[2025:RJ-JP:36678] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4821/2002 Jai Singh Nirwan S/o Late Shri Govind Ram, aged about 51 years, R/o Plot No. C-22, Jaipur Metal Colony, Amba Bari, Jaipur, at present posted as Vice Principal/Superintendent, Industrial Training Institute (ITI), Kota. ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Government of Rajasthan through Secretary, Department of Personnel. 2. Secretary, Technical Education, Government of Rajastahn, Secretariat, Jaipur. ----Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. S.C. Gupta Advocate with Mr. Harsh Saxena Advocate & Mr. Tarun Singhal Advocate. For Respondents : Mr. Archit Bohra Additional Government Counsel with Ms. Anjali Sharma Advocate. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Judgment RESERVED ON :: 03.09.2025 PRONOUNCED ON :: 15.09.2025 1. By way of filing instant writ petition, petitioner has assailed the legality, validity and propriety of penalty order dated 01.09.2000, whereby penalty of withholding of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect was imposed upon the petitioner. Petitioner has further challenged order dated 11.10.2001, whereby review petition filed by the petitioner against aforesaid penalty order dated 01.09.2000 has been dismissed. [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (2 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was initially appointed as Instructor (Filler) on 11.11.1976 and was later on promoted on the post of Superintendent/Vice Principal in the year 1992. The petitioner was served with charge dated 06.05.1997 sheet under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to referred as ‘the Rules of 1958’) containing charges regarding committing forgery and embezzlement in purchase and issue of certain office articles. Petitioner filed reply to the charge sheet on 27.07.1997 denying all the charges levelled against him. However, considering reply to the charge sheet submitted by the petitioner, the disciplinary authority instead of dropping the proceedings at that stage itself, appointed enquiry officer to conduct enquiry. Enquiry Officer conducted enquiry in a slipshod manner without affording proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and submitted enquiry report on 03.07.1999. Thereafter, the petitioner was afforded opportunity to submit representation against the findings of enquiry officer by issuing notice dated 16.07.199. The petitioner availed opportunity and submitted representation in order to point out material flaw and defects in the enquiry, yet without considering the same, in quite mechanical manner, the disciplinary authority passed penalty order dated 01.09.2000, whereby penalty of withholding two annual grade increments with cumulative effect, which is a major penalty, has been imposed upon the petitioner. The petitioner also preferred review petition before His Excellency, The Governor of Rajasthan for reviewing and recalling the matter and to quash the [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (3 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] penalty order, yet he remained unsuccessful, as review petition was rejected vide order dated 11.10.2001. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a joint enquiry was conducted against the petitioner as well as two other persons, namely, Kailashnath Mathur and Amraram Dayal. It is submitted that the work of purchase and issue of orders with regard to purchase was not of the petitioner and such work was conducted by Kailashnath Mathur, Instructor, Commercial Workshop, Calculation and Amraram Dayal, LDC. It was also submitted that the person involved in the matter has also deposited the amount of alleged embezzlement, therefore, under these circumstances, only for the reasons that the entries were verified by the petitioner, imposing major penalty upon the petitioner is totally unjustified whereas other two persons involved in the matter were penalised with minor penalties. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the enquiry officer, while conducting enquiry, has relied upon the report of preliminary enquiry and same has also been considered by the disciplinary authority while passing the penalty order, yet copy of such preliminary enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner, which is material irregularity and amounts to violation of principles of natural justice as well as procedure contemplated under the Rules of 1958. Thus, on account of not supplying the material documents, entire enquiry proceedings along with penalty order and order passed by reviewing authority and penalty imposed upon the petitioner are liable to quashed and set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as the petitioner was not granted any opportunity of hearing during preliminary [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (4 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] enquiry, therefore, report of preliminary enquiry could not have been considered either by the enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Others, (2009) 2 SCC 570. 5. Per contra, learned Additional Government Counsel for the respondents opposed the writ petition and submitted that charges levelled against the petitioner were serious in nature. He was holding the post of Superintendent and all the purchases were being made on his instructions and his subordinates used to work as per his directions. Charge sheet issued to the petitioner contained specific and definite charges pointing out the vital role of the petitioner. It was submitted that even without supply of the articles mentioned in the charge sheet, payment thereof was embezzled and such entries with regard to purchase were duly verified by the petitioner. Reply to charge sheet submitted by the petitioner was totally vague, evasive and not satisfactory. Hence, in order to ascertain the correct facts and to enforce discipline, enquiry officer was appointed by the disciplinary authority. During enquiry, the petitioner was afforded complete opportunity to put forward his defence. Material witnesses deposed against the petitioner in his presence and he was also granted opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and even opportunity to produce defence witnesses was also granted to the petitioner. 6. Learned Additional Government Counsel further submits that after meticulous examination of the evidence on record and analysing the same in the light of charges levelled against the petitioner, detailed enquiry report, while discussing the [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (5 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] entire material, was submitted by the enquiry officer wherein charges were found proved against the petitioner. The petitioner was also afforded due opportunity to submit representation against the findings of the enquiry officer. However, the petitioner utterly failed to point out any material irregularity or illegality in the enquiry report. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority considered the entire material, evidence, defence put forward by the petitioner and gravity of the charges and thereafter, penalty of withholding of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect was imposed upon the petitioner, which is quite justified and proportionate to the guilt of the petitioner. 