner was reconsidered and was again rejected on 27.12.2010, Annexure A-2. This rejection was sent to the petitioner, who refused to receive the same which borne out, from the postal remarks dated 10.02.2011, Annexure R-3. Reply-Affidavit further indicates that the seniority cannot be unsettled at this belated stage. In this background, prayer was made for dismissal of the writ petition. NO REBUTTAL BY PETITIONER: 4. Despite several opportunities granted from 24.02.2024, petitioner has not filed any rejoinder. In absence of any rebuttal, the averments contained made in the Reply-Affidavit remain uncontroverted. 5. Heard, Ms. Parav Sharma, Learned Counsel for petitioner and Mr. Vishwadeep Sharma, Learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondents- ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 8 - State. ANALYSIS: 6. Taking into account the entirety of the facts and circumstances and the material on record, this Court is of the considered view, that the instant petition seeking promotion to higher posts of Inspector after rectifying his placement in the seniority lists dated 14.12.1973 Annexure R-1 and Tentative Seniority List dated 17.05.1997 as Sub Inspectors/Inspector respectively and secondly, the claim for release of annual increments on up-gradation of posts from Sub Inspector to Auditor and thereafter from Auditor to Inspector and thirdly, for promotion as District Inspector/District Audit Officer on the basis of reservation before retirement is not tenable and is disallowed, for the following reasons: [A] NO CHALLENGE TO FINAL SENIORITY LIST DATED 14.12.1973 AS SUB INSPECTOR AND TENTATIVE SENIORITY LIST DATED 17.05.1997 AS INSPECTOR: 6(i). First Contention of Learned Counsel for ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 9 - the petitioner is that the Final Seniority List of Sub Inspectors dated 14.12.1973, Annexure R-1, placing the petitioner as junior vis-à-vis Avtar Singh and Shyam Lal is not in accordance with law and after rectifying the seniority, the petitioner deserves to be reconsidered and given promotion to higher posts from due date. The above contention is mis-conceived for the reason that firstly the Final Seniority List of Sub Inspectors dated 14.12.1973, Annexure R-1 was issued by the Competent Authority, as per KLM formula in accordance with law; and secondly, the Final Seniority List of 14.12.1973, Annexure R-1, remained in force and thereafter various seniority lists were issued showing the petitioner as junior at seniority no. 212 whereas other incumbents, Avtar Singh and Shyam Lal were placed at seniority no 165 and 166 of the said list but no challenge was made to his placement in the seniority lists; ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 10 - and thirdly the petitioner has not been able to point out any patent defect, based on the Recruitment and Promotion Rules and/or Instructions that the Final Seniority List dated 14.12.1973 was in any manner contrary to law and therefore, this Court refrains from interfering in the Final Seniority List of Sub Inspectors dated 14.12.1973, Annexure R-1, in these proceedings; and fourthly, even the petitioner has acquiescenced in the issuance of Final Seniority List dated 14.12.1973, Annexure R-1, and even the Tentative Seniority List dated 17.05.1993 for the last 24 years then, the settled seniority cannot be permitted to be unsettled after 24 years; and lastly, the Final Seniority List issued in 1973 and 1997 [supra] cannot be permitted to be assailed by the petitioner behind the back of Avtar Singh and Shyam Lal. Non-impleading above incumbents is fatal to the prayer sought for and the same is a patent illegality, so as to disallow the claim of the petitioner, ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 11 - in these proceedings. B. ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION ON CLAIM FOR PROMOTION AFTER RECTIFYING SENIORITY: 6(ii) An additional claim set up is that after rectifying the Seniority Lists, the petitioner deserves to be considered and given promotion to higher posts. The above claim is not tenable for the reason that a perusal of the rejection orders dated 27.12.2010, Annexure A-2, reveals that the Final Seniority List of Sub Inspectors on 14.12.1973, Annexure R-1, and Tentative List of Inspectors dated 17.05.1997, have not been assailed in the instant proceedings; and secondly, non-challenge to seniority lists, refrains this Court from giving any finding with respect to the validity of these seniority lists; and thirdly, the Tentative List issued on 17.05.1997 was objected by the petitioner by making representation on 2.8.1997 and this representation stood rejected on 9.9.1997, Annexure R-2 and fourthly, rejection dated 9.09.1997, Annexure R-2 has not been assailed in the instant ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 12 - proceedings; and fifthly, the Final Seniority List issued in 1973 cannot be permitted to be unsettled after 24 years; and sixthly, the Final Seniority List issued in 1973 cannot be gone into by this Court, without pointing out, any non-compliance of any Rules or Instructions while issuing the Seniority List(s) and seventhly, persons, namely, Avtar Singh and Shyam Lal who are likely to be affected have not been impleaded in these proceedings; and eighthly, permitting the petitioner to assail the Final Seniority List of 1973, Annexure R-1, at this stage, when, the petitioner had acquiesced to his seniority placement assigned to him by not availing the remedies available to him within a reasonable period; and ninthly, even acquiescence or tacit knowledge of seniority placement cannot be reopened after 24 years and when nothing has been pleaded or shown to assert that the earlier Seniority Lists were not circulated/received by the petitioner. Thus, the ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 13 - acquiescence is enough to disallow the claim as per the mandate of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chairman, State Bank of India versus M J James, (2022) 2 SCC 301 has outlined that the doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence is applicable to non-suit a litigant who approaches the Court after unreasonable delay. “36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 14 - as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case. 38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and State of U.P. v. Manohar [State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] this Court observed that if the statutory authority has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same by taking the plea that the person who has been deprived of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in some cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action. The State being a virtuous litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on their part. However, this general principle would not apply when, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either express or implied from his conduct. Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as has been held in para ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 15 - 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several judgments, has accepted the following elucidation in Halsbury's Laws of England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras 12-13) “12. 470-71, paras 12-13) “12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911, p. 395 as follows: “‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 16 - considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’ 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?” 39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between “acquiescence” and “delay and laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 17 - having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34] Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. [See “Introduction”, U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures— Law of Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.] However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence. 40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 18 - active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.” 6(iii). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India versus N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25, outlined that the principle of delay, laches and acquiescence destroys the rights as well as remedy, as a right needs to be assailed by a party for getting relief or remedy expeditiously or within a reasonable time as under: 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 19 - the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. 25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to- case basis.” ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 20 - 6(iv). While dealing with the issue as to what would be the permissible period for assailing the Seniority Lists, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Shukla versus Arvind Rai and others, (2022) 12 SCC 579, has held as under: 24. We may now discuss the law on the point regarding delay in approaching the court and in particular challenge to a seniority list. The learned Single Judge had placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Shiba Shankar Mohapatra vs. State of Orissa (supra). Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J., after considering the question of entertaining the petition despite long standing seniority filed at a belated stage discussed more than a dozen cases on the point including Constitution Bench judgments and ultimately in paragraph 30 observed that a seniority list which remains in existence for more than three to four years unchallenged should not be disturbed. It is also recorded in paragraph 30 that in case someone agitates the issue of seniority beyond period of three to four years he has to explain the delay and laches in approaching the adjudicatory forum by furnishing satisfactory explanation. Paragraph 30 is reproduced below: “30. Thus in view of the above, the settled legal proposition that emerges is that once the seniority had been fixed and it remains in existence for a reasonable period, any challenge to the same should ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 21 - not be entertained. In K.R. Mudgal, this Court has laid down, in crystal clear words that a seniority list which remains in existence for 3 to 4 years unchallenged, should not be disturbed. Thus, 3-4 years is a reasonable period for challenging the seniority and in case someone agitates the issue of seniority beyond this period, he has to explain the delay and laches in approaching the adjudicatory forum, by furnishing satisfactory explanation.” 26. In the case of Dayaram Asanand Gursahani (supra), there was a delay of 9 years. In the case of B.S. Bajwa (supra), there was a delay of more than a decade. In Malcom Lawrence Cecil D’ Souza(supra), the delay was of 15 years and in R.S. Makashi (supra) there was a delay of 8 years. In all these cases, this court has recorded that the delay has not been explained. Shiba Shankar Mohapatra (Supra) is a judgment of 2010, which has laid down that, three to four years would be a reasonable period to challenge a seniority list and also that any challenge (1984) 3 SCC 36 (1998) 2 SCC 523 (1976) 1 SCC 599 (1982) 1 SCC 379 , beyond the aforesaid period would require satisfactory explanation. 30. Once it is established that the seniority list was prepared in contravention to the statutory provisions laid down in Rules 1991, the seniority list could be interfered with. The Appointing Authority would be bound by the statutory rules and ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 22 - any violation or disregard to the statutory rules would vitiate the seniority list. The same would be arbitrary, dehors the rules and in conflict with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The only exception to the above would be where there is unreasonable delay which is unexplained. 