[2025:RJ-JP:31317] COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2094/2002 Madan Singh S/O Shri Hanuman Singh, aged about 33 years, R/o Parvatisar, Churu (Raj.) ----Petitioner Versus 1. State of Rajasthan, through the Secretary cum Commissioner to the Government, Home Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur. 2. The Director General of Police, Police Head Quarters, Jaleb Chowk, Jaipur. 3. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, R.A.C. Range-II, Jaipur 4. The Commandant, 10th Battalion, R.A.C. (I.R.), Bikaner. ----Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Dinesh Yadav Advocate with Mr. Mahendra Verma Advocate For Respondents : Mr. Vinod Kumar Gupta, Additional Government Counsel HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA JUDGMENT RESERVED ON :: 08.08.2025 PRONOUNCED ON :: 14.08.2025 1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assails, (i) the departmental enquiry report dated 08.12.1999; (ii) the penalty order of dismissal from service dated 03.01.2000; (iii) the appellate order dated 24.03.2001; and (iv) the review order passed by the Governor dated 06.02.2002. The petitioner prays that the said proceedings/orders may be quashed and set aside, with further direction to reinstate him in service with consequential benefits. [2025:RJ-JP:31317] (2 of 12) [CW-2094/2002] 2. The single dominant question for adjudication is whether the disciplinary proceedings culminating in dismissal from service was legally sustainable and whether it qualified the tests of procedural fairness, reasoned appreciation of evidence and proportionate exercise of disciplinary discretion. 3. Succinctly, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Constable by order dated 07.03.1986 and joined duty on 14.03.1986. On 01.04.1999, he was served with a charge sheet (Annexure-1) containing three charges. The central and cardinal allegation (Charge No.1) was that the petitioner had procured employment by submitting a forged Primary Pass Certificate purportedly issued by “Dayal Primary School, Sujangarh”. The preliminary enquiry conducted prior to the departmental reference purported to show the certificate to be fabricated, inter alia relying upon a letter said to have been issued by the District Education Officer (Boys), Churu. On 16.04.1999, Enquiry Officer was appointed to hold a formal departmental enquiry. The Department produced ten prosecution witnesses and exhibited eight documents. The petitioner produced five defence witnesses and exhibited 13 documents, including an affidavit of one Master Dungar Mal (Annexure-2), the headmaster who, according to the petitioner’s case, corroborated the existence of the school and the genuineness of the certificate. 4. The Inquiry Officer submitted a report dated 08.12.1999 (Annexure-3) finding the petitioner guilty on all three charges. Consequentially, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the petitioner from service vide order dated 03.01.2000 (Annexure-4). [2025:RJ-JP:31317] (3 of 12) [CW-2094/2002] The petitioner’s appeal and application for condonation of delay were ultimately rejected as time barred by order 24.03.2001 (Annexure-6). A review petition to the Governor was also rejected on 06.02.2002 (Annexure-8). 5. Separately, with the same allegations, criminal proceedings were also instituted by the Respondent-department and after holding a full-fledged trial, the petitioner was acquitted by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ratangarh, District Churu vide order dated 17.05.2000 (Annexure-5). The petitioner also places reliance on a Government Circular dated 19.04.1986 (Annexure-9) explaining that where a delinquent has been acquitted in criminal proceedings, the penalty should ordinarily be reviewed. 6. Respondents contentions, as may fairly be obtained from the record, are that departmental enquiry is a separate quasi-judicial process governed by the test of preponderance of probabilities. Hence, a criminal acquittal, therefore, does not ipso facto invalidate departmental findings, more so when the acquittal was not honourable and was merely based upon benefit of doubt. It has been submitted that the Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry in accordance with the Rules, recorded evidence from several witnesses and relied upon documentary material (notably, the letter of the District Education Officer and the police challan), and written reasoned findings. Accordingly, penalty order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was just and calls for no interference. The Appellate Authority rejected the appeal on valid grounds and the Governor considered the review and after due application of [2025:RJ-JP:31317] (4 of 12) [CW-2094/2002] mind, has rightly rejected the same. It has been submitted on behalf of the Respondents that even if certain lacunae are pointed out, the cumulative material on record was sufficient to justify dismissal for deception/forgery. Hence, this Court should not supplant the disciplinary authority’s appreciation of evidence unless the enquiry is vitiated by perversity, mala fide or gross breach of natural justice. 7. I have meticulously examined the record and heard rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. 8. It is well settled that departmental proceedings ordinarily require proof on the preponderance of probabilities and are not governed by the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Criminal proceedings and departmental enquiries are distinct and serve different objectives. 9. However, a settled and important caveat to this rule is that where the charge, the witnesses, and the material considered in the criminal trial and the departmental enquiry are substantially identical, and the criminal court has returned a meritorious acquittal on the merits, it would be unconscionable to sustain disciplinary action based on the same material. This exception has been applied by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions including in the case of G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others, (2006) 5 SCC 446 and subsequent pronouncements in the case of Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan & Others, (2024) 1 SCC 175. [2025:RJ-JP:31317] (5 of 12) [CW-2094/2002] 10. In the case of G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others (supra.), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as under: "30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand." 11. After considering so many earlier judgments as well as judgment in the case of G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others (supra.), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan & Others (supra.), as under:- [2025:RJ-JP:31317] (6 of 12) [CW-2094/2002] "28. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21-4-1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The Court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used. 29. We are satisfied that the findings of the Appellate Judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, “not proved” — in fact the charge even stood “disproved” by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be “disproved” when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor “disproved” (see Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P.). 30. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank." 12. Apart from above, this court in a recent judgment delivered in the case of Krishan Gopal Sharma vs The General Manager, UCO Bank & Others, (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2106/2021 decided on 09.06.2025), has held as under: "17. Learned Senior Counsel in order to press his submissions has relied upon the case of Joginder Singh Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, (2015) 2 SCC 377, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that denial of appointment solely on the basis of a criminal case, in which the accused has been acquitted, must satisfy the test of proportionality and must not [2025:RJ-JP:31317] (7 of 12) [CW-2094/2002] rest on vague moralistic surmise. Following observations in the above case are relevant:- "19. Further, an acquittal of the appellant is an “honourable” acquittal in every sense and purpose. Therefore, the appellant should not be deprived from being appointed to the post, in the public employment, by declaring him as unsuitable to the post even though he was honourably acquitted in the criminal case registered against him. 20. Further, undisputedly, there has been no allegation of concealment of the fact that a criminal case was registered against him by the appellant. Thus, the appellant has honestly disclosed in his verification application submitted to the selection authority that there was a criminal case registered against him and that it ended in an acquittal on account of compromise between the parties involved in the criminal case, he cannot be denied an opportunity to qualify for any post including the post of a Constable." 32. Bare perusal of the above observations in the context of the instant case, it would be clear that before arriving at the conclusion to acquit the Petitioner, the competent Courts have discussed the evidence in detail and thereafter, found the same not sufficient to hold the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. Hence, such judgments are well considered and based upon meticulous analysis of evidence. Hence, decision to acquit on the basis of such sound findings cannot be weighed lightly so as to deny removal of blot attached to the initial accusations. 33. It would be relevant to refer that in the case of Inspector General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiran, 2013(1) SCC 598, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “24……When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.” 34. Furthermore, the respondents have failed to demonstrate the existence of any additional compelling or discernible material suggesting that the petitioner was involved in acts amounting to moral turpitude or deliberate criminality. The decision to brand the petitioner unsuitable appears to be based not on any evidence of unfitness, but on a generalized apprehension. 35. It is settled preposition of law that the presumption of innocence is a foundational principle of criminal jurisprudence. This presumption, once [2025:RJ-JP:31317] (8 of 12) [CW-2094/2002] crystallized through acquittal, must be given full legal effect unless explicitly rebutted. A “benefit of doubt” acquittal does not create lingering suspicion for guilt, rather it is a legal declaration that the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden." 13. In addition to above, a fundamental proposition of evidence and fair procedure even in departmental enquiry is that a document which constitutes the backbone of the case must be properly proved; ordinarily the author or custodian of the document must be produced so that its provenance and veracity can be tested by the trier of fact. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v/s Workmen & Others, (1971) 2 SCC 617 that mere filing or marking of a letter/exhibit without producing its maker is not adequate foundation for a conclusive proof. 14. It can be deduced from the judgment of the celebrated case of Union of India & Another vs. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 that administrative decisions which deprive a person of service or livelihood must be reasoned and must record the basis upon which material evidence is accepted or rejected. 15. The Enquiry Officer in the departmental enquiry, placed decisive reliance upon a letter said to have been authored by the District Education Officer (Boys), Churu. A close and dispassionate scrutiny of the record reveals that it bears no details, which ordinarily are used to trace and vindicate an official communication. The alleged author or authorised witness who could confirm its origin, dispatch and contents of the letter was not produced in a manner that would permit unimpeachable proof of the document’s origin and contents. The Department produced [2025:RJ-JP:31317] (9 of 12) [CW-2094/2002] a witness described as P.W.-3 (District Education Officer), but his evidence does not supply the missing foundation. Indeed, on the record P.W.