1 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 355 of 2015 Reserved on : 14.08.2025 Decided on: 29.08.2025 _________________________________________________________ State of Himachal Pradesh …..Appellant Versus Ram Singh ……Respondent __________________________________________________________ Coram Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge 1 Whether approved for reporting? Yes. ______________________________________________________ For the appellant: Mr. Raj Negi, Deputy Advocate General. For the respondent: Mr. Vijay Chaudhary, Advocate. Sushil Kukreja, Judge The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 21.03.2015, passed by the learned Special Judge(II), Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., in Sessions Trial No.32/14/13, whereby the accused (respondent herein) was acquitted of the offence punishable under Sections 18 and 20 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, the ‘NDPS Act’). 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case, giving rise to present appeal as per the prosecution story, are that on 03.03.2013, a police 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) party, headed by ASI Jeet Singh, was on patrolling duty towards Kanda- Bagshad-Kharshi and had laid a naka at place Khalut Mod, then at about 7:00 p.m., one person, coming from Kharsi road side was noticed, who was having a pithu bag (rucksack ) on his back. On seeing the police, he suddenly tried to run back, but was apprehended by the police. Having suspicion of some contraband, the police inquired his name and whereabouts, who disclosed his name as Ram Singh (respondent- accused herein). Thereafter, he was made aware about his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and in this regard, consent was taken from him as required under Section 50 of ND&PS Act and then, the pithu bag being carried by him was searched. During search of the bag, a carry bag, containing black coloured substance in the shape of round and sticks was recovered and on the basis of experience and smell, it was found to be cannabis/charas. Inside the said pithu bag, three chappati type black coloured substance, wrapped in a piece of newspaper, was also recovered, which was found to be opium. On weighing the aforesaid contraband, it was found to be 3 kg and 250 grams of cannabis and 100 grams of opium. Thereafter, the cannabis as well as the opium were kept inside the same carry bag and then put in the aforesaid pithu bag, which was sealed with seven seals of seal impression "A". Police completed all the codal formalities, viz., recovered contraband was taken into possession, statements of the witnesses were 3 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) recorded and the spot map was prepared. Rukka was sent to the police station, on the basis of which, the FIR in question was registered. 3. On the completion of the investigation and receipt of the SFSL report, the charge-sheet was prepared and presented before the Trial Court. 4. The learned Trial Court, vide order dated 19.06.2013 framed charge against the accused under Sections 18 and 20 of NDPS Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 5. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined as many as eleven witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313, Cr.PC was recorded, wherein he denied all set of incriminating evidence led by the prosecution against him, besides pleaded to be innocent and falsely implicated in the case. However, he did not examine any witness in his defence. 6. The learned trial Court, vide the impugned judgment dated 21.03.2015, acquitted the accused for commission of the offence punishable under Sections 18 and 20 of NDPS Act, hence, the instant appeal by the appellant-State. 7. The learned Deputy Advocate General contended that the Trial Court has appreciated the evidence on record in a very slip-shod and perfunctory manner. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has discarded the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses for 4 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) untenable reasons in the absence of any proof of enmity. He also contended that the learned Trial Court has wrongly thrown-away the statements of official witnesses on the ground that no independent witnesses have been associated. It is submitted that the learned Trial Court has given undue weightage to the minor contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, which do not go to the root of the case, hence, in view of the above submissions, he prayed that the impugned judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside. 8. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent-accused contended that the impugned judgment has been passed by the learned Trial Court after proper appreciation of both facts and law. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence in its true perspective and the impugned judgment does not require any interference by this Court, as such, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant-State as well as learned counsel for the respondent-accused and also carefully examined the entire records. 10. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, 5 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 11. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another Vs. State of Karnatka reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730, which reads as under :- "10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup [1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years. 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: "7...........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of 6 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan [20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court, (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal, (iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471, observed as under:- 7 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) “31.The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1.Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir] 31.2.However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows: 31.2.1.Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse; (a)Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980) (c)Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393] (d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard 8 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99] (f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610] (g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445] 31.2.2.Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice; (a)Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502] (b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610].” 13. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:- “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while 9 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows: 8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2.The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3.The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4.If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5.The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible. 9.Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court’s view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken.” 14. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court 10 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court. 15. In the instant case, the accused has been tried for commission of the offence under Sections 18 and 20 of NDPS Act on the allegation that on 03.03.2013, at about 7:00 p.m., at place Khalut Curve, link road Panglate, near Noun, he was found in possession of 3.250 Kg. and 100 grams of opium. 16. To substantiate the charge framed against the respondent- accused and to bring home his guilt, the prosecution examined as many as eleven witnesses. However, case of the prosecution mainly rests upon the statements of PW-1 HC Rajesh Kumar, PW-6 HHC Chunni Lal and PW-11 ASI Jeet Singh (Investigating Officer), who have been examined primarily to prove the search, recovery and seizure of 3 kilo 250 grams of charas and 100 grams of opium in question from the exclusive and conscious possession of the accused. 17. HC Rajesh Kumar, while appearing in the witness-box as PW-1, deposed that on 03.03.3013, he alongwith ASI Jeet Singh, HHC Rajinder Kumar, HHC Chuni Lal and HHC Chet Ram, proceeded from the police station towards Kanda and laid a naka at place Khalut Mod and then at about 7:00 pm, one person came on foot from Kharsi side, who was carrying one racksack (Pithu bag). On seeing the police, he 11 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) turned back and tried to run away, but he was apprehended by them at a distance of about 15 meters away. On suspicion, his name and address was inquired, who disclosed his name as Ram Singh. The place was secluded one. On suspicion of having some narcotic drugs or Illegal articles with the accused, ASI Jeet Singh prepared consent memo. Ext.PW1/A, under Section 50 of NDPS Act and asked the accused whether he wanted to give his search before a Magistrate or a Gazetted officer, to whcih, he gave in writing his consent to be searched by the police. Thereafter, the police officiais gave their personal search to the accused, however, nothing incriminating was recovered and in this regard, memo. Ex.PW1/B was prepared. Then, search of Pithu bag, being carried by the accused, was conducted by ASI Jeet Singh and from inside the bag, one carry bag was found, which was containing a black coloured substance in round and stick shaped. The substance was weighed with electronic scale, which was brought by ASI Jeet Singh with him while proceeding from the police station. On weighing, the substance was found to be 3 kg 250 grams. On smelling, the substance was found cannabis. In the said pithu bag, three chappati type black coloured substance, wrapped in a polythene and then in a paper, was also recovered, which was found to be opium and on weighing, the same was found to be 100 grams. 18. Similarly, PW-6 HHC Chunni Lal deposed that 03.03.2013, 12 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) he alongwith HHC Rajinder Kumar, HC Rajesh Kumar, ASI Ajeet Singh and driver HHC Chet Ram, in govt vehicle bearing No. HP-33A-8714 was present at place Khallut Mod link road Pangleti near Noun at about 7.00 pm in connection with nakabandi and searching excise cases. At that time, one person came from Kharsi side towards Noun, who was carrying a Pithu bag on his back. On seeing the police party, the said person turned back and tried to run away, but he was apprehended by them at a distance of about 15-20 steps. On suspicion, Investigating Officer asked his name and address and he disclosed his name as Ram Singh. The place where he was apprehended was secluded and lonely one. On suspicion of having some illegal articles with the accused, ASI Jeet Singh prepared a consent memo Ext. PW1/A under Section 50 of NDPS Act in the presence of witnesses HC Rajesh Kumar and HHC Rajinder Kumar. ASI Jeet Singh informed the accused that he had suspicion that he was having some narcotic articles with him, as such, he Informed the accused whether he wanted to be searched before Magistrate or Gazetted Officer and apprised him of his legal right. The accused gave his consent that he wanted to be searched by the police. Thereafter, the police officials gave their personal search to the accused, however, nothing incriminating was recovered and then personal search of the accused was done, but nothing incriminating was found from him. Then search of the pithu bag was conducted and one carry bag, which was of Badami 13 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) colour, was found and on opending the same, black coloured substance in round and stick shape was found. On smelling, the same was found cannabis (charas). On weighing the substance, it was found to be 3 kg 250 grams. Three Chappati numa black coloured substance was also recovered, which was wrapped in polythene in the Badami coloured carry bag and on smelling, the same was found opium. On weighing, the opium was found to be 100 grams. 