HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR (Virtual mode) Bail App No. 167/2025 ASIF AHMAD DAR … Petitioner/Appellant(s) Through: Mr. Shahbaz Sikander, Advocate Vs. UT TH. POLICE STATION BIJBEHARA ...Respondent(s) Through: Mr. Ilyas Nazir Laway, GA CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHD YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE ORDER 27.10.2025 1. Through the medium of the instant successive bail petition filed in terms of the provisions of Section 483 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as the „BNSS‟ for short), corresponding to Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (, repealed but applicable in respect of the pending matters as on 01.07.2024 (hereinafter referred to as the “Code” for short), the petitioner has sought the concession of bail in his favour in case FIR No. 85/2023 of Police Station, Bijbehara, registered under Sections 8/21, 29 of the NDPS Act, and 3/181, 146/196 of the M.V. Act, on the grounds that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the case FIR. That the trial in the case is at its advanced stage and the material witnesses recorded at the trial have not supported the charge against him. That the said statements of material witnesses are highly contradictory in respect of material particulars. That no illicit narcotic substance, as alleged, was recovered from his possession, and he has been falsely implicated in the case. That bar under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not attracted in his case, as, in the light of the evidence of material witnesses recorded at the 2 Bail App 167/2025 trial so far, he does not seem to be guilty of the offences charged against him. That he has no past criminal record at his back and he commands a great respect in the society, being a reasonable law-abiding citizen. That the mandatory provisions under the NDPS Act have been observed in breach during investigation of the case, which is clear from the statements of the witnesses recorded at the trial. That the earlier bail application filed on his behalf before the learned trial court was denied vide order dated 20.05.2025, without appreciating the grounds pleaded in the said application. That his continuous detention in the case is violative of his constitutional guarantees under Articles 19 & 21 of the Constitution of India. That his unjustified detention tantamounts to his pre-trial conviction. That the prosecution case is riddled with inconsistencies, contradictions, and factual discrepancies. That the testimonies of the key witnesses, including PW1, PW2 and PW3, regarding the sequence of events, alleged recovery of contraband and identification of the petitioner, are inconsistent. That he is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty at the trial and, as such, he deserves to be admitted to bail. That he has been in custody in the case since April 2023, and the conclusion of the trial is likely to take some more time. That his right to speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution stands already violated, as he has been facing trial since last more than two years, which is likely to take some more years, for conclusion. That he is a teenager having no criminal record at his back. That the general rule is bail, not jail, especially in cases where there appear to be no reasonable grounds of involvement of the accused, with no apprehension of his misusing the concession of bail by tampering with the evidence and absconding from trial. That the Hon‟ble Supreme 3 Bail App 167/2025 Court has stressed for upholding the right to life and personal liberty of an individual during consideration of bail applications in celebrated judgments cited as “Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (2011) 1 SCC 694; Kharak Singh Vs. State of UP & Ors. AIR 1953 SC 1295; Maneka Gandhi Vs. UOI & Anr. (1978) 1 SCC 248; State of AP Vs. Chala Ramkrishna Redy & Ors. (2000) 5 SCC 712; Kaftar Singh Vs, State of Punjab & Ors. (1994) 3 SCC 569; Francis Coralie Mullin Vs. Administrator, UT of Delhi & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 6081; P.Rathinam/Nagbhusan Patnaik Vs. U.O.I & Anr. (1994) 3 SCC 394”; That he shall abide by any conditions that may be imposed by this Court in case of his enlargement on bail. 2. The respondent/State, through its objections filed by the learned GA, has resisted the bail application on the grounds that the petitioner/accused is involved in heinous offenses punishable under Sections 8/21, 29 NDPS Act, which attract the bar in terms of the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, as a commercial quantity of illicit narcotic/psychotropic substances has been recovered from his possession. That 50 bottles of manufactured drugs were recovered from his possession on the date of the incident, regarding which he could not tender any justification. That the disclosure of the petitioner/accused led to the involvement and arrest of the co-accused at whose instance further recovery was effected. That the offenses committed by the petitioner/accused under conspiracy are highly anti-social, as drug addiction is rampant and has eaten the vitals of the society. That the earlier application of the petitioner has been rejected by the learned trial court vide order dated 25.05.2025. That the petitioner/accused has 4 Bail App 167/2025 agitated false and fabricated grounds in order to defeat the process of law for undue advantage. That having regard to the guiding principles/considerations evolved by the Hon‟ble Apex Court and other High Courts of the Country including this Court, with reference to the heinousness of the crime, severity of punishment, nature of evidence, character of the accused, and impact of the crime on society and the State, the petitioner does not deserve the concession of bail. That the enlargement of the petitioner shall encourage likeminded persons to the prejudice of the society. The learned GA, prayed for the rejection of the bail application. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for both the sides. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, while reiterating his stand already taken in the instant application, contended that the petitioner has been falsely and frivolously implicated in the case FIR, when he is innocent. That no contraband substance, as alleged, was ever seized from his possession, and the incident appears to have been manipulated with the sole object of involving him in the case. He further contended that the investigating officer has observed the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act in breach during investigation, which raises a reasonable suspicion regarding the genuineness of the case. That the material witnesses examined at the trial so far have given contradictory versions in respect of the sequence of events, recovery and seizure of alleged contraband, etc. That having regard to the evidence which has come at the trial so far, coupled with the non-observation of the mandatory provisions under the NDPS Act, there appear no reasonable grounds of involvement of the petitioner in the case. He further contended that there is nothing on record suggestive of the fact that the 5 Bail App 167/2025 petitioner, if enlarged on bail, will repeat the commission of crime, as he has no positive criminal record at his back. The learned counsel further contended that the petitioner/accused was arrested on 21.04.2023 and has been in custody since then. That the final report/challan in the case was presented before the learned trial court on 17.07.2023, and the petitioner, alongwith the co-accused, came to be charged of the offences under the challan vide order dated 29.09.2023. That the learned trial court, through the same order dated 29.09.2023, called the prosecution evidence upon pleading not guilty by the petitioner and co-accused. That out of the total 21 listed prosecution witnesses, even half among the same have not been examined till date. That the trial of the case is, as such, likely to take much more time to conclude. The learned counsel contended that it is a settled legal position that an accused deserves to be released on bail on account of long incarceration in cases where there are no immediate prospects of conclusion of the trial. The learned counsel also very vehemently contended that the co- accused, Saleem Yousuf stands already admitted to bail by this Court vide order dated 16.01.2025, passed on his bail application, while appreciating the contradictory evidence of the material witnesses examined at the trial even till that date. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his arguments placed reliance on the judgments cited as “Chet Ram Vs. State of H.P, Cr. MP(M) No. 1806 of 2025, decided on 26.08.2025; Mohd Idrish Ali Vs. State NCT of Delhi Bail Appln 776/2025 & CRL. M.A 13452/2025 decided on 01.07.2025; 6 Bail App 167/2025 Firdous Ahmad Wani Vs. UT of J&K Th. SHO P/S Sumbal, Bail App No. 18/2021 2021 SCC Online J&K 351 decided on 18.05.2021; and Vimal Rajput Vs. State of UP, Criminal Misc Bail App. No. 3604 of 2024, decided on 05.06.2024”. 5. Per contra, the learned GA, very vehemently while opposing the bail petition submitted that the petitioner/accused does not deserve the concession of bail as he is facing the charge in the offences under the NDPS Act in relation to commercial quantity. The learned GA submitted that the petitioner was apprehended red-handed while traveling on his scooter on the incident day, when he was nabbed by the NAKA party of Police Station Bijbehara, and 50 bottles of Codeine Phosphate under the brand name of “Myberry”, each of 100 ml, came to be recovered from his possession, regarding which he could not tender any justification. That on the disclosure of the petitioner/accused, the co-accused came to be arrested, at whose instance further recovery came to be effected. The learned GA further contended that the evidence so far recorded at the trial has fully incriminated the petitioner and that the minor contradictions, if any, occurring in their statements are not fatal to the prosecution case and, as such, cannot be relied upon in the bail matter. The learned GA further contended that the offences under the NDPS Act are highly heinous and anti-social, owing to which fact stringent penal provisions stand provided in case of proof of such offences at the trial. The learned GA contended that the enlargement of the petitioner/accused is likely to encourage other like-minded persons who are dragging the youth into the menace of drug addiction. The learned GA, therefore, prayed for rejection of the bail. 7 Bail App 167/2025 6. Before proceeding ahead, it is desirable to give a brief synopsis of the prosecution case as under:- “On 21.04.2023, one bag containing 50 bottles of “Myberry” was recovered from the petitioner when he was driving a scooter bearing registration number JK03F-8004 without DL and IC. That on the confessional statement of petitioner, 20 more bottles of Myberry were recovered from accused No. 2, and further 30 bottles of the same drug were recovered from the accused No. 3, on the confessional statement of accused No. 2. The, “Myberry” bottles were found to contain narcotic/psychotropic drug Codeine Phosphate in mixture”. 7. Keeping in view the perusal of the instant successive bail petition, the objections filed in rebuttal by the learned State counsel, the scanned copy of the trial court record especially the statements of the prosecution witnesses examined during the trial of the case and consideration of the rival arguments advanced on both the sides, this Court, without making any comment regarding the merits of the case, is of the opinion that it may meet ends of justice in case the petitioner/accused is admitted to bail in case FIR in question, subject to some reasonable terms and conditions. 