26.02.2025 Item No.05 Court No.11 Avijit Mitra WPLRT 20 of 2025 Debasish Dey - Versus – State of West Bengal & ors. Ms. Debjani Sengupta …for the petitioner Sk. Md. Galib, Ms. Prayamvada Singh ….for the State Mr. Anindya Lahiri Mr. Anish Chakraborty ….for the respondent no.5 Affidavit-of-service filed by the petitioner be kept on record. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 17th January 2025, passed by the learned Tribunal in MA No. 394 of 2023, which was filed in connection with an Original Application (in short, O.A.) No. 3636 of 2022 (LRTT). By that order, the application for condonation of delay, MA No. 394 of 2023, was dismissed on the grounds that 'the delay had not been sufficiently explained.' Ms. Sengupta, learned advocate representing the petitioner, submits that in the present case, the original owner of the land had constituted his father as his attorney to take all steps in connection with the OA filed challenging the order of the appellate authority passed under Section 54 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the '1955 Act'). She submits that the appeal was filed by the private respondents herein without impleading the petitioner as a party to the proceedings. The appeal was disposed of by an order dated 29th March 2022, directing the removal of the petitioner's vendor's name from the record of rights. She contends that the petitioner was unaware of the order dated 29th March 2022 and only came to know about it on 27th July 2022, when the private respondents disclosed the order in a collateral proceeding. Immediately thereafter, the petitioner instructed his father to file the original application, which was affirmed in August 2022. However, due to his father's illness, the application could not be filed until November 2022. She submits that there was no intentional delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the original application and that the delay was caused by circumstances beyond the petitioner's control. She asserts that the delay was sufficiently explained in the application for condonation of delay, and through a supplementary affidavit, all the medical documents concerning the petitioner’s father were brought to the attention of the learned Tribunal. However, the learned Tribunal overlooked these materials and submissions and arrived at an erroneous conclusion that the delay had not been properly explained, and consequently dismissed the application for condonation of delay Mr. Galib, learned Senior Government Advocate enters appearance on behalf of the State. Mr. Lahiri, learned senior advocate appearing for the respondent no.5 vehemently opposes such prayer of the petitioner. According to him, the delay had not been adequately 2 explained and as such, the learned Tribunal has rightly dismissed the application for condonation of delay. In support of his contention, he places reliance upon a judgment delivered in the case of H. Guruswamy & ors. Vs. A. Krishnaiah, since deceased by Lrs., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and considered the materials on record. Undeniably, the appeal was preferred under Section 54 of the 1955 Act without impleading the present petitioner, who is a person interested in the land in question, as a party to the proceedings. Therefore, the period of limitation in this case should begin from the date the petitioner gained knowledge of the order. The petitioner submits that such knowledge was acquired on 7th July 2022, when the fact was disclosed by the private respondent in a collateral proceeding. The record reveals that the petitioner filed two medical certificates to demonstrate that his father fell ill in two phases: from 14th July 2022 to 26th July 2022, and from 27th July 2022 to 26th October 2022. The record further shows that the original application was affirmed in August 2022, but due to the petitioner’s father's illness, it was not filed until November 2022. It is also important to note that prior to this period, the normal life of people was disrupted due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The law of limitation, which is grounded in public policy, originates from the maxim 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium,' meaning that it is for the general welfare that a period be set for litigation. Admittedly, in the interest of justice, there must be a lifespan for a specific remedy. Such a lifespan cannot be 3 expected to be timeless. However, the legislature did not incorporate such a provision in the Limitation Act with the intention of destroying the rights of the parties, but rather to ensure that a litigant or an aggrieved party takes steps to seek redress promptly and within a specific time period. In every case of delay, there may be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned, but that alone is not sufficient to reject their plea and shut the door on them. If the explanation does not appear to be mala fide, or if it is not found that the delay was caused by dilatory tactics intended to gain some wrongful advantage, then, as a rule, a liberal and justice-oriented approach should be adopted. A pragmatic approach should take precedence over technicalities. In the present case, the medical documents, which have not been disputed by any of the parties to the OA, show that the petitioner's attorney was ill from 14th July 2022 to 26th July 2022 and again from 27th July 2022 to 26th October 2022. The petitioner came to know about the order only on 27th July 2022 and instructed his father to file the OA. However, due to his father’s illness, the OA, although affirmed in August 2022, was not filed until November 2022. There is no dispute regarding the binding precedent of the decision cited by Mr. Lahiri. However, the same is distinguishable on facts. From the sequence of facts, it appears that the delay is neither mala fide nor intentional, and it cannot be said that the petitioner adopted dilatory tactics. In view of the above, and considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the 4 delay has been sufficiently explained by the petitioner. Therefore, we believe that the learned Tribunal should have condoned the delay. Accordingly, that the order passed by the learned Tribunal is set aside and the writ petition is revived to its original file and number. The learned Tribunal is directed to dispose of the original application on merits, as expeditiously as possible, without granting any unnecessary adjournment to either of the parties. With the above observations and directions, the writ petition is disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates for the parties. (Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.) (Tapabrata Chakraborty, J.) 5