19. PW-11 ASI Jeet Singh, who is the Investigating Officer, deposed that on 03.03.2013, at about 6 p.m, he alongwith HC Rajesh Kumar, HHC Rajinder Kumar and HHC Chuni Lal moved for patrolling towards Kanda-Bagshad-Kharshi in Government vehicle having No.HP- 33A-8714 and having HHC Chet Ram No.128 as driver in the vehicle with investigation kit bag, weighing machine and search light etc. At about 7:00 p.m., when they were at place Khalyuth curve link road to Pangleti near Nouan, a person came on foot from Kharsi side, who was having one pithu bag on his back. On seeing the police party, he started running back, but he was over-powered at about 15-20 paces by them. He was suspicion regarding having illegal substance and some contraband. This place was forest area and lonely place and, thereafore, he associated HC Rajesh Kumar and HHC Rajinder Singh as witnesses and thereafter the said person was inquired regarding his name, who disclosed his name as Ram Singh and then he was asked as to what was in 14 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) rucksack, but he could not give any reply. Thereafter, accused Ram Singh was told regarding his legal right to be searched before a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer and he gave his consent to give his search before him. After that he gave his personal search to the accused in presence of official witnesses, regarding which memo Ext.PW1/B was prepared on the spot. Thereafter, the aforesaid rucksack was checked and inside the same, one carry bag light badami in colour, in which stick and ball shaped substance was found, which was black in colour and as per the experience and on smelling, it was found to be cannabis. Inside the said bag, there was three chappati shaped black substance in a polythene, which was wrapped in a newspaper and on experience and smelling, the same was found to be opium. After that he weighed the cannabis with the electronic weighing machine, which was found to be 3 kg and 250 grams in weight and opium on weight was found to be 100 grams. Thereafter, the recovered cannabis was put inside the same carry bag and the opium was also packed in the same manner in the same newspaper and put inside the rucksack. 20. It is well settled that the conviction can be based upon the testimony of the police officials, provided that such testimony is reliable, trustworthy and confidence inspiring. In Pramod Kumar Versus State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 588, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the testimony of the police 15 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the Court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinizing the evidence, the Court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the Court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. Para-13 of the judgment reads as under:- “13. This Court, after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large show their disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that quality of the evidence weighs over the quantity of evidence.” 21. Similarly, in Baldev Singh Versus State of Haryana, (2015) 17 Supreme Court Cases 554, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Relevant para of the judgment reads as under:- “10. There is no legal proposition that evidence of police officials unless supported by independent evidence is unworthy of acceptance. Evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Prudence however requires that the evidence of police officials who are interested in the outcome of the result of 16 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) the case needs to be carefully scrutinised and independently appreciated. Mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their creditworthiness.” 22. In Surinder Kumar Versus State of Punjab, (2020) 2 Supreme Court Cases 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. Para-16 of judgment reads as under:- “16. In State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Sunil it was held as under: (SCC p.655) “It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. The official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature”. 23. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid settled legal position, the testimony of police witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground of non- corroboration by independent witnesses, however such testimony needs to be carefully scrutinized. The same must inspire confidence and should be consistent with the case set up by the prosecution. In case there are material contradictions, which goes to the root of the case and make the prosecution case highly doubtful, then this Court would obviously be circumspect while placing reliance on such testimony. 24. We have carefully scrutinized the entice evidence of the prosecution on record and have found that there are material 17 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses and various other infirmities, which go to the root of the case as rightly noticed by the learned Trial Court and the same render the prosecution case highly suspicious. In his cross-examination, PW-1 HC Rajesh Kumar stated that the camera was with police party and similarly PW-6 HHC Chunni Lal also stated in his cross-examination that camera and video machine were with the Investigating officer, whereas, PW-11, ASI Jeet Singh, Investigating Officer denied this fact. Perusal of the record reveals that no photograph of the spot was taken despite having camera or video machine with the police. PW-1 HC Rajesh Kumar, in his cross- examination, stated that no vehicle came at the spot during the course of search and till the time they remained at the spot, whereas, the Investi- gating Officer (PW-11), in his cross-examination, stated that 2-3 vehicles had crossed the spot, which were checked by them. The learned Trial Court also noticed another contradiction with respect to the proceedings conducted in this case. PW-1 as well as PW-6 stated that the proceed- ings and statements of the witnesses were written inside the vehicle at the spot, but the Investigating Officer(PW-11), in his cross-examination, stated that all the documents were prepared on the bonnet of the vehicle at the spot in a search light, which also creates a serious doubt about the presence of witnesses at the spot. Further, PW-1 HC Rajesh Kumar deposed that sampling was done on the main road, however, the 18 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) investigating officer did