Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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Item Nos. 18
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR AT IMPHAL
CRL.A. No. 29 of 2025
Thoudam Bobby Singh … Appellant - Versus -
State of Manipur & Anr. … Respondents
B E F O R E HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. BIMOL SINGH
O R D E R [M. Sundar, CJ] 29.01.2026 [1]
Captioned criminal appeal is a statutory appeal under Section 21 of the ‘National Investigation Agency Act, 2008(34 of 2008)’ [hereinafter ‘NIA Act’ for the sake of brevity]. [2]
Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba, learned counsel for appellant and Mr. S. Nepolean, learned senior advocate instructed by Mr. Y. Robert, learned Deputy Government Advocate (State counsel on record) for the respondents ( to be noted, both respondents shall be collectively referred to as State for the sake of convenience) are before this Court. [3]
An application filed by the Investigation/Prosecution under Section 43D(2)(b) first proviso of the ‘Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 (47 of 1967)’ [hereinafter ‘UAPA’ for the sake of brevity] was allowed by the Trial Court. KHOIROM BIPINCHAN DRA SINGH Digitally signed by KHOIROM BIPINCHANDRA SINGH Date: 2026.01.29 18:05:21 +05'30'
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To be noted, the Trial Court is Court of Special Judge (NIA), Bishnupur, Manipur and the criminal case is vide FIR Case No. 32(8)202 BPR. PS. u/s 20 UA(P) Act & 25 (1-A) Arms Act and the order of the Trial Court allowing the application of Investigation/Prosecution is dated
07.11.2025. This 07.11.2025 order shall be referred to as ‘impugned order’ for the sake of convenience. [4]
Considering the limited legal perimeter within which captioned appeal should perambulate, main criminal appeal was taken up with consent of both sides. [5]
The short point is, while allowing Section 43D(2)(b) first proviso application of Investigation/Prosecution for extension of remand, the Trial Court vide the impugned order has extended the remand by 180 days post 90 days, whereas the first proviso to Section 43D(2)(b) of ‘UAPA’ makes it clear that the extension can be up to a ‘total’ period of 180 days.
[6]
In the light of the afore-referred short point, learned counsel for both sides, i.e. learned counsel for appellant and learned senior counsel for State very fairly submitted that the captioned appeal can be disposed of by a consent order modifying the impugned order to the limited extent of saying that extension by 180 days will now be extension by 90 days. [7]
This Court places on record it’s appreciation for the fair stand taken by both sides and both sides agreeing/requesting for consent order. [8]
This Court, for the sake of specificity, clarifies that 90 days remand elapsed on 08.11.2025. One day prior to 08.11.2025 i.e. on 07.11.2025, Investigation/Prosecution filed application for extension of
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remand under Section 43D(2)(b) first proviso of ‘UAPA’. The extension of remand application by the Investigation/Prosecution was disposed of by the Trial Court vide impugned order on the same day by extending the remand by 180 days as alluded to supra. This means that the remand stands extended up to 07.05.2026. [9]
Now, this Court modifies the impugned order by writing that extension of remand is sustained but the period of extension is modified as 90 days instead of 180 days. This means that the extended period of remand (180 days in all) would elapse on 06.02.2026. [10]
To be noted, with the exception of aforementioned modification, the impugned order will remain undisturbed and it is sustained in all other aspects. [11]
Captioned appeal disposed of as partly allowed in the aforesaid manner vide afore-referred consent order. [12]
There shall be no order as to costs. JUDGE
CHIEF JUSTICE
Bipin