7. Learned Additional Government Counsel for the respondents submits that copy of enquiry report (Exhibit P-1) was supplied to the petitioner, therefore, no such ground, which is against the record, can be raised on behalf of the petitioner. Learned Additional Government Counsel also submits that the petitioner was the Superintendent of the institution, therefore, degree of responsibility on the petitioner was higher than his subordinates. Hence, the disciplinary authority in quite justified manner has imposed major penalty upon the petitioner and minor penalty has been imposed upon his subordinates, who acted on the dotted lines drawn by th petitioner in the capacity of head of the institution. Therefore, penalty imposed upon the petitioner cannot be said to be discriminatory. The reviewing authority has properly examined the record as well as issue of quantum of punishment and since no new facts or grounds were raised, the reviewing authority dismissed the review petition filed by the petitioner. [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (6 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] 8. Learned Additional Government Counsel for the respondents also objected that scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of india in such matters is very limited and under the circumstances where no material irregularity, illegality or defect in enquiry proceedings has been pointed out, no interference can be made in the instant writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. He relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan & Others Vs. Bhupendra Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908. 9. I have considered rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined the record. 10. First ground raised on behalf of the petitioner is that copy of preliminary enquiry report, on the basis of which enquiry officer has based the enquiry report and disciplinary authority has also relied upon while passing the penalty order, was not supplied to the petitioner. In this regard, this Court finds that copy of enquiry report was served upon the petitioner in order to enable him to represent against the findings of enquiry officer. However, no such objection was raised by the petitioner at the relevant time. Thereafter, even in the review petition filed by the petitioner against penalty order, such plea with regard to not furnishing copy of preliminary enquiry report was raised. Even in the entire memo of writ petition, any such pleading has been made to show that copy of preliminary enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner. On the contrary, it has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that the preliminary enquiry report has been marked as exhibit during enquiry proceedings and all the documents which [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (7 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] were marked as exhibit were supplied to the petitioner. In the light of above, it cannot be inferred that copy of preliminary enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner. Hence, no prejudice in this regard was caused to the petitioner. 11. Perusal of the record would also make it clear that the enquiry report is not solely based upon the report of preliminary enquiry and the enquiry officer has taken statements of independent witnesses and such statements given by the witnesses as well as other material on record were duly considered by the enquiry officer in order to hold the petitioner as guilty. The penalty order would also not suggest that it is solely based upon the alleged preliminary enquiry report, rather the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer while conducting enquiry in accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 was taken into consideration. It is also relevant to observe that even during enquiry, the Joint Director (P.W.5) appeared before the enquiry officer being author of report of preliminary enquiry for giving his statement in respect of preliminary enquiry (Exhibit P-18). Therefore, it cannot be said that the preliminary enquiry report was the sole basis for penalising the petitioner. The officer, who has conducted preliminary enquiry himself appeared before the enquiry officer and was subjected to cross-examination by the delinquent. 12. One of the ground raised by the petitioner is that during preliminary enquiry conducted by the Joint Director, no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has utterly failed to point out any rule for mandating opportunity of hearing while conducting preliminary [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (8 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] enquiry. In fact, a preliminary enquiry is an initial investigation to gather preliminary evidence and to determine if there are sufficient grounds for a formal departmental enquiry or other disciplinary action. Hence, no opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the delinquent during preliminary enquiry. Hence, such ground raised by the petitioner is totally misconceived. 13. The petitioner also submitted that the evidence led before the enquiry officer do not suggest that the petitioner was involved in the alleged embezzlement, yet on the basis of mis- appreciation of evidence, decision to penalise the petitioner has been taken. In this regard, it is sufficient to reiterate that the scope of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is extremely limited. This Court, while examining the matters relating to disciplinary enquiry cannot sit as an appellate court over the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority. Bare perusal of the enquiry report as well as order passed by the disciplinary authority would reflect that evidence has been well considered by those authorities. There cannot be any reappraisal of evidence in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also raised an issue that other two persons, namely, Kailashnath Mathur and Amraram Dayal were awarded minor penalties, but major penalty of withholding two annual grade increments with cumulative effect was imposed upon the petitioner. In this regard, this Court finds that the petitioner was holding the post of Superintendent of the institution and was final authority to place any order of purchase as well as to verify the purchase. In the instant case, without there being any supply of the goods/material, such purchase was [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (9 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] verified by the petitioner. Being head of institution, without physical availability of the goods/material, such verification could not have been done and only on account of such verification, embezzlement has actually taken place. Therefore, no fault whatsoever has been committed by the disciplinary authority by imposing major penalty upon the petitioner. So far as decision cited by the petitioner in the case of Roop Singh Negi (supra), this Court finds that the aforesaid decision was delivered by the Hon’ble Superme Court in entirely different facts. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the effect of decision in criminal case over the findings recorded in discipline proceedings. Such facts are not at all there in the instant case. Hence, decision cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 15. In the case of State of Rajasthan & Others Vs. Bhupendra Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the scope of writ petition in a matter of disciplinary enquiry and after examining its earlier decisions, following pertinent observations have been given: “23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3-Judge Bench stated: ‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (10 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’ (emphasis supplied) 24. The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal strength in State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC 249. Three learned Judges of this Court stated as under in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557: ‘21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25 : (1964) 2 LLJ 150]. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (11 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. xxx 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477 : (1964) 5 SCR 64]. 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do. xxx 26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing and reassessing the evidence. The appeal is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.’ (emphasis supplied) 25. In State Bank of India v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, two learned Judges of this Court held: [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (12 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] ‘28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [[1949] 1 All ER 109 : 65 TLR 225] way back in 1949, these principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405 : (1978) 2 SCR 272]) The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 152] and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664].) As pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262], the dividing line between quasi-judicial function and administrative function (affecting the rights of a party) has become quite thin and almost indistinguishable — a fact also emphasised by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [[1984] 3 All ER 935 : [1984] 3 WLR 1174 : [1985] A.C. 374, HL] where the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair hearing — applying the test of prejudice, as it may be called — that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations where observance of the requirement of prior notice/hearing may defeat the very proceeding — which may result in grave prejudice to public interest. It is for this reason that the rule of post-decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 465]. There may also be cases where the public interest or the interests of the security of State or other similar considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a particular action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries : a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between “no notice”/“no hearing” and “no adequate hearing” or to put it in different words, “no opportunity” and “no adequate opportunity”. To illustrate — take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin [[1964] A.C. 40 : [1963] 2 All ER 66 : [1963] 2 WLR 935]). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid — or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr [[1980] A.C. 574 : [1979] 2 All ER 440 : [1979] 2 WLR 755 PC]). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704]) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi [(1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62]) it would be a case falling in the latter category [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (13 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] — violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice — in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct — in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid.’ 26. In Union of India v. K.G. Soni,(2006) 6 SCC 794, it was opined: ‘14. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 : [1947] 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision. 15. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.’ (emphasis supplied) 27. The legal position was restated by two learned Judges in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Man Mohan Nath Sinha, (2009) 8 SCC 310: ‘15. The legal position is well settled that the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. The court does not sit in judgment on merits of the decision. It is not open to the High Court to reappreciate and reappraise the evidence led before the inquiry officer and examine the findings recorded by the inquiry officer as a court of appeal and reach its own conclusions. In the instant case, the High Court fell into grave error in scanning the evidence as if it was a court of appeal. The approach of the High Court in consideration of the matter suffers from manifest error and, in our thoughtful consideration, the matter requires [2025:RJ-JP:36678] (14 of 14) [CW-4821/2002] fresh consideration by the High Court in accordance with law. On this short ground, we send the matter back to the High Court.’ 28. Turning our gaze back to the facts herein, we find that the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench acted as Courts of Appeal and went on to re-appreciate the evidence, which the above-enumerated authorities caution against. The present coram, in Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra, (2024) 6 SCC 418, has laid down: ‘29. As regards the power of the High Court to reappraise the facts, it cannot be said that the same is completely impermissible under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constituion . However, there must be a level of infirmity greater than ordinary in a tribunal's order, which is facing judicial scrutiny before the High Court, to justify interference. We do not think such a situation prevailed in the present facts. Further, the ratio of the judgments relied upon by the respondent in support of his contentions, would not apply in the facts at hand.’ (emphasis supplied) 29. Evidently, while reappraisal of facts and evidence is not impermissible by the High Court, the infirmity in the underlying order has to be greater than ordinary. It is not the respondent's case that due to omissions by the appellants in substantive and/or procedural compliances, prejudice has ensued to him. Let us examine the aspect independently too. The facts reveal that an earlier removal order was quashed, and a copy of the Enquiry Report alongwith the RPSC's opinion was supplied to the respondent. The respondent, thereafter, received an opportunity to submit a written representation, which he availed of. Further, he was afforded an opportunity of hearing as well. In this view, we are unable to find any violation of the principles of natural justice.” 16. In the light of aforesaid discussion as also the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme, this Court finds no error in the penalty order or review order passed against the petitioner. 17. Hence, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is hereby dismissed. 18. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of. (ANAND SHARMA),J MANOJ NARWANI /