6(v). Factual matrix reveals that the Final Seniority List was issued in 14.12.1973, Annexure R-1, and the petitioner remained silent till he made the first representation on 02.08.1987. No explanation has been put forth in the writ petition as to why, the petitioner did not assail the Final Seniority List issued in 1973 till the year 1997 and has knowingly allowed the claim to become stale. In absence of any explanation for the delay, the challenge to the Final Seniority List of Sub Inspectors dated 14.12.1973, Annexure R-I, cannot be permitted to be unsettled or reopened in view of delay and latches. The petitioner has neither laid any challenge to the Final Seniority List of 1973 nor to Tentative Seniority List dated 17.05.1997 in these proceedings. The ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 23 - Seniority Lists cannot be permitted to be unsettled beyond the outer limit of three-four years, in terms of the mandate of law of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Shiba Shankar Mahapatra, relied in case of Ajay Kumar Shukla (supra), except in a fact situation of a case, where, satisfactory explanation is offered for the delay in assailing the Seniority Lists. In present case, no explanation, what to talk of satisfactory explanation is forthcoming. Besides, the tacit consent and even the acquiescence of the petitioner in not laying a challenge to Final Seniority Lists from 1974 to 1997 is sufficient to negate the prayer for seeking rectification of these lists after 24 years, as per the mandate of Hon’ble Supreme Court in M J James and N Murugesan (supra). It is not the case of the petitioner that the Seniority Lists issued between 1974 to 1997 were not circulated or were not in his knowledge. No explanation has been offered disclaiming the grounds ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 24 - basis-reasons as to why, the challenge to Seniority List could not be made within the permissible outer period of 3-4 years as mandated by law by the petitioner. Further, once the incumbents, namely Avtar Singh and Shyam Lal, over whom petitioner has claimed seniority, has acquired rights in the integrum, therefore, such rights and benefits acquired by above named persons cannot be unsettled at this belated stage. Once claim laid to the seniority lists fails therefore, the resultant prayer for promotion by rectifying seniority cannot sustain and the same is disallowed. C. CLAIM FOR INCREMENTS ON UPGRADATION: 6(vi) Learned Counsel for petitioner contends that in the year 1979, though the post of Sub Inspector was upgraded to that of Auditor and then in the year 1983 from Auditor to Inspector and petitioner was entitled for increments on upgradation, but the benefit of pay fixation, on up gradation has ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 25 - not been accorded to petitioner. The above contention is mis-conceived and factually incorrect for the reasons that a perusal of the speaking orders dated 27.12.2010, Annexure A-2, indicates that upon upgradation from the post of Sub Inspector to the post of Auditor w.e.f. 1.1.1978 four admissible increments already stand released to the petitioner. However, speaking orders indicate that Auditors were only re-designated as Inspector [Audit] Cooperative Societies w.e.f. 16.03.1983 and since it was a re-designation, therefore, no increments were admissible or were due in terms of the stand of the State Authorities in the rejection orders dated 27.12.2010, Annexure A-2, have not been controverted by filing rejoinder thereto. Thus, the stand of State Authorities in the rejection orders dated 27.12.2010, Annexure A-2, remains undisputed. Accordingly, the claim of the petitioner for increments on upgradation from Sub Inspector to Auditor stands released ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 26 - whereas the claim for increments asserting it to be up-gradation from Auditor to Inspector is not tenable, when, such change in nomenclature from Auditor to Inspector was only change in designation and was not upgradation and no increments were admissible on redesignation, therefore, the claim was devoid of any merit. D. CLAIM FOR PROMOTION AS PER RESERVATION AS DISTRICT INSPECTOR/ DISTRICT AUDIT OFFICER: 6(vii) Learned Counsel contends that petitioner belongs to Schedule Caste category and based on reservation, he had a right to be considered for promotion from the post of Inspector to the post of District Inspectors/District Audit Officer prior to his superannuation but the benefit was denied to him illegally. The above contention of Learned Counsel for the petitioner is contrary, to records for the reason, that a perusal of rejection-speaking orders ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 27 - dated 27.12.2010, Annexure A-2, specifically indicates that DPC was held on 23.06.1997 for filling posts in promotional cadre of District Inspector/District Audit Officer and as per 15% reservation for Schedule Caste incumbents, though 5 posts were meant for Scheduled Caste incumbents in the promotional cadre of District Inspector/District Audit Officer, but against the quota of Scheduled Caste 5 posts, 9 Scheduled Caste incumbents were already in position, in cadre of District Inspector/District Audit Officer. In these circumstances, once the reservation percentage of 15 % stood achieved and no reserved vacancy was available therefore, the petitioner has neither any right nor claim for promotion on the basis of reservation dehors the mandate of the percentage reservation and the reservation roster. Further, the petitioner has not filed any rejoinder, so as to controvert the stand of respondents in the rejection orders dated 27.12.2010, Annexure A-2 ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 28 - and therefore, the claim of petitioner for promotion as District Inspector/District Audit Officer on the basis of reservation is turned down. CONCLUSION: 7. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant petition is dismissed, in the following terms: (i) Claim of the petitioner for promotion as Sub Inspector and thereafter as Inspector without laying challenge to Final Seniority List dated 14.12.1973, [Annexure R-1] and Tentative List dated 17.05.1997 is disallowed; (ii) Claim of the petitioner for increments from Auditor to Inspector on upgradation is not tenable when, no increments are admissible on mere redesignation ; (iii) Claim of the petitioner for promotion as District Inspector/District and Audit Officer on the basis of reservation as Schedule Caste incumbent cannot be allowed dehors 15% reservation ; when, against 5 incumbents, 9 incumbents were in position and the claim is disallowed; ( 2025:HHC:17624 ) - 29 - (iv) Parties to bear respective costs. In aforesaid terms, the instant petition is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of, accordingly. (Vivek Singh Thakur) Judge (Ranjan Sharma) Judge June 04, 2025 (himani)