-3 expressly stated that the school in question did not fall under his jurisdiction and that the primary school matters came under a different office. This undercuts any attempt to treat the letter as a self-authenticating document. The Inquiry Officer nevertheless proceeded to accept the letter’s contents as a decisive plank of the prosecution case without establishing the document’s chain of custody or proving the circumstances of its issuance. The effect of the above lacunae is legally deterministic. A document, which is neither dated, nor proved by its author, cannot, consistently with basic standards of adjudication, be a basis for harshest penalty of dismissal. 16. Whereas on the contrary, the petitioner placed before the Inquiry the affidavit of Master Dungar Mal (Annexure-2), who, according to the petitioner, was Headmaster of the Dayal Primary School for providing material corroboration of the school’s existence and, by necessary implication, of the certificate’s genuineness. The salient features on this score are that the affidavit was on record and was relevant, direct and exculpatory; but the Enquiry Report contains no reasoned analysis of this affidavit; neither is there an explanation recorded as to why the abovementioned affidavit was rejected or found unworthy of credence; and the Enquiry Officer’s report, on its face, contains conclusory statements that the charge stood proved but does not contain a calibrated consideration of the defence witnesses and documents, nor any comparison of rival evidentiary stands. [2025:RJ-JP:31317] (10 of 12) [CW-2094/2002] 17. A quasi-judicial adjudicator must advert to defence material and must record reasons for accepting or rejecting it. A bare, unelaborated dismissal of defence is indistinguishable from non-consideration and violates the canon of reasoned decision- making. 18. The Enquiry Officer and thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority relied exclusively on the unproved letter. No attempt was made by the Enquiry Officer to seek objective, independent corroboration, for example, by obtaining school registers, admission records, or the testimony of independent residents of the area, who could depose to the existence and functioning of the school. The omission to pursue such objectively verifiable material suggests an incomplete and one-sided biased approach. 19. It is an admitted fact that in the criminal prosecution lodged by the respondent-department, which was also based upon the similar facts, charges and set of evidence, the petitioner was acquitted by a criminal court on 17.05.2000. The acquittal is not a mere technical or procedural discharge; rather, it was grounded in a conclusion that the prosecution had failed to establish the alleged offences. The record before this Court reveals that the primary evidence in both forums overlapped i.e., the letter and the issue of the certificate’s provenance were central to both the criminal and departmental proceedings. In such circumstances the law laid down in G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others (supra.) and explained in subsequent decisions including Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan & Others (supra.) and in Krishan Gopal Sharma vs The General Manager, UCO Bank & Others [2025:RJ-JP:31317] (11 of 12) [CW-2094/2002] (supra.) is directly attracted. Hence, it is settled that where the criminal court declares acquittal on substantially identical evidence, it would ordinarily be inequitable to sustain departmental punishment based on the same evidence. 20. The criminal court’s acquittal is a material and weighty circumstance which the disciplinary and appellate authorities were bound to consider carefully; their failure to give it due regard is a serious infirmity. 21. In addition to above, the penalty order dated 03.01.2000 records that the Disciplinary Authority was “not satisfied” with the petitioner’s reply and imposed the maximum punishment of dismissal. There is no reasoned exercise of discretion recorded showing that the Disciplinary Authority considered lesser penalties in light of the available evidence and attendant circumstances (including the fact of long service, absence of prior adverse record on the face of the pleadings and the existence of exculpatory material). The imposition of the maximum penalty without an articulated balancing exercise amounts to non-application of mind and disproportionality. 22. Further, the appellate authority rejected the application for condonation of delay and declined to decide the appeal on merits. Even the Reviewing Authority failed to manifest any fresh application of mind to the newly available or under-considered material (notably the criminal acquittal and the headmaster’s affidavit). An appellate or reviewing authority which declines to address material and potentially determinative aspects of the case [2025:RJ-JP:31317] (12 of 12) [CW-2094/2002] frustrates the purpose of an appeal/review and vitiates the process. 23. Furthermore, the Government circular dated 19.04.1986 (Annexure-9) expresses administrative policy that where a delinquent is acquitted in criminal proceedings, the penalty ought to be reviewed. The respondents have not shown that this administrative direction was applied or even considered. While a circular is not determinative of conclusive procedure, it embodies a legitimate administrative expectation which the authorities ought to have considered, especially where employment and livelihood are at stake. 24. Resultantly, in view of the foregoing discussion, the present writ petition is allowed. The order of dismissal dated 03.01.2000 (Annexure-4), the appellate authority’s order dated 24.03.2001 (Annexure-6) and the Review authority’s order dated 06.02.2002 (Annexure-8) are quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith in service with continuity of service and all consequential service benefits from the date of dismissal. However, the Petitioner shall not be entitled to any actual monetary benefits for the intervening period and such benefits shall be allowed to him only on notional basis. The respondents shall make necessary compliance within Eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. (ANAND SHARMA),J MANOJ NARWANI /