(Cr.A.No.124/2018) 2025:CGHC:25193-DB AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No.124 of 2018 {Arising out of judgment dated 27-9-2017 in Special Case (Juvenile) No.3/2016 of the Juvenile Court (Children's Court)/Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Korba} X {Child in Conflict with Law through his mother} ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh, through Police Station, Out Post Rampur, Police Station Kotwali, Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Mirza Keshar Beg, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Government Advocate and Mr. H.A.P.S. Bhatia, Panel Lawyer. Amicus Curiae : Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, Advocate. Division Bench: - Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Deepak Kumar Tiwari, JJ. Judgment On Board (18/06/2025) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The short but important question involved in this criminal appeal is, whether the Children’s Court constituted under the provisions of the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005 is justified in convicting the appellant herein – a Child in Conflict with Law (for SISTA SOMAYAJULU Digitally signed by SISTA SOMAYAJULU Date: 2025.06.23 18:27:55 +0530 (Cr.A.No.124/2018) short, ‘the CCL’), for offence under Section 307 of the IPC by awarding imprisonment for life treating the said offence as heinous offence and trying under Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for short, ‘the Act of 2015’)? 2. The aforesaid question of law arises for consideration on the following factual backdrop: - 3. The present appeal has been filed by the CCL under Section 374(2) of the CrPC impugning the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27-9-2017 passed by the Juvenile Court (Children's Court)/Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Korba in Special Case (Juvenile) No.3/2016, by which the CCL has been convicted under Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for life & pay a fine of 2,000/-, in default of payment ₹ of fine to further undergo additional simple imprisonment for two years. 4. The Station House Officer, Police Chowki Rampur, Police Station Kotwali, Korba filed charge-sheet before the Juvenile Justice Board, Korba, against the CCL, aged about 17 years, for offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC in which the Juvenile Justice Board by order dated 28-9-2016 held that the CCL appears to be in between 16 and 18 years of age and therefore decided to make preliminary assessment in accordance with Section 15 of the Act of 2015 holding (Cr.A.No.124/2018) that offence under Section 307 of the IPC is “heinous offence” within the meaning of Section 2(33) of the Act of 2015 and accordingly, called for preliminary inquiry / report from Psychologist Mr. Sanjay Tiwari with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence. The report was ultimately received on 16-6-2016 and finally, after hearing the arguments of the learned counsel engaged by the CCL, the Juvenile Justice Board preliminarily assessed the case of the CCL and passed order dated 30-11-2016 holding that under Section 18(3) of the Act of 2015 there is a need for trial of the child as an adult and transferred the case to the Children’s Court having jurisdiction to try the offences i.e. the Children’s Court, Korba constituted under the provisions of the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005. 5. The Children’s Court, Korba, upon receipt of record on 9-12-2016 from the Juvenile Justice Board, Korba, recorded a finding that since the case has been transferred from Juvenile Justice Board under Section 18(3) of the Act of 2015 and the Children’s Court, Korba has jurisdiction to try the case, the case be registered as Special Case No.3/2016 and fixed the case for hearing under Section 19(1)(i) & (ii) of the Act of 2015, and ultimately, on 7-3-2017 held that there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as per the provisions of the (Cr.A.No.124/2018) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and ultimately, framed charge against the CCL on 7-4-2017 and after conclusion of trial, proceeded to convict him for offence under Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for life and further sentenced him to pay a fine of 2,000/-, in default to further undergo ₹ additional simple imprisonment for two years. 6. 6. Feeling aggrieved against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the CCL i.e. the present appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC calling in question legality, validity and correctness of the same. 7. Mr. Mirza Keshar Beg, learned counsel appearing for the appellant herein/CCL, would submit that the Children’s Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the CCL for offence under Section 307 of the IPC which is totally unsustainable and bad in law and liable to be set aside. He would also submit that copy of the preliminary assessment report has not been served upon the counsel engaged by the CCL as sufficient time has to be granted for perusing the report and making submission, which was not granted and the impugned judgment and order was passed. 8. Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State/respondent, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the preliminary assessment conducted under Section (Cr.A.No.124/2018) 15(1) of the Act of 2015 has been conducted in accordance with law after affording opportunity of hearing to the child and similarly, inquiry under Section 19(1)(i) of the Act of 2015 has also been conducted by the Children’s Court after giving opportunity of hearing to the child and as such, the impugned judgment passed by the Children’s Court is in accordance with law. He would further submit that since the Children’s Court has not barred the premature release of the child, there is no violation of Section 21 of the Act of 2015 and as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, learned counsel appearing as amicus curiae, would submit as under: - 1. Offence under Section 307 of the IPC would not fall under the category of heinous offence, as no minimum sentence has been prescribed for the said offence and in that view of the matter, it would fall within the definition of serious offence as defined under Section 2(54) of the Act of 2015 and similar question has been answered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another1. Once the Child in Conflict with Law (CCL) is alleged to have committed serious offence, the CCL has to be tried in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 14(5)(e) of the Act of 2015 by the Juvenile Justice Board, as 1 (2020) 2 SCC 787 (Cr.A.No.124/2018) trial has to be conducted following the procedure laid down in the CrPC as summons case. 2. Even if the offence is to be held to be heinous offence, the procedure of conducting preliminary inquiry under Section 15(1) of the Act of 2015 has to be followed, but in the present case, reasonable opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the CCL as held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master Bholu and another2 and therefore the entire procedure followed is faulty. 3. Even after receipt of record, the learned Children’s Court did not hold any further inquiry as per the provisions contained in Section 19(1) of the Act of 2015, which is mandatory in nature and therefore in absence of holding further inquiry, which has not been conducted as per the submission made on behalf of the CCL, the order holding the need for trial of the child as an adult runs contrary to the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh3. 4. The Child in Conflict with Law has been imposed the sentence of imprisonment for life which runs contrary to the provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act of 2015, therefore, the 2 (2023) 12 SCC 401 3 (2023) 15 SCC 678 (Cr.A.No.124/2018) judgment impugned is liable to be set aside in toto and the matter need not be remanded. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 11. The first question for consideration would be, whether the learned Juvenile Justice Board and the learned Children's Court are justified in holding that offence under Section 307 of the IPC is heinous offence within the meaning of Section 2(33) of the Act of 2015? 12. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to notice the meaning of heinous offence as defined in clause (33) of Section 2 of the Act of 2015, which states as under: - “(33) “heinous offences” includes the offences for which the minimum punishment under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force is imprisonment for seven years or more;” 13. Similarly, serious offence has been defined in clause (54) of Section 2 of the Act of 2015, which states as under: - “(54) “serious offences” includes the offences for which the punishment under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force, is imprisonment between three to seven years;” 14. The Parliament has amended the definition of “serious offences” by substituting clause (54) of Section 2 of the Act of 2015 which came (Cr.A.No.124/2018) into force with effect from 1-9-2022. The amended definition of “serious offences” states as under: - “(54) “serious offences” includes the offences for which the punishment under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force, is,— (a) minimum imprisonment for a term more than three years and not exceeding seven years; or (b) maximum imprisonment for a term more than seven years but no minimum imprisonment or minimum imprisonment of less than seven years is provided.” 15. A careful perusal of the definition of “heinous offence” contained in Section 2(33) of the Act of 2015 would show that it includes the offences for which the minimum punishment under the IPC or any other law for the time being in force of seven years or more has been prescribed, whereas, the definition of “serious offence” contained in Section 2(54) would show that it includes the offences for which the punishment under the IPC or any other law for the time being in force, is minimum imprisonment for a term more than three years and not exceeding seven years or maximum imprisonment for a term more than seven years but no minimum imprisonment or minimum imprisonment of less than seven years is prescribed. 16. The question whether an offence can be termed as “heinous offence” or “serious offence” is no longer res integra and stood decided by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal (supra) in which the question before their Lordships was, “whether an offence (Cr.A.No.124/2018) prescribing a maximum sentence of more than 7 years’ imprisonment but not providing any minimum sentence, or providing a minimum sentence of less than 7 years, can be considered to be a “heinous offence” within the meaning of Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015?”. Their Lordships considered the issue and answered the question in negative holding that an offence which does not provide a minimum sentence of 7 years cannot be treated to be an heinous offence and the Act of 2015 does not deal with the 4th category of offences viz. offence where the maximum sentence is more than 7 years’ imprisonment, but no minimum sentence or minimum sentence of less than 7 years is provided, shall be treated as “serious offences” within the meaning of the Act of 2015. It has been observed as under: - “36. In view of the above discussion we dispose of the appeal by answering the question set out in the first part of the judgment in the negative and hold that an offence which does not provide a minimum sentence of 7 years cannot be treated to be an heinous offence. However, in view of what we have held above, the Act does not deal with the 4th category of offences viz. offence where the maximum sentence is more than 7 years' imprisonment, but no minimum sentence or minimum sentence of less than 7 years is provided, shall be treated as “serious offences” within the meaning of the Act and dealt with accordingly till Parliament takes the call on the matter. 37. In passing we may note that in the impugned judgment the name of the child in conflict with law, has been disclosed. This is not in accordance with the provisions of Section 74 of the 2015 Act, and various judgments of the courts. We direct (Cr.A.No.124/2018) the High Court to correct the judgment and remove the name of the child in conflict with law.” 17. However, later-on, taking cognizance of the law declared by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal (supra), the Parliament has amended the definition of “serious offences” by substituting clause (54) of Section 2 of the Act of 2015 by Act 23 of 2021, which came into force with effect from 1-9-2022. Thus, from the unamended definition of “serious offences” contained in clause (54) of Section 2 of the Act of 2015, it is quite vivid that for offence under Section 307 of the IPC, no minimum sentence of imprisonment or minimum sentence of imprisonment of less than seven years has been prescribed and therefore offence under Section 307 of the IPC cannot be treated as “heinous offence” within the definition of Section 2(33) of the Act of 2015 and in light of the decision in Shilpa Mittal (supra), offence under Section 307 of the IPC would fall under the category of serious offence under Section 2(54) of the Act of 2015. Now, the definition of “serious offence” had already underwent amendment by the Parliament and though in the present case, the offence was said to have been committed on 16- 6-2016 much prior to the amendment, it would fall only under the category of “serious offence” and as such, the Juvenile Justice Board and the Children’s Court both are totally unjustified in holding that offence under Section 307 of the IPC is a heinous offence. Page 11 of 21 (Cr.A.No.124/2018) Consequently, the Juvenile Justice Board was required to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 14(5)(e) of the Act of 2015 and could have disposed of the inquiry of offence under Section 307 of the IPC by following the procedure for trial in summons cases under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. As such, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside on this ground only. Yet, we propose to consider whether the Juvenile Justice Board/Children's Court has followed the due procedure contained in the Act of 2015 while holding the need for trying the CCL as an adult? 18. Section 15 of the Act of 2015 deals with the procedure for conducting inquiry into heinous offences by the Board with regard to mental and physical capacity of the child to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence. Section 15 of the Act of 2015 states as under: - “15. Preliminary assessment into heinous offences by Board.—(1) In case of a heinous offence alleged to have been committed by a child, who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence, and may pass an order in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 18: Provided that for such an assessment, the Board may take the assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho- social workers or other experts. Page 12 of 21 (Cr.A.No.124/2018) Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, it is clarified that preliminary assessment is not a trial, but is to assess the capacity of such child to commit and understand the consequences of the alleged offence. (2) Where the Board is satisfied on preliminary assessment that the matter should be disposed of by the Board, then the Board shall follow the procedure, as far as may be, for trial in summons case under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974): Provided that the order of the Board to dispose of the matter shall be appealable under sub-section (2) of section 101: Provided further that the assessment under this section shall be completed within the period specified in section 14.” 19. Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act of 2015 provides that where the Board after preliminary assessment under Section 15 is satisfied that there is a need for trial of the child as an adult, it may order transfer of the trial of the case to the Children’s Court having jurisdiction to try such offences. In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in Barun Chandra Thakur (supra) may be noticed herein profitably in which their Lordships have considered the manner and procedure of conducting inquiry by the Board, whether the child in conflict with law is to be tried as an adult by the Children's’ Court or by the Board itself, treating him to be a child and it has been held that if the child in conflict with law is tried as an adult by the Children’s Court, it involves consequences of serious nature and having a lasting effect for the entire life of the child, and (Cr.A.No.124/2018) it has serious civil consequences, therefore, reasonable opportunity must be afforded. It has been observed as under: - “Effect of an order of preliminary assessment 47. The order of preliminary assessment decides whether the child in conflict with law, falling in the age bracket of 16-18 years and having committed heinous offence, is to be tried as an adult by the Children's Court or by the Board itself, treating him to be a child. There are two major consequences provided in the 2015 Act, if the child is tried as an adult by the Children's Court. First, that the sentence or the punishment can go up to life imprisonment if the child is tried as an adult by the Children's Court, whereas if the child is tried by the Board as a child, the maximum sentence that can be awarded is 3 years. The second major consequence is that where the child is tried as a child by the Board, then under Section 24(1), he would not suffer any disqualification attached to the conviction of an offence, whereas the said removal of disqualification would not be available to a child who is tried as an adult by the Children's Court, as per the proviso to Section 24(1). Another consequence, which may also have serious repercussions, is that as per Section 24(2), where the Board or the Children's Court, after the case is over, may direct the police or the registry that relevant records of such conviction may be destroyed after the period of expiry of appeal or a reasonable period as may be prescribed. Whereas, when a child is tried as an adult, the relevant records shall be retained by the relevant Court, as per the proviso to Section 24(2). 48. These consequences are serious in nature and have a lasting effect for the entire life of the child. It is well settled that any order that has serious civil consequences, reasonable opportunity must be afforded. The question is of what would be a reasonable opportunity in a case where a preliminary assessment is to be made by the Board under Section 15.” 20. Thereafter, their Lordships dealt with the question as to what would be a reasonable opportunity in a case where a preliminary (Cr.A.No.124/2018) assessment would be made by the Board under Section 15 of the Act of 2015 and it is held that the expression “may” in the proviso to Section 15(1) and the requirement of taking assistance of experienced physiologists or psycho-social workers or other experts would operate as mandatory unless the Board itself comprises of at least one member who is a practising professional with a degree in child psychology or child psychiatry. It has been observed by their Lordships as under: - “83. Therefore, looking to the purpose of the 2015 Act and its legislative intent, particularly to ensure the protection of best interest of the child, the expression “may” in the proviso to Section 15(1) thereof and the requirement of taking assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho-social workers or other experts would operate as mandatory unless the Board itself comprises of at least one member who is a practising professional with a degree in child psychology or child psychiatry. Moreover, in case the Board, in view of its own composition with at least one member, who is a practising professional with a degree in child psychology or child psychiatry, chooses not to take such assistance, it would record specific reasons therefor. Conclusion 85. We are conscious of the fact that the power to make the preliminary assessment is vested in the Board and also the Children's Court under Sections 15 and 19 respectively. The Children's Court, on its own, upon a matter being referred to under Section 18(3), would still examine whether the child is to be tried as an adult or not, and if it would come to the conclusion that the child was not to be tried as an adult then it would itself conduct an inquiry as a Board and pass appropriate orders under Section 18. Thus, the power to carry out the preliminary assessment rests with the Board and the Children's Court. This Court cannot delve upon the exercise of preliminary assessment. This Court will only (Cr.A.No.124/2018) examine as to whether the preliminary assessment has been carried out as required under law or not. Even the High Court, exercising revisionary power under Section 102, would test the decision of the Board or the Children's Court with respect to its legality or propriety only. In the present case, the High Court has, after considering limited material on record, arrived at a conclusion that the matter required reconsideration and for which, it has remanded the matter to the Board with further directions to take additional evidence and also to afford adequate opportunity to the child before taking a fresh decision.” 