not state anything about the said fact. Similarly, PW-1, during his cross-examination, stated that PW-6 Chunni Lal went to the police station on foot from the spot and returned back on a bike by self driving, whereas, PW-8 ASI Subhash Singh, in his cross- examination, deposed that HHC Chuni Lal had come to Police Station in a vehicle of police bearing No.HP-33-8714 and returned to the spot in the same vehicle. It clearly goes to indicate that no rukka was taken to the police station from the spot and all the paper formalities were conducted just to make this case. If the statement of the Investigating Officer (PW-11) is perused, he deposed that PW-6 Chunni Lal had gone with rukka from the spot in a private vehicle and returned back to the spot in a private vehicle, which is a material contradiction in the statements of aforesaid witnesses and goes to the root of the case and creates a serious doubt about sending of rukka from the spot and preparation of the documents at the spot. PW-6 Chunni Lal stated that the police officials were inside the vehicle when accused was noticed, whereas, PW-11 ASI Jeet Singh stated that the police officials were outside the vehicle. PW-6 Chunni Lal stated that the accused was coming towards Kharsi side, however, perusal of rukka Ext. PW1/F reveals that the accused was coming from Kharsi side and this fact also creates a serious doubt about the case of the prosecution. 19 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) 25. The evidence produced by the prosecution shows that no independent witness has been associated in investigation nor any efforts were made by Investigating Officer to associate independent witnesses in investigation despite their availability. The Investigating Officer, i.e. PW-11 ASI Jeet Singh, stated in his cross examination that there was a state highway at the spot where the vehicles plied frequently and 2-3 vehicles had crossed the spot during that period and three vehicles were checked, but he had not associated any passenger of those vehicles in the investigation. He also admitted that there were many houses in village Naun, where Panchayat members were also residing, but no person was sent to village Naun to bring any independent witness at the spot. He further stated that many vehicles had crossed the spot at the time of investigation, but no passenger or pedestrian was associated in the investigation by the police. PW-6 HHC Chuni Lal stated that the Investigating Officer had not taken any steps for calling any independent witness from village Noun, when he suspected the accused having some contraband article. He admitted, in his cross-examination, that independent person could have been associated by the Investigating Officer within five minutes, but he had not associated any independent witness before effecting the search of the accused and his bag. The village Naun is near the place of occurrence, but no person from village Naun has been associated in the investigation or brought at the spot by 20 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) the police. PW-11 had also stated that PW-6 Chunni Lal had gone in a private vehicle with rukka to the police station, but even driver of that private vehicle was not associated in the investigation. Thus, non-joining of independent witnesses despite their availability is fatal to the case of prosecution. There is no evidence on record that independent witnesses refused to join the search and seizure proceedings despite efforts made by Investigating Officer to join them as independent witnesses. Therefore, we are of the opinion that non-joining of independent witnesses by prosecution at the time of preparation of search and seizure memo despite their availability has caused miscarriage of justice to the accused, especially when the evidence of police witnesses is totally unreliable and untrustworthy. 26. Hence, we are of the opinion that it is not expedient in the ends of justice to convict the accused solely on testimonies of police officials due to various contradictions, discrepancies and inconsistencies in their statements and also due to non association of any independent witnesses despite their availability which has caused miscarriage of justice to accused and has also created serious doubt in the mind of Court about the impartial investigation of present case. 27. Law is well settled with regard to the fact that howsoever strong the suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, 21 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) (2013) 5 SCC 722 on this aspect of the matter held as under:- “21. Suspicion, howsoever grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that `may be proved and `will be proved. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason, that the mental distance between `may be and `must be is quite large and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between `may be true and `must be true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between `may be true and `must be true, the court must maintain the vital distance between conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense.” 28. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The view taken by the learned Trial Court while acquitting the accused under Sections 18 and 20 of NDPS Act is a reasonable view based on the evidence on record and the same cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record. Hence, no interference in the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 21.03.2015, rendered by the learned Special Judge (II), Mandi, District Mandi, HP, in Sessions Trial No.32/14/13, is required as the same is the result of proper appreciation 22 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29287 ) of evidence and law. The appeal, which is devoid of merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged. 29. In view of the provisions of Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the respondent is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within a period of four weeks with the stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The appeal is accordingly disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. ( Vivek Singh Thakur ) Judge ( Sushil Kukreja ) Judge August 29, 2025 (V.Himalvi)