8. Admittedly, the petitioner/accused came to be arrested in the case on 21.04.2023 on the allegation of recovery of 50 bottles of a manufactured drug under the trade name “Myberry”, consisting of Codeine Phosphate (a narcotic substances in mixture). On the disclosure of the petitioner, the accused No. 2, and on the disclosure of the latter, co-accused No. 3 came to be arrested, at whose instance further recovery is alleged to have been effected. The petitioner, as such, has been facing detention in the case since last more than two and a half 8 Bail App 167/2025 years. The perusal of the scanned copy of the trial court records reveals that out of 21 listed witnesses, half of them are yet to be examined, and as such, it is believed that the trial of the case may take much more time to conclude. As submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner during his arguments, co-accused Saleem Yousuf stands already admitted to bail by this Court in the same case. 9. The learned counsel, during his arguments. inter alia. submitted that the investigating officer has observed the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act in breach, which justifies the enlargement of the petitioner/accused. Admittedly, the provisions of the NDPS Act providing for presumption in terms of Sections 35 and 54 can be invoked only after the prosecution is able to lead any cogent evidence supporting the foundational facts of its case. Intention of the legislature is that when stringent punishments are provided under the NDPS Act, there should be sound safe guards to ensure that innocent persons are not harassed or unnecessarily detained by any arbitrary or whimsical actions of the police or other authorities. The provisions of a statute have to be interpreted inter alia with reference to the intention of the legislature. A perusal of the provisions of NDPS Act leads no doubt that while the legislature wanted to curb the menace of drug addiction with heavy hand by providing stringent punishment, it was nevertheless conscious of the constitutional requirement that liberty of an individual must not be curtailed and in order to avoid or lesson the possibility of false implication, it provided sound procedural safe guards. The Provisions which stand incorporated in Sections 52 clause (1) and 57 NDPS Act to be 9 Bail App 167/2025 followed after search and arrest of the accused or seizure are mandatory in character. The learned counsel for the petitioner during his arguments also contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, especially having regard to the evidence of material witnesses examined at the trial so far, no reasonable ground appears to be made out regarding the involvement of the petitioner/accused, in the case A criminal court while recording his satisfaction as to whether there appear “reasonable grounds” of involvement of an accused in the commission of an offense attracting the bar in terms of provisions of Section 37 NDPS Act., has to use its discretion in a judicious manner so that no miscarriage of justice happens either by grant of bail or by denial of the same. The “reasonable grounds” of involvement can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case especially, the nature of the evidence. The Court is supposed to consider the broader probabilities to reach its supposition regarding the existence of reasonable grounds of involvement of the accused. The words “reasonable grounds” cannot be read to mean proved as used in „Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam’. Such an interpretation would in my opinion set at naught the power vested in a court to grant bail pending trial. The expression “reasonable grounds” would obviously mean something more than mere suspicion and conjectures and something less than proof. It would necessarily mean such grounds or material that would prima facie enable a person of ordinary prudence to believe that the accused is or is not guilty. 10 Bail App 167/2025 It is no doubt true that the object of the legislation of such disabling provisions is to prevent the offenders from immediately granting bail in heinous offences. In this view of the matter, the court is required to examine the material placed before it and then to arrive at a conclusion that there exist “reasonable grounds” to believe that accused is guilty or not guilty The “reasonable grounds” would vary from case to case and from one accused to another. What may be reasonable in one case may not be so in another and therefore the words “reasonable grounds” cannot, on account of a discretion vested in the court, be put into a straight-jacket. Each case would have to be dealt with and examined on its own facts and decided keeping in view the mandate of law. The consideration at the time of taking up of the bail application for disposal is different from the consideration adopted at the end of the trial for holding an accused guilty or not guilty. In considering an application for bail, court is not required to conduct a preliminary trial. The Courts while deciding bail applications will be traversing beyond their ambit and would be exceeding their limit of functions if they engage themselves in discovering the guilt or innocence of the accused which can only be determined at the trial stage. The courts should not go at a tangent in order to find out the possible excuses for grant bail. Whether there are “reasonable grounds” or not is the question which must be decided judicially, that is to say there should be some tangible evidence on which the Court might come to the conclusion that if unrebutted, the accused might be convicted. Whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person is guilty of such an offence depends on what evidence is offered by the prosecution to the charge against him. 11 Bail App 167/2025 In order to come to the conclusion, that a person is guilty, the Court must consider the evidence which if unrebutted may lead to conclusion that the charge against him stands proved and cannot unjustifiably hold that there are “reasonable grounds” for believing that he is guilty. It is a settled position of law that the real question whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person is guilty of offences attracting bar under Section 37 NDPS Act, depends upon what evidence is offered by the prosecution to prove the charge against him. While reaching such conclusion, the Court must consider the nature and character of evidence against him. The petitioner/accused is reported to be a teenager who has already suffered detention in the case of more than 2 ½ years. 