21. However, going by the records of the Juvenile Justice Board, it appears that only the report of experienced Psychologist Mr. Sanjay Tiwari has been called and even the copy of the report has not been served upon the counsel for the CCL and order dated 30-11-2016 has been passed holding that under Section 18(3) of the Act of 2015 there is a need for trial of the child as an adult, which is total non- compliance of the provisions contained in this regard in the Act of 2015. As such, the order of the Juvenile Justice Board as also the impugned judgment and order of the Children's Court are liable to be set aside. 22. The third ground on which the impugned judgment of the Children’s Court has been subjected to challenge is, once the Juvenile Justice Board has transferred the case to the Children’s Court under Section 18(3) of the Act of 2015, thereafter, the Children's Court is required to make an inquiry under Section 19(1)(i) and thereafter, it has to proceed for trial in accordance with the provisions contained in the (Cr.A.No.124/2018) CrPC. In this regard, the provisions contained in Section 19(1) of the Act of 2015 deserve to be noticed: - “19. Powers of Children’s Court.—(1) After the receipt of preliminary assessment from the Board under section 15, the Children’s Court may decide that— (i) there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as per the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and pass appropriate orders after trial subject to the provisions of this section and section 21, considering the special needs of the child, the tenets of fair trial and maintaining a child friendly astrosphere; (ii) there is no need for trial of the child as an adult and may conduct an inquiry as a Board and pass appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions of section 18.” 23. A careful perusal of the provisions contained in Section 19(1)(i) of the Act of 2015 would show that after the receipt of preliminary assessment report from the Board under Section 15, the Children’s Court has to decide that there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as per the provisions of the CrPC and thereafter, pass appropriate orders after trial subject to the provisions contained in Sections 19 and 21, considering the special needs of the child, the tenets of fair trial and maintaining a child friendly atmosphere. The provisions contained in Section 19(1)(i) of the Act of 2015 came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Ajeet Gurjar (supra) in which it has been held by their Lordships that holding an inquiry in terms of Section 19(1)(i) is not an empty formality and the word (Cr.A.No.124/2018) “may” employed in Section 19(1) will have to be read as “shall”, and observed as under: - “9. There are two parts to sub-section (1) of Section 19. The first part requires the Children's Court to decide whether there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as per the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. If the Court is satisfied that the child needs to be tried as an adult as per the provisions of CrPC, the Children's Court can proceed with the trial and thereafter pass an appropriate order subject to the provisions of Sections 19 and 21 of the JJ Act. 10. Clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 is very crucial which indicates that though the word “may” have been used in the opening part of sub-section (1) of Section 19, the same will have to be read as “shall”. Clause (ii) provides that after examining whether there is a need for a trial of the child as an adult, if the Children's Court comes to the conclusion that there is no need for the trial of the child as an adult, instead of sending back the matter to the Board, the Court itself is empowered to conduct an inquiry and pass appropriate orders in accordance with provisions of Section 18 of the JJ Act. The trial of a child as an adult and his trial as a juvenile by the Juvenile Justice Board has different consequences. 11. Therefore, holding an inquiry in terms of clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 is not an empty formality. The reason is that if the Children's Court comes to the conclusion that there is no need to try the child as an adult, he will be entitled to be treated differently in the sense that action can be taken against him only in terms of Section 18 of the JJ Act. 12. The observation of the High Court that the order passed under sub-section (3) of Section 18 has attained finality completely ignores that the order under sub-section (3) of Section 18 is not a final adjudication on the question of trying the child as an adult. The reason is that the order under sub- section (3) of Section 18 is based on a preliminary assessment made under Section 15. As such order is based only on a preliminary assessment, the law provides for a further inquiry in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 19 by the competent Children's Court. Hence, the Children's Court cannot brush (Cr.A.No.124/2018) aside the requirement of holding an inquiry under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 19.” 24. Coming to the facts of the present case, the Children’s Court relied upon the report of preliminary assessment conducted by the Juvenile Justice Board and no further inquiry was either conducted or held by the Children’s Court under Section 19(1)(i) of the Act of 2015 and only after hearing the argument of learned counsel for the CCL, order under Section 19(1) was passed on 27-9-2017 which is in teeth of the provisions contained in Section 19(1)(i) of the Act of 2015. Even there is no evidence on record to show that copy of the report of preliminary assessment has been served upon the counsel engaged by the CCL under Section 19(1) of the Act of 2015 holding that the child needs to be tried as an adult in accordance with the provisions of CrPC and there is also no evidence to show that sufficient time has been granted to the counsel engaged by the child for perusing the report and making submission. As such, on this ground also, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 25. Lastly, the Children’s Court has committed grave legal error in not following the mandatory provision contained in Section 21 of the Act of 2015, which states as under: - “21. Order that may not be passed against a child in conflict with law.—No child in conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or for life imprisonment without the possibility of release, for any such offence, either under the provisions of this Act or under the provisions of the Indian (Cr.A.No.124/2018) Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force.” 26. Thus, Section 21 of the Act of 2015 clearly provides that no child in conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or for life imprisonment without the possibility of release, for any such offence, either under the provisions of the Act of 2015 or under the provisions of the IPC or any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, it is clear that in the present case, the Children’s Court has proceeded to award life imprisonment to the child in violation of Section 21 of the Act of 2015. 27. As an upshot of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that offence under Section 307 of the IPC is only a “serious offence” as defined under Section 2(54) of the Act of 2015 and it would not fall under the category of “heinous offence” in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal (supra) and therefore inquiry could have been conducted as “serious offence” under Section 14(5)(e) of the Act of 2015 by the Juvenile Justice Board following the procedure for trial in summons cases as provided under the CrPC and it could not have been sent to the Children’s Court. Even otherwise, reasonable opportunity of hearing as provided under Section 15(1) of the Act of 2015 is required to be afforded to the child as laid down by the Supreme Court in Barun Chandra Thakur (supra) and further inquiry as contemplated under (Cr.A.No.124/2018) Section 19(1) has not been conducted by the Children’s Court as held by the Supreme Court in Ajeet Gurjar (supra). Furthermore, mandate of Section 21 of the Act of 2015 has not been followed by the Children’s Court. Consequently, we are unable to sustain the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Children’s Court convicting the appellant for offence under Section 307 of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life. 28. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 27-9-2017 passed by the juvenile Court (Children's Court)/Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Korba in Special Case (Juvenile) No.3/2016 is set aside. The appellant/CCL is acquitted of the charge alleged against him. He is on bail. He need not surrender and his bail bond stands discharged. 29. The criminal appeal stands allowed. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the Children’s Court and all the Juvenile Justice Boards for information and needful action. 30. While parting with the record, we must notice that name / identity of the Child in Conflict with Law i.e. the appellant herein has been disclosed in the cause title of this appeal memo as also in the judgment of the trial Court which ought not to have been disclosed, as it runs contrary to the provisions contained in Section 74 of the (Cr.A.No.124/2018) Act of 2015, which has also been directed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal (supra). Therefore, it is directed that the name of the appellant in the present appeal be not reflected in the cause title, rather it be reflected as “X {Child in Conflict with Law through his mother}” and in this regard, the Children’s Courts are directed to follow the mandatory provisions contained in Section 74 of the Act of 2015 and further directed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal (supra). 31. We express our gratitude to Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, learned amicus curiae; Mr. Mirza Keshar Beg, learned counsel for the appellant/ child in conflict with law; and Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned Government Advocate, for their valuable assistance rendered in the matter to come to the above-stated conclusion. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) JUDGE JUDGE Soma