10. Apart from the statutory bar, if any, two paramount considerations viz. likelihood of accused fleeing from justice and tampering with the prosecution evidence relate to the ensuring of a fair trial of the case in a court of law. It is essential that due and proper appreciation and weightage should be bestowed on these factors apart from others. The grant of bail or the denial of the same falls within the purview of the judicial discretion meant to be exercised on sound legal principles upon the logical interpretation and application of the same in the given facts and circumstances of the case. The necessary arrests subject to the law of bails as provided under the Code, BNSS and the provisions of different special Legislations are permissible under the Constitution of our Country by way of a reasonable exception to the fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and the mandate of the provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution is meant to be followed upon making any such necessary arrests. 11. In State of Rajasthan Jaipur Vs. Balchand AIR 1977 S.C. 2447, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has held, “basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail not jail, except where there are circumstances of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the 12 Bail App 167/2025 shape of repeating offences or intimidating the witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the court. 12. No single rule or a golden litmus test is applicable for consideration of a bail application and instead some material principles/guidelines are needed to be kept in mind by the Courts and the Magistrates for consideration of a bail application especially including: i. The judicial discretion must be exercised with the utmost care and circumspection; ii. That the Court must duly consider the nature and the circumstances of the case; iii. Reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered; iv. Investigation being hampered or v. The judicial process being impeded or subverted. vi. The liberty of an individual must be balanced against the larger interests of the society and the State. vii. The court must weigh in the judicial scales, pros and cons varying from case to case. viii. Grant of bail quo an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life is an exception and not the rule; ix. The court at this stage is not conducting a preliminary trial but only seeking whether there is a case to go for trial; x. The nature of the charge is the vital factor, the nature of evidence is also pertinent, the punishment to which the party may be liable also bears upon the matter and the likelihood of the applicant interfering with the witnesses or otherwise polluting the course or justice, has also a bearing on the matter. xi. The facts and circumstances of the case play a predominant role. 13. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Gur Bakash Singh Sibbia Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1980 S.C. 1632, referred to the following extract from the American Jurisprudence having bearing on the subject of bail, “where the grant of bail lies within discretion of the court, granting or denial is regulated to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of detention order/imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the preliminary enquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would yield that end. It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not, 13 Bail App 167/2025 depends for its answer upon a Variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity for justifying the grant or refusal of bail”. 14. It has been laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Chandra vs. Central Bureau of Investigation AIR 2012 SC 830 at Para 14 of its Judgment as under:- 14) “In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment beings after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un-convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, necessity is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of a refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an un-convicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.” 14 Bail App 167/2025 15. This Court in its opinion is fully fortified with the authoritative law laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court cited as Sanjay Chandra Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40 in which the bail was granted to the appellant who was involved in economic offences. It is profitable to reproduce the relevant paras 24 and 25 of the judgment for ready reference:- “24. In the instant case, as we have already noticed that the “pointing finger of accusation” against the appellants is “the seriousness of the charge”. The offences alleged are economic offences which have resulted in loss to the State exchequer. Though, they contend that there is possibility of the appellants tampering with the witnesses, they have not placed any material in support of the allegation. In our view, seriousness of the charge is, no doubt, one of the relevant considerations while considering bail applications but that is not the only test or the factor: the other factor that also requires to be taken note of is the punishment that could be imposed after trial and conviction, both under the Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act. Otherwise, if the former is the only test, we would not be balancing the constitutional rights but rather “recalibrating of the scales of justice.” “25. The provisions of Cr.P.C. confer discretionary jurisdiction on criminal courts to grant bail to accused pending trial or in appeal against convictions, since the jurisdiction is discretionary, it has to be exercised with great care and caution by balancing the valuable right of liberty of an individual and the interest of the society in general. In our view, the reasoning adopted by the learned District Judge, which is affirmed by the High Court, in our opinion, is a denial of the whole basis of our system of law and normal rule of bail system. It transcends respect for the requirement that a man shall be considered innocent until he is found guilty. If such power is recognized, then it may lead to chaotic situation and would jeopardize the personal liberty of an individual.” 16. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi, (2001) 4 SCC 280, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has laid down the special factors for taking into 15 Bail App 167/2025 consideration while exercising the bail jurisdiction and the relevant para 8 of the said judgment is reproduced as hereunder for ready reference:- “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of the evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.” 17. The observations of the Hon‟ble Apex Court laid down in State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21 at para 18 of the judgment also deserve a needful mention: “18. It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail [see Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)]. While a vague allegation that the accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may not be a ground to 16 Bail App 167/2025 refuse bail, if the accused is of such character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused.” 18. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Sanjay Chandra‟s case cited supra has inter alia held at para 40 of the judgment, “the grant or refusal to grant bail lies within the discretion of the Court. The grant or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. But at the same time, right to bail is not to be denied merely because of the sentiments of the community against the accused. The primary purposes of bail in a criminal case are to relieve the accused of imprisonment, to relieve the State of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to keep the accused constructively in the custody of the Court, whether before or after conviction, to assure that he will submit to the jurisdiction of the Court and be in attendance thereon, whenever his presence is required.” 19. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in its judgments cited as Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs. State of Maharastra decided on 02/12/2010, AIR 2011 SC 312 and Sushila Aggarwal and others vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another decided on January 29, 2020 by a larger bench 2020 SC online 98, has interpreted law on the subject of anticipatory bail with a very wide outlook and while interpreting the concept of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of our country in a flexible and broader sense. It has been inter alia observed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments that the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made. “The inner urge for freedom is a natural phenomenon of every human being. Respect for life and property is not merely a norm or a policy of the state but an essential requirement of any civilized society. Just as the liberty is precious to an individual, so is the society‟s interest in maintenance of peace, law and order.” 17 Bail App 167/2025 20. For the foregoing discussion, and without commenting on the merits of the case which obviously shall be the subject matter of final disposal of the trial case, petitioner-accused is admitted to bail in the instant case FIR bearing No. 85/2023 of Police Station Bijbehara, under Sections 8/21, 29 NDPS Act, and 3/181,146/196 of M.V. Act, subject to his furnishing surety and personal bonds to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- each (surety bond Rs. 1,00,000/- to be furnished by two sureties from amongst the relatives of the petitioner/accused, each liable to the extent of Rs. 50,000/-) respectively to the satisfaction of the learned trial court and the Superintendent of jail concerned. This order shall, however, be subject to the following conditions: a. Petitioner-accused shall remain punctual at the trial of the case. b. The Petitioner shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat, or compromise to any of unexamined prosecution witnesses so as to dissuade them from making their factual averments at the trial. c. Petitioner shall not leave the limits of UT of J&K without the prior permission of the learned trial court. d. Petitioner shall not repeat the commission of crime. e. In case the requisite surety bonds are furnished to the satisfaction of the learned trial court and duly attested, a formal release order shall be issued by learned trial court directing the release of the petitioner-accused from the place of his lodgment in the instant case FIR bearing No. 85/2023 of Police Station, Bijbehara subject to petitioner's furnishing of personal bond in the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the satisfaction of the Superintendent of jail concerned. 18 Bail App 167/2025 21. Learned trial court shall be competent to proceed against the petitioner-accused in terms of provisions of Sections 491 and 492 of the BNSS corresponding to Sections 446, 446-A of the Code in the event of violation of any bail conditions. 22. Disposed of. (MOHD YOUSUF WANI) JUDGE Jammu: 27.10.2025 “ayaz” Whether the order is speaking Yes/No Whether approved for